CORDELL SANDERS v. CARTER et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

CORDELL SANDERS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-01373-SEM

)

CARTER et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court are Motions to Reinstate Case (Doc. 5), for

Reconsideration (Doc. 6), for Hearing (Doc. 7), and for Status (Doc.

8) filed by Plaintiff Cordell Sanders, a prisoner at Menard

Correctional Center (“Menard”).

For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Case

(Doc. 5) is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reopen

Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration (Doc. 6),

Hearing (Doc. 7), and Status (Doc. 8) are MOOT. Plaintiff’s

Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a federal claim

on which relief may be granted, but Plaintiff has thirty days from

the entry of the Court’s Order to file a Motion for Leave to File an

Amended Complaint that complies with the Court’s guidance.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Filing in the Southern District of Illinois

On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois,

alleging that officials at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”)

violated his constitutional rights. On the date of his filing, Plaintiff

was incarcerated at Menard. (Id. at 4.) See Sanders v. Carter, case

No. 25-01755 (S.D. Ill.).

On September 9, 2025, the Southern District Court directed

Plaintiff to either pay the $405 filing fee or file a petition to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Id. at Doc. 3.) Two days later, the

Southern District transferred Plaintiff’s case to the Central District

Court. (Id. at Doc. 4.) On September 22, 2025, the Southern District

recorded Plaintiff’s payment of $405 in case No. 25-01755.

Plaintiff’s transferred case was docketed as Central District

Court case No. 25-1390 and assigned to District Court Judge

Michael M. Mihm. On September 15, 2025, Judge Mihm entered the

following order:

On 9/15/2025, this case was transferred to

the Central District of Illinois from the

Southern District of Illinois. (See Sanders v.

Carter, et al., SDIL Case No. 25-01755).

Plaintiff’s Complaint 1 is identical to the

Complaint he filed in this Court on 9/8/2025

in Sanders v. Carter, et al., CDIL Case No. 25-

1373, which is currently pending before Judge

Sue E. Myerscough. It appears that Plaintiff

mailed identical complaints to the Southern

District of Illinois and the Central District of

Illinois. Therefore, the Clerk is directed to close

this case, as it is duplicative of Case No. 25-

1373. No judgment needs to be entered. No

filing fee is assessed.

Id.

On November 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider

in case No. 25-1390, which the district court denied on the same

grounds noted in its September 15, 2025, Order.

B. Plaintiff’s Filing in the Instant Case

On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) in

the Central District of Illinois, alleging that several correctional

officers at Pontiac violated his constitutional rights. (Pl. Compl.,

Doc. 1.)

The same day Plaintiff filed his pleading, the Court sent

Plaintiff a Notice of Case Opening (Doc. 2) and entered a separate

Order, directing the following:

Plaintiff has filed a Complaint but has not paid

the $405 filing fee nor filed a petition to

proceed [IFP]. Within 21 days of the entry of

this order, Plaintiff must pay the $405 filing

fee in full or file a petition to proceed [IFP] with

attached trust fund ledgers for the last 6

months. Failure to comply without good cause

will result in dismissal of this case without

prejudice, and the Plaintiff will still be

responsible for payment of the filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1914. The Clerk is directed to

send Plaintiff the forms for proceeding [IFP].

See September 8, 2025, Text Order. In accordance with the Court’s

instructions, the Clerk of the Court sent Plaintiff an IFP Petition to

Plaintiff at Menard (Doc. 3).

On November 17, 2025, after the September 29, 2025,

deadline for Plaintiff to comply with the Court’s Order expired, the

Court entered the following Order:

On September 8, 2025, the Court directed

Plaintiff to either pay the $405 filing fee or file

a Petition to Proceed … IFP. The Court advised

Plaintiff that failure to comply would result in

the dismissal of his case. The Court’s Order

was sent to Plaintiff at Menard Correctional

Center, where Plaintiff is incarcerated. See

Individual in Custody Search for Cordell

Sanders, IDOC No. R41346,

https://idoc.illinois.gov/offender/inmatesearc

h.html (last visited November 14, 2025)

(showing Plaintiff’s parent institution as

Menard). However, Plaintiff has not complied.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

case for his failure to comply with the Court’s

order.

See November 17, 2025, Text Order.

II. POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS

A. Motion to Reinstate

In Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate, he claims he did not receive the

Court’s September 8, 2025, Order, directing him to either file an IFP

Petition or pay the filing fee in full. (Doc. 5 at 2.) Plaintiff also appends a

letter with an annotation from Menard that confirms Plaintiff’s letter was

sent to the Southern District Court on October 21, 2025. Plaintiff’s

correspondence requested that the $405 filing fee posted to case No. 25-

01755 be transferred to the Central District. (Id. at 1.) This Court’s

review of the Southern District case No. 25-01755 does not show

Plaintiff’s letter docketed in that case, nor does case 25-1390 or the

instant case show receipt of the $405 filing fee.

Regardless, because Plaintiff has shown that he paid the $405 filing

fee that he then attempted to have transferred to this Court, Plaintiff’s

Motion to Reinstate Case (Doc. 5) is granted. The Court directs the Clerk

of the Court to reopen Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s subsequent Motions for

Reconsideration (Doc. 6), Hearing (Doc. 7), and Status (Doc. 8) are moot

given the Court ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Case.

III. COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Alleged Facts

Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies the following Pontiac

Defendants: Corrections Lieutenant Zimmermann and Corrections

Officers Allsup, Carter, and Slayton.

On October 31, 2024, Defendants Carter and Slayton told

Plaintiff that he was being transported for a medical appointment.

At that time, Plaintiff claims he was wearing only boxer shorts but

got dressed “under the watchful eye of Carter and Slayton.” (Pl.

Compl., Doc. 1 at 2.) Carter then applied hand and leg restraints,

and both Carter and Slayton escorted Plaintiff for a body scan X-ray

that did not detect any contraband.

Thereafter, Defendants Carter and Slayton escorted Plaintiff to

another building where Carter conducted a strip and inspected

Plaintiff’s clothes and shoes, as Slayton and Defendant Zimmerman

observed, which did not reveal any contraband. After the strip

search, Defendants Carter and Slayton took Plaintiff to see

Defendant Allsup, who performed a pat-down search “by rubbing

her hands all over Plaintiff’s body [and] uniform.” (Id.)

Plaintiff was then transported to an orthopedic facility in

Peoria, Illinois. Upon his return to Pontiac, Plaintiff states that he

was subjected to the same searches but in reverse, which did not

detect any contraband. Plaintiff claims the number of searches

performed was unreasonable given the full-body scan. (Id. at 3.)

C. Analysis

In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979), “the Supreme

Court held that requiring inmates to submit to so serious an

intrusion as body-cavity searches after every contact visit with a

person outside the institution did not violate the Fourth

Amendment.” Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1982). “In

light of this holding, [a prisoner] clearly has no ground on which he

could challenge the mere fact that he was frisked . . . .” Id.

Further, “a pat-down search of a male inmate by a female

guard, excluding the genital area . . . clearly falls short of the kind

of shocking, barbarious treatment proscribed by the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. at 53. As such, “requiring [a prisoner] to submit to

a limited frisk-type search by a female guard infringes upon no

right guaranteed by the Constitution.” Id. at 55.

Even so, a pat-down search may run afoul of the Constitution,

for example, if the officer grabs the prisoner’s genitals or conducts

the search in a harassing, degrading manner unrelated to legitimate

security needs, which would violate constitutional standards

regardless of the gender of the officer searching. See Washington v.

Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing grant of

summary judgment to guard because sufficient evidence existed

that guard touched inmate’s private parts to humiliate inmate or to

gratify guard’s sexual desires); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936,

939 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff states a claim on

allegations strip search conducted in harassing manner intended to

humiliate and inflict psychological pain).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Defendants Allsup,

Carter, Slayton, and Zimmermann, as he does not claim, and his

account does not permit the inference that the searches performed

were conducted in a manner intended to humiliate or inflict

psychological pain. Instead, Plaintiff alleges a constitutional

violation based on the number of searches performed, which,

without more, fails to state a plausible claim for relief.

Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for

failure to state a claim for relief. However, if Plaintiff believes he can

revise his pleading to state a cause of action, he may file a Motion

for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff elects to file, his

second amended pleading must be attached to his motion for leave.

The Court does not accept piecemeal amendments. Plaintiff’s

claims must stand independently without referring to his initial

filing and contain all claims against all defendants. Plaintiff must

specify the constitutional violation, when it occurred, and the

persons involved. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th

Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must

establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the

deprivation of a constitutional right.”); see also Adams v. City of

Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Rule 8 specifies

what is required in the complaint: ‘A pleading that states a claim for

relief must contain: . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .’”) (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P.8(a)).

The Court informs Plaintiff that any attempt to join unrelated

claims and defendants is not permitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

In other words, multiple claims against a single defendant are

allowed, but “Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined

with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507

F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Case (Doc. 5) is GRANTED.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to reopen Plaintiff’s

case.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration (Doc. 6), Hearing

(Doc. 7), and Status (Doc. 8) are MOOT.

3) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to

state a federal claim on which relief may be granted as

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

4) Plaintiff has thirty days from the entry of the Court’s

Order to file a Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint that complies with the Court’s guidance. If

Plaintiff does not submit an amendment on or before the

thirty-day deadline, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s case

without prejudice.

ENTERED February 3, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_______________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE