Huddleston

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

WILLIAM C. HUDDLESTON CIVIL CASE NO. 22-2105

VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS

SHANNON CONSTANTINE, ET AL MAG. JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment. Matt Cloud (“Deputy

Cloud”), Mark Baden (“Deputy Baden”), Billy Fuller (“Deputy Fuller”), and Mark

Wood (“Sheriff Wood”) (collectively, the “RPSO Defendants”) filed the first Motion for

Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 42). Shannon Constantine (“Officer Constantine”), the

City of Alexandria (the “City”), the Alexandria Police Department (the “APD”), and

Ronney Howard (“Chief Howard”) (collectively, “APD Defendants”) filed the second

Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 44). Plaintiff, William Huddleston

(“Huddleston”), opposes both motions (R. Docs. 55, 57). RPSO Defendants and APD

Defendants (collectively referred to as “Defendants”) replied to Huddleston’s

oppositions (R. Docs. 65, 67). Huddleston filed a sur-reply to the RPSO Defendants’

reply (R. Doc. 70).

After consideration of the parties’ memoranda and the applicable law, the

Motions are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the alleged false arrest of Huddleston on July 14, 2021,

when he was detained by Officer Constantine and Deputies Cloud, Baden, and Fuller.

That morning, at 8:28 a.m., Officer Constantine was dispatched to investigate a

carjacking.1 Officer Constantine obtained a description of the vehicle and its license

plate from the victim—a gray Honda Ridgeline with the license plate Y154496.2 She

was also told that one or more firearms were in the Ridgeline when it was stolen.3

When Officer Constantine investigated the carjacking, she spoke to a witness who

was a minor at the time of the incident.4 The witness did not observe the carjacking.5

The witness stated that “the only thing he saw was two black male subjects leaving

in the Ridgeline.”6 Officer Constantine issued a “be on the lookout” (“BOLO”) based

on the information provided by the victim and that the suspects were considered

armed and dangerous, but she did not include the description of the suspects from

the minor witness because he was a minor and he did not witness the crime, only the

escape.7 Officer Constantine believed that the witness may have been mistaken, and

that the suspects may have been “‘wearing dark clothing’ or been ‘disguised,’ or

‘wearing masks’ while driving off.”8

1 See R. Doc. 57 at 11.

2 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 18–19.

3 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 19.

4 See R. Doc. 57 at 11.

5 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 40.

6 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 40.

7 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 87.

8 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 37.

At 9:18 a.m., Officer Constantine contacted dispatch to inquire about a Nissan

Altima that was spotted at the scene of the carjacking.9 At 9:24 a.m., APD Dispatcher

Alleuna Williams (“Dispatcher Williams”) contacted the LaSalle Parish Sheriff’s

Office regarding the Nissan Altima and was informed that it was stolen from

Ouachita Parish and involved in a hit and run in LaSalle Parish.10 It was later

confirmed to Dispatcher Williams that the Altima was stolen in Monroe, Louisiana,

and it was believed that three escapees from a correctional facility for juveniles were

the suspects.11

At 10:13 a.m., the stolen Honda Ridgeline was seen on Interstate Highway 49

South in Carencro, Louisiana.12 A Detective from the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff’s

Office informed APD Sergeant Smith (“Sergeant Smith”) of the sighting at 11:16 a.m.,

and based on the sighting, Sergeant Smith stated, “[t]hey’re headed – they’re

probably headed to New Orleans.”13 Around 11:43 a.m., APD Dispatcher Rachael

Martin (“Dispatcher Martin”) updated Officer Constantine with the information that

the stolen Honda Ridgeline had been spotted at 10:13 a.m.14

Prior to 12:19 p.m., Deputy Cloud stated he observed a Honda Ridgeline

matching the description provided in the BOLO in the same area of the carjacking

traveling westbound on Highway 28 West in Alexandria, Louisiana.15 He was able to

9 See R. Doc. 57 at 12.

10 See R. Doc. 57 at 13.

11 See R. Doc. 57 at 13–14.

12 See R. Doc, 57 at 15.

13 See R. Doc. 57 at 15.

14 See R. Doc. 57 at 16.

15 See R. Doc. 57

drive close enough to the Ridgeline to observe the license plate number.16 Deputy

Cloud entered the license plate into his in-car computer system to run the plate.17

Deputy Cloud claims that after entering the license plate number from the Ridgeline,

it came back as a license plate for a different vehicle (i.e., switched tags).18 However,

data from his in-car computer system shows that at 12:14 p.m., he made a license

plate inquiry using license plate number X120145, which is the license plate for

Huddleston’s Ridgeline.19 Huddleston’s Ridgeline turned off Highway 28 West and

parked at his son’s office.

At 12:19 p.m., Deputy Cloud called APD’s dispatcher and stated that he had

spotted a Ridgeline matching the description of the BOLO that appeared to have

switched tags on it.20 Deputies Fuller and Baden heard this call and travelled to

Deputy Cloud’s location.21 Around 12:22, Officer Constantine was contacted by APD

dispatch regarding a Honda Ridgeline with allegedly switched tags, so she drove to

the Ridgeline’s location and parked behind it.22 Because the Ridgeline was reported

to have firearms in it, and the suspect could get out shooting, Officer Constantine did

not take the time to call in or run the license plate number.23

Once Officer Constantine and Deputies Fuller, Baden, and Cloud were all at

the scene, Deputy Fuller directed Huddleston to step out of the vehicle and walk

16 See R. Doc. 57 at 16.

17 See R. Doc. 57 at 16.

18 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 13.

19 See R. Doc. 57 at 16.

20 See R. Doc. 57 at 18.

21 See R. Doc. 57 at 18.

22 See R. Doc. 57 at 18.

23 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 19.

towards them with his hands up, which commands Huddleston disobeyed.24

According to Officer Constantine, “[h]e was not obeying the commands given. He was

told to put his hands up. He was being very argumentative with us.”25 Officer

Constantine briefly drew her gun and pointed it at the ground before putting it back

in her holster.26 They thought Huddleston could be armed, so in attempt to make sure

everyone was safe, they attempted to handcuff Huddleston.27 While Officer

Constantine and Deputy Fuller were attempting to handcuff Huddleston, he tensed

and moved his arms which caused Huddleston’s hand to hit Officer Constantine’s

chest-mounted bodycam.28 Officer Constantine and Deputy Fuller “double cuffed”

Huddleston, meaning two sets of handcuffs were used instead of one, to prevent stress

on Huddleston’s shoulders and chest.29 While handcuffing Huddleston, Officer

Constantine touched his waistband and found no weapons.30 She also began reading

him his Miranda rights, but stopped before she finished.31

After Huddleston was handcuffed, Officer Constantine requested that the

vehicle not be touched because she was unsure if it was the stolen Honda Ridgeline.32

She was concerned that it was a potential crime scene from the carjacking.33

Nevertheless, when she relayed the VIN of Huddleston’s Ridgeline to APD dispatch,

24 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 19.

25 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 20.

26 See Shannon Constantine Body Worn Camera Footage at 00:30–00:45; see also R. Doc. 67 at 21.

27 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 20.

28 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 20.

29 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 20–21.

30 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 21.

31 See R. Doc. 57 at 20.

32 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 21.

33 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 21.

she was advised that it was not the stolen vehicle from earlier that morning.34 After

approximately four-to-five minutes, Huddleston was released.35 Since the incident,

Huddleston has been treated for shoulder injuries and has sought counseling for

mental anguish and anxiety.36

On July 14, 2022, Huddleston filed suit against the RPSO Defendants, the APD

Defendants, and the Rapides Parish Police Jury.37 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Huddleston asserts violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution. He alleges that he was falsely arrested without

probable cause, excessive force was used during the arrest, he was not informed of

the nature and cause of the allegations against him when he was arrested, he was

deprived of liberty without due process of law, and he was deprived of equal protection

of the laws. Huddleston also asserts state law claims of excessive force, assault,

battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence against Defendants.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.”38 A material fact impacts the outcome of a lawsuit and can be

identified through substantive law.39 A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if

34 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 21.

35 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 21.

36 See R. Doc. 55 at 44–49.

37 See R. Doc. 1. Huddleston voluntarily dismissed his claims against the Rapides Parish Police Jury

before the instant motions were filed. See R. Doc. 6.

38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

39 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could render a verdict for the nonmoving

party.”40 “[A] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must

support the motion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record.”41

In a summary judgment motion, “a party seeking summary judgment always

bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings ... [and] affidavits, if any,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”42 If the

movant meets this initial burden, then the non-movant has the burden of going

beyond the pleadings and designating specific facts that prove that a genuine issue

of material fact exists.43 A non-movant, however, cannot meet the burden of proving

that a genuine issue of material fact exists by providing only “some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated

assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”44 Similarly, “unsupported allegations or

affidavit or deposition testimony setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and

conclusions of law are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”45

In reviewing the evidence, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or

weigh the evidence.”46 The district court will not “evaluate the credibility of the

40 Id.

41 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

42 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

43 Id. at 324.

44 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

45 Clark v. Am's Favorite Chicken, 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997).

46 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.”47 Factual controversies

are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when … both parties have

submitted evidence of contradictory facts.”48

III. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGE

a. Kologik Printout

The RPSO Defendants object to Huddleston’s Exhibit 6 (R. Doc. 57-9 at 1–6),

which is a letter from defense counsel to Huddleston’s counsel accompanied by the

following: (1) Security Agreement between Kologik (a software company) and the

Rapides Parish Sheriff (R. Doc. 57-9 at 3); (2) LLETS Offline Search Request Form

(R. Doc. 57-9 at 4); Kologik printout containing Deputy Cloud’s Usage Report 7/10/21-

7/17/21 (R. Doc. 57-9 at 6); and Excerpt from Responses to Interrogatories (R. Doc.

57-10).49

The RPSO Defendants assert that the exhibit is not competent summary

judgment evidence because it includes hearsay, hearsay within hearsay, is not

relevant, and lacks a proper foundation.50 First, they argue that “this piece of paper

is hearsay as it is an out of court statement submitted for the truth of the matter

asserted.”51 In addition, they argue that the information contained within the paper

is also hearsay.52 Further, the RPSO Defendants contend that Huddleston’s

interpretation of the entries he cited is nothing more than his attorney’s

47 Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

48 Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

49 See R. Doc. 65 at 6.

50 See R. Doc. 65 at 6.

51 See R. Doc. 65 at 7.

52 See R. Doc. 65 at 7.

speculation.53 Finally, the RPSO Defendants argue that during discovery,

Huddleston had the opportunity to depose Kologik to determine the how, when, and

where of the information contained therein.54 According to the RPSO Defendants, it

was up to Huddleston’s attorney to explore whether the documents could be made

admissible and that no attempt was made to lay the foundation to allow for the

admissibility of the pages.55

The Court finds that Huddleston’s Exhibit 6 is competent summary judgment

evidence. First, the Court finds that the license plate search history logs of Deputy

Cloud do not constitute “statements” under Rule 801(a).56 Second, the inquiries made

by Deputy Cloud, evidenced through the search logs, do not constitute hearsay

because they are questions, and questions are not “statements” under Rule 801(a).57

Next, even if the license plate search history logs were found to be “statements,” they

would not be hearsay because the license plate search history logs are statements by

a party opponent pursuant to the contract between the RPSO and Kologik under FRE

801(d)(2)(C) & (D). And finally, even if the license plate search history logs were found

to be hearsay, they can be considered under the business record exception in FRE

803(6).

53 See R. Doc. 65 at 7.

54 See R. Doc. 65 at 7.

55 See R. Doc. 65 at 8.

56 United States v. Diggs, No. 18 CR 185, 2020 WL 5878018, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2020), aff'd, 81

F.4th 755 (7th Cir. 2023) (“The phone call logs and web search history plainly are not ‘statements’

under Rule 801(a), so they are not hearsay.”).

57 Cross Trailers, Inc. v. Cross Trailer Mfg. & Sales, LLC, 363 F. Supp. 3d 774, 786 (W.D. Tex. 2018)

(“Questions and inquiries are not hearsay because they do not, and are not intended to, assert

anything.”) (cleaned up).

Moreover, “[a]t the summary judgment stage, materials cited in support or

dispute a fact need only be capable of being ‘presented in a form that would be

admissible in evidence.’”58 Here, Huddleston has not laid the proper foundation for

the exhibit, but he can do so at trial. Accordingly, the exhibit is admissible.

IV. ANALYSIS

a. Improper Defendants

Huddleston has named as defendants the Rapides Parish Sheriff’s Office59 and

the Alexandria Police Department. The RPSO and APD, however, are not proper

defendants, and summary judgment is granted as to any claims against them.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) the capacity to sue or be sued

is determined “by the law of the state where the Court is located.” To possess such a

capacity under Louisiana law, an entity must qualify as a “juridical person.”60 In

Louisiana, “a sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued….”61 The same

is true of a city police department, because “city police departments in Louisiana lack

juridical capacity.”62

Because the RPSO and APD are not capable of being sued, they are not proper

parties and summary judgment must be granted for the claims against them.

58 Moore v. LaSalle Corrections, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-01007, 2020 WL 6389183, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 30,

2020)

59 In his Complaint, Huddleston uses “Rapides Parish Sheriff’s Office” and “Rapides Parish Sheriff’s

Department” interchangeably. The Court will hereinafter refer to it as the “RPSO.”

60 Dugas v. City of Breaux Bridge Police Dep’t, 757 So.2d 741, 743 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/2/2000).

61 Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir. 2002).

62 Williams v. Houma Police Dep’t, No. CV 20-0040, 2020 WL 4808651, at *4 (E.D. La. July 14,

2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4785079 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2020).

b. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

i. Equal Protection

In his Complaint, Huddleston claims that all Defendants deprived him of “the

right to equal protection of the laws, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution.”63 In the Complaint, however, Huddleston makes no effort to properly

plead his equal protection claim, and instead, relies on the one conclusory

allegation.64 Further, Huddleston makes no argument whatsoever as to who, when,

or how Defendants deprived him of his equal protection rights. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Huddleston’s equal protection claims

are granted.

ii. Due Process

Huddleston also claims that all Defendants deprived him of his “right to not be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ….”65 “A plaintiff may

bring a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment only if the

claim alleged is not susceptible to proper analysis under a specific constitutional

source.”66 Here, the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source for all of

63 See R. Doc. 1, ¶ IV-1-C.

64 See Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2020) (“To state a claim for equal protection, the

plaintiff must prove that similarly situated individuals were treated differently.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

65 See R. Doc. 1, ¶ IV-1-C.

66 Warren v. Talley, No. CV 21-0133, 2022 WL 2359787, at *4 (W.D. La. June 29, 2022) (citing Petta v.

Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 901 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)

(“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection

against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”).

Huddleston’s false arrest and excessive force claims.67 Substantive due process is not

the guide for Huddleston’s claims.68

Thus, to the extent that Huddleston asserts false arrest and excessive force

claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment on Huddleston’s substantive due process claims are granted. However,

Huddleston’s false arrest and excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment

will be discussed below.

c. Fourth Amendment Claims

i. Section 1983 Claims Against Deputies Cloud, Baden, and

Fuller and Officer Constantine

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the “deprivation of any

rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” against any

person acting under color of state law. Section 1983 does not itself create substantive

rights; rather, it merely provides remedies for rights guaranteed to citizens by the

United States Constitution or other federal laws.69 For example, § 1983 is used in

vindicating rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment, as Huddleston seeks to do in

the instant case.70

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

67 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.

68 Id.

69 See id. at 393–94; see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

70 See, e.g, Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”71

Accordingly, “officers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their

conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’”72 The two steps of the qualified

immunity inquiry may be performed in any order.73

The qualified immunity doctrine turns the traditional summary judgment

burden on its head, requiring a plaintiff—the non-moving party—to “demonstrate the

inapplicability of the defense.”74 To meet this burden, the plaintiff must “(1) raise a

fact dispute on whether his constitutional rights were violated by the defendants’

individual conduct, and (2) show those rights were ‘clearly established at the time of

the violation.’”75 “This is a demanding standard.”76 “Because qualified immunity

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law, we

do not deny its protection unless existing precedent places the constitutional question

beyond debate.”77 However, even when conducting a qualified immunity analysis, the

Court views all evidence and makes all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.78

71 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)).

72 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (citing Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).

73 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

74 Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 975 (5th Cir. 2023).

75 Id.

76 Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 907 (2016).

77 Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 435 (2024) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

78 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014).

1. Investigative Detention vs. False Arrest

As a preliminary matter, the parties differ in their description of the seizure

that occurred in this case. Both the RPSO and APD Defendants characterize the

detention as a Terry stop, while Huddleston characterizes the detention as a false

arrest.

“The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be ‘secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’”79

“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in

view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would

have believed that he was not free to leave.”80 Even where an individual did not

attempt to leave, circumstances that possibly indicate a seizure include: “the

threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some

physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice

indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”81

“A seizure rises to the level of an arrest only if ‘a reasonable person in the

suspect’s position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on

freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.’”82

An “arrest” requires probable cause.83 The “reasonable person” for these purposes is

one “neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive

79 United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).

80 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (footnote omitted).

81 Id.

82 Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 692–93 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Carroll v. Ellington, 800

F.3d 154, 170 (5th Cir. 2015)).

83 Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2007).

to the seriousness of the circumstances.”84 A person, however, may be physically

restrained by law enforcement without that custody being considered an arrest for

constitutional purposes. “The police are allowed to stop and briefly detain persons for

investigative purposes if the police have a reasonable suspicion supported by

articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”85

When determining whether an investigative stop amounts to an arrest, “[t]he

relevant inquiry is always one of reasonableness under the circumstances,” which

must be considered on a case-by-case basis.86 “[U]sing some force on a suspect,

pointing a weapon at a suspect, ordering a suspect to lie on the ground, and

handcuffing a suspect—whether singly or in combination—do not automatically

convert an investigatory detention into an arrest requiring probable cause.”87

Moreover, immediately advising a suspect of their Miranda rights does not amount

to a de facto arrest.88

Huddleston argues that a reasonable person in his position would believe that

an arrest occurred.89 He asserts that he “was in shock” during the encounter, saw

multiple officers approaching him from all sides with their guns pointed at him, he

was never informed of the situation, he was handcuffed, and had his Miranda rights

84 United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1988).

85 United States v. Lewis, 208 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).

86 United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 206–07 (5th Cir. 1993).

87 Id. at 206.

88 United States v. Davis, No. CR 06-60-JJB, 2006 WL 8439459, at *4 (M.D. La. Dec. 4, 2006), aff'd, 330

F. App'x 469 (5th Cir. 2009)

89 See R. Doc. 57 at 25.

read to him.90 He further claims that he did not have the ability to move, go anywhere,

or do anything.91

Defendants argue that the situation was a Terry stop. Defendants contend that

Huddleston was only detained for roughly four-to-five minutes, and the facts do not

give rise to an arrest.92 Further, the APD Defendants contend that although

Huddleston stated that Officer Constantine raised her firearm at him as he

approached,93 Officer Constantine’s body camera footage contradicts Huddleston’s

testimony and shows that she only pointed the gun to the ground and quickly put it

back in her holster.94 As such, Defendants contend that the “totality of these

circumstances do not ‘constitute a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree

which law associates with a formal arrest,’ and accordingly, the stop never progressed

to a formal arrest.”95 Defendants are correct.

In Smith v. Heap, the Fifth Circuit found similar circumstances to constitute

an investigatory stop.96 In Smith the plaintiff alleged that the “deputies aimed guns

at him, ‘activated the sirens and flashers on their vehicles, commanded [him] to exit

his vehicle, handcuffed [him], and tried to place [him] into the back of a squad car.’”97

In determining that the plaintiff did not adequately plead an unreasonable seizure,

the court reasoned that “those measures typify our cases dismissing claims of de facto

90 See R. Doc. 57 at 25–26.

91 See R. Doc. 57 at 26.

92 See R. Doc. 65 at 17; see also R. Doc. 67 at 21–22.

93 See R. Doc. 55 at 25.

94 See Shannon Constantine Body Worn Camera Footage at 00:30–00:45; see also R. Doc. 67 at 21.

95 See R. Doc. 65 at 17.

96 31 F.4th 905 (5th Cir. 2022).

97 Id. at 911.

arrest.”98 The court also noted that the officers detained the plaintiff for mere minutes

and released him after he denied aiming his gun at another driver.99

Based on the parties’ arguments and the applicable Fifth Circuit case law, the

Court finds that the seizure in this case was an investigative detention under Terry,

and not an arrest. Now that it has determined that the stop and detention do not

amount to an arrest, the Court will analyze Huddleston’s unlawful seizure and

detention claims under the framework from Terry and its progeny.

2. Unlawful Seizure Against Deputy Cloud

It is well settled that “police officers may stop and briefly detain an individual

for investigative purposes if they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is

afoot.”100 To meet the “reasonable suspicion” standard, an officer must be able to

articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

‘hunch.’”101 An investigatory detention (1) must be “justified at its inception” and (2)

“the officer’s subsequent actions must be reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that justified the stop.”102 The first prong requires a court to determine

“whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable

suspicion to stop [the plaintiff] ….”103 Reasonable suspicion is a “low threshold[,]” one

98 Id.

99 Id.

100 Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000).

101 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

102 United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20).

103 United States v. Darrell, 945 F.3d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.

266, 273 (2002)).

that “exists when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences … reasonably warrant the search and seizure.”104

Deputy Cloud contends that the BOLO from the APD provides the basis for his

reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Huddleston.105 “[A]n alert of BOLO report

may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop.”106

“Whether a particular tip or BOLO report provides a sufficient basis for an

investigatory stop depends upon a number of factors, including the credibility or

reliability of the source of the information set forth in the BOLO, the specificity of the

information contained in the BOLO, the extent to which the information in the report

can be verified by officers in the field, and whether the report concerns active or recent

activity, or has instead gone stale.”107 These factors are commonly referred to as the

Gonzalez factors.108

In this case, the information used to describe the stolen Honda Ridgeline—

including the color and license plate number—came from the victim of the carjacking.

The information contained in the BOLO did not contain the age or race of the

suspects, but did include specific information regarding the make, model, color, and

license plate of the stolen vehicle—all verifiable by officers in the field. “[T]he Fourth

Amendment does not require that a BOLO specifically include a vehicle’s license plate

104 United States v. Walker, 49 F.4th 903, 907 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Lopez-Moreno,

420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005)).

105 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 27.

106 United States v. Rodriguez, 564 F.3d 735, 742 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 190

F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1999)).

107 United States v. Reed, No. 6:15-CR-00113, 2015 WL 10739299, at *7 (W.D. La. Dec. 28, 2015), report

and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1704402 (W.D. La. Apr. 26, 2016), report and recommendation

adopted, 187 F. Supp. 3d 743 (W.D. La. 2016) (citing Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 672).

108 See Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668.

number or registration information.”109 Finally, the BOLO had not gone stale because

it concerned a carjacking that had occurred roughly four hours earlier. The Court is

satisfied that the four Gonzalez factors have been met.110 Accordingly, the Court finds

that the information regarding the gray Honda Ridgeline that was provided to APD

by the victim of the carjacking gave Deputy Cloud the reasonable suspicion to conduct

a Terry stop of Huddleston’s vehicle.111

Huddleston alleges that Deputy Cloud did not have any reasonable suspicion

to stop the vehicle and detain him because the 12:14 p.m. license plate search

dispelled all belief of any criminal activity.112 According to Huddleston, the “search

history of [Deputy] Cloud clearly confirms that Mr. Huddleston was the registered

owner of the vehicle with license plate number X120145.”113 Huddleston is correct

that the search history does confirm that Huddleston was indeed the owner of the

vehicle with the license plate number X120145. However, Huddleston is incorrect

that the search history “dispelled any reasonable suspicion” to stop the vehicle

because the search history relied on by Huddleston does not provide the make, model,

or color of the vehicle searched. In fact, after reviewing the search history, the Court

cannot discern any information other than the license plate number ran by Deputy

Cloud and Huddleston’s information including his name, race, and sex. Any assertion

109 Rodriguez, 564 F.3d at 742.

110 See Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 672.

111 Benfer v. City of Baytown, Texas, No. 4:22-CV-2196, 2023 WL 6465870, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4,

2023), aff'd, 120 F.4th 1272 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1313 (2025) (“Given that Officer

Calvert had reasonable suspicion based upon the BOLO report that Plaintiff was committing an

offense by potentially driving a stolen vehicle, the Court finds that he had reasonable suspicion to

justify an investigatory stop.”).

112 See R. Doc. 57 at 45.

113 See R. Doc. 57 at 45.

to the contrary by Huddleston would be nothing more than a guess on his part.114

Further, based on the information in the BOLO, Deputy Cloud did not have any

description of the suspect(s) in the carjacking. In viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Huddleston, the Court finds Deputy Cloud was justified in making the

stop, and that he had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop.

Since the Court finds that the first prong is met, the Court now moves to the

second prong which considers whether the officer’s subsequent actions were

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.115

The Court finds that this prong is met. When the stop occurred, Deputy Fuller

ordered Huddleston to step out of the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs with Officer

Constantine while it was confirmed whether the vehicle was the one stolen. The

whole process took roughly five minutes.116 The actions of Officer Constantine and

Deputies Fuller, Baden, and Cloud were taken in response to the possibility that the

driver of the vehicle could have been the armed and dangerous suspect from the

earlier violent carjacking.

And even if Deputy Cloud lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Huddleston, to

defeat Deputy Cloud’s qualified immunity defense, Huddleston must identify a case

where a court, on similar facts, found that reasonable suspicion did not exist.117 He

did not. Thus, because the Court finds that there was no constitutional violation, and

114 See Williams v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 143 F.4th 593, 602 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Unsubstantiated

assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment.”) (citations omitted).

115 Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20).

116 See Shannon Constantine Body Worn Camera Footage at 00:00–04:28.

117 See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63–64.

Huddleston did not make the requisite showing that the stop violated a clearly

established right, Deputy Cloud is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly,

summary judgment on Huddleston’s unlawful seizure claim against Deputy Cloud is

granted.

3. Unlawful Detention Against Officer Constantine

Huddleston alleges an unlawful detention claim against Officer Constantine.

He claims that Officer Constantine could not have a reasonable suspicion to detain

Huddleston because she had information that the suspects in the carjacking were two

African American males, and the stolen vehicle was allegedly spotted in Carencro,

Louisiana.118

First, the description of the suspects. When Officer Constantine investigated

the carjacking, she spoke to a witness who was a minor at the time of the incident.

The witness did not observe the carjacking.119 The witness stated that “the only thing

he saw was two black male subjects leaving in the Ridgeline.”120 Officer Constantine

stated the witness “did not observe [the victim] getting battered. He did not observe

anything like that. … He heard a commotion, he went outside and he saw them

leaving.”121 Officer Constantine did not include the witness’s description of the

suspects in the BOLO because he was a minor and he did not witness the crime, only

the escape.122 Officer Constantine believed that the witness may have been mistaken,

118 See R. Doc. 55 at 36–40.

119 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 40.

120 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 40.

121 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 40.

122 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 87.

and that the suspects may have been “‘wearing dark clothing’ or been ‘disguised,’ or

‘wearing masks’ while driving off.”123 Huddleston contends that failing to include the

description of the suspects in the BOLO was improper and that Officer Constantine’s

beliefs contradicted the witness’s statements and based on pure speculation

unsupported by any articulable fact.124

When considering a BOLO, an officer must consider the credibility and

reliability of an informant, the specificity of the information, and the extent to which

the information can be verified.125 The physical description of the suspect “may be of

little use when the offender is traveling by car,” in which case the suspicion turns

largely on the description police have of the vehicle.126 Here, Officer Constantine was

able to verify the description of the vehicle, its license plate, and that the suspect(s)

may be armed and dangerous. She was unable to verify the race of the suspects

because the only witness was a minor who only briefly saw the suspects drive away.

Courts must allow law enforcement officers “to draw on their own experience and

specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative

information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”127 It is

entirely reasonable for Officer Constantine—based on her experience and specialized

training—not to contain a description of the suspects in the BOLO because it could

123 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 37.

124 See R. Doc. 55 at 37–38.

125 Gonzalez, 190 F.3d at 672.

126 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(h)(1) (6th ed.

2020).

127 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273.

have been wrong.128 What was not wrong, however, was the make, model, color, and

license plate of the stolen vehicle that was included in the BOLO.

Next, Huddleston claims that Officer Constantine did not have reasonable

suspicion to detain him because she had information that the stolen Ridgeline was

spotted in Carencro, which is 82.5 miles south of Alexandria.129 He contends that

during the course of investigating the carjacking, Officer Constantine had

information from APD dispatchers and other officers that the carjacking suspects

were three male juvenile suspects who had escaped from a correctional facility for

juveniles located in Monroe, Louisiana.130 The juveniles had allegedly stolen a Nissan

Altima in Ouachita Parish and been involved in a hit and run in LaSalle Parish before

stealing the Ridgeline in Alexandria and being spotted in Carencro, Louisiana.131

Huddleston claims that Officer Constantine knew that the stolen Ridgeline was no

longer in the area because Dispatcher Martin had informed her that the Lafayette

Parish Sheriff’s Office spotted the Ridgeline on a camera at 10:15 a.m.132 Because of

this, Huddleston argues that Officer “Constantine’s suggestion that it was unknown

who committed the crime is contrary to logic and reason.”133

Officer Constantine argues that she was not informed that the stolen Ridgeline

was possibly in Carencro earlier that morning when she had detained Huddleston.134

128 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-

known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”).

129 See R. Doc. 55 at 39.

130 See R. Doc. 55 at 38.

131 See R. Doc. 55 at 38.

132 See R. Doc. 55 at 14–15; see also R. Doc. 55-3 at 151–152.

133 See R. Doc. 55 at 38.

134 See R. Doc. 67 at 6; see also R. Doc. 55-3 at 89.

Further, although Dispatcher Martin said she conveyed the information to Officer

Constantine, she later stated that she could not remember if she advised Constantine

because it was over three years ago at the time of her deposition.135

Dispatcher Williams made it clear that the stolen Ridgeline was “still missing

or stolen” and since it was “a moving vehicle—it could’ve been traveling anywhere.”136

Even if Dispatcher Martin had conveyed the information to Officer Constantine, the

stolen Ridgeline was spotted on the camera two hours before Deputy Cloud spotted

Huddleston; this is more than enough time for the Ridgeline to make it back to

Alexandria.137 And although Deputy Cloud’s report that Huddleston’s vehicle had

switched tags was ultimately incorrect, Officer Constantine could rely on the

information that the suspected stolen vehicle had been spotted in the area of the

carjacking with switched plates.

Once at the scene, Officer Constantine was not constitutionally required to

postpone the detention of Huddleston until it was confirmed that he was a suspect in

the carjacking.138 Courts have routinely dismissed Fourth Amendment challenges to

investigative detentions in which the police failed to confirm the physical description

of the suspect or the vehicle prior to the stop and therefore mistakenly detained the

wrong person.139

135 See R. Doc. 55-5 at 170.

136 See R. Doc. 44-6 at 6.

137 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007) (An “opponent must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”).

138 See Armijo v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2010) (As long as police officers act

reasonably, they “need not exhaust every avenue of dispelling suspicion” prior to detaining a suspect.).

139 See United States v. Webster, 314 F. Appx. 226, 229 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Although it might have been

better for Officer Manora to call in to confirm the BOLO before stopping Webster, we cannot say that

it was unreasonable for him not to do so.”); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1505-1506 (10th

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Huddleston, Huddleston has

failed to show that Officer Constantine did not have a reasonable suspicion to briefly

detain him during the stop. He has further failed to identify for the Court a case

where, on similar facts, another court found that reasonable suspicion did not exist.

Thus, because the Court finds that there was no constitutional violation, and

Huddleston did not make the requisite showing that the detention violated a clearly

established right, Officer Constantine is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly,

summary judgment on the claim is granted.

4. Unlawful Detention Against Deputy Fuller and Deputy

Baden

As to Deputy Fuller, Huddleston alleges that he directed Huddleston to step

out of the vehicle and assisted Officer Constantine in placing Huddleston in

handcuffs.140 As to Deputy Baden, Huddleston alleges that he directly participated in

the detention by being present as a show of force, investigating the vehicle, and

maintaining control over Huddleston while the other Defendants cleared the

vehicle.141

To the extent that Deputy Fuller could be subject to potential liability under §

1983, he is protected from liability under the collective knowledge doctrine. An officer

is shielded from liability in cases “where the arresting officer has no personal

knowledge of any of the facts establishing probable cause, but simply carries out

Cir. 1996) (finding that an officer did not behave “unreasonably in failing to confirm the physical

description of the suspect” prior to the stop).

140 See R. Doc. 57 at 40–41.

141 See R. Doc. 57 at 42–43.

directions to arrest given by another officer who does have probable cause.”142 Here,

the Court has already established that Deputy Cloud had reasonable suspicion to

initiate the stop and Officer Constantine had reasonable suspicion to detain

Huddleston. As such, even though Deputy Fuller would have reasonable suspicion on

his own to place Huddleston in handcuffs, he could rely on the “collective knowledge”

of Deputy Cloud and Officer Constantine to establish his reasonable suspicion for

detention. The same goes for Deputy Baden, who did not actually participate in

handcuffing Huddleston. As such, summary judgment is granted as to these claims

against Deputies Fuller and Baden.

5. Excessive Force by Officer Constantine and Deputy Fuller

“To be liable under § 1983, [an officer] must have been personally involved in

the alleged constitutional deprivation or have engaged in wrongful conduct that is

causally connected to the constitutional violation.”143 Although Huddleston lodges

excessive force claims against Deputies Fuller, Baden, Cloud, and Officer

Constantine, only Officer Constantine and Deputy Fuller engaged in the alleged

wrongful conduct. Thus, only the claims against Officer Constantine and Deputy

Fuller are capable of review, and summary judgment is granted as to the others.

The Fourth Amendment creates a “right to be free from excessive force during

a seizure.”144 “[O]vercoming qualified immunity is especially difficult in excessive-

force cases.”145 To overcome [an officer’s] claim of qualified immunity on [a] claim of

142 United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 323 (5th Cir. 1984).

143 Turner, 848 F.3d at 695–96.

144 Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2017).

145 Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 2019).

excessive force, [a plaintiff] must show (1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly and

only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which

was clearly unreasonable.”146 “[T]he right to make an arrest or an investigatory stop

necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat

thereof to effect it.”147

In reviewing whether the use of force was reasonable, courts must consider the

Graham factors. A court’s review “requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including” (1) “the severity of the crime at

issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others,” and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.”148 The “focus is on the officers’ reasonable perception of the events

at issue, as they happened, without the aid of hindsight, multiple viewing angles,

slow motion, or the ability to pause, rewind, and zoom.”149 Thus, the overarching

question is “whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them.”150

Huddleston alleges that he suffered various injuries stemming from the

encounter that Defendants do not contest.151 They do, however, contest that the

injurious use of force was clearly excessive.152

146 Terrell v. Allgrunn, 114 F.4th 428, 437 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d

624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012).

147 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

148 Id.

149 Terrell, 114 F.4th at 437–38 (emphasis in original) (quoting Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d

165, 176 (5th Cir. 2021).

150 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

151 See R. doc. 55 at 44–49.

152 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 30–32; see also R. Doc. 44-1 at 42–46.

Officer Constantine argues that the body camera footage shows that

Huddleston never once complained about the handcuffs or his arms or shoulder while

handcuffed.153 Moreover, Officer Constantine argues that she did not use just one set

of handcuffs, but that she “double-cuffed” Huddleston as an accommodation to

prevent any injury.154 According to Officer Constantine, she took into account

Huddleston’s age when using two sets of handcuffs, rather than one.155 The RPSO

Defendants contend that only Deputy Fuller assisted in handcuffing Huddleston, and

the handcuffing included an accommodation of using two sets of handcuffs instead of

one.156 Further, Deputy Baden and Deputy Cloud did not participate in the

handcuffing, but instead, they stood by to provide backup if necessary.157 Huddleston

does not make arguments that the force used was clearly excessive. Instead, he lists

out all of his injuries, then leaps to the conclusion that the first two prongs of the

inquiry are satisfied.158

In the Fifth Circuit, it takes far more than handcuffing to run afoul of the

deferential “clearly excessive” standard. See Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex.,159 (no excessive

force where arrestee was hog-tied and died due to asphyxiation); see also Davila v.

United States,160 (surrounding car with guns drawn, handcuffing plaintiffs, and

forcing plaintiffs to kneel during traffic stop was not excessive or objectively

153 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 43.

154 See R. Doc. 44-1 at 43.

155 See R. Doc. 55-3 at 98.

156 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 32.

157 See R. Doc. 42-1 at 32.

158 See R. Doc. 55 at 44–50.

159 822 F.3d 174, 184 (5th Cir. 2016).

160 713 F.3d 248, 260 (5th Cir. 2013).

unreasonable use of force); see also Freeman v. Gore,161 (no excessive force where

“deputies twisted [plaintiff’s] arms behind her back while handcuffing her, ‘jerked her

all over the carport,’ and applied the handcuffs too tightly, causing bruises and marks

on her wrists and arms”); see also Glenn v. City of Tyler,162 (“handcuffing too tightly,

without more, does not amount to excessive force”).

The Court finds that double-cuffing Huddleston behind his back was not a

“clearly excessive” use of force by Defendants Deputy Fuller and Officer Constantine.

As such, Officer Constantine and Deputy Fuller are entitled to qualified immunity as

to Huddleston’s excessive force claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment as to Huddleston’s excessive force claim is granted.

d. Sixth Amendment Claims

In his Complaint, Huddleston claims that all Defendants violated his “right to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him secured to Plaintiff

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United

States.”163 The Sixth Amendment right is applicable to the states through the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”164

The United States Supreme Court has “never held that” a police officer is

“constitutionally required” to “inform a person of the reason for his arrest at the time

he is taken into custody.”165 Under the Sixth Amendment, “the accused shall enjoy

161 483 F.3d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007).

162 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001).

163 See R. Doc. 1, ¶ IV-1-B.

164 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).

165 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004).

the right to … be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ….”166 However,

“[a] defendant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation brought

against him does not exist until the Government is committed to a prosecution.”167

“‘[C]riminal prosecution[n]’ in the Sixth Amendment refers to the

commencement of a criminal suit by filing formal charges in a court with jurisdiction

to try and punish the defendant.”168 An arrest does not constitute a “criminal

prosecution” under the Sixth Amendment.169 Nor does an investigatory stop

constitute a criminal prosecution. Here, because an investigatory stop without more

does not constitute a “criminal prosecution” under the Sixth Amendment,

Huddleston’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against

him did not yet exist. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to

Huddleston’s Sixth Amendment claims are granted, and Huddleston’s claims are

dismissed.

e. Monell Claims

A municipality may be subject to liability pursuant to § 1983 when the

municipality maintains an unconstitutional policy or custom.170 These claims are

sometimes referred to as “Monell claims,” in reference to the Supreme Court case by

that name.171 In order to state a claim against a municipal defendant for an alleged

166 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

167 Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000).

168 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 223 (2008).

169 See id.; see also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984) (observing that the Court has

“never held that the right to counsel [under the Sixth Amendment] attaches at the time of arrest.”)

(modification to original).

170 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).

171 Monell, 436 U.S. 658.

unconstitutional policy or practice, the plaintiff must allege that “(1) an official policy

(2) promulgated by a policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a

constitutional right.”172 An “official policy or custom” giving rise to liability pursuant

to Monell may be “a persistent, widespread practice which, although not officially

promulgated, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly

represents municipal policy.”173

Huddleston seeks to impose Monell liability on “Police Chief Ronney Howard,

APD, and the City of Alexandria for having a dispatch policy that facilitates the

exclusion of information in BOLOs.”174 However, before the Court can address the

merits of Huddleston’s purported Monell claim on summary judgment, Huddleston

must have sufficiently pled the claim in his Complaint. To plausibly plead “a practice

‘so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law,’ . . . a plaintiff

must do more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury.”175 “A plaintiff

may not infer a policy merely because harm resulted from some interaction with a

governmental entity.”176 “The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to

the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory, it must

contain specific facts.”177

172 Hicks–Fields v. Harris Cnty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

173 Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).

174 See R. Doc. 55 at 56.

175 Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).

176 Pudas v. St. Tammany Par., No. 18-10052, 2019 WL 2410939, at *3 (E.D. La. June 7, 2019)

(alteration in original) (quoting Colle v. Brazos Cnty., 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993)).

177 Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Fraire v.

Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992)).

Here, Huddleston’s attempt at pleading a Monell claim is woefully insufficient.

His assertion that the City is liable because “each and all of the alleged acts and/or

omissions, conduct, and behavior of Defendants were acting according to a policy or

custom of the Alexandria Police Department or Rapides Parish Sheriff’s [Office]” is

insufficient because it is conclusory and contains no description whatsoever of the

policy or custom.178

And to the extent that Huddleston seeks to hold the APD, the City, and the

RPSO “vicariously liable for all acts and/or omissions of the parties” under § 1983,

these claims must also be dismissed. Section 1983 does not create vicarious or

respondeat superior liability for the wrongdoing of others.179

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on Huddleston’s Monell claims.

f. State Law Claims

Huddleston also asserts state law claims of excessive force, assault, battery,

false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and negligence against Defendants.180

Instead of discussing the merits of his state law claims against Defendants,

Huddleston simply argues that Defendants are not entitled to discretionary

immunity for his state law claims.181 However, the Court need not decide whether

discretionary immunity applies because Huddleston’s claims fail on the merits. As

178 See id.

179 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–94; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (“‘[S]upervisory

liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”).

180 See R. Doc. 1, ¶¶ V 1–11.

181 See R. Doc. 55 at 55–56; see also R. Doc. 57 at 59.

such, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Huddleston, Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and their motions for summary judgment as

to Huddleston’s state-law claims are granted.

i. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Excessive Force,

Assault, and Battery

Louisiana’s standard for qualified immunity is identical to the federal

standard.182 Accordingly, Huddleston’s state law claims are barred by qualified

immunity for substantially the same reasons assigned in dispensing of his federal

claims.

Under Louisiana law, “[f]alse arrest and imprisonment occur when one arrests

and restrains another against his will without a warrant or other statutory authority.

Simply stated, it is restraint without color of legal authority.”183 As discussed above,

Huddleston was detained in accordance with the “reasonable suspicion” standard of

the Fourth Amendment as described in Terry. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held

that a “valid investigatory stop” that falls short of an arrest precludes liability for

false arrest under Louisiana law.184 Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law for Huddleston’s state law false arrest and false imprisonment

claims. Further, since we found neither Officer Constantine nor Deputy Fuller to

182 See Escort v. Miles, 2018 WL 3580656, at *8 (W.D. La. July 25, 2018).

183 Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 971 (La. 1977).

184 Harrison v. State Through Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corr., 721 So.2d 458, 462–63 (La. 1998); see also

O'Dwyer v. Nelson, 310 Fed.Appx. 741, 745 n. 4 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Harrison for the proposition

that “Fourth Amendment principles underpin Louisiana law relating to false arrests” and discussing

federal and state law claims for false arrest in conjunction).

have used excessive force, Huddleston’s assault and battery claims fail as a matter of

law.185

ii. Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress

Huddleston’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims fail to plausibly

allege “conduct … so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly

intolerable in a civilized community.”186 Further, Huddleston’s fails to allege that the

alleged conduct was intended to cause severe emotional distress.187 Accordingly,

summary judgment is granted as to Huddleston’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress claims.

“Louisiana law does not generally recognize an independent cause of action for

negligent infliction of emotional distress.... The cause of action is available under

limited circumstances only.”188 The plaintiff must meet the heavy burden of proving

outrageous conduct by the defendant.189 Here, Huddleston has not met that burden.

As such, summary judgment is granted as to his negligent infliction of emotional

distress claims as well.

185 See Taylor v. United States, 1991 WL 280066 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 1991) (“Under Louisiana law, in the

absence of the use of excessive force, a law enforcement officer cannot be held liable for assault and

battery if the assault and battery occurred during a lawful arrest.”).

186 White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991).

187 See White v. City of Winnfield, No. 1:19-CV-01410, 2021 WL 2880522, at 11 (W.D. La. Mar. 5,

2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2879921 (W.D. La. July 8, 2021).

188 DirectTV, Inc. v. Atwood, 2003 WL 22765354, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 2003) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

189 See Haith v. City of Shreveport, 2005 WL 2140583, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 1, 2005).

iii. Negligence

In determining whether to impose liability under Louisiana Civil Code article

2315, Louisiana courts employ a duty-risk analysis, whereby a plaintiff must

establish the following five elements:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific

standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant's conduct failed to

conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the

defendant's substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's

injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard

conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability

or scope of protection element); and (5) the actual damages (the damages

element).190

“A negative answer to any of the inquiries of the duty-risk analysis results in a

determination of no liability.”191

Huddleston alleges that the Deputies and Officer Constantine failed to “act as

a reasonable or prudent police or peace officer would have acted under similar

circumstances.”192 The breach factor of the duty/risk analysis considers the

reasonableness of the actions taken.193 Reasonableness is determined by examining

the totality of the circumstances.194 “A court must evaluate the officers[] actions

against those of ordinary, prudent, and reasonable men placed in the same position

as the officers and with the same knowledge as the officers.”195

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court—having already

concluded that the Deputies and Officer Constantine had reasonable suspicion to

190 Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

191 Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So.2d 318, 321 (La. 1994).

192 See R. Doc. 1, ¶¶ V 1–7.

193 Westmoreland v. City of Natchitoches, 771 So.2d 715, 717 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/4/00).

194 Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 973 (La.1977).

195 Id.

detain Huddleston, Deputy Cloud had a reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, and

Deputy Fuller and Officer Constantine used reasonable force in detaining

Huddleston—finds that the Deputies and Officer Constantine acted as reasonable

officers and did not breach their duty owed to Huddleston. As such, even taking the

facts in the light most favorable to Huddleston, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment.

iv. Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Retention

Huddleston alleges that the APD, through Chief Howard, the City, through

Mayor Jeffrey Hall, and the RPSO, through Sheriff Wood, were negligent in hiring

and maintaining personnel and failed to properly train and supervise its

employees.196 As discussed supra, the APD and RPSO are not juridical persons, and

thus not capable of being sued.197 Thus, the negligent hiring, training, supervision,

and retention claims can be brought against Chief Howard, the City, and Sheriff

Wood.

The Complaint alleges few facts, if any, supporting Huddleston’s claims. The

Complaint alleges in detail the incidents in July 2021 that include the stop and

detention of Huddleston.198 However, the Complaint does not allege facts explaining

how the APD’s or RPSO’s training programs or any actions by the Deputies or Officer

Constantine support Huddleston’s claims that they were negligent in hiring, training,

supervising, or retaining APD officers or RPSO deputies. The RPSO Defendants have

196 See R. Doc. 1, ¶¶ V 8–10.

197 See Part IV.a.

198 See R. Doc. 1, ¶¶ III 1–18.

submitted evidence in the summary judgment record detailing the training received

by the Deputies,199 as did the APD Defendants.200 In contrast, Huddleston does not

point to any evidence relating to the APD’s or RPSO’s hiring, training, supervision,

or retention practices, nor does he address Defendants’ arguments that these

negligence claims should be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’

motions for summary judgment with respect to Huddleston’s negligent hiring,

training, supervision, and retention claims.

v. Vicarious Liability

Finally, Huddleston alleges that the APD, through Chief Howard, the City,

through Mayor Jeffrey Hall, and the RPSO, through Sheriff Wood, are “vicariously

liable for all acts and/or omissions” under Louisiana law of the Deputies and Officer

Constantine.201 The vicarious liability claims can only be levied against Chief

Howard, the City, and Sheriff Wood for reasons discussed supra.202

The principle of vicarious liability in Louisiana law is codified in article 2320

of the Civil Code, which provides, in pertinent part: “Masters and employers are

answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise

of the functions in which they are employed.”203 Unlike § 1983 actions,

“[m]unicipalities do not enjoy special protection from vicarious liability under

Louisiana law and are subject to respondeat superior like every other employer.”204

199 See R. Docs. 42-9, 42-10, 42-11, 42-12, & 42-13.

200 See R. Doc. 44-8.

201 See R. Doc. 1, ¶¶ V 8–10.

202 See Part IV.a.

203 La. Civ. Code art. 2320.

204 Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 173–74 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Brasseaux v. Town of Mamou, 752

So.2d 815, 820 (La. 2000) (“Although an employment relationship may in fact exist, the employer will

However, because the Court has found no underlying torts on the part of the Deputies

and Officer Constantine, Chief Howard, the City, and Sheriff Wood cannot be found

vicariously liable.2°5 Accordingly, Chief Howard, the City, and Sheriff Wood are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is granted on these

claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein,

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (R.

Docs. 42, 44) are GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Plaintiff's federal and state law

claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 2nd day of February, 2026.

RRY EDWARDS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

not be liable for the substandard conduct of the employee unless the latter can be fairly said to be

within the course and scope of employment with the former.”)).

205 Frank v. Parnell, No. 1:18-CV-00978, 2019 WL 2438685, at *9 (W.D. La. May 14, 2019), report and

recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2479462 (W.D. La. June 10, 2019) (“If there is no underlying tort,

there can be no basis for the imposition of vicarious liability.”).

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