The opinion
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 3, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Estate of No. 60728-0-II
JACK L. FRANKS, a/k/a JACKIE LEE
LEWIS FRANKS,
PUBLISHED OPINION
Deceased.
SECURITY STATE BANK, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Jack L. Franks,
Respondent,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE,
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Jack Franks and Anneliese Roldan were in a committed intimate
relationship for 40 years. When Franks passed away, he had a valid will. Franks left most of his
assets to Roldan, the rest to his grandsons, and one dollar to his son. Franks’ son contested the will
and sought to have it invalidated. Roldan responded by filing a petition under the Trust and Estate
Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), ch. 11.96A RCW.
Franks’ son, grandsons, and Roldan were able to reach a settlement agreement in the
TEDRA action. The agreement established that Franks and Roldan were in a committed intimate
No. 60728-0-II
relationship and that all property acquired during the relationship was community-like property.1
The total value of the couple’s assets was determined to be about $8.3 million, and Franks and
Roldan each had a one-half interest in the assets, totaling about $4.15 million.
The Estate filed its estate taxes. On the tax return, the Estate claimed the gross estate, minus
exclusions, was about $4.13 million. The Department of Revenue disagreed, asserting that Franks’
estate at the time of death included the entire $8.3 million and Roldan’s one-half interest was
distributed to her after Franks’ death. The Department found that the Estate owed about $824,000
in tax and interest.
The Estate objected to the Department’s findings in another TEDRA petition. The trial
court held a hearing, overruled the Department’s findings, concluded that Roldan’s one-half
interest was not part of Franks’ estate at the time of death, and determined the Estate owed no
additional taxes.
The Department appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it determined that Roldan
had an undivided one-half interest in the property acquired during her committed intimate
relationship with Franks and that her one-half interest was not part of Franks’ taxable estate. The
Department also argues that Roldan’s TEDRA petition was not a valid claim that was deductible
from Franks’ taxable estate.
We hold that the trial court correctly applied the committed intimate relationship doctrine.
Roldan had an undivided one-half interest in the community-like property when it was acquired
during the relationship prior to Franks’ death, her interest became her separate property upon
1
The TEDRA petition, agreement, and order use the term “community property,” but the Estate
clarifies on appeal the correct term was “community-like property.” Clerk’s Papers at 105.
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No. 60728-0-II
Franks’ death, and therefore it was not part of Franks’ taxable estate. We also affirm based on the
alternative argument that Roldan’s TEDRA petition is a legal, valid, and deductible claim because
it was a claim that arose from an obligation imposed by Washington common law. We award
attorney fees to the Estate on appeal in an amount to be determined by this court’s commissioner.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jack Franks’ Will and His Death
In 2005, Jack Franks executed a will. The will listed Anneliese Roldan, a “very special
friend with whom I have lived for thirty years,” as a beneficiary. Ex. 101 at 2. Franks left three
parcels of real property, one investment account, and twelve cars to Roldan. The will also identified
Franks’ son, Jackie Franks, Jr., and two grandsons. Due to a falling out with his son, Franks only
left him one dollar. The will left the remainder of the estate to Franks’ two grandsons.
Franks passed away more than a decade later in August 2017. At the time of his death,
Franks had been in a committed intimate relationship with Roldan for 40 years, but all of the
couple’s property was titled in Franks’ name. The Department of Revenue does not dispute the
existence of the committed intimate relationship or the length of the relationship. Nor does the
Department dispute that all of the couple’s property at the time of his death was acquired during
the committed intimate relationship.
The trial court entered an order admitting the will into probate and appointing a bank as
the administrator of the estate.
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B. Will Challenge and TEDRA Petition
Franks’ son contested the will. Franks’ son sought to have the will invalidated in order to
have Franks’ estate pass according to the laws of intestate succession. Franks’ son also filed a
creditor’s claim, asserting Franks owed him for unpaid work. Franks’ grandchildren disputed the
challenge and asked that the estate be distributed according to the will.
Roldan responded by filing a TEDRA petition. Roldan sought findings that she and Franks
were in a committed intimate relationship, and as a result of their relationship, all property acquired
during the relationship was community-like property subject to division between Franks’ estate
and Roldan.
C. TEDRA Petition Agreement and Order
Several months later, all of the parties reached an agreement. The agreement stated that
Franks and Roldan were in a committed intimate relationship. The agreement also concluded that
all of the assets, including some that were not originally listed in the will, were acquired during
the relationship and thus they were the “community property” of Franks and Roldan. Ex. 105 at 6.
The agreement stated that the total value of the assets was $8,308,196.85, and Franks and Roldan
each had an undivided one-half interest in the assets, totaling $4,154,098.43.
A month later, the trial court filed an order approving the agreement. The order stated that
the agreement set forth a “mutually agreed legal basis to establish the community property interest
of [Roldan] in all assets of the estate.” Ex. 106 at 2.
D. Estate Tax Proceedings
Then the Estate filed its tax return. On line one of the tax computation section, the Estate
claimed the total gross estate less exclusions was $4,127,801.00. The Estate listed Roldan as a
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surviving spouse even though the Estate marked Franks as “divorced” for marital status. Ex. 108
at 1. For each schedule attachment that described the estate’s property, the Estate listed “Less 50%
Community Property: Interest of surviving spouse” and deducted half the value for each respective
piece of property. Ex. 108 at 15-18.
The Department sent a letter to the administrator of the Estate. The letter stated that the
Department would honor the TEDRA agreement for the purposes of finding that Franks and
Roldan were in a committed intimate relationship but would not honor the agreement that the
property was community property. The Department wrote that characterizing it as community
property was contrary to both statute and case law. Rather, property acquired during a committed
intimate relationship was “‘community-property-like.”’ Ex. 111 at 1. And because Franks and
Roldan were not married, all assets should have been considered the sole property of Franks at the
time of his death for the purposes of calculating the gross estate.
After the Estate and the Department exchanged communications for more than two years
arguing about whether the gross taxable estate included Roldan’s undivided one-half interest in
the property accrued during the relationship, the Department filed its findings of tax due in superior
court. The Department determined the Estate owed $823,920.49 in additional tax, including
interest accrued.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Estate’s Objections to the Department’s Findings of Tax Liability
The Estate objected to the Department’s findings and initiated a petition under TEDRA,
specifically RCW 11.96A.080 and .090. The Estate argued that it properly filed its taxes and that
“Washington law clearly holds that a committed intimate partner holds an undivided half-interest
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in community-like property that severs immediately upon death.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 13. First,
the Estate argued that under the committed intimate relationship doctrine, Roldan’s share of
community-like property vested immediately at Franks’ death. Alternatively, it argued that
Roldan’s TEDRA claim to her one-half share was a valid and enforceable claim that is deductible.
The Estate mainly relied on Olver v. Fowler. 131 Wn. App. 135, 126 P.3d 69 (2006) (Olver
I), aff’d, 161 Wn.2d 655, 168 P.3d 348 (2007). In Olver I, two partners, Cung and Thuy, were in
a committed intimate relationship. Id. at 141. Tragically, they simultaneously died in a car
accident. Id. at 137. All of the property they had acquired during their relationship was held solely
in Cung’s name and initially inventoried in Cung’s estate. Id. at 138. Thuy’s personal
representative contested Cung’s estate inventory. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the committed
intimate relationship doctrine operates to recognize property interests acquired during the
relationship, so Thuy had an undivided one-half interest in the community-like property. Id. at
146. The court said that “[a]pplying community property principles by analogy, each partner in a
[committed intimate relationship] owns an undivided interest in the joint property. After a partner
dies, that partner’s share is the estate upon which inheritance rules will operate.” Id. at 145.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed this holding and said,
In a marriage, each spouse has a present, undivided interest in the couple’s
community property. By analogy to community property law, Thuy had an
undivided interest in the couple’s jointly acquired property, even though it was
titled in Cung’s name. The death of one or both partners does not extinguish that
right; Thuy’s estate merely steps into her shoes.
Olver v. Fowler, 161 Wn.2d 655, 670-71, 168 P.3d 348 (2007) (Olver II) (citation omitted).
Relying on this reasoning in Olver II, Franks’ estate concluded it only had a one-half
interest in the couple’s property that was reportable and subject to estate tax. The Estate also made
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an alternative argument that Roldan’s assets were deductible from Franks’ estate as a claim under
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 2053. The Estate argued that a “petition to obtain a portion
of community-like property from a deceased person’s estate is a valid claim under Washington
law” and Roldan’s TEDRA petition was therefore a valid claim that had to be excluded from the
gross taxable estate. CP at 18.
B. The Department’s Response
The Department responded, relying on the history of the committed intimate relationship
doctrine and arguing for its narrow application. The Department argued that the doctrine was
created only to equitably distribute property to prevent unjust enrichment at the end of a committed
intimate relationship, not to “permit a tax windfall not authorized by law.” CP at 207 (boldface
omitted). The Department argued that Olver II “is simply another application of the committed
intimate relationship doctrine in the context of an equitable property distribution.” CP at 210. The
Department emphasized that Washington courts have “repeatedly refused to expand the doctrine
beyond the context of property distributions” between the parties in the relationship. CP at 209.
The Department cited a handful of cases to demonstrate the limited application of the doctrine to
equitable means of property distribution. See, e.g. Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 113 Wn.2d 243, 244-
45, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989); Davis v. Emp’t. Sec. Dep’t, 108 Wn.2d 272, 278, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987);
CP at 209.
The Department also rejected the Estate’s alternative argument that Roldan’s TEDRA
petition was a claim that qualified for a deduction. The Department argued that Roldan did not
submit a bona fide claim against the Estate. And procedurally, the Estate never actually claimed a
deduction on its tax returns.
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C. Trial Court Decision
The trial court held a hearing under the summary adjudication provisions in TEDRA. The
trial court agreed with the Estate that the issue was really about who had a property interest, not
property distribution and, under Olver II, it was clear that each party in the committed intimate
relationship had a one-half interest in the property obtained during the relationship at the time of
Franks’ death. Thus, his estate did not contain Roldan’s one-half interest in the property acquired
during the 40-year relationship. The trial court overruled the Department’s findings, declared the
Estate had fully paid all estate tax due, and denied the Estate’s request for attorney fees.
The Department appeals.
ANALYSIS
The Department appeals the trial court’s order concluding no additional tax was due. The
Department does not dispute that Franks and Roldan were in a committed intimate relationship for
more than forty years and that all of the property titled in Franks’ name when he died was acquired
during their committed intimate relationship. Thus, the parties agree there are no facts in dispute.
The Department argues the trial court erred when it determined that Roldan had an
undivided one-half interest in the property acquired during the couple’s committed intimate
relationship, and that when Franks died, Roldan’s one-half interest did not flow into Franks’
taxable estate. The Department also argues Roldan’s TEDRA petition was not a valid claim that
is deductible from the estate. We disagree with the Department as to both arguments.
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I. BURDEN AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A taxpayer seeking relief from a tax obligation has the burden of proving that the
Department of Revenue incorrectly assessed the tax. See RCW 82.32.180; FPR II, LLC v. Dep’t
of Revenue, 16 Wn. App. 2d 706, 713, 482 P.3d 320 (2021).
Questions of law and orders granting judgment based on issues of law are reviewed de
novo. In re Est. of Hambleton, 181 Wn.2d 802, 817, 335 P.3d 398 (2014). How a statute applies
to the facts is also a question of law reviewed de novo. See Wash. Imaging Servs., LLC v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 171 Wn.2d 548, 555, 252 P.3d 885 (2011).
II. APPLICATION OF COMMITTED INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE TO ESTATE TAXES
A. Estate Tax Scheme
“Because of the legislature’s decision to incorporate much of the federal estate tax scheme,
the starting point when analyzing an estate tax in Washington is the federal taxable estate.” Est. of
Ackerley v. Dep’t of Revenue, 187 Wn.2d 906, 911, 389 P.3d 583 (2017). The “Washington taxable
estate” is defined as “the federal taxable estate.” RCW 83.100.020(15). In turn, “federal taxable
estate” is defined as “the taxable estate as determined under chapter 11 of the internal revenue
code.” RCW 83.100.020(6).
The federal taxable estate is calculated by determining the value of the gross estate less
applicable deductions. 26 U.S.C. § 2051. The value of the gross estate of the decedent “shall be
determined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of [their] death
of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated,” 26 U.S.C. § 2031(a),
and “shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at
the time of [their] death.” 26 U.S.C. § 2033. In determining the value of the taxable estate for
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purposes of calculating the amount of estate tax owed, the tax code allows a deduction for “claims
against the estate . . . as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . under which the estate is
being administered.” 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(3).
B. Committed Intimate Relationship Doctrine
A “committed intimate relationship” is a “stable, marital-like relationship where both
parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.” Connell v.
Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831 (1995). To determine if a committed intimate
relationship exists, a court will weigh factors such as continuous cohabitation, length of
relationship, purpose of relationship, pooling of resources, and the intent of the parties. Id. at 346.
These factors are not exhaustive. Id. “[A]ll property acquired during a [committed intimate
relationship] is presumed to be owned by both parties.” Id. at 351. When a committed intimate
relationship ends, the court requires a “just and equitable distribution” of any property acquired
during the relationship. Id. at 347.
As discussed above, the Washington Supreme Court applied the committed intimate
relationship doctrine in Olver II where a couple, Cung and Thuy, simultaneously passed away in
a car accident. 161 Wn.2d at 657-58. The Washington Supreme Court held that despite the fact
that all of the couple’s property was titled in Cung’s name, Thuy’s estate contained one-half of the
property acquired during the relationship upon their death, while Cung’s estate contained the other
half. Id. at 672-73.
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C. Application of the Doctrine When One or Both Partners Have Died
The Department contends that the trial court erred by applying the committed intimate
relationship doctrine so that Roldan’s one-half interest reduced Franks’ gross estate value for the
purposes of estate taxation. The Department raises multiple potential consequences of adopting
the Estate’s position. First the Department states the trial court ignored the conscious decision by
many couples to not marry, potentially upending predictable estate planning. Second, the
Department expresses concern about the future burden on the Department should it have to
determine whether a committed intimate relationship existed in order to allow estate tax
reductions. Third, the Department says applying the doctrine in the manner the Estate suggests
would create unintended legal consequences regarding an as-yet-undefined property right.
The Estate responds that the Washington Supreme Court decided in Olver II that the estate
of each partner in the committed intimate relationship obtained an undivided one-half interest in
the property accumulated during the relationship upon their simultaneous death, regardless of how
the property was titled. Therefore, the Estate argues, the estate of one partner in a committed
intimate relationship does not contain the full interest in community-like property at the time of
death. Rather upon death, the estate contains one-half of all assets acquired during the relationship.
We agree with the Estate.
In Olver II, the Washington Supreme Court made a point to affirm the “well reasoned”
opinion of the Court of Appeals. 161 Wn.2d at 658. The Court of Appeals used language that
recognized the committed intimate relationship doctrine does not operate to alter property interests
at the moment the relationship ends, rather it recognizes property interests acquired during the
relationship. Olver I, 131 Wn. App. at 145-46. For example, the Court of Appeals stated that
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Thuy’s entitlement to her share of the property “preceded her death, and [was] not overcome or
diminished by the mere circumstance that she did not survive the accident.” Id. at 146.
The Court of Appeals applied community property principles by analogy to hold that “each
partner in a [committed intimate relationship] owns an undivided interest in the joint property.
After a partner dies, that partner’s share is the estate upon which inheritance rules will operate.”
Id. at 145. The Supreme Court then emphasized that Thuy had an undivided interest despite the
couple’s property being titled in Cung’s name. Olver II, 161 Wn.2d at 670. “The death of one or
both partners does not extinguish that right; Thuy’s estate merely steps into her shoes.” Id. at 670-
71.
Similarly, here, Roldan’s property interest preceded Franks’ death. Although Roldan had
to use the procedural mechanism of a TEDRA petition to enforce her rights, that does not mean
she was not always entitled to a one-half interest of property acquired during the relationship, both
before Franks’ death and at the moment of his death. Applying the doctrine here is not an expansion
of Olver II; it is an application of Olver II’s reasoning. While only one partner has passed away in
this case, the same principles apply. Like Thuy, Roldan had a right that existed during her
committed intimate relationship with Franks.
The Department implies that because Roldan did not obtain formal legal acknowledgment
of her interest in the property until it was distributed after Franks’ death, her interest should have
no bearing on the computation of estate tax that is based on the estate’s value upon death. However,
that argument is belied by language the Supreme Court adopted in Olver II. It states that only “after
the contents of the estate are established can the personal representative distribute the contents of
the estate according to a valid will or the rules of intestacy. . . . Once a decedent’s share is
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determined, ‘that partner’s share is the estate upon which the inheritance rules will operate.’” Olver
II, 161 Wn.2d at 669 (quoting Olver I, 131 Wn. App. at 145). And “In a marriage, each spouse has
a present, undivided interest in the couple’s community property. By analogy to community
property law, Thuy had an undivided interest in the couple’s jointly acquired property, even though
it was titled in Cung’s name.” Id. at 670 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The committed
intimate relationship and the interests in property acquired during the relationship do not spring to
life only at the moment when a judge declares a committed intimate relationship existed, as the
Department suggests. The Olver II court’s language and reasoning assume both partners in a
committed intimate relationship have an undivided, one-half interest in the community-like
property during the relationship. And when a partner dies, their estate contains that partner’s one-
half interest. See id. at 669-70.
The Department relies on Peffley-Warner to argue that Washington courts have refused to
expand the committed intimate relationship doctrine beyond the context of property distributions
that occur after the end of a relationship. Br. of Appellant at 28; Peffley-Warner, 113 Wn.2d at
244-45. The Washington Supreme Court has long recognized that separate “property owned by
one of the parties prior to the [committed intimate relationship] and property acquired during the
[committed intimate relationship] by gift, bequest, devise, or descent with the rents, issues and
profits thereof, is not before the court for division.” Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 351. Thus, unlike a
spouse, a partner in a committed intimate relationship cannot ask a court to equitably distribute a
portion of the other partner’s separate property at the end of a relationship.
While the Department is correct that the committed intimate relationship doctrine does not
confer all the rights and benefits of married spouses to committed intimate partners, the
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Department is incorrect that the facts of Peffley-Warner are consistent with the situation here. In
Peffley-Warner, the court declined to equate a surviving partner in a committed intimate
relationship to a spouse under intestate succession laws because the surviving partner of the
committed intimate relationship sought entitlement to the separate property of the deceased partner
that a spouse would be entitled to. 113 Wn.2d at 244-45, 253. Here, Roldan only sought
confirmation of her own interest in the community-like property the couple acquired together
during the committed intimate relationship. Roldan never sought a widow’s share or a portion of
separate property that only a spouse would be entitled to.
Essentially, the Department alleges that the trial court erred when it treated Roldan like a
spouse. The Department relies on Olver II to argue that the courts have “carefully distinguished”
between an equitable interest in property and a legal interest. However, the Olver II court’s
discussion of Peffley-Warner does not support the Department’s argument:
The dissent ignores the Peffley-Warner court’s distinction between
equitable division of property jointly acquired during the relationship and the
distribution of property that was owned by the deceased partner by way of intestacy.
As discussed in more detail below, this case involves the initial distribution of
jointly acquired property between committed intimate partners.
Olver II, 161 Wn.2d at 667 n.7. Like in Olver II, this case involves the division of community-like
property acquired during the relationship by operation of law upon a partner’s death, not any claim
to other property that was not community-like in character. The Estate is clear that it does not ask
us to grant spousal rights to Roldan, which could encompass an interest in separate property or in
a portion of Franks’ one-half interest in the couple’s property. Again, the Estate’s argument and
the trial court’s holding only sought to honor Roldan’s one-half interest in community-like
property acquired during the relationship.
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D. The Department’s Additional Arguments
The Department raises three additional arguments as to why the trial court’s application of
the committed intimate relationship doctrine here was in error. All of these arguments fail.
1. The conscious decision not to marry
First, the Department argues that the trial court “‘ignore[d] the conscious decision by many
couples not to marry’” and would equate committed intimate relationships with marriage Br. of
Appellant at 37 (quoting Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 350).
This argument ignores that the trial court merely followed what the Washington Supreme
Court held more than 15 years ago in Olver II. Partners come to the decision of whether or not to
marry based on innumerable factors. That does not change the fact that a person in a committed
intimate relationship is entitled to an undivided one-half interest in jointly acquired community-
like property during the relationship, regardless of how the property is titled. And as discussed
above, Roldan did not seek any additional property interest that only a spouse would be entitled
to.
2. The burden of determining if committed intimate relationships exist
Second, the Department argues that applying the doctrine to estate taxes would put a burden
on the Department in future cases to investigate whether a committed intimate relationship existed.
The Department theorizes that a partner and estate of another partner could agree via settlement
that a committed intimate relationship existed, without any court approval. Should that happen,
the Department would have the burden to inquire into the “intimate details of cohabitating
partners’ interpersonal relationship and their finances.” Br. of Appellant at 39.
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This argument is overblown. While the Department may have to make these factual
inquiries in order to determine tax liability, it is not beyond the scope of the Department’s
responsibilities to do just that. The Department often makes similarly complicated factual
determinations in other contexts, for example, to determine whether a business qualifies for a
certain B&O tax deduction or reduced tax rate. See, e.g., Wash. Imaging Servs., LLC, 171 Wn.2d
at 554-55. Also, an estate would have the burden of presenting facts to support its assessment of
the value of the gross taxable estate at the time of death, as the Estate did here, and a surviving
partner in a committed intimate relationship could seek a trial court determination under TEDRA
as Roldan did here.
3. New type of property interest
The Department’s third argument is that by allowing the application of the committed
intimate relationship doctrine in this context, we would be creating “unintended legal
consequences regarding property rights.” Br. of Appellant at 40. The Department contends that the
committed intimate relationship doctrine only creates a presumption of community-like property
that can be overcome. Thus, a partner’s property interest does not arise until a court determines
that the property is indeed community-like.
But, again, we are not creating a new type of property interest. We are recognizing, as
Olver II did, that each partner in the committed intimate relationship has an undivided one-half
interest when the property is acquired, even if the property is titled in only one partner’s name.
These principles are not new. Moreover, the presumption that arises can only be rebutted by
evidence that the property in question was in fact separate property or traceable to separate
property. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 352. Thus, application of the presumption is more about
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determining what property is community-like and what is not, rather than determining the interests
that arise in community-like property or when a partner’s property interest attaches. Thus, the fact
that a presumption must be applied does not undermine the legal consequence of the fact that
certain property is community-like.
Finally, the Department expresses concern that a person in a long-term stable relationship
will not be able to predict whether the property they acquire during the relationship is community-
like or separate property. But nothing prevents a couple from entering into an agreement to resolve
this issue, just as married couples can enter into agreements that define what property is community
property and what is not. See Higgins v. Stafford, 123 Wn.2d 160, 161-62, 866 P.2d 31 (1994).
E. Conclusion
Ultimately, the Department wants us to treat Roldan’s entitlement to her one-half interest
in the property as a claim to a portion of Franks’ estate, rather than a property interest that existed
during the relationship, prior to, and upon Franks’ death. But based on Olver II and Peffley-
Warner, we disagree. As a partner in a committed intimate relationship, Roldan had a property
interest in jointly acquired community-like property when Franks was alive and at the moment of
his death. The TEDRA settlement simply recognized her property interest. The fact that a court
may equitably distribute property between committed intimate partners after death has no bearing
on the computation of estate tax, which depends on the value of the estate at the moment of death.
And under the Supreme Court’s decision in Olver II, at the moment of Franks’ death, Franks’
estate did not contain Roldan’s one-half interest in the property acquired during their relationship.
Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that Roldan’s one-half of the jointly acquired property
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was not a part of Franks’ gross estate to which the estate tax applied. RCW 83.100.020(6); 26
U.S.C. §§ 2031(a), 2033.
III. TEDRA PETITION AS A DEDUCTIBLE CLAIM
The Department also contends that Roldan’s TEDRA petition was not a valid claim of
deduction. Instead, the Department argues that Roldan made a claim “‘for a portion of the estate”’
rather than a “‘claim against the estate.”’ Br. of Appellant at 45 (quoting Lindberg v. United States,
927 F. Supp. 1401, 1404-05 (D. Colo. 1996)). The Department also asserts that the TEDRA
petition fails to meet § 2053 of the Internal Revenue Code’s additional requirements because
“[w]hen ‘claims against the estate’ are ‘founded on a promise or agreement,’ they must ‘be limited
to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth.’” Br. of Appellant at 46-47 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 2053(c)(1)(A)). We
disagree.
A. The TEDRA Petition Was a Valid Basis for Deduction
The federal tax code states that “the value of the taxable estate shall be determined by
deducting from the value of the gross estate such amounts . . . for claims against the estate . . . as
are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction.” 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(3). A claim may be based on
tort, contract, or an obligation imposed by law. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2053-4(a)(1). The Washington
Supreme Court has recognized claims for property after the death of a partner in a committed
intimate relationship. See Vasquez. v. Hawthorne, 145 Wn.2d 103, 105, 107-08, 33 P.3d 735
(2001).
Here, Roldan’s TEDRA petition was a legal and valid claim against the Estate because her
claim for her one-half interest in the couple’s property relied on an obligation imposed by
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Washington law. Washington common law created this obligation via the committed intimate
relationship doctrine. See Vasquez, 145 Wn.2d at 107-08; see also, Olver II, 161 Wn.2d at 672-73.
As discussed above, Roldan’s entitlement to her one-half interest existed before Franks’
death. Roldan’s entitlement needed to be resolved in order to determine what assets were part of
Franks’ estate and eligible to be distributed to the other beneficiaries. Roldan’s claim was thus not
for a “portion of the estate,” as the Department contends, but rather for assets that belonged to her
upon Franks’ death and not the Estate.
Therefore, Roldan’s TEDRA petition was a valid and legal claim based on an obligation
imposed by Washington common law.
B. The TEDRA Petition Did Not Need to Meet the Additional 2053(c)(1)(A) Requirements
The Department also argues that because the TEDRA petition fails to meet 26 U.S.C. §
2053(c)(1)(A)’s additional requirements, it cannot be a legal and valid claim. The Department
states that because the Estate never claimed a deduction based on Roldan’s rights as a partner in a
committed intimate relationship under 26 U.S.C. § 2053, it has never proved Roldan’s claim was
supported by adequate and full consideration. We disagree.
The federal statute provides, “The deduction allowed by this section in the case of claims
against the estate, unpaid mortgages, or any indebtedness shall, when founded on a promise or
agreement, be limited to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money’s worth.” 26 U.S.C. § 2053(c)(1)(A).
Roldan’s TEDRA petition does not need to meet these additional requirements because
Roldan’s claim was based on the committed intimate relationship doctrine, not a founded promise
or agreement that had to be supported by consideration. The Department fails to show that the
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committed intimate relationship doctrine has ever treated an implied contract as a precondition of
a committed intimate relationship. The doctrine’s foundation is to avoid unjust enrichment and
achieve equity. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 349-50.
Thus, the Estate does not need to prove that Roldan’s petition was supported by full and
adequate consideration because it was based on neither a promise nor an agreement, but a claim
based on the committed intimate relationship doctrine.
ATTORNEY FEES
The Estate argues it should be awarded attorney fees under RCW 11.96A.150(1). Under
this statute, we may equitably order costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to be awarded to any
party. Id. We may consider any and all factors that we deem to be relevant and appropriate. Id. In
light of the fact that the Estate’s argument is consistent with the Supreme Court’s longstanding
reasoning in Olver II, 161 Wn.2d at 670-71, we award attorney fees to the Estate in an amount to
be determined by a commissioner of this court.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s application of the committed intimate relationship doctrine and
recognize that Roldan’s property interest in the couple’s community-like property existed prior to
Franks’ death. Under Olver II, upon his death, Frank’s estate contained only his one-half interest
in the community-like property acquired during the relationship. The agreement resolving
Roldan’s TEDRA petition appropriately recognized this. The trial court did not err in its
application of the doctrine and it did not expand the doctrine to grant partners in a committed
intimate relationship the same rights as a spouse. We also affirm on the basis that Roldan’s petition
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No. 60728-0-II
was a legal, valid, and deductible claim. We grant attorney fees to the Estate in an amount to be
determined by this court’s commissioner.
GLASGOW, J.
We concur:
LEE, J.
CRUSER, C.J.
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