Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WESTERN DIVISION

No. 5:25-CV-174-BO-BM

MATHESON & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, )

Plaintiff,

V. ORDER

WHITCOMB SELINSKY, PC,

Defendant. ;

This cause comes before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss [DE 10] for lack of

personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiff has responded in opposition

[DE 13] and defendant has replied [DE 14]. In this posture, the motion is ripe for ruling. For the

following reasons, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The parties are law firms both seeking to provide legal services to businesses operating in

the alcoholic beverage industry. Plaintiff asserts a claim for trademark infringement of its

registered mark “Beer Law Center.” Defendant marketed its services under the name “Beer Law

HQ.” Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The complaint contends that the Court “has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because,

on information and belief, Defendant has committed acts of infringement within this judicial

district.” [DE 1, 7]. “Further, [] this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant

under the North Carolina Long-Arm Statute N.C. Gen. Stat. §1-75.4, because, on information and

belief, the Defendant has transacted business in North Carolina and caused an injury in this state

by marketing their legal services using “Beer Law HQ” through its interactive website[.]” [DE 1,

8).

Defendant is a Colorado law firm whose connection to the state of North Carolina is limited

to its representation of North Carolina clients, its email correspondence with plaintiff prior to this

lawsuit, and its marketing efforts on its website that can be accessed from North Carolina. The

sole question before the Court is whether this is enough contact with North Carolina to establish

personal jurisdiction over defendant.

DISCUSSION

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal for lack of

personal jurisdiction. When personal jurisdiction has been challenged on the papers alone, the

plaintiff must make a prima facie case showing that personal jurisdiction exists, and a court

construes all facts and inferences in favor of finding jurisdiction. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673,

676 (4th Cir. 1989). A court may consider affidavits attached to a motion when determining

whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Grayson v.

Anderson, 816 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2016). “If the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed

factual questions the court may resolve the challenge on the basis of a separate evidentiary hearing,

or may defer ruling pending receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional question.”

Combs, 886 F.2d at 676.

“In federal question actions based on a statute that does not provide for nationwide

jurisdiction, a federal court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in the manner

consistent with state law.” Moseley v. Fillmore Co., 725 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (W.D.N.C. 2010).

The Lanham Act does not provide for nationwide jurisdiction. Red Hill Ranch, LLC v. Old S.

Carriage Co., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 3d 422, 424 (D.S.C. 2015).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction is lawful “if [1] such jurisdiction is authorized by the

long-arm statute of the state in which it sits and [2] the application of the long-arm statute is

consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Consulting Engineers Corp.

v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 2009). North Carolina’s long-arm statute is

coextensive with the due process clause. Christian Sci. Bd. of Directors of First Church of Christ,

Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, the Court must only decide whether

exercising personal jurisdiction over defendant would offend due process. /d.

Two types of personal jurisdiction are recognized: general and specific. Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). To satisfy

due process, a plaintiff asserting general jurisdiction must establish that the defendant’s

“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home

in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). “[T]he exercise of general jurisdiction

over a corporate defendant in a forum other than its state(s) of incorporation and principal place of

business is ‘exceptional[.]’” Ferraro v. Rodgers, No. 7:24-CV-833-FL, 2025 WL 1287982, at *4

(E.D.N.C. May 2, 2025) (quoting BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017)). Defendant is a

Colorado-based entity, and the fact that it represented a handful of North Carolina clients does not

support a finding of general jurisdiction. See also Fidrych v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124,

128-29, 134 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding no general personal jurisdiction even when defendant had

ninety locations in the state—albeit a small proportion of its nationwide presence-—and a website

tar geting resiclents).

“Specific jurisdiction . . . depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underly ng:

controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forurn State and isi

therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation, 564 U.S. at 919

(internal alterations, quotation, and citation omitted). The Court must analyze “(1) the extent to

which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State;

(2) whether the plaintiff[’s] claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether

the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.” UMG Recordings, Inc.

v. Kurbanov, 963 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2020).

Defendant does not maintain offices, employees, or agents in North Carolina. [DE 12, {]

7-9]. Defendant does not own any property or maintain any physical presence in North Carolina.

Id. at § 10. While defendant operates a website that is accessible in North Carolina, the website

does not offer any products for sale through its website or allow users to purchase or retain legal

services online. Jd. at § 23. A “generally accessible, semi-interactive Internet website” is not a

sufficient basis on which to find that defendants have directed activity into North Carolina.

Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc. , 334 F.3d 390, 401 (4th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff has identified two North Carolina entities to whom defendant rendered trademark

law services on three occasions. But because the representation of these clients has no relationship

to the present trademark dispute, they cannot support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. See

Ferraro, 2025 WL 1287982, at *4 (contacts with the forum that occurred “months before the

earliest events described in the complaint” and “have no connection whatsoever to the complaint”

did not support personal jurisdiction); see also Fidrych, 952 F.3d at 140 (explaining that the

contacts “have nothing to do with the claims asserted in this case and thus are not relevant to our

inquiry”).

Attached to plaintiff's complaint is the affidavit of Catherine Pearce. [DE 1-6]. Catherine

Pearce is a professional in the North Carolina craft brewing industry. Pearce, along with lawyers

from both the plaintiff and defendant law firms, attended a craft brewing conference and tradeshow

in Norfolk Virginia, and observed a seminar on trademark law presented by defendants. Pearce

explains in her affidavit that she was familiar with plaintiff's mark, Beer Law Center, and when

she saw defendant’s logo, Beer Law HQ, she assumed the two were related. Plaintiff points to this

confusion as an example of the present dispute’s effects on North Carolina brewers. However,

because this use of the Beer Law HQ logo occurred in Virginia, not North Carolina, it cannot

evidence defendant’s purposeful availment of North Carolina’s privileges and protections.

Plaintiff also contends that defendant, by corresponding with plaintiff about the trademark

dispute over email, reached into North Carolina such that the Court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over it. Plaintiff theorizes that defendant’s emailed promise to change its logo was

purposeful availment under the rule of ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d

707, 711 (4th Cir. 2002).

“[A] state may exercise judicial power over a person outside of the state when that

person (1) directs electronic activity into the state, (2) with the manifested intent of

engaging in business or other interactions with the state, and (3) that activity creates

in a person within the state, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's

courts.”

Id. at 714. This single email thread, however, does not establish purposeful availment. Defendant

cites several cases for the proposition that courts consistently find pre-litigation communications,

especially when limited to email, insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

Danzig Ltd. v. Inception Mining, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55972, at *9

(W.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2018) (recognizing that “the parties’ communications during

negotiations of the asset purchase are insufficierit to create specific personal

jurisdiction”); Pan-American Prods. & Holdings, LLC v. R.T.G. Furniture Corp.,

825 F. Supp. 2d 664, 682 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (recognizing that “the mere fact that

emails, telephone calls, and faxes were employed does not, of itself, alter the

minimum contacts analysis”); Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d

273, 281 (4th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “four brief emails, several telephone

conversations about NDA I, and the exchange of the various drafts,” coupled with

the exchange of a “choice of law provision” “do[es] not make out a prima facie

showing of a sufficient jurisdictional basis to survive challenge”).

[DE 14, p. 4].

There is insufficient evidence that defendants “reached into” North Carolina repeatedly in

order “to transact business.” CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts of India, 551 F.3d 285,

295 (4th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that defendant purposefully

availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in North Carolina.

A court need only consider the second and third inquiries if the defendant is found to have

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state. Consulting

Engineers Corp., 56\ F.3d at 278. However, plaintiffs fail to provide evidence that any of the three

representations by defendant of North Carolina clients form the basis of plaintiff's claims, and thus

the second factor further does not support a finding of personal jurisdiction.

Defendants have demonstrated that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. The

complaint must therefore be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss [DE 10] is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED, this 3 _ day of February 2026.

tis W BOYLE /

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JODGE