Daniel Ewald v. Tetyana Ewald

02/03/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 5, 2025 Session

DANIEL EWALD v. TETYANA EWALD

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Montgomery County

No. DI 21-130 Matthew Joel Wallace, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2024-00381-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

Husband and Wife divorced. In ruling upon contested matters, the trial court adopted a

parenting plan submitted by Husband with minor modifications, named Husband primary

residential parent of the parties’ minor children, and granted Husband primary custody of

his stepson. The trial court ordered Wife to pay child support and declined to grant her

alimony. The court also categorized and distributed the parties’ marital property. The

court denied Wife’s request to hold Husband in contempt for purportedly interfering with

her parenting time. Because the parties agree there was error as to Wife’s income for

purposes of the child support calculation and agree as to the number that should have been

used for her income, we modify the trial court’s award of child support accordingly. We

also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to value the marital property and to apply

the statutory factors and make relevant findings in connection with dividing the marital

estate. We conclude that the issue of primary custody over Husband’s stepson, who was

nearly 18 at the time of argument in this case, is moot. We affirm as to the other issues

presented in this appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

in Part; Modified in Part; Vacated in Part; Remanded

JEFFREY USMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL MCBRAYER and

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

Daniel P. Bryant, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tetyana Ewald.

Roger A. Maness and Colleen Hyder, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Daniel

Ewald.

OPINION

I.

Daniel Ewald (Husband), a member of the United States Army, met Tetyana Ewald

(Wife), who was from Ukraine, in 2014. They met while Husband was on deployment in

Jordan, which is where Wife was residing at the time. Within months of meeting, Husband

and Wife married, and Wife came to the United States for the first time. Nearly seven

years later, Husband filed for divorce from Wife, and Wife responded with her own

counter-complaint for divorce.

Husband and Wife contested multiple issues before the trial court. Both sought an

equitable division of marital assets and debts and a parenting plan providing for the two

minor children born of the marriage. Husband also sought visitation with his minor

stepson, Wife’s child from a prior relationship. Wife sought alimony. The court heard

testimony on these matters at trial from Husband, Wife, Husband’s stepson, Husband’s

parents, Wife’s mother, and two of Wife’s friends.

The parties both testified regarding complications in their relationship stemming

from Wife’s interactions with Husband’s ex-wife and his daughter from his previous

marriage. According to Husband, Wife had asked him “many times” to abandon his

relationship with his daughter. Husband believed the relationship between Wife and his

daughter was “not at all a healthy” one. In his view, “there was a lot of resentment on

[Wife’s] behalf toward” his daughter, whom Wife treated “like the scapegoat.” He also

testified that his daughter “was afraid of [Wife].” For her part, Wife testified that she felt

“there [was] a psychological problem” with Husband’s daughter. Furthermore, she

considered the daughter’s custody case as “a huge problem in [their] family” because, in

her view, Husband had “decided to take this child from her mother for no reason” and

“against [Wife’s] will.”

According to Husband, after a fight between Wife and Husband’s ex-wife turned

physical, Wife issued an ultimatum that Husband could either leave with his daughter or

stay with Wife and her children. Wife also “started to become destructive.” Husband

described one incident in which Wife allegedly “said she was going to go have [Husband’s]

funeral” and “burned half of [his] clothing” in their firepit. In another, “she smashed [his]

truck” with an iron skillet and a sledgehammer, causing thousands of dollars in damage.

For her part, Wife testified that she was in control of herself and knew what she was

doing during these events. She admitted that she “burned the stuff,” including some of

Husband’s clothes and art he had given her, as a symbolic “bye-bye to him” after he had

publicly insulted her. As for the truck, she indicated that her “intention wasn’t to damage

[it],” but instead “to let [her] regret about this man to go out,” which she felt “successful”

in doing.

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Husband and Wife offered dramatically divergent accounts of Wife’s interactions

with him and his extended family. According to Husband, Wife once threw his personal

items out of his truck’s window while he was driving, and she hit him until he bled. Wife

denied hitting Husband during the incident. In her telling, Husband had taken her phone,

and she “probably, maybe touched him” while trying to get it back. She claimed that after

they both exited the vehicle, he “grabbed” her, and she pushed him away to protect herself.

Husband’s father testified that Wife had once also “swung at” him and “hit [him] in the

face” when he reached out to take one of the children from her during an exchange. Wife

countered that she pushed him away and cursed at him because she felt that “he was

grabbing” at her and “touched” her while reaching for the child. Husband’s mother

testified about another event in which Wife pushed and “attacked” her in order to get into

Husband’s apartment. Addressing this incident, Wife attempted to justify her actions by

explaining that, even though Husband’s mother had asked her to leave the apartment, Wife

did not “have to listen to her [because] she’s nobody to [Wife].” The altercation escalated,

eventually resulting in Husband’s mother throwing Wife’s phone, grabbing her neck, and

pushing her against a wall.

Following her fight with Husband’s mother, Wife concluded that it would be

inappropriate for Husband to allow the children near their paternal grandmother anymore.

The next time Husband drove the children to his parents’ home, several states away, Wife

followed in her own vehicle. Wife brought her minor son from her prior marriage on the

hours-long drive, justifying this by stating she wanted her son to “see who he’s trusting”

and describing Husband’s family as “the liars.” Husband and his parents testified that,

from inside their house, they observed Wife climb into the back of Husband’s truck and

yell loudly in Russian while her minor son observed from Wife’s vehicle. At trial, Wife

rationalized her actions by noting that Husband’s truck was her truck as well, so she could

be there if she so desired. She claimed that she had been yelling in Russian because she

had just learned about the destruction of her premarital home in Ukraine.

Wife testified that she did not know how many times she had been arrested for

similar interpersonal incidents. At least one criminal charge resulting from her fights with

Husband’s family remained pending as of trial in the present case. Additionally, as a result

of Wife’s actions during the divorce proceedings, the court entered an order of protection

for Husband against Wife for stalking him. Wife claimed that she was making changes

though, including going to therapy, taking a class regarding “emotion[al] violence,” and

starting a parenting class.

Wife’s mother, who had moved from Ukraine to live with Husband and Wife,

testified in support of Wife. She explained that she depended on Wife for “everything”

and that she often helped Wife with childcare in exchange for continuing their living

arrangement. When questioned about Wife’s alleged bad behavior toward her and others,

Wife’s mother excused many of Wife’s actions as having been misinterpreted. Wife’s

mother also testified that she viewed Wife’s threats to have her deported as jokes. Wife’s

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mother also denied that Wife had ever assaulted or threatened her, despite evidence that

the police had once arrested Wife for threatening and assaulting both her and Wife’s son.

Addressing the incident with her son, Wife testified that she did not assault her son. She

instead insisted that he “fell down on [her] by inertia, and he hit [her] with his phone in the

face.” As for her mother, Wife indicated that she had only “kind of, like, push[ed]” her

mother in order to direct her to move.

During the divorce proceedings, Husband retired from his career with the military

in order to make more time for increased parenting responsibilities. His military service

had previously required him to leave the children in Wife’s sole care during several

months-long trainings and deployments, but his new employment at a fire station had a

more lenient schedule generally consisting of 24-hours-on, 48-hours-off. Husband hoped

to be named primary residential parent and to keep all the children together, including his

stepson, as the siblings were “bonded with each other.” Husband testified that he had raised

Wife’s child from her prior relationship, who did not have a significant relationship with

his biological father, “as a son.” Wife’s son agreed that he saw Husband as his father and

that he called Husband “Pop” or “Papa.” He testified that he wanted both parents in his

life, but he would prefer to live with his stepfather, Husband, rather than with Wife.

Husband submitted an itemized income and expense statement showing a monthly

surplus after paying all regular expenses for himself and the children. He earned

approximately $9,000 per month from his work plus military retirement and disability. The

most significant marital asset was the parties’ home, which he believed was worth between

$375,000 and $380,000. Approximately $213,000, however, remained owing on it.

Husband said he was prepared to buy Wife out of the equity in the home if permitted.

Wife testified that she was working for 40 hours each week and earning $23 per

hour, and she sometimes worked an additional freelancing job at a rate of $17 per hour.

She was uncertain of her regular expenses. She indicated that Husband was paying the

mortgage, electricity, water, and insurance bills on the home in which she resided. Wife

estimated that the mortgage was $1,500 and that the other bills were “up to $600, maybe

$500” in the winter and “even less” in the summer. She claimed that she owed around

$12,000 on her vehicle, which she thought might be worth $24,000. She also claimed that

she paid for her mother’s medical bills and son’s insurance. She provided no other

information about necessary expenses or her financial need. As for the marital home, she

agreed that Husband made the “correct statement” of its worth. She wanted to remain

living there but did not have any idea of what should be done with the home equity. She

stated that “whatever the judge will decide, I will do.”

Husband indicated that he had received a reenlistment bonus shortly before filing

for divorce and that he had removed funds from a joint account to a separate account to

which Wife did not have access. Wife testified that Husband had removed $100,000 from

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a joint account and used $20,000 of that amount to pay off his truck. She indicated he had

hidden the rest of the money.

The court granted Husband a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital

conduct. It also found “a significant existing relationship between [Husband] and [Wife’s

son, his stepson]” as well as a significant relationship between Wife’s son and the minor

children born of the marriage, such that the child was in “danger of substantial mental and

emotional harm” if visitation were not permitted. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-303(a)(1)

(authorizing courts to order stepparent visitation in certain “extraordinary cases”). The

court determined that it would consider the best interests of all three children together.

In analyzing the relevant statutory factors for the best interests of the children, the

court adopted a permanent parenting plan substantially similar to Husband’s proposed plan.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (effective July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2021).1 Husband

was named primary residential parent of all three children, who would reside with him for

285 days each year, while Wife would receive 80 residential parenting days. Husband also

received sole decision-making for educational and non-emergency healthcare decisions.

The court added several special provisions relating to parental communication and

exchanges, including a provision that each parent would have a right of first refusal to care

for the children overnight whenever the other parent was unavailable to do so during his or

her scheduled parenting time.

Based on the parenting plan and the applicable child support worksheet, the court

ordered Wife to pay Husband $620 in child support each month. See Tenn. Comp. R. &

Regs. 1240-02-04-.03 (explaining the “Income Shares Model” and steps for determination

of a parent’s basic child support obligation in Tennessee), -.04(1)(a)-(b) (mandating use of

a Child Support Worksheet for the calculation of a parent’s child support obligation); -.08

(instructions for completing the Child Support Worksheet). It then classified and divided

the parties’ property as follows:

3. Nonmarital property: Husband’s North Carolina real property

and/or proceeds is not marital property, and as such, is not subject to division.

Any real property owned by Wife located in Ukraine is not marital property,

and as such, is not subject to division.

1

See Cotten v. Cotten, No. M2023-01282-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 2505461, at *6 n.1 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Sept. 2, 2025) (“We apply the version of the statute in effect when [Husband] filed this divorce

action.”); see also In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (“[T]he version of the

statute in effect at the time of the petition’s filing controls this action.”).

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4. Personal property: [Husband] is awarded his weapons, military

gear, tools and separate property from the home and garage. [Wife] is

awarded the remaining personal property.

5. Debts: heretofore existing in a responsive party’s name shall be

their respective debt, each party holding the other harmless therefrom.

6. Retirement: Wife is entitled to a portion of Husband’s military

retirement. The Court finds the duration of marriage to represent One

Hundred Eight (108) months divisible by Husband’s creditable service of 21

years and 11 months.

7. Marital home: The Court finds that parties’ [marital residence] to

have a net equity in the amount of One Hundred Sixty Thousand Dollars,

with Wife’s share at fifty (50%) percent. Husband has the following two

options with regard to the home: Due to [Husband’s] stated interest in

residing in the home at minimum until the oldest child graduates [high

school], he may 1. elect to refinance the home now with Wife’s share to be

reimbursed from proceeds of the refinance, or 2. elect to sell the home within

sixty (60) days of the oldest child graduating high school, but shall pay to

Wife 50% of the net equity resulting from the sale.

After entry of the final decree, Wife moved to alter or amend the final order in

numerous respects, and she also sought to hold Husband in contempt for allegedly

interfering with her parenting time with her son. The court denied both requests.

Wife appeals. With regard to parenting, Wife contends that the trial court erred by

designating Husband as the primary residential parent, by adopting his proposed parenting

plan, and by granting Husband primary custody over her son from a prior relationship. We

note that Wife’s son was almost 18 when this case was argued before this court. Wife also

asserts the trial court erred as to her income for purposes of calculating her child support

obligations. As to the marital estate, Wife insists that the trial court erred by failing to

value the marital property and by failing to apply the relevant statutory factors or make

findings to support its division of the marital estate. Wife also contends that the trial court

erred by denying her motion for contempt against Husband. Additionally, she argues that

the trial court erred in failing to award her alimony.

In considering this appeal, including reading the parties’ briefs and reviewing the

record, it became apparent that the trial court had not disposed of Wife’s claim for alimony

or the parties’ competing claims for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, this court entered an

order directing the trial court to address these issues. The trial court, in response, denied

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the claims for alimony and attorney’s fees.2 This court invited further briefing from the

parties and offered a timeline for competition of this briefing. No supplemental briefing

was filed by either party.

II.

Wife raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting Husband primary

custody of Wife’s son from a prior relationship. As a threshold matter, we “must first

consider questions pertaining to justiciability” of this issue “before proceeding to the merits

of any remaining claims.” City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tenn.

2013) (citing UT Med. Grp., Inc. v. Vogt, 235 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tenn. 2007)). The

justiciability doctrines “provide criteria for determining whether the courts should hear and

decide a particular case.” Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty.,

301 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Tenn. 2009). Among these is the mootness doctrine, which the

Tennessee Supreme Court has described as follows:

A case must remain justiciable (remain a legal controversy) from the time it

is filed until the moment of final appellate disposition. While the doctrines

of standing and ripeness focus on the suit’s birth, the doctrine of mootness

focuses attention on the suit’s death. A moot case is one that has lost its

justiciability either by court decision, acts of the parties, or some other reason

occurring after commencement of the case. A case will be considered moot

if it no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of judicial relief to the

prevailing party.

Id. at 203-04 (citations omitted).

An issue may lose justiciability and thereby become moot during the pendency of a

case. Lufkin v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of the Sup. Ct., 336 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Tenn. 2011).

Tennessee courts have previously concluded that parenting issues have been mooted by

children reaching the age of majority. See, e.g., Niemeyer v. Niemeyer, No. E2022-01690-

COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 1645829, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2024). In the present

case, Wife’s son turned 18 shortly after oral argument and during the pendency of this

2

The trial court responded with a brief order, which stated:

. . . on October 8, 2025, the trial court conducted a phone conference regarding the

order with all counsel in the matter.

It was and is this Court’s intent to deny any relief not specifically granted in its

prior order, to include claims for attorney’s fees and alimony. To the extent not already

denied, claims for attorney’s fees and alimony are hereby respectfully denied.

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appeal. We therefore conclude a challenge as to the trial court’s award of primary custody

of Wife’s son to Husband is moot.

III.

Wife also contends that the trial court erred in fashioning the parenting plan’s

residential parenting schedule as to the two minor children born of the marriage and in

designating Husband the primary residential parent. Decisions regarding parenting plans

are factually driven, and thus, “determining the details of parenting plans is ‘peculiarly

within the broad discretion of the trial judge.’” Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685,

693 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988)). We will

not reverse the court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42

S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001) (“It is not the function of appellate courts to tweak a

[residential parenting schedule] in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the

trial court.”). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court applies incorrect legal

standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous

assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the

complaining party.” West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tenn. 2015).

“The paramount concern in establishing a permanent parenting plan is the best

interest of the children.” Maupin v. Maupin, 420 S.W.3d 761, 770 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)

(citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-401(a)). The determination of a child’s best interest

presents a question of fact. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692. The Tennessee Supreme Court

has “emphasized the limited scope of review to be employed by an appellate court in

reviewing a trial court’s factual determinations in matters involving child custody and

parenting plan developments.” C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tenn. 2017).

Additionally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has indicated that

trial courts enjoy broad discretion in formulating parenting plans. Thus,

determining the details of parenting plans is peculiarly within the broad

discretion of the trial judge. Appellate courts should not overturn a trial

court’s decision merely because reasonable minds could reach a different

conclusion.

Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, in reviewing the trial court’s decisions

regarding such matters, Tennessee appellate courts “should reverse custody decisions ‘only

when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably

result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence.’” Id. (citation and

quotation omitted).

In challenging the trial court’s decisions, Wife contends that the court abused its

discretion by incorrectly weighing the statutory factors regarding the best interests of the

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children. Specifically, she challenges the trial court’s determination in connection with

factors (1), (2), (9), (12), (14). These include:

(1) The strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each

parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority of

parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child;

(2) Each parent’s or caregiver’s past and potential for future performance of

parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the

parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing

parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s parents,

consistent with the best interest of the child. In determining the willingness

of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and

continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the child’s

parents, the court shall consider the likelihood of each parent and caregiver

to honor and facilitate court ordered parenting arrangements and rights, and

the court shall further consider any history of either parent or any caregiver

denying parenting time to either parent in violation of a court order;

...

(9) The child’s interaction and interrelationships with siblings, other relatives

and step-relatives, and mentors, as well as the child’s involvement with the

child’s physical surroundings, school, or other significant activities;

...

(12) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or

frequents the home of a parent and such person’s interactions with the child;

...

(14) Each parent’s employment schedule, and the court may make

accommodations consistent with those schedules . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (effective July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2021).3

3

The other factors to be considered by the trial court in analyzing the best interests of the children

under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a) include:

...

(3) Refusal to attend a court ordered parent education seminar may be considered by the

court as a lack of good faith effort in these proceedings;

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Wife challenges trial court’s analysis of Factor (2), which the court found weighed

in favor of Husband. In considering Factor (2), as noted above, a court evaluates each

parent’s “past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including

the willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage

a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child[ren] and both of the

child[ren]’s parents . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(2). In the present case, the trial

court concluded that it had “concerns . . . with regards to [Wife’s]” willingness to coparent,

stating that, “given the level of acrimony that clearly exists between the parties, co-

(4) The disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care,

education and other necessary care;

(5) The degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver, defined as the parent who

has taken the greater responsibility for performing parental responsibilities;

(6) The love, affection, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child;

(7) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;

(8) The moral, physical, mental and emotional fitness of each parent as it relates to their

ability to parent the child. The court may order an examination of a party under Rule 35 of

the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and, if necessary for the conduct of the

proceedings, order the disclosure of confidential mental health information of a party under

§ 33-3-105(3). The court order required by § 33-3-105(3) must contain a qualified

protective order that limits the dissemination of confidential protected mental health

information to the purpose of the litigation pending before the court and provides for the

return or destruction of the confidential protected mental health information at the

conclusion of the proceedings;

...

(10) The importance of continuity in the child’s life and the length of time the child has

lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;

(11) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other parent or to any

other person. The court shall, where appropriate, refer any issues of abuse to juvenile court

for further proceedings;

...

(13) The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older. The court

may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preference of older children

should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children;

...

(15) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.

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parenting will continue to be a struggle.” Wife seeks to recharacterize much of what the

trial court found concerning regarding her conduct as mere “incidents of passionate

display” on her part or as part of an overall “volatile relationship.” She suggests Husband

would not have reconciled with her on multiple occasions prior to the divorce if her conduct

had truly been egregious. However, the trial court found that Wife had engaged in

significant destruction of Husband’s property, including the incident she referred to as “his

funeral,” and awarded Husband an order of protection against Wife that was continued in

the final order. From our review of the record, the evidence does not preponderate against

the trial court’s finding as to concern regarding Mother’s conduct or the trial court’s

conclusion that coparenting favors Father.

Wife also contends that Factors (1) and (14) should have weighed in her favor based

on the parties’ past and present work schedules and related parenting roles. Factor (1)

requires a court to consider “[t]he strength, nature, and stability of the child[ren]’s

relationship with each parent, including whether one (1) parent has performed the majority

of parenting responsibilities relating to the daily needs of the child,” and Factor (14)

specifically directs the court to review “[e]ach parent’s employment schedule.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(1), (14). In Wife’s view, her parenting during Husband’s past

deployments should have weighed more heavily in her favor, and the trial court should

have found that Husband’s current 24-hours-on, 48-hours-off work schedule with the fire

department “work[ed] against him.” In the present case, the trial court did consider that

Wife had “served in a primary parenting role” during Husband’s deployments. The trial

court also observed, however, that Mother’s parenting role was more substantial prior to

the grandmother’s arrival in the United States. Additionally, the trial court “credit[ed]

[Husband’s] testimony considerably with regards to his primary parenting role” when not

deployed. Additionally, the court considered the differences between both parents’ work

schedules and concluded that Husband’s schedule warranted the addition of a provision

outlining a right of first refusal any time either parent was unable to care for the children

overnight. From our review of the record, we cannot say that the record preponderates

against the trial court’s findings as to these factors.

Finally, Wife argues that Factors (9) and (12) should have weighed in her favor

based on her familial relationships. Factor (9) focuses on “[t]he child[ren]’s interaction

and interrelationships with siblings, other relatives and step-relatives, and mentors, as well

as the child[ren]’s involvement with the child[ren]’s physical surroundings, school, or other

significant activities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(9). Similarly, Factor (12) evaluates

“[t]he character and behavior of any other person who resides in or frequents the home of

a parent and such person’s interactions with the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-

106(a)(12). The court found Factor (9) relevant for purposes of granting Husband

parenting time with his stepson, but it found Factor (12) inapplicable. Mother notes that

she lives with the children’s maternal grandmother, whom Husband has entrusted with the

children and who has a positive relationship with the children. Additionally, Wife notes

Husband had a positive perception of Wife’s mother. Assuming that the grandmother

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residing with Wife weighs in Wife’s favor, this would still not change the overall best

interest analysis to such an extent so as to render the trial court’s ruling an abuse of its

discretion.

The trial court’s ruling ultimately plainly reflects the trial court’s concern with

Mother’s volatility and the negative impact of that volatility on the children. Given the

discretion afforded to the trial court, having considered the arguments and reviewed the

record, we simply cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in the allocation

of parenting time or in the designation of the primary residential parent in the present case.

IV.

Wife also contends the trial court abused its discretion in setting her income for

purposes of calculating child support and thus erred in its final child support order.

Husband concedes that Wife is correct on this point.

“The process and criteria for ascertaining a parent’s child support obligation [are]

governed by Child Support Guidelines promulgated by the Tennessee Department of

Human Services, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(e).” Reeder

v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 275 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); see also Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.

1240-02-04-.04 (Tennessee Child Support Guidelines). Application of the guidelines

results in a presumptive award of child support, Richardson v. Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720,

725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), from which the trial court may deviate, so long as it “make[s]

a written finding that the application of the child support guidelines would be unjust or

inappropriate in that particular case ” and provides “a justification for the variance from

the guidelines.” Tenn. Code Ann. 36-5-101(e)(1)(A) (effective May 10, 2019, to Mar. 28,

2021); see Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.07.

The Child Support Guidelines provide a Child Support Worksheet, the use of which

is “mandatory in order to ensure uniformity in the calculation of child support awards

pursuant to the rules.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-02-04-.04(1)(b). Because the Child

Support Guidelines are based on an income shares model, the Child Support Worksheet

requires input of, among other things, each parent’s gross income. Tenn. Comp. R. &

Regs. 1240-02-04-.03, -.04(3). “Determining a party’s income is a question of fact that

‘require[s] careful consideration of all the attendant circumstances.’” Robeson v. Robeson,

No. M2023-01449-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 368233, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2025)

(quoting Richardson, 189 S.W.3d at 726).

Here, the final decree of divorce states that Wife’s “income for purposes of child

support shall be calculated using her income from [her primary job] solely,” without

including any freelance earnings. Wife testified that she worked 40 hours per week at her

primary job and earned $23 per hour. According to Wife, “[t]his would put her income at

$3,986 per month.” However, the trial court input gross monthly income of $4,160 into

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the Child Support Worksheet. Husband concedes that Wife “is correct in her assertion that

her monthly income [for] child support purposes is $3,986.” He adds that the error in

calculating child support resulted from inadvertently “using $24 per hour rather than $23

per hour.”

We have previously modified a child support order where the trial court made only

a “mathematical error.” State ex rel. Williams v. Woods, 530 S.W.3d 129, 145 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2017). Here, inputting the agreed-upon $3,986 for Wife’s income into the Child

Support Worksheet, instead of the $4,160 that the parties agree was error, results in an

order that Wife pay to Husband $597 monthly in child support. We therefore modify the

permanent parenting plan order to reflect that Wife’s gross monthly income for child

support purposes is $3,986 per month and that Wife shall pay to Husband as regular child

support the sum of $597 monthly.

V.

We turn next to Wife’s challenge to the division of the marital estate. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (effective July 1, 2017 to March 30, 2022) (requiring the court

to equitably divide the marital property of the divorcing parties). While conventional

arguments with regard to marital estate distribution tend to touch upon purported

misclassification of property or purported inequitable distribution of the property, here,

Wife challenges the trial court’s ruling at a foundational level. She argues that “[t]here

was no valuation of the property or debt. There was no analysis of the property under the

[statutory] factors. This is an abuse of discretion.” She concedes the trial court valued the

marital home and that she does not dispute the trial court’s valuation thereof. However,

beyond the home, she notes that the trial court’s order is devoid of any valuation of the

property. She notes a failure to address Husband’s reenlistment bonus; Husband’s use of

$20,000 to pay off the debt on his vehicle, while leaving the debt on Wife’s vehicle; and

Husband’s admitted removal of funds from a joint account into an account in his name,

which Wife contends amounted to 100,000 dollars and which she asserts was hidden from

her.

Husband does not contend that the trial court properly valued the property in the

marital estate or that the trial court made appropriate findings or applied the applicable

statutory factors for consideration in equitably distributing a marital estate. Husband

instead relies upon a waiver argument. He asserts Wife waived this issue based upon her

failure to include a Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 7 table.

Rule 7 provides as follows:

(a) In any domestic relations appeal in which either party takes issue with the

classification of property or debt or with the manner in which the trial court

divided or allocated the marital property or debt, the brief of the party raising

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the issue shall contain, in the statement of facts or in an appendix, a table in

a form substantially similar to the form attached hereto. This table shall list

all property and debts considered by the trial court, including: (1) all separate

property, (2) all marital property, and (3) all separate and marital debts.

(b) Each entry in the table must include a citation to the record where each

party’s evidence regarding the classification or valuation of the property or

debt can be found and a citation to the record where the trial court’s decision

regarding the classification, valuation, division, or allocation of the property

or debt can be found.

(c) If counsel disagrees with any entry in the opposing counsel’s table,

counsel must include in his or her brief, or in a reply brief if the issue was

raised by opposing counsel after counsel filed his or her initial brief, a similar

table containing counsel’s version of the facts.

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 7.

At oral argument, this court questioned Wife’s counsel regarding the absence of a

Rule 7 table. Though Wife’s counsel conceded that the trial court valued the marital home,

as Wife had noted in her brief, Wife’s counsel also pointed to the inherent challenge in

creating a Rule 7 valuation table where the trial court did not value the property of the

marital estate.4

Husband is correct that non-compliance with Rule 7 may be grounds for waiver.

See e.g. Harden v. Harden, M2009-01302-CA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2612688, at *8 (Tenn Ct.

App. June 30, 2010). “However, this court exercises a preference to decide issues upon

the merits and may in its discretion consider an issue despite a party’s failure to include a

Rule 7 table, especially where the table would be of little value to the determination of the

issue and where the appealing party provides citation to the record supporting their

argument elsewhere in their brief.” Bailey v. Bailey, No. M2022-01467-COA-R3-CV,

2025 WL 1517411, at *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2025); see e.g. Green v. Green, No.

M2011-00840-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2389607, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2012)

(exercising discretion to consider property division despite Rule 7 violation where the table

would have been of little value given the trial court’s failure to classify marital and separate

property and where appellant provided relevant citations to the record elsewhere in their

4

We note any deficiencies by the trial court regarding valuation do not actually prevent Wife from

generating a table delineating the separate and marital property and the separate and marital debts presented

before the trial court as to which she is asserting error in failing to value entirely or properly on appeal. Nor

would any deficiencies as to the trial court’s findings as to valuation prevent Wife from indicating what

evidence she presented to establish valuation. In other words, the challenges noted by Wife’s counsel point

toward an explanation for an incomplete table but not an entirely absent one. Wife did, however, in her

brief cite to the record with regard to specific property as to which she had concerns as to lack of valuation.

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brief and also noting “our preference that cases be decided on the merits”); Dilley v. Dilley,

M2009-02585-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2015395, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2011)

(exercising discretion to consider property division despite Rule 7 violation and despite

voluminous record given “our preference that cases be decided on the merits”); Wells v.

Wells, W2009-01600-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 891885, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15,

2010) (exercising discretion to “suspend the requirements” of Rule 7 even though the court

consequently had to conduct a “tedious and meticulous review of the parties’ briefs and the

record” and noting “[t]he intent of the Rules is for all cases to be decided on the merits if

possible”); Collins v. Collins, W2008-02660-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3103821, at *4

(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009) (same); see also Tenn. Ct. App. R. 1(b) (“For good cause,

including the interest of expediting a decision upon any matter, this Court, or the panel

assigned to hear a particular case, may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of

these rules in a particular case on motion of a party, or on its own motion, and may order

proceedings in accordance with its discretion.”).

Here, Wife made core foundational process challenges to the division of a marital

estate under Tennessee law. She asserted the trial court failed to make determinations as

to valuation of marital property, failed to apply the applicable statutory factors, and failed

to explain its reasoning. The trial court’s final order on its face is supportive of Wife’s

argument, and she provides citations to the record regarding property of particular concern.

Given the nature of her argument while also remaining mindful of the preference that cases

be decided on the merits, we exercise our discretion to consider the issue despite Wife’s

non-compliance with Rule 7. We caution, however, that our holding should not be

construed as setting forth a general rule that a party may be routinely excused from the

requirements of Rule 7. See Green, 2012 WL 2389607, at *3 & n. 4 (citing Wells, 2010

WL 891885, at *4).

“Trial courts divide a couple’s marital estate using a four-step process:

identification, classification, valuation, and distribution.” Henry v. Henry, No. M2024-

00030-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 304573, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2025). According

to Wife, the breakdown in the present case occurred after the classification step. We have

previously stated:

Once property has been classified as marital property, the court should place

a reasonable value on property that is subject to division. After this

valuation, the trial court is to divide the marital property in an equitable

manner considering the statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated

section 36-4-121(c).

Trezevant v. Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 606-07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted).

This court has observed that “Tennessee law is clear that ‘[t]rial courts must place

a reasonable value on marital property that is subject to division.’” Artry v. Artry, No.

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W2020-00224-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 4372775, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2022)

(quoting Kraus v. Thomas, No. M2012-00877-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 2612458, at *10

(Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2013); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, No. M2012-01845-COA-R3-CV,

2013 WL 1400618, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013)). We have also noted the

mandatory nature of applying the statutory factors for determining the proper distribution

of the marital estate.5 Hill v. Hill, 682 S.W.3d 184, 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023); see also

5

At the time Mr. Ewald filed for divorce, the statute listed the following factors:

(1) The duration of the marriage;

(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability, earning capacity,

estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of the parties;

(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the education, training or

increased earning power of the other party;

(4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;

(5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation,

depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, including the contribution

of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a

party as homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party has fulfilled

its role;

(B) For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means wasteful

expenditures which reduce the marital property available for equitable distributions and

which are made for a purpose contrary to the marriage either before or after a complaint

for divorce or legal separation has been filed;

(6) The value of the separate property of each party;

(7) The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;

(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to

become effective;

(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable

sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;

(10) In determining the value of an interest in a closely held business or similar asset, all

relevant evidence, including valuation methods typically used with regard to such assets

without regard to whether the sale of the asset is reasonably foreseeable. Depending on

the characteristics of the asset, such considerations could include, but would not be limited

to, a lack of marketability discount, a discount for lack of control, and a control premium,

if any should be relevant and supported by the evidence;

(11) The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and

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Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (“Trial courts have wide

latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property. Their decisions must be

guided by the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) . . . .” (citations omitted))

Addressing deficiencies in a trial court’s findings in connection with assessing the

distribution of the marital estate under the statutory factors, we have noted the following:

[A]lthough the trial court made certain factual findings that were relevant to

an analysis of some statutory factors, the court failed to consider or omitted

other factors. The trial court’s order lacks a concerted analysis of the

statutory factors or a discussion of their applicability. In addition, the court’s

order lacks values assigned to certain assets. As a result of these omissions,

we are unable to adequately assess the trial court’s overall marital property

distribution to determine whether it is equitable. We therefore have no

choice but to vacate the marital property distribution and to remand this

matter to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to “make specific

findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code

Annotated § 36-4-121(c) and Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.”

[Leonard v. Leonard, No. W2018-02235-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 1515951,

at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2020)].

Hill, 682 S.W.3d at 205.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court as to the distribution of the

marital estate and remand for valuation and distribution in accordance with the statutory

factors as well as for findings that elucidate the trial court’s decision.

VI.

Wife also argues that the court erred in denying her post-trial motion to hold

Husband in contempt for allegedly interfering with her parenting time with her child from

a prior relationship. The entirety of Wife’s argument on appeal is as follows: “In a one-

page order, and without testimony or reasons given, the Trial Court summarily denied [the]

Motion. This is clearly an abuse of discretion. Some form of testimony or reasoning must

be given.”

We have repeatedly held that “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to

research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l

Resp. of Supreme Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). Thus, where “a party fails to

(12) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (effective July 1, 2017, to March 30, 2022).

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develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal

argument,” as Wife has done here, “the issue is waived.” Id.

VII.

Wife also asserts that the trial court erred in declining to award her alimony. It is

well established that a trial court’s decision regarding spousal support is factually driven,

so we are “disinclined to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal support decision” absent an

abuse of discretion. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting

Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). As the Tennessee Supreme

Court has explained,

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by

applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the

case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning

that causes an injustice. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166,

176 (Tenn. 2011); Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn.

2010). This standard does not permit an appellate court to substitute its

judgment for that of the trial court, but “‘reflects an awareness that the

decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable

alternatives,’ and thus ‘envisions a less rigorous review of the lower court's

decision and a decreased likelihood that the decision will be reversed on

appeal.’” Henderson, 318 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Lee Medical, Inc. v.

Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)). Consequently, when

reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, such as an alimony

determination, the appellate court should presume that the decision is correct

and should review the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision.

Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 176; Henderson, 318 S.W.3d at 335.

Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 105-06.

Tennessee courts have repeatedly explained that, of these factors, “[t]he two most

important factors considered are the need of the disadvantaged spouse and the obligor

spouse’s ability to pay.” Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tenn. 2004);

Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 110. In fact, the “threshold consideration” in an alimony

determination is the need of the disadvantaged spouse. Ellis v. Ellis, 621 S.W.3d 700, 706

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has described “the real need of the spouse seeking the

support” as “the single most important factor” in the analysis. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at

115 (quoting Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995)). Thus, even where there

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exists evidence of disparity in the parties’ income or an ability to pay, our Supreme Court

has found denial of alimony appropriate where the party seeking alimony “has not

demonstrated that [he or she] is in need of additional financial assistance in order to adjust

to the economic consequences of [his or her] divorce.” Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court

has also found denial of alimony appropriate where “the record contains no evidence at all

regarding [the disadvantaged spouse’s] expenses” nor any evidence of a “demonstrated

need for support.” Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108, 119 (Tenn. 2012). “A spouse’s

need for alimony must be established by proof. Indeed, absent evidence regarding need,

as well as the other factors pertinent to the parties’ circumstances, alimony should not be

awarded.” Id. at 120.

Here, Wife introduced no evidence of financial need beyond speculation as to the

costs of her regular mortgage and utility bills, which Husband paid. She testified as to her

uncertainty as to those estimates. Furthermore, Wife did not submit any evidence

demonstrating past or current expenses. She did not submit an income and expense

statement, nor did she provide financial documentation, such as bills or receipts, to

demonstrate financial need. However, she presented evidence of an income of $23 per

hour at a rate of 40 hours per week, with occasional additional freelancing work at a rate

of $17 per hour.

On appeal, Wife has not pointed to any part of the record demonstrating evidence

of her financial need. As support for her alimony request, she refers to Husband’s financial

affidavit as evidence of his ability to pay, to her history as a caregiver for the children, to

her diverse employment history, to a past knee surgery, and to a statement regarding

minimal personal retirement savings. Wife had the burden to offer proof establishing the

nature of and the extent of her need for alimony. This she has not done. Accordingly, we

cannot find the trial court abused its discretion.

VIII.

For the aforementioned reasons, we modify the decision of the Chancery Court for

Montgomery County regarding the award of child support, and we vacate the trial court’s

judgment with regard to the distribution of the marital estate. We, otherwise, affirm the

trial court’s judgment. Costs of this appeal are taxed equally to the appellant, Tetyana

Ewald, and the appellee, Daniel Ewald, for which execution may issue if necessary. The

case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this

opinion.

s/ Jeffrey Usman

JEFFREY USMAN, JUDGE

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