Owens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JAMES OWENS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 3:25-cv-03161-MMM

)

LATOYA HUGHES, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Pinckneyville

Correctional Center seeks to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge various

aspects of the proposed terms of his state court mandatory supervised release. Several

matters are before the Court and will be addressed in turn.

A. Merit Review

The court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process identify

and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” Id.

The court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the

plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory

statements and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted).

Allegations

Plaintiff names as Defendants IDOC Director Latoya Hughes, the Illinois

Prisoner Review Board, the Chair and several Members of the Prisoner Review Board,

Illinois Parole Chief Jason Garnett, Deputy Illinois Parole Chief Dion Dixon, John Does,

and Alyssa Williams.

Plaintiff is 66 years old. In 1979, in California, Plaintiff sexually abused a six-

year-old girl he was left alone with at the house of an acquaintance. He alleges he “had

been curious about engaging in sexual intercourse with a young girl.” He was arrested,

charged, found guilty, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. After serving that

time he was diverted to a mandatory treatment facility where he received treatment

over the next forty-two months. Plaintiff there admitted to “fondling” four other girls in

the past, when he had been left alone with them. Plaintiff moved to Illinois in 1983, met

his “life partner” Brenda, and they had a son in 1985. In about 1999 Plaintiff sexually

assaulted his son’s friend Brittany repeatedly over a period of 7 or 8 months. Plaintiff

pled guilty to a criminal charge based on those actions and was sentenced to 30 years in

prison. He is nearing the end of that sentence.

He now seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the Illinois Prisoner Review

Board’s Order setting the terms of his Mandatory Supervised Relief. Plaintiff argues

that for various reasons that Order is constitutionally infirm.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and the

precedent developed therefrom. Heck prohibits a prisoner from obtaining relief in a

§ 1983 suit where a judgment in [his] favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of

his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. This is so, unless “the conviction or

sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of

habeas corpus.” Id. at 489.

The Heck-bar applies to terms of mandatory supervised release because “[f]or

parolees, the ... ‘conditions’ of parole are the confinement.” Williams v. Wisconsin, 336

F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2003); Ortega v. Ford, No. 23-1784, 2024 WL 1634072, at *3 (7th Cir.

Apr. 16, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 437 (2024).

Here, there is no indication that Plaintiff has attempted to invalidate this aspect

of his sentence through collateral attack in one full round of state court review followed

by petitioning a federal court for federal habeas relief. Those are the steps Plaintiff must

take to try to invalidate the terms of his sentence, rather than this civil suit under § 1983.

If successful in invalidating his sentence, and if he could plausibly allege that he was

somehow injured, it is possible that perhaps he could then pursue a suit like this one.

B. Motion to Request Counsel

Plaintiff requests that the Court appoint counsel on his behalf. Doc. 5.

The Seventh Circuit has summarized the legal standard for Plaintiff’s request as

follows:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a federal court “may request an attorney to

represent any person unable to afford counsel.” The statute is “entirely

permissive.” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Civil

litigants have no constitutional or statutory right to court-appointed

counsel, and § 1915(e)(1) “does not authorize the federal courts to make

coercive appointments of counsel.” Id. at 653 (quoting Mallard v. U.S. Dist.

Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318

(1989)). Rather, the statute “codifies the court’s discretionary authority to

recruit a lawyer to represent an indigent civil litigant pro bono publico.” Id.

“Almost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too

many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer

for these cases.” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). “District

courts are thus placed in the unenviable position of identifying, among a

sea of people lacking counsel, those who need counsel the most.” Id.

Accordingly, we have recently explained that “the decision whether to

recruit a lawyer for a particular plaintiff is made against the twofold

backdrop of a high volume of indigent, pro se litigants (particularly

incarcerated individuals) and a small pool, by comparison, of attorneys

willing and able to take those cases on pro bono.” Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th

755, 763 (7th Cir. 2022). Based on these and other practical considerations,

we have held that district judges should engage in a two-step inquiry when

faced with a request for pro bono counsel under § 1915(e)(1), asking first

“(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel

or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the

difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it

himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654.

The first step needs no elaboration. Step two “can be complex” and involves

a pragmatic judgment about the difficulty of the case and the plaintiff’s

ability to present it to the court on his own. Watts, 42 F.4th at 760. “The

inquiries are necessarily intertwined; the difficulty of the case is considered

against the plaintiff’s litigation capabilities, and those capabilities are

examined in light of the challenges specific to the case at hand.” Pruitt, 503

F.3d at 655. A judge will normally consider “the plaintiff’s literacy,

communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience” along

with any evidence in the record “bearing on the plaintiff’s intellectual

capacity and psychological history.” Id. But these are merely factors that are

ordinarily relevant. No one factor is “necessary or conclusive.” Id. at 655

n.9. Indeed, “[t]here are no fixed requirements for determining a plaintiff’s

competence to litigate his own case.” Id. at 655. Ultimately, the “inquiry into

the plaintiff’s capacity to handle his own case is a practical one, made in

light of whatever relevant evidence is available on the question.” Id.

Finally, “the decision whether to recruit pro bono counsel is left to the

district court’s discretion.” Id. at 654. Our job is to ensure that this discretion

is exercised in accordance with appropriate legal principles. The “question

on appellate review is not whether we would have recruited a volunteer

lawyer in the circumstances, but whether the district court applied the

correct legal standard and reached a reasonable decision based on facts

supported by the record.” Id. at 658.

Jones v. Anderson, 116 F.4th 669, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2024). In determining the second step, the

Court may view the case through the lens of certain factors that the Seventh Circuit has

enumerated.

Though this inquiry must be case-and plaintiff-specific, we have identified

circumstances that tend to diminish a prisoner-plaintiff’s ability to litigate

pro se, such as when: (1) the case reaches later stages of litigation, (2) the

plaintiff is transferred to another facility and loses access to relevant

witnesses or evidence, (3) the claim depends on the state of mind of the

defendant, and (4) expert testimony is necessary to prove the claim.

Owens v. Wexford Health Sources, et al., No. 22-2882, 2024 WL 5242367, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec.

30, 2024), citing James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 327-28 (7th Cir. 2018).

Here, first, Plaintiff has not shown a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on his

own, nor has he shown he cannot do so. He indicates he was at a time held in segregation,

but he is now at a different prison and has been in regular written communication with

the Courts. Plaintiff must attempt to find an attorney by writing to several attorneys,

specific to this lawsuit, and if unsuccessful may renew his motion, attaching copies of his

request letters sent along with any responses received.

As to the second inquiry, Plaintiff’s claims are not factually difficult; he alleges his

rights were violated under his sentence. However, working out exactly who did what at

what time in relation to decisions that were made may be difficult to prove because

Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of some of those facts, and has moved prisons

several times. This factor somewhat favors a search for counsel on Plaintiff’s behalf.

Written discovery would produce to Plaintiff the relevant conviction and sentence

records related to his claims, though, making the factual difficulty overall a wash.

Plaintiff’s claims are not particularly legally difficult, though all federal litigation

is difficult to a degree. Plaintiff’s pleadings are clear and legible. They are coherent. And

Plaintiff has extensive federal litigation experience, which weighs against appointing

counsel. Plaintiff’s education level is not before the Court, but once again he appears well

able to communicate. There is no information before the Court that indicates Plaintiff is

mentally impaired to the extent that he cannot represent himself.

Most importantly, it appears this case is without legal merit as brought, and so

recruitment of counsel would be a poor use of Court resources in this case.

Here, looking at Plaintiff’s abilities compared with the many other unrepresented

litigants who ask for help finding a free lawyer, considering all the factors, and in an

exercise of its discretion, the Court finds Plaintiff can adequately continue representing

himself.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [5] is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Hearing [6] is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff's motions for status [7], [8] are DENIED as MOOT.

4. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable as they must be pursued as

collateral attacks to his sentence rather than under § 1983. As such, Plaintiff's

allegations do not state a claim. This action is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff

must first proceed in state court and federal habeas if he wants to challenge the terms

of his sentence. Judgment to enter for Defendants. A future court may find this

dismissal counts under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Entered this 2nd day of February, 2026.

s/Michael M. Mihm

MICHAEL M. MIHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE