Rollins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DERRICK ROLLINS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-3099

)

STEVEN CAMPBELL et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court for screening is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983

by Plaintiff Derrick Rollins, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff also filed

Motions for Counsel (Docs. 4) and Status (Docs. 7, 9, 10).

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In

reviewing the Complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally

construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,

721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations at Graham Correctional Center against

Defendant Warden Steven Campbell and Corrections Officer Dale Vick.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Vick has engaged in a sustained campaign of

harassment against Plaintiff since July 24, 2022, such as pushing keys into Plaintiff’s back

while “verbally assaulting” him, grabbing Plaintiff’s groin and winking, following

Plaintiff and attempting to provoke him by calling Plaintiff a coward, and entering

Plaintiff’s cell while he was using the toilet. In support of his claim, Plaintiff has appended

grievances, complaining of harassment. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Campbell

ignored his pleas for assistance.

C. Analysis

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they treat inmates in a way

that is “motivated by a desire to harass or humiliate rather than by a legitimate

justification, such as the need for order and security in prisons.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d

889, 897 (7th Cir. 2015). “Even where prison officials can identify a valid penological

justification, their actions may still violate the Eighth Amendment if ‘conducted in a

harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain.’” Id. at 897

(quoting Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, “[a] prison guard

carrying out a prison security measure can violate the Eight Amendment in one of two

ways: by maliciously inflicting pain or injury, see Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th

Cir. 2012), or by performing some action that is ‘intended to humiliate the victim or

gratify the assailant’s sexual desires,’ Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir.

2012).” Gillis v. Pollard, 554 F. App’x 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim for harassment

against Defendant Vick. See Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 357 (7th Cir. 2015) (“To attempt to

draw a categorical distinction between verbal and physical harassment is arbitrary,” as

both physical and psychological pain can constitute cruel punishment.).

Plaintiff also states a claim against Defendant Campbell based on his assertion that

Campbell ignored his requests for assistance. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781–82

(7th Cir. 2015) (“An inmate’s correspondence to a prison administrator may . . . establish

a basis for personal liability under § 1983 where that correspondence provides sufficient

knowledge of a constitutional deprivation.”).

II. Counsel and Status

Plaintiff also moves for the Court’s assistance in recruiting counsel to represent

him. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court cannot require an

attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask

for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a

district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in

certain circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask

two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel

or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case,

does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654

(7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is denied because he has not satisfied his

threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically

requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.

Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 7, 9, 10) are moot with the entry of the Court’s

Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 7, 9, 10) are MOOT.

3) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff states Eighth Amendment harassment claims against

Defendants Campbell and Vick. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants proceeds

in their individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the

case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown

or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court recommends that Plaintiff

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise

directed by the Court.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.

Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not

filed their respective Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of

the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of

service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive deadlines.

6) If a defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity

for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be kept only by the Clerk and

shall not be kept in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

7) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends

the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all

defenses proper under the Federal Rules. The Answer and later pleadings shall

be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. An answer sets forth the

Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions

unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no response to the Answer

is necessary or will be considered.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents

that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does

not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses

are not filed with the Court. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests

and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses

sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the

subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’

counsel files an appearance and the Court enters a scheduling order, which will

provide more detailed information about the discovery process.

9) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of

a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this

lawsuit with prejudice.

11) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will

require Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

12) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

13) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED January 3, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE