Jones

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

FREDERICK DWIGHT JONES, )

#157783, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:23-CV-165-SMD

)

ROLANDA CALLOWAY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Frederick Dwight Jones, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed an amended

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Doc. 16. Although the amended complaint states

multiple claims against multiple defendants, all but one claim against one defendant have

been dismissed prior to entry of this Order. See Docs. 65, 66. The only remaining claim is

whether Defendant Rolanda Calloway, Warden of Kilby Correctional Facility during

some—but not all—of the events alleged in the amended complaint, violated Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process based on an alleged over-detention.2

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 95), and Defendant

1 The amended complaint is the operative pleading in this action. See Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia

Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (“An amended pleading supersedes the former pleading;

the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader’s averments

against his adversary.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2 As will be discussed further below, to the extent Plaintiff’s filings can be interpreted as attempting to state

any additional claims against Defendant Calloway, such claims are not properly before the Court and will

not be considered.

Calloway has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 104), to which Plaintiff has

filed numerous documents in response (see Docs. 106, 108–110). Upon careful

consideration, and for the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (Doc. 95) is DENIED, Defendant Calloway’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 104) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD3

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court must grant

a motion for “summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of

some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue

of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). “An issue

of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for

the nonmoving party.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496

(11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “An issue is ‘material’ if it might

affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

3 Given that both parties rely on evidence beyond the pleadings in this matter, the Court evaluates this case

under the Rule 56(c) standard for summary judgment rather than the Rule 12(c) standard for judgment on

the pleadings. See, e.g., Dean v. 1715 Northside Drive, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1308 n.1 (N.D. Ga.

2016) (“While the standard applied by the court is nearly identical under both a motion for summary

judgment and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will consider matters outside of the

pleadings in ruling on the [parties’ motions] and thus should proceed under the Rule 56 framework.”).

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute

of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322–23.

Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond

the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The

parties must support their assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” by

“citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not

establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)–(B).

If the nonmovant “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as

required by Rule 56(c),” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of

the motion” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)(2)–(3).

“In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the [C]ourt must

stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of

the matter.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–99 (11th Cir. 1992)

(citation omitted). “Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 999 (citations and internal

quotations omitted). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are

legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d

1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough

of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d

1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (“If the evidence [on

which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,

summary judgment may be granted.”) (internal citations omitted).

III. RELEVANT FACTS4

Plaintiff served 30 years on a life sentence for an Alabama state robbery conviction

before receiving parole in 2004. Doc. 18 at 1; Doc. 17 at 4. In March of 2020, Plaintiff was

4 The “facts” set forth herein are merely for purposes of resolving summary judgment and may not be the

actual facts. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on

reh’g, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hat we state as ‘facts’ . . . for purposes of reviewing the rulings

on the summary judgment motion [] may not be the actual facts.”).

arrested in Indiana based on a violation of the terms of his Alabama state parole and

transported to Kilby Correctional Facility. Doc. 16 at 2. Plaintiff did not receive a hearing

on his alleged parole violation within 20 business days, in violation of Ala. Code § 15-22-

32(a).5 Id. Defendant Calloway arrived at Kilby on May 1, 2020, at which time she served

as Acting Facility Head. Doc. 72-1 at 1.

In May of 2020, Plaintiff “wrote and spoke with” Defendant Calloway about not

receiving a revocation hearing, but Defendant Calloway did not notify the Board of

Pardons and Paroles of Plaintiff’s detention. Doc. 16 at 2. However, Plaintiff’s daughter

“called the Board several times” in April of 2020; Plaintiff wrote multiple letters to the

Board in or around May of 2020; and “the Human Rights Agency and Southern Poverty

contacted the Board” about Plaintiff not receiving his hearing. Doc. 18 at 1–2; see also

Doc. 16 at 2. Although Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) requires that a detained, alleged parole

violator be released back to parole supervision when no hearing occurs within the 20-day

timeframe, Plaintiff was not released. Id.

On August 27, 2020, Assistant Field Director Terry Anthony instructed Defendant

Calloway via email to release Plaintiff pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a), and Plaintiff

was released on September 1, 2020. Doc. 16 at 2. Plaintiff’s revocation hearing was

5 Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) states in relevant part: “Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a

prisoner who has been paroled has violated his or her parole, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, at its next

meeting, may declare the parolee to be delinquent, and time owed shall date from the delinquency. The

Department of Corrections, after receiving notice from the sheriff of the county jail where the parolee is

being held, shall promptly notify the board of the return of a parolee charged with violation of his or her

parole. The board, a single member of the board, a parole revocation hearing officer, or a designated parole

officer shall hold a parole court at the prison or at another place as it may determine within 20 business

days and consider the case of the parole violator . . . . If a hearing is not held within the specified 20 business

days, the parolee shall be released back to parole supervision.” Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) (emphasis added).

subsequently held on September 16, 2020, in Decatur, Alabama, and it was recommended

that he be returned to prison for three years. Id. at 3.

IV. DISCUSSION

a. To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant Calloway in

her official capacity, Defendant Calloway is entitled to sovereign immunity.

Official capacity suits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit

against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As such, a state

employee may not be sued in her official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984), or Congress has abrogated the immunity, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). It is well-settled that Alabama has not waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abrogated it. Holmes v. Hale, 701

F. App’x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521,

1525 (11th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from

Defendant Calloway in her official capacity as an employee of the Alabama Department

of Corrections, Defendant Calloway is entitled to sovereign immunity.6 See, e.g., Selensky

v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 849 (11th Cir. 2015); Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d

1271, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 1998); Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th

6 Additionally, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ [subject to

suit] under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Carr, 916 F.2d

at 1525 n.3 (“[S]tate officials acting in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ subject to liability under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).

Cir. 1995).

b. To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant Calloway in

her individual capacity, he has failed to establish a genuine issue of material

fact on a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment

“applies when an individual alleges an ‘over-detention,’ or a continued detention after a

right to release.” Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Ellard v.

Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 943 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that,

once a state chooses to confer a right such as parole, a prisoner’s interest in the right has

“real substance” and may be revoked only in compliance with the Fourteenth

Amendment).

“When an over-detention occurs and the Fourteenth Amendment governs the

analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference

to [his] due-process rights.” Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 953. To establish deliberate indifference,

a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as

used in the criminal law,’ . . . and to do so he must show that the defendant was actually,

subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the

plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024).7

Moreover, an actionable due process claim under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to

7 “[C]ivil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the

face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Wade,

106 F.4th at 1256 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). By contrast,

“criminal law . . . generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm

of which he is aware.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37).

demonstrate “an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions

and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Holt v. Glenn, 361 F. App’x 75, 77 (11th Cir.

2010) (per curiam) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)).

Applying this requirement to an over-detention claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

the defendant’s specific acts or omissions caused the alleged over-detention.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant Calloway

acted with subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law; that is, that she was

subjectively aware that her own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to

Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff avers that he told Defendant Calloway in May of 2020 that

he had not had a revocation hearing, he fails to make a sufficient showing that Defendant

Calloway was either (1) aware that she had any personal responsibility to notify the Parole

Board of Plaintiff’s detention; or (2) aware that Plaintiff was entitled to release based on

his failure to receive a hearing within 20 business days.

First, there is no evidence before the Court that Defendant Calloway, as Acting

Facility Head, was personally responsible for contacting the Board on behalf of Plaintiff.

See Doc. 72-1 at 1–2 (in which Defendant Calloway avers that “it was not my

responsibility to alert the Alabama Department of Pardons and Paroles of [Plaintiff’s]

arrest; nor was it my responsibility to schedule [Plaintiff] a hearing with the Board of

Pardons and Paroles”). Indeed, Plaintiff admits that he is uncertain as to who specifically

within the Alabama Department of Corrections was responsible for such notification. See

Docs. 99 at 2 (“Someone at Kilby facility was responsible for letting the parole know that

Plaintiff was there awaiting a revocation hearing.”); 109-1 at 2 (“[I]f not the warden,

someone working under her supervision had the duty of notifying the board.”).8

Second, even assuming it was in fact Defendant Calloway’s responsibility to contact

the Board, there is no evidence that she was subjectively aware of that fact or that she

knew Plaintiff was entitled to release as a result of not receiving a timely revocation

hearing. Plaintiff postulates that an individual in Defendant Calloway’s position should

have known that his rights were being violated, but he makes no showing that Defendant

Calloway subjectively possessed such knowledge. See Docs. 95 at 4 (“Plaintiff has shown

. . . that his over-detention was or should have been known by the defendant.”); 99 at 4

(“Even if this defendant argue that she didn’t know, this is a clearly established statutory,

constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.”); 99-1 at 2

(“[Defendant Calloway] knew or should have known that prisoners were being held at her

prison without being afford a revocation hearing.”); Doc. 108 at 4 (“The defendant clearly

state that it is not her responsibility or her staff to notify the parole board.[] Clearly this

defendant don’t know her duties or is lying to the Court.”). Notably, Plaintiff avers that

he did not learn about Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) until after he spoke with Defendant

Calloway in May of 2020, see Doc. 89 at 2, so it is clear they did not discuss it during

their conversation. Thus, the evidence fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference by

Defendant Calloway.

8 The Court notes that Defendant Calloway cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of her

employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978) (holding doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable

to § 1983 actions); Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff

cannot hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior or vicarious liability under § 1983).

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the causation component of an

over-detention claim. Throughout the record9, Plaintiff repeatedly avers that the Board

knew he was detained beyond the permissible 20-day period but knowingly and willfully

failed to take any action:

• “Sometime in May 2020, Plaintiff wrote the Ala. Parole Board . . . and

informed them that he had not been afford a hearing within the 20

business days[.] Plaintiff also had his daughter . . . call the Parole Board

several times to inquire into why Plaintiff had not had a parole revocation

hearing. Because [Board members] were not allowed to come into Kilby

prison, they decided not to do anything about Plaintiff . . . being held

without a hearing.” Doc. 16 at 2.

• “The defendants will argue that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the

Board was unaware of Plaintiff’s recapture[.] This argument don’t hold

water. Phone records will show that Plaintiff’s daughter . . . called the

Board several times in April of 2020, inquiring about why Plaintiff has

not had a hearing. Plaintiff also wrote the parole board several times

asking about his revocation hearing.” Doc. 18 at 1–2.

• “[T]he parole board was mad at Kilby because they were not allowed on

the premises. Myself and the other prisoners . . . were punished for

something that we had no control over or anything to do with.” Doc. 29

at 3.

• “The parole board was upset that the Warden at Kilby would not let them

on the premises to conduct hearings, so they decided not to do anything

and just let [me] sit in prison.[] The board could have held video hearings

or should have released me[.]” Doc. 32 at 4.

• “Ass. Attorney General J. Eric Anderson lied to Montgomery Circuit

Court, and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, stating that the Board

was unaware of my recapture for several weeks[.] On March 12, 2020,

Floyd County Jail . . . contacted the Alabama Parole Board[.] On March

27, 2020 I arrived at Kilby back gate, and the parole board was notified[.]

On September 27, 2020 the Board sent Kilby an e-mail, ordering my

immediate release. This is 6 months from when the Board had to have

9 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court “need consider only the cited materials, but

it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (emphasis added).

known that I was recaptured.” Doc. 49 at 9–10.

• “At all times the [parole board] defendants were fully aware of

Plaintiff[’]s whereabouts. The defendants made a conscience decision to

let Plaintiff sit inside of prison without affording him a hearing or

releasing him.[] This is not a mere case of negligence, these are

intentional acts, knowingly and willingly. For every day that they

couldn’t come on the premises of Kilby prison, they knew that Plaintiff .

. . had not been afford a hearing, as required by law.” Doc. 53 at 5.

• “Plaintiff will show that the [parole board] defendants knew Plaintiff was

at Kilby prison from March 27, 2020 until his release.[] On March 27,

2020 Plaintiff arrived at Kilby prison, and . . . [t]he prison and the

transportation agency had to call the Alabama parole board . . . in order

for Plaintiff to be accepted at Kilby prison. Again Plaintiff would aver

that the board was notified of Plaintiff[’]s arrival at the prison.[] Plaintiff

didn’t allege that Warden Calloway failed to notify the board until after

the defendants submitted to Montgomery Circuit Court in their motion to

dismiss that for several weeks they were unaware of Plaintiff[’]s

incarceration, which rightfully is a straight lie.” Doc. 55 at 7–8.

• “Warden Calloway was not the warden at that time. As far as Warden

Babers, Plaintiff would assume that she notified the Board or one of her

employees notified the board. [T]he wardens notification is not the only

trigger of a prompt revocation hearing. Actual knowledge of the parolee

incarceration surely triggers the time clock, and the executed of the

warrant also triggers the time clock, plus the parolee notice to the board

that he wishes to have a prompt hearing. All of these things happened and

because of them[,] the time clock was triggered.[] [T]he defendant nor

Plaintiff alleges that ‘no’ warden at Kilby Prison notified the board of

plaintiff’s return, only Warden Calloway, who was not the warden at that

time. Keep in mind that Plaintiff alleged Warden Calloway didn’t notify

the board because the defendants lied and submitted to Montgomery

Circuit Court that they were unaware of Plaintiff’s whereabouts for

several weeks.” Doc. 55 at 12.10

10 Plaintiff further asserts, throughout numerous unsworn documents, that he is certain the Board was

notified of his detention in March of 2020 and nevertheless knowingly and willfully violated his rights. See,

e.g., Docs. 28 at 4; 40 at 2; 56 at 11; 58 at 1; 59 at 2. However, “[u]nsworn statements may not be considered

by a district court in evaluating a motion for summary judgment.” See, e.g., Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1347

(11th Cir. 2022) (citing Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n.26 (11th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept.

29, 2003).

Plaintiff is adamant throughout his sworn filings that the Board had actual

knowledge of his detention as early as March of 2020; that the Board willfully failed to

either schedule a hearing or release him despite that knowledge; and, quite notably, that

he only brought Defendant Calloway into this action after the Board lied about that

knowledge. These averments directly contradict Plaintiff’s later unsworn and unsupported

assertion that he “would have been released had [Defendant Calloway] contacted the

parole board,” Doc. 76-1 at 3, and render it impossible for a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that Plaintiff’s over-detention was caused by Defendant Calloway’s failure to

notify.

Because the evidence fails to establish either deliberate indifference by Defendant

Calloway or that she affirmatively caused Plaintiff’s over-detention, Plaintiff has failed to

establish a genuine issue of material fact on his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

Accordingly, Defendant Calloway is entitled to summary judgment.

c. To the extent Plaintiff’s filings can be interpreted as attempting to state any

further claims against Defendant Calloway, such claims are not properly

before the Court.

After he filed his amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff

acknowledged that, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), any claim

challenging the legality of his conviction or sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

See Doc. 29 at 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff made clear that is not seeking release from

imprisonment, but merely “compensation for holding Plaintiff for 5 additional months”

beyond the 20-day period. Id. at 2 (“A ruling in Plaintiff[’s] favor would only determine

how much money the defendants would have to pay for the illegal incarceration of five

months.”). He explicitly stated that this is “the only issue/claim” on which he wished to

proceed, and “all of the other claims can be dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at 3.

He reiterated this intention throughout his later filings. See Docs. 55 at 2 (“The

essential factual basis of this civil action is the claim that the defendants detained Plaintiff

5 months beyond the 20 business day period[.] Plaintiff willingly dismissed all of the other

claims[.]”); 59 at 2 (“Plaintiff never had a revocation hearing within the 20 business days

and was not released until five months after the 20 days had expired. This is the only claim

that has been properly exhausted for review by this Court.”); 94 at 4 (providing that the

only substantive issue before the Court is “[w]hether Warden Calloway violated Plaintiff’s

due process rights by not notifying the Alabama Parole Board in a timely manner”); 99-1

at 2 (acknowledging that Defendant Calloway “had no control over any event that

happened after Plaintiff was released”).

Accordingly, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s pleadings or subsequent filings appear

to challenge events that occurred after his release from Kilby on September 1, 2020—

including the validity and outcome of his subsequent revocation hearing as well as any

subsequent denials of parole—any such claims are not properly before the Court, are not

cognizable in a § 1983 action pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, and will not be considered

here.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 95) is DENIED;

(2) Defendant Calloway’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 104) is

GRANTED;

(3) Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendant Calloway and against

Plaintiff; and

(4) This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

Final Judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 3rd day of February, 2026.

CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE