Patterson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ROLAND N. PATTERSON, JR.,

*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

* _ Civil No. 24-2812-BAH

LINDA H. LAMONEETAL.,

Defendants. .

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Roland N. Patterson, Jr. (“Patterson”) sues twenty-one individuals, including

current and former members of the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, former

‘Maryland Bar Counsel Lydia Lawless (“Lawless”) and Glenn Grossman (“Grossman”), and

former Deputy Bar Counsel Raymond Hein (“Hein”) (Lawless, Grossman, and Hein together

referred to as “Bar Counsel”) (collectively “Defendants”) alleging forty-seven! claims arising out

.of the denial of two of Patterson’s petitions to be reinstated to the Maryland bar. ECF 27 (amended

complaint)? Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF 43 (the “Motion”);

ECF 47 (amended memorandum of law). Patterson filed an opposition, ECF 31 (amended

opposition), and Defendants filed a reply, ECF 56. All filings include memoranda of law, and the

Motion includes an exhibit.? See ECF 22. The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds

! Though the counts in the amended complaint appear to only go to forty-five, counts twenty-one

‘and twenty-two are listed twice. See ECF 27, at 62-64.

2 The original complaint is docketed at ECF 1. .

3 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-

generated page numbers at the top of the page.

that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Accordingly, for the reasons

stated below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.

1. BACKGROUND □

A. Statutory Background .

This action arises from two of Patterson’s petitions to be reinstated to the Maryland bar

after an indefinite disciplinary suspension. See ECF 27, at 9{7. Maryland Rule 19-702 establishes

the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), which “consist[s] of 12

members appointed by the Supreme Court [of-Maryland].” Md. Rule 19-702(a). The Commission

is tasked with, infer alia, appointing and supervising Bar Counsel, as well as exercising its

authority to discipline attorneys who violate the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. See

id. (h). Bar Counsel is appointed by the Commission and has the duty to, as relevant here,

“investigate professional misconduct,” “issue subpoenas,” “prosecute all disciplinary and remedial

proceedings,” “investigate petitions for reinstatement ... and represent the Commission in those

-proceedings.” Md. Rule 19-703(b)(1)}{3), (7).

Where, as here, an attorney seeks to be reinstated after a suspension exceeding six months,

the suspended attorney, must “file a verified petition for reinstatement with the Clerk of the

- Supreme Court ... The attorney shall be the petitioner. Bar Counsel shall be the respondent.”

Md. Rule 19-752(c). In addition to providing “facts establishing the attorney’s subsequent conduct

and reformation,” the petitioning attorney must also provide certain information to Bar Counsel’

including details of his or her previous employment, any pending civil or criminal actions, details

of the attorney’s income during the period of discipline, and income tax returns. Jd. (d)(2). Bar

Counsel then must respond to the petition. Jd. (e)(1). “[U]pon review of the petition and Bar:

4 Accordingly, Patterson’s request for a hearing on the Motion, ECF 58, is DENIED.

Counsel’s response, the [Supreme] Court may ... without a hearing, dismiss the petition[.]” Jd.

(HC).

B. ‘Factual Background

Patterson became “licensed to practice law in Maryland in May [of] 1987.” ECF 27, at 9

. In 2011, his license was suspended indefinitely with the right to request readmission after six

months.’ Id. at 10 § 10; see also Att’y Grievance Comm. of Md. v. Patterson, 28 A.3d 1196 (Md.

2011).° In May of 2012, Patterson applied for reinstatement of his license. ECF 27, at 11 § 11.

Grossman and Hein objected to Patterson’s reinstatement petition for a number of reasons,

including that Patterson allegedly submitted a fraudulently written character reference with his

petition, id. at 13 § 24, failed to timely withdraw representation of clients after his suspension, id.

at 18 46, failed to file a notice of his employment at a law firm as required by the Maryland

Rules, id. at 19 § 52, and failed to disclose traffic citations, id. at 19-209 55. The Supreme Court

of Maryland heard argument on Patterson’s 2012 petition but did not hold a testimonial hearing,

id. at 21 959, and his petition was subsequently denied based on Bar Counsel’s objections. Jd. at

15 933.

In 2021, Patterson filed another reinstatement petition, id, at 24 9 71, to which Lawless

objected due to several income and tax-related issues, see @.g., id. at 28 § 89, at 29 J 93, at 30-31

101, at 33-34 109. Lawless also requested certain of Patterson’s medical records, id. at □□

74, which Patterson attempted to exclude from disclosure by filing a writ of mandamus with the

> Patterson indicates he is not challenging the 2011 suspension. ECF 27, at 10 § 10.

© See Torkornoo v. Helwig, Civ. No. TDC-15-2652, 2017 WL 4898260, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Oct. 27,

2017) (taking judicial notice of rulings in a state court case (citing Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp.,

572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that a court may take judicial notice of matters of public

record))), aff'd, 723 F. App’x 198 (4th Cir. 2018). -

□

Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied, id. at 26-27 4 84-85.: Patterson alleges

that Lawless unjustifiably cited his opposition to the disclosure of his medical records as a basis

for objecting to his 2021 reinstatement petition. Jd at 28 J 90. Patterson’s petition for

reinstatement was again denied by the Supreme Court of Maryland, allegedly without any hearing.

Id. at 98 7 352, at 99-100 7 362(C).

In the order denying the 2021 petition,’ the Supreme Court of Maryland cited Bar

Counsel’s objections as justification for dismissal of Patterson’s 2021 reinstatement petition,

including that Patterson “fail[ed] to provide.information and copies of filed tax returns for the

years subsequent to his suspension, . . . fail[ed] to provide adequate information concerning his

employers during the period of discipline, . . . fail[ed] to provide information concerning the source

and amount of his monthly income,” engaged in “unauthorized practice of law during the period

of suspension,” and “submi[tted] a fraudulent character letter in connection with his initial Petition

for Reinstatement.” ECF 43-2, at 2-3.

Patterson brings forty-seven claims against Commission members and Bar Counsel

including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging the violation of Patterson’s due process and equal

protection rights, a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, and additional claims under Maryland state law. ECF’

27, at 49-98 9] 179-357.8 Patterson seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees,

7 The order is attached to the Motion as an exhibit. See ECF 43-2. “In reviewing a motion to

dismiss, courts may consider documents referenced or relied upon in the complaint.” Medispec,

Ltd. v. Chouinard, 133 F. Supp. 3d 771, 772.n.1 (D. Md, 2015) (citing Abelman v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., 976 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 n.1 (D. Md. 2013)). Because the order is referenced in

Patterson’s complaint, and no party disputes its authenticity, the Court considers it. See, e.g., ECF

_ 27, at 78 § 263 (“The Maryland Supreme Court referred generally to this objection by Defendants.

at Premise Two of its Order, issued October 26", 2021.”).

® The Court observes that the nature of several of Patterson’s claims is unclear, as the amended .

complaint lists counts merely labeled as “MALICE,” ¢.g,, ECF 27, at 61 J 213, while others

4 .

and declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. at 99-100. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

Patterson’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), ECF 43,

-which is now ripe for resolution.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint for

alack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Pruitt v. Resurgent Cap. Servs., LP, 610 F. Supp. 3d 775,

779 (D. Md. 2022) (explaining that motions to dismiss for lack of standing are considered under

Rule 12(b)(1)). “Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are properly granted

where aclaim fails to allege facts upon which the court may base jurisdiction.” Davis v. Thompson,

367 F. Supp. 24 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005) (citing Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F.Supp. 676, 679 (D. Md.

1996)). In deciding whether a complaint alleges facts sufficiemt to support subject matter

jurisdiction, the Court assumes the truthfulness of the facts alleged] Kerns v. United States, 585

F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs dismissal for failure to “state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” In considering a motion-under this rule, courts discount legal

conclusions stated in the complaint and “accept as true all of the fagtual allegations contained in

the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Asheroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009). A court then draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and

considers whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief on its face. Nemet Chevrolet,

Ltd, v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,.253 (4th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

‘inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

collectively list various statutes, cases, and Constitutional Articles together as the basis for an

individual claim, ¢.g., id. at 77 7260.

sg

“The complaint must offer ‘more than labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action[.]’” Swaso v. Onslow Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App’x 745, 747

(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). At the same time,,.

a “complaint will not be dismissed as long as [it] provides sufficient detail about [the plaintiff's]

claim to show that [the plaintiff] has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.”

Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off, 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014).

Ill. ANALYSIS

Defendants assert Eleventh Amendment, prosecutorial, and state personnel immunity. See

ECF 47, at 11-21. Defendants also argue that Patterson’s claims are time-barred and that he has

failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd. at 21-24. As explained below, Patterson’s claims

will be dismissed because Defendants enjoy Eleventh Amendment and prosecutorial immunity.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity .

Defendants first argue that Patterson’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

ECF 47, at 11-15. An “Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis turns on whether the Defendants

are sued in their individual or official capacities.” Mitchell y. Stump, Civ. No. PX-17-2056, 2018

WL 4468855, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2018). Patterson asserts claims against Defendants in both

their official and individual capacities. See ECF 27, at 16, The Court first analyzes the viability

of Patterson’s official capacity claims and then turns to his individual capacity claims.

Ll. Official Capacity Claims

Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state and its agencies

and departments are immune from suits in federal court absent state consent or Congressional

action. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims:

against state officials acting in their official capacities are also subject to Eleventh Amendment

immunity because a suit against the state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state itself. See

;

Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). While the State of Maryland has waived its

sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought in its courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t

§ 12-201 (a), it has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court. “A State’s constitutional

interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.”

Halderman, 465 U.S. at 99 (emphasis in original). —

“(T]he Attorney Grievance Commission is an arm of the state of Maryland.” Kramer v.

Grossman, Civ. No. ELH-13-1745, 2014 WL 937146, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2014) (citing

_ Muhammad v. Maryland Court of Appeals, Civ. No. CCB-06-3444, 2008 WL 398246, at * 1 (D.

Md. Feb. 8, 2008)). Defendants contend, and Patterson does not dispute,’ that members of the

Commission and Bar Counsel are state officials for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Compare ECF 47, at 13 (“Defendants are agents of the state.”), with ECF 51-1, at 11 (“[I]t is

necessary for the named defendants to be sued here in both their official and personal capacities.”).

Patterson’s official capacity claims are thus barred under the Eleventh Amendment unless they fall

under the Ex parte Young exception.

“(T]he Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity remains generally

available to a plaintiff who seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against a state

official for an ongoing violation of federal law.”"° TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 204 (4th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004).

‘However, “[j]ust because a private citizen’s federal suit seeks declaratory injunctive relief against □

failing to respond to this argument[,] Plaintiff concedes the point.” Stenlund v. Marriott Int 1,

Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 874, 887 (D. Md. 2016).

10 The Ex parte Young exception rests on the notion “that a State officer who acts in violation of

the Constitution is ‘stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person

to the consequences of his individual conduct.’”” Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir.

2002) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).

State officials does not mean that it must automatically be allowed to proceed under an exception

to the Eleventh Amendment protection.” Bell Atl. Md, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279,

294 (4th Cir. 2001). To determine if this exception applies, courts consider “whether □□□□□□

complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as

prospective.” Biggs v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 242 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). This is a.

“straightforward inquiry” and “does not include an analysis of the merits of the claim.” Verizon

Ma, Inc., 535 U.S. at 646.

Here, Patterson asserts that his federal official capacity claims survive because of the Ex.

parte Young exception, see ECF 51-1, at 11, but the requested declaratory and injunctive relief in

the amended complaint fail to trigger that exception. First, Patterson’s requests for declarations

that Md. Rule 19-752(0(2)(A) and “the structure of Maryland [a]ttorney [d]iscipline” are both

“unconstitutional as violative of Due Process and Equal Protection,” fail because he does not seek

relief based on any allegedly unconstitutional acts of individual state officials. See ECF 27, at 99.

“The Ex Parte Young exception only permits actions against state officials, not the State itself or

its instrumentalities.” MediGrow, LLC y. Natalie M. LaPrade Med. Cannabis Comm’n, 487 F.

Supp. 3d 364, 373 (D. Md. 2020). Here, Patterson seeks relief against the Commission, if not the

State itself, and thus fails to implicate the Ex parte Young exception. Cf id. (finding the Ex parte

Young exception inapplicable where the plaintiff sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of

acts by the state Medical Cannabis Commission and not individual state officials).

Plaintiff's request for declarations that the “denial of his 2012 and 2021 reinstatement

petitions were unconstitutional” and reinstatement of his “right to practice law before The United

. .

States District Court for [t]he District of Maryland”! likewise fail to trigger the exception because

Patterson seeks to retrospectively redress past state actions. See ECF 27, at 99-100. This type of

“backwards-looking” relief is not implicated by Ex parte Young and remains barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. See Howell v. Hogan, Civ. No. SAG-22-0408, 2022 WL 17812641, at *3

(D. Md. Dec. 19, 2022) (noting that the Ex parte Young exception is inapplicable when a Plaintiff

“seeks a declaration relating to past state actions”). Patterson also fails to tailor his other requests

for injunctive relief to any allegedly ongoing constitutional violations. See ECF 27, at 100

(demanding that Bar Counsel refrain from “represent[ing] themselves in future proceedings on the

[r]einstatement of [Patterson]” and that Defendants negotiate with the Governor and the legislature

‘on “how Maryland [a]ttorney licensure and regulation may be best moved from the judicial to the

executive branch”); see also MediGrow, LLC, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 374 (finding request for

injunctive relief that was “not tailored to any purported constitutional violation” failed to trigger

‘the Ex parte Young exception). Accordingly, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to

Patterson’s requests for relief, and his official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

11 Admission to the bar of this Court is predicated on an attorney’s good standing as a member of

a state bar. See Loc. R. 701.1(a) (D. Md. 2025). When an attomey is indefinitely suspended from

a state bar, this Court imposes “identical discipline.” See id. 705.3(d). An attorney that has been

indefinitely suspended “may only apply for reinstatement” to the bar of this Court “upon proof

that the attorney has been reinstated by the court in which the attorney was disciplined.” Id.

705.4(b). In other words, Patterson cannot apply for reinstatement to the bar of this Court unless

and until he is reinstated to the Maryland bar. To the extent Patterson asks this Court to order his

reinstatement to the Maryland bar so he can then seek to be reinstated to the federal bar, this remedy

would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits this Court from “exercising

appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463

(2006); see also Czura v. Supreme Ct. of S.C., 813 F.2d 644, 646 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that an

“attack[ on] the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court permanently disbarring [a plaintiff]

from the practice of law” was “properly dismissed under [District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 (1983)]”).

Oo

2. ADA Claims

Patterson asserts that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to “Counts 35 and

because he raises claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). ECF 51-1, at

11. “Title II of the ADA properly abrogates sovereign immunity as provided by the Eleventh

Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Dee v. Maryland Nat. Capitol Park & Plan.

Comm'n, Civ. No. CBD-09-491, 2010 WL 3245332, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2010) (citing United

States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006)). “[I]nsofar as Title II creates a private cause of

action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment,

Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159 (emphasis in:

original); see also Burnett v. Maryland Dep’t of Lab., Civ. No. MJIM-24-3718, 2025 WL 2720147,

at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2025) (“[A] state government’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit

in federal court is abrogated under Title II of the ADA insofar as the conduct alleged to violate.

Title II ‘actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment’ of the U.S. Constitution.”) (quoting

Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 280 (4th Cir. 2020)). To determine whether Eleventh

Amendment immunity applies, courts must determine “on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which.

aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also

violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did

not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign

immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. As such,

“[t]he first step of the Georgia inquiry requires the district court to assess whether Defendants’

alleged conduct ‘forms the basis for a Title II claim.’” Holly Hill Nursing LLC v. Padilla, Civ.

The Court notes that Counts labeled thirty-three and thirty-four of the amended complaint

mention the ADA. ECF 27, at 75-77 246-259. Patterson indicates the claims were “mis-

numbered.” ECF 55-1, at 5.

0 .

No. PWG-17-3554, 2018 WL 5013826, at *8 (D. Md, Oct. 16, 2018) (quoting Bowers v. □□□□□

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” -42 U.S.C. §

12132. To establish a violation of Title IJ, Patterson must show that “(1) [he] ha[s] a disability;

‘(2) [he is] otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity; and

(3) [he was] denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated

against, on the basis of [his] disability.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503

‘(4th Cir. 2016). “A failure to make reasonable accommodations may constitute discrimination

under Title II.” Holly Hill Nursing, 2018 WL 5013826, at *8 (citing Lamone, 813 F.3d at 503

n.5).

Patterson’s purported ADA claims falter at the first step of the Georgia inquiry as he fails

to allege any violation of Title I]. Although Patterson alleges he has a disability, see ECF 27, at

24 4 75 (‘Plaintiff has a diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis”), he does not allege that any of the

defendants engaged in discriminatory conduct on the basis of his disability. Instead, he merely

mentions the ADA in two counts related to Lawless’ request for his medical records. See, ¢.g.,

ECF 27, at 76 J 252 (“This thinking violated the reasonable accommodations rationale” of the

ADA), at 77 § 258 (“Defendants’ efforts to obtain Plaintiff's medical records, in spite of [t]he

ADA... affected the Liberty Interest of Plaintiff to pursue the private practice of law”). Patterson

also states that “[t]he ADA calls for ‘reasonable accommodations’ to be provided in cases of

disclosed disabilities,” but he does not allege that he requested or was denied any accommodations

in violation of the ADA. Jd. at 25 ]76. Patterson does not otherwise allege any discrimination on

11

the basis of his disability, nor does he allege that either of his reinstatement petitions were denied

because of his disability... Accordingly, Patterson fails to overcome Eleventh Amendment

immunity because he does not sufficiently plead a claim under the ADA.!4 Cf Holly Hill Nursing,

2018 WL 5013826, at *7-9 (finding that plaintiffs disability discrimination claims were not

sufficiently pled to overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity where plaintiffs “assert[ed] broadly

that state officials discriminated”); Burnett, 2025 WL 2720147, at *8 (Eleventh Amendment

immunity applied where the plaintiff “allege[d] no facts to suggest any discriminatory conduct by

Defendant or conduct by Defendant that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

3, Individual Capacity Claims

Patterson asserts that his claims survive the Eleventh Amendment because he has also sued

Defendants “in their personal .. . capacities.” ECF 51-1, at 8. Defendants argue that Patterson’s

“mere incantation of the term ‘individual capacity’” fails to “transform an official capacity action’

into an individual capacity action,” specifically because Patterson “has made no allegations

wherein [Defendants’] actions can be conceived as performed in their individual capacity.” ECF

47, at 13-14 (quoting Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2018)).

“When defendants are sued in their individual capacities, ... they are not immune to suit

under the Eleventh Amendment.” Mitchell, 2018 WL 4468855, at *3 (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 22 (1991)). “Ifa complaint specifically alleges a capacity in which the defendant is being.

'3 Such threadbare allegations would also be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), as Patterson

fails to plead sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

[Defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

'4 Patterson likewise fails to allege any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, since “the right to

pursue one’s chosen profession or common calling is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Oliver v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 312 F. Supp. 3d 515, 529 (E.D.

Va. 2018). But the Court need not reach this issue as the Georgia inquiry ends at the first step

because Patterson fails to state a claim under the ADA. .

12

‘sued, that designation controls.” Harvey v. Cline, No. CV 15-14091, 2016 WL 1562950, at *4

(8.D.W. Va. Apr. 18, 2016) (citing Amos v. Md. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Sves, 126 F.3d 589,

608 (4th Cir. 1997)). However, in a personal capacity suit, “individual liability must be based on

‘personal conduct.” Robinson vy, Bd. of Educ. of Washington Cnty., Civ. No. ELH-22-1102, 2023

WL 6643373, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2023) (citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir.

1985)). Here, the amended complaint lacks allegations of individual action by any of the named

‘defendants other than Lawless, Grossman, and Hein. With respect to the Commission member

defendants, Patterson broadly refers to them as “Defendants 2012 Grievance Commissioners,”

“Defendants 2021 Grievance Commissioners,” or just “Defendants” in asserting his claims. See,

ECF 27, at 11, 23. Patterson otherwise fails to allege any conduct by any of the members of

the Commission and thus does not plead “sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to

each defendant.” Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Jgbal, 556 U.S,

at 676 (emphasis in original)); see also Heym v. APG Hous., LLC, Civ. No. JRR-23-2092, 2024

WL 2302306, at *3 (D. Md. May 21, 2024) (“A pleading cannot simply ‘lump[ ] [Defendants]

together in the complaint without sufficient detail,’ or further without ‘alleging any facts specific

to each entity.’”) (quoting Wormack v. Caesars Baltimore Mgmt. Co., LLC, Civ. No. SAG-22-

01108, 2022 WL 2668183, at *5 (D. Md. July 11, 2022)). As Patterson has failed to state a claim

against them, individual capacity suits against the eighteen current and former members of the

Attorney Grievance Commission may not lie, See Love v. Hogan, No. 22-1928, 2025 WL 763473,

at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025) (finding the district court properly dismissed personal capacity

claims where the plaintiff “did not plead specific, individualized allegations against any

Defendant” and “[i]nstead[ ] used ‘Defendants’ throughout his complaint”).

192

Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, does not apply to the individual capacity claims

against Lawless, Grossman, and Hein because Patterson specifies that they are sued in their

personal capacities and has made definitive allegations against them. For example, Patterson

pleads that “Lawless personally handled the investigation and pleadings which caused the

unconstitutional denial of the 2021 Reinstatement Petition,” Grossman “personally oversaw the

processing and decisions which resulted in the unconstitutional dental of the 2012 Reinstatement

Petition,” and “Hein was the Assistant Bar Counsel assigned to the 2012 Reinstatement Petition,”

ECF 27, at 8-9 {fj 4~6; see also e.g., id. at 14 | 28 (‘Grossman and Hein caused [the Supreme

Court of Maryland] to believe that the character reference was signed.”), at 55-56 4 200 (“Lawless

accused Plaintiff of ‘willfully’ not paying his taxes and purposely filing his taxes late during the

years between 2011 and 2021.”), As such, Lawless, Grossman, and Hein do not enjoy Eleventh

Amendment immunity with respect to Patterson’s personal capacity claims against them.

B. Prosecutorial Immunity

Nevertheless, as Defendants contend, Lawless, Grossman, and Hein are entitled to

prosecutorial immunity. “[A]bsolute immunity protects a ‘prosecutor when serving as an advocate

in judictal proceedings, ’ including for ‘acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the

initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an

advocate for the State[.]’” Mathis v. McDonough, Civ. No. ELH-13-2597, 2014 WL 3894133, at’

*11(D. Md. Aug. 7, 2014) (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997)). A prosecutor’s

absolute immunity when performing advocative functions is designed to protect the judicial

process. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US. 409, 427-28 (1976) (providing that qualifying a:

prosecutor’s immunity would “prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s

duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system”); Kalina, 522 U.S.

at 125-26. Thus, the relevant inquiry to determine whether a prosecutor’s actions are protected.

14

‘by absolute immunity is whether the actions at issue are closely associated with judicial process.

See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 (1991) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). Courts must use a

“functional approach” to “determine whether a particular act is ‘intimately associated with the

Judicial phase.’” Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 118 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jmbler, 424 U.S. at

430). In applying this functional approach, courts in the Fourth Circuit consider only ““the nature

of the function performed,’ without regard to ‘the identity of the actor who performed it,’ “the

harm that the conduct may have caused,’ or even ‘the question whether it was lawful.” Jd.

(quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 271 (1993)).

“(T]he Fourth Circuit and district courts within this Circuit have extended absolute

immunity outside the context of traditional criminal prosecutions.” Mathis, 2014 WL 3894133, at

*13 (first citing Pak v. Ridgell, Civ. No. RDB-10-01421, 2011 WL 3320197, at *7 (D. Md. Aug.

1, 2011) (concluding that “bar counsel prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity for conduct

performed in a judicial capacity”); then citing Hunter v. Virginia State Bar, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1107,

1112 (E.D. Va. 2011) (extending prosecutorial immunity to an assistant bar counsel); and then

citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)). “Courts that have considered the

issue have extended prosecutorial immunity to prosecutorial disciplinary counsel or bar counsel,

as well.” Whitner v. Coggiola, No. CA 3:12-1876-CMC-JDA, 2012 WL 4051121, at *4 (D.S.C.

Aug. 21, 2012) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 3:12-1876-CMC-

JDA, 2012 WL 4051185 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2012), aff'd, 508 F. App’x 195 (4th Cir. 2013); Pak,

2011 WL 3320197, at *6.

Judge Bennett’s decision in Pak v. Ridgell squarely addresses prosecutorial immunity for

Bar Counsel, see Civ. No, RDB-10-01421, 2011 WL 3320197 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2011), aff'd sub

nom. Hekyong Pak v. Ridgell, 476 F. App’x 750 (4th Cir. 2012), and the Court finds it instructive

14 :

here. In Pak, the Court found that “[ijn light of the persuasive authority in other Circuits,

analogous cases in the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding.

prosecutorial immunity... bar counsel prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity for conduct

performed in a judicial capacity.” Pak, 2011 WL 3320197, at *7, Accordingly, the defendant,

Assistant Bar Counsel, enjoyed prosecutorial immunity for appearing not only in front of the,

Supreme Court of Maryland with respect to the plaintiff attorney’s disbarment, but also before an

informal Peer Review Panel on the same issue. Jd. While it was clear to the Court that Assistant

Bar Counsel had immunity while “acting in an official capacity in a courtroom proceeding,” it

reasoned that immunity also applied in the informal peer review context because the Peer Review

Panel occurred after investigation, and “bar counsel clearly acts as an advocate in front of the Peer

Review Panel . . . intend[ing] to persuade the Panel to recommend further disciplinary action.” Jd.

at *8. Moreover, Judge Bennett noted that “affording bar counsel absolute immunity for conduct

in judicial proceedings serves an important interest” of ““protect[ing] the public by determining a

lawyer’s fitness to practice law.’” Jd, (quoting Altorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland y.

Collins, 457 A.2d 1134; 1142 (Md. 1983)).

Here, Defendants assert that prosecutorial immunity applies because the “actions alleged

in the amended complaint occurred during the investigatory and reinstatement proceedings and...

were intimately ‘associated with the judicial process.’” ECF 47, at 18. The Court agrees, at least

with respect to Bar Counsel. First, Patterson’s claims regarding his 2012 petition arise out of Bar

Counsel’s various objections to his reinstatement, all of which were argued ina hearing in front of

the Supreme Court of Maryland. See ECF 27, at 21 4 59 (alleging that “arguments were heard in

court” on the 2012 reinstatement petition). Also, as in Pak, Bar Counsel’s appearance in court

plainly qualities as “conduct performed in a judicial capacity,” as Bar Counsel were “acting in an

. 16

official capacity in a courtroom proceeding.” See Pak, 2011 WL 3320197, at *7 (finding it “clear

that [Assistant Bar Counsel] has immunity for her conduct in both the evidentiary hearing in the

Circuit Court for Baltimore County and in the Court of Appeals of Maryland” because she was

“acting in an official capacity in a courtroom proceeding”). As such, Bar Counsel enjoys

prosecutorial immunity for the alleged acts relating to the 2012 reinstatement petition.

Patterson asserts that prosecutorial immunity does not apply to Bar Counsel’s conduct

related to the 2021 reinstatement petition because Lawless did not appear in front of the Supreme

Court of Maryland, and thus, Bar Counsel “only acted as investigators in this case.” ECF 51-1, at

14. This argument is unavailing. Patterson cites no case law for the proposition that prosecutorial

immunity attaches only when there is a court proceeding. Indeed, the general rule is that “acts

undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and

which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of

absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added); cf Hunter, 786 F. Supp. 2d at

1 112 (finding that Virginia assistant bar counsel enjoyed prosecutorial immunity where she had

only initiated disciplinary proceedings against an attorney, before a hearing was held). Here, the

allegations reflect Bar Counsel’s allegedly unlawful acts in 2021 were all undertaken in the course

of their role as advocates and were related to the preparation for and presentment of objections to

the Supreme Court of Maryland regarding Patterson’s petition for reinstatement. See e.g., ECF

27, at 55 J 198 (alleging that Bar Counsel required Patterson to supply his medical records and

‘objected to his reinstatement on the ground that he refused to disclose his records); at J 199

(“Lawless required [Patterson] to answer 16 questions as part of their investigation of [t]he 2021

[r]einstatement [p]etition); at 56 | 200 (“Lawless accused [Patterson] of ‘willfully’ not paying his

‘taxes ... in the formal. objections” presented to the Supreme Court). As in in Pak, Bar Counsel

17

“clearly act[ed] as an advocate” in, presenting their objections to the Supreme Court of Maryland,

“intend[ing] to persuade” the Court to deny Patterson’s petition. Pak, 2011 WL 3320197, at □□□□

Assuming all of Patterson’s allegations to be true, the Court nonetheless finds that Lawless,

Grossman, and Hein, in their roles as Bar Counsel, are protected by prosecutorial immunity for

actions taken with respect to Patterson’s petitions. As such, all individual capacity claims against’

them are dismissed. The Court need not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments.

Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF 43, is GRANTED.

A separate implementing order will issue.

Dated: February 3, 2026 [s/

□ Brendan A. Hurson

United States District Judge

15 The Court notes that all of Patterson’s claims arising from his 2012 petition for reinstatement’

are also subject to dismissal because they are time barred. “The statute of limitations for § 1983

claims is borrowed from the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury actions,

even when a plaintiff's particular § 1983 claim does not involve personal injury.” Deramus v.

Montgomery Cnty. Domestic Rels. Section, Civ. No. GJH-18-2337, 2019 WL 2395311, at #2 (D.

Md. June 5, 2019) (quoting Tommy Davis Const., Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth., 807 F.3d 62,

66-67 (4th Cir. 2015)). “In Maryland, the applicable statute of limitations is three years from the.

date of the occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.” Jd. (quoting Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 5-101). Generally, a “statute of limitations begins to run ‘when the plaintiff possesses

sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.””

Id. (quoting Nassim v. Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995)). Here, Patterson had

sufficient knowledge of the alleged facts forming the basis for his claims related to his 2012

reinstatement petition at the moment his petition was denied, which was twelve years before he.

filed his complaint. See ECF 43-2, at 2.