Vick

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER VICK, et al., Individually )

and on behalf of all others )

similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00739-DGK

)

FRESH GREEN, LLC, et al., and JOHN )

DOE DISPENSARIES 1–215, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ LEAVE TO AMEND TO REDEFINE THE CLASS

This is a putative class action that was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson

County, Missouri. Missouri Plaintiffs Christopher Vick, Bridget Biersmith, Ryan Russell, Joshua

Holman, and Jordan Damewood seek to certify a Plaintiff and a Defendant class and allege claims

under Missouri law against seven named Missouri marijuana dispensaries and 215 John Doe

dispensaries. Defendants removed the case from Jackson County to this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1453(b), alleging federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs moved to remand to the Circuit Court of Jackson

County under CAFA’s local-controversy and home-state exceptions. ECF No. 6; see 28 U.S.C. §

1332(d)(4)(A)–(B). The Court stayed proceedings pending its ruling on the Motion to Remand.

ECF No. 23. The Court further ordered the parties to file a joint proposal for expedited discovery

limited to the question of Plaintiff Class member citizenship. ECF No. 24. The parties have done

so. ECF No. 28.

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Complaint to Redefine the Class.

ECF No. 27. This would be Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs seek to limit the

class to “citizens of the state of Missouri” and readily inform the Court in their briefing that so

limiting the class would defeat CAFA jurisdiction and require remand to state court. ECF No. 30

at 7. They intend to renew their Motion to Remand if the Court grants leave to file an amended

complaint. ECF No. 27 at 1 n.1. Defendants oppose the pending Motion to Amend. ECF No. 29.

For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is GRANTED.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading

only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give

leave when justice so requires.” A district court may deny leave to amend only when there is

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive” by the movant, “undue prejudice to the opposing

party,” or “futility.” Dennis v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 207 F.3d 523, 525 (8th Cir. 2000). “In

the context of motions to amend a class definition, futility is determine[d] [by] whether the

proposed class could be certified [under Rule 23].” Irvine v. Johnson, No. 4:21-CV-04224-KES,

2024 WL 4766373, at *3 (D.S.D. Nov. 13, 2024) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

Discussion

Plaintiffs assert their proposed amendment would provide “clarity and manageability and

. . . ensure the case proceeds consistently with [their] intended class theory.” ECF No. 27 at 2.

“The proposed Second Amended Complaint refines and narrows the proposed class definition to

ensure the case proceeds on the claims Plaintiffs actually intend to litigate.” Id. at 1. Plaintiffs

argue Defendants would not be prejudiced by the amendment because “[a] clarified class definition

does not inject new factual predicates; it identifies who is included in the class and thus what

discovery and certification issues matter.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs also seek to avail themselves of the

rule recently articulated by the Supreme Court (affirming the Eighth Circuit1) that “federal

jurisdiction now depends on the operative complaint after amendment.” Id. at 1; see Royal Canin,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 30 (2025) (“When a plaintiff amends her complaint

following her suit’s removal, a federal court’s jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint

says.”). Under this rule, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint would be the operative complaint

and would therefore determine jurisdiction, which, in this case, would lead to mandatory remand

to state court under CAFA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)–(B).

Defendants oppose the motion. The bulk of Defendants’ opposition brief distinguishes

Royal Canin, which was not a CAFA case, and addresses Eighth Circuit CAFA caselaw, which

indicates that courts are to determine jurisdiction based on the operative complaint at the time of

removal, not on post-removal amendments. See, e.g., Hargett v. RevClaims, LLC, 854 F.3d 962,

966–67 (8th Cir. 2017); Hargis v. Access Cap. Funding, LLC, 674 F.3d 783, 789–90 (8th Cir.

2012). Ultimately, Defendants argue a complaint amended post-removal cannot deprive a federal

court of jurisdiction in the CAFA context. ECF No. 29 at 1. Defendants appear to advance an

argument of futility, concluding their brief, “Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would not result in

remand and suggests no other changes to the operative pleading. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion

should be denied.” ECF No. 29 at 5.

Defendants’ opposition to amendment fails. As noted above, “[i]n the context of motions

to amend a class definition, futility is determine[d] [by] whether the proposed class could be

certified [under Rule 23].” Irvine v. Johnson, 2024 WL 4766373, at *3. Defendants make no

argument on this score. They argue that the Court should not consider a post-removal amended

complaint when ruling on Plaintiffs’ eventual motion to remand, but this is not an argument against

1 See Wullschleger v. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc., 75 F.4th 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2023), aff’d, 604 U.S. 22 (2025).

amendment itself. And while the Eighth Circuit instructs district courts to scrutinize motions to

amend if amendment seems to aim at defeating federal jurisdiction, this caution normally applies

to joinder of parties “with little connection with any of the events set out in the original complaint.”

Brown v. Wallace, 957 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Bailey v. Bayer CropScience L.P.,

563 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The district court, when faced with an amended pleading

naming a new nondiverse defendant in a removed case, should scrutinize that amendment more

closely than an ordinary amendment. . . . [T]he Court is required to consider . . . the extent to which

the joinder of the nondiverse party is sought to defeat federal jurisdiction . . . .” (alternation in

original) (citations omitted)).

Here, Plaintiffs’ amendment would have the effect of excluding potential plaintiffs with

the same injury as the proposed Missouri-citizen-only class, not adding parties “with little

connection” to the allegations. Defendants do not allege that this will prejudice them or that

Plaintiffs are trying to delay. And there is no allegation or indication of bad faith: Plaintiffs state

clearly their intent only to form a class of Missouri citizens to challenge Missouri dispensaries

under Missouri law.

“The plaintiff is the master of the complaint, and therefore controls much about her suit.

She gets to determine which substantive claims to bring against which defendants. . . . And the

plaintiff ’s control over those matters extends beyond the time her first complaint is filed.” Royal

Canin, 604 U.S. at 35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants have not shown

the amended complaint is the product of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, that it will

prejudice Defendants or is futile. Therefore, there no basis for denying the amendment.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend and file a Second Amended

Complaint is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs have indicated they intend to renew their Motion for Remand upon filing their

Second Amended Complaint. The parties have already partially addressed remand in their

arguments on this motion to amend. The Court therefore sets the following expedited briefing

schedule for Plaintiffs’ motion to remand:

- Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and Suggestions in Support due February 5, 2026.

- Defendants Opposition Brief due February 10, 2026.

- Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief due February 13, 2026.

The parties should not simply repeat the arguments they made on this motion. The Court is aware

of them and will consider them in its remand ruling. The parties should confine their briefs to the

question of whether the Second Amended Complaint with its Missouri-citizen-only class

supersedes the First Amended Complaint for purposes of the Court’s CAFA jurisdiction analysis.

In doing so, the parties should only present arguments or binding authority they have not already

presented.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: February 3 , 2026 /s/ Greg Kays

.

GREG KAYS, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT