Opinion

Santos

Court
District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed
Feb 3, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.4%

“By taking away the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis from prisoners who have struck out, the rule is ‘designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.’” (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)

How later courts described this case

  • “By taking away the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis from prisoners who have struck out, the rule is ‘designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.’” (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)
  • “A court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of inferior courts.” (citation and internal quotations marks omitted
  • noting the district court took “judicial notice of [the prisoner’s] status as a ‘three strikes’ litigant under the PLRA”
  • “[A] prisoner’s allegation that he faced imminent danger sometime in the past is . . . insufficient.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

NEDOLANDEZ SANTOS, )

AIS # 140896, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:26-CV-62-WKW

) [WO]

TINA TYLER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nedolandez Santos, an inmate in the custody of the Alabama

Department of Corrections (ADOC), filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint

against multiple Defendants. (Doc. # 1.) However, Plaintiff has filed at least three

federal lawsuits that have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to

state a claim, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is in imminent danger of

serious physical injury to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Hence, he was required to pay the $405.00 filing fee at the

time he initiated this action.1 Because he did not submit the $405.00 filing fee, this

action will be dismissed without prejudice under § 1915(g).

1 If a person is not granted in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the filing fee for a

non-habeas civil action includes a $350.00 statutory fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) and a $55.00

II. DISCUSSION

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) imposes specific restrictions on

civil rights lawsuits filed by inmates in federal court. One key restriction is known

as the “three strikes” provision, which states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in

a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3

or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

§ 1915(g). Section 1915(g)’s purpose is “to curtail abusive prisoner litigation.”

Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also Wells

v. Brown, 58 F.4th 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2023) (“By taking away the privilege of

proceeding in forma pauperis from prisoners who have struck out, the rule is

‘designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.’”

(quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)). Under this provision, if a

prisoner has three or more qualifying dismissals (“strikes”) and fails to pay the

required $405.00 fee at the time the new complaint is filed, the court must dismiss

the case without prejudice. See Dupree, 284 F.3d at 1236. As the Eleventh Circuit

explained in Dupree, the three-striker cannot cure such failure by paying the filing

fee after the complaint has been filed:

general administrative fee, as set forth in § 1914(b) and the District Court Miscellaneous Fee

Schedule established by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

We conclude that the proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss

the complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to the three strikes provision of

§ 1915(g). The prisoner cannot simply pay the filing fee after being

denied in forma pauperis status. He must pay the filing fee at the time

he initiates the suit.

Id.; accord Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiff has filed numerous civil actions in Alabama federal courts while

incarcerated and has accumulated at least three strikes under § 1915(g).2 See, e.g.,

Santos v. Hutto, No. 2:09-cv-135-TMH-TFM (M.D. Ala. filed Feb. 24, 2009)

(dismissed May 19, 2009, as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)); Santos v. Flemmings,

No. 2:09-cv-787-TMH-TFM (M.D. Ala. filed Aug. 20, 2009) (dismissed December

17, 2009, as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); and Santos v. Hale, No.

2:09-cv-1087-ID-TFM (M.D. Ala. filed Nov. 30, 2009) (dismissed January 19,

2010, as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). These dismissals place

2 Courts regularly take judicial notice of a prisoner’s litigation history in federal courts when

determining whether the prisoner has accrued three strikes under § 1915(g). See, e.g., Lloyd v.

Benton, 686 F.3d 1225, 1226 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting the district court took “judicial notice of [the

prisoner’s] status as a ‘three strikes’ litigant under the PLRA”); Lee v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2025

WL 1113423, at *1 & n.1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2025) (taking judicial notice of the prisoner’s prior

federal lawsuits to dismiss the action under the “three-strikes” rule); Burton v. Walker, 2025 WL

241115, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2025) (taking judicial notice of its own records to evaluate the

prisoner’s three-strikes status under § 1915(g)); see also United States v. Glover, 179 F.3d 1300,

1303 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of

inferior courts.” (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). Moreover, the final dispositions

of a prisoner’s prior federal lawsuits “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). The provided list of

Plaintiff’s “strikes” may not be exhaustive.

Plaintiff in violation of § 1915(g).3 Consequently, federal district courts in Alabama

have dismissed multiple subsequent civil actions filed by Plaintiff as barred by

§ 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision. See, e.g., Santos v. Mitchem, No. 2:10-cv-2057-

IPJ-PWG (N.D. Ala. filed July 28, 2010) (dismissed August 3, 2010, pursuant to

§ 1915(g)); Santos v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:11-cv-59-CG-M (S.D. Ala. filed

Feb. 3, 2011) (dismissed April 15, 2011, pursuant to § 1915(g)); Santos v. Mitchem,

No. 7:11-cv-2666-RDP-PWG (N.D. Ala. filed July 26, 2011) (dismissed July 28,

2011, pursuant to § 1915(g)); and Santos v. Lawson, No. 2:12-cv-621-TMH-TFM

(M.D. Ala. filed July 19, 2012) (dismissed August 29, 2012, pursuant to § 1915(g)).

Because Plaintiff has accrued three strikes under § 1915(g), he cannot proceed

in forma pauperis in this case. He was required to pay the $405.00 filing fee at the

time he initiated this action and did not do so. However, there is an exception to the

three-strikes rule: A three-striker can proceed in forma pauperis if he was “under

imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time he filed his complaint. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2021)

3 Plaintiff acknowledges that he has filed “previous law suit[s],” but it appears that he only admits

to two. (See Doc. # 1 at 1.) Contrary to his representation, Plaintiff has filed thirteen suits in the

Middle District of Alabama (including this one and a separate, pending suit: Santos v. Stallworth,

No. 2:26-cv-5-BL-JTA (M.D. Ala. filed Jan. 5, 2026)). Additionally, Plaintiff has been advised

previously by federal courts in at least four separate cases that he is subject to the three-strikes bar

under § 1915(g). Plaintiff is cautioned that his status as a pro se litigant does not excuse him from

the obligation to provide truthful and complete information regarding his litigation history and that

a failure to do so in future actions, following notice and an opportunity to respond, may serve as

an independent basis for dismissal of those actions as a sanction. See Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d

869, 875 (11th Cir. 2017).

(“To satisfy this exception, the prisoner must show he is in imminent danger ‘at the

time that he seeks to file his suit in district court . . . .’” (quoting Medberry v. Butler,

185 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 1999))). Allegations of past harm do not satisfy

the requirements of the statutory exception. Daker, 999 F.3d at 1311; see also

Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193 (“[A] prisoner’s allegation that he faced imminent

danger sometime in the past is . . . insufficient.”). Additionally, generalized

assertions, lacking “specific fact allegations” to demonstrate that serious physical

injury is imminent, are insufficient to trigger the exception under § 1915(g).

Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193; see also Daker, 999 F.3d at 1311 (holding that

“[g]eneral assertions . . . are ‘insufficient to invoke the exception to § 1915(g) absent

specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or of a pattern of

misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury’” (quoting

Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004))). In assessing whether a

prisoner has shown “imminent danger of serious physical injury” under § 1915(g),

the court considers the complaint, in its entirety, “construing it liberally and

accepting its allegations as true.” Daker, 999 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Brown, 387 F.3d

at 1350).

Plaintiff did not file an application to proceed in forma pauperis in this action,

but even if he had, his complaint as a whole fails to meet the exception to the three-

strikes provision under § 1915(g). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was

assaulted by multiple inmates while incarcerated at Elmore Correctional Facility.4

(Doc. # 1 at 4.) He claims he was “hit with a[] locker-box[] lock” and “punch[ed],”

and he “had to beat on [the] cubical door” for help as he was “bleed[ing].” He further

alleges that he was provided “no adequate treatment” and that correctional officers

were “making mockery face[s]” at him. (Id. at 4–5.) He also accuses the

correctional-officer Defendants of engaging in a “conspiracy, obstructing justice”

because they allegedly refused to retrieve the ceiling-camera footage from Plaintiff’s

assault. (Id. at 6.) He seeks $50,000 from each Defendant. (Id. at 9.)

The bulk of Plaintiff’s allegations are confusing and seemingly unrelated.

Thus, the allegations do not demonstrate that Plaintiff faced imminent danger of

serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint.5 Also, it appears that, since

the alleged assault and before filing this action, Plaintiff has been transferred to

Ventress Correctional Facility, further indicating that Plaintiff was not in imminent

danger at the time of filing. Accordingly, he does not meet the imminent-danger

exception to the three-strikes provision under § 1915(g), and this case will be

dismissed without prejudice.

4 It is unclear whether this alleged assault occurred on November 6, 2025 (Doc. # 1 at 2) or

February 6, 2025 (Doc. # 1 at 4).

5 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2009). Absent evidence to the contrary, the court must “assume that a prisoner delivered a

filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310,

1314 (11th Cir. 2014). It appears that Plaintiff signed and dated his complaint “1-22-26.” (See

Doc. # 1-1 at 2.)

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has filed at least three federal lawsuits while incarcerated that were

dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), and he has not shown that he was under imminent danger of serious

physical injury when he filed his complaint in this action. Therefore, Plaintiff was

required to pay the $405.00 filing fee at the time of filing his complaint but failed to

do so. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without

prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Final Judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 3rd day of February, 2026.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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