Hankins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BILAL HANKINS * CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-1129

*

* SECTION: “L”(1)

VERSUS *

* JUDGE ELDON E. FALLON

*

KEVIN WHEELER, ET AL. * MAGISTRATE JUDGE

* JANIS VAN MEERVELD

*********************************** *

ORDER AND REASONS

This is a §1983 civil rights action concerning an alleged unreasonable seizure and use of

excessive force in June 2020. Before the Court is the defendants’ Motion to Compel Independent

Mental Examination (Rec. Doc. 269) of the plaintiff, who alleges emotional injury and psychiatric

distress as a result of the incident and has produced mental health treatment records reflecting

treatment beginning in April 2025. The Court finds good cause for the requested examination and,

further, finds that the psychologist’s description of the evaluation to be performed is sufficiently

detailed to provide an appropriate scope for the examination. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel

is GRANTED as provided further herein.

Background

This case arises out of the alleged traffic stop of plaintiff Bilal Hankins, a Black man, and

two other Black males by law enforcement officers who were working a private security detail in

New Orleans on the night of Saturday, June 13, 2020. Hankins resides in the Uptown neighborhood

where the alleged stop occurred and was riding as a rear seat passenger in his friend Tahj Pierre’s

BMW as they drove slowly through the neighborhood looking for his neighbor Diondra Robbins’

chihuahua. Robbins’ 12-year-old nephew L.M. was riding in the front passenger seat.

When they saw Officer Kevin Wheeler1 working a private security detail for the Hurstville

Security and Neighborhood Improvement District, they allegedly asked him to assist them with

their search. But, instead, Hankins alleges that after they continued on their search, Officer

Wheeler called Officer Ramon Pierre2—also working a private security detail for Hurstville—for

backup. The Officers followed Hankins and his companions and then turned on their flashing

lights.

According to Hankins, Tahj Pierre turned down a side street, believing the officers had

been called to some emergency. But the officers turned down the same street, and Officer Wheeler

ordered Tahj Pierre to exit the car with his hands up. He complied. Hankins put his hands out the

window to show he was unarmed. Hankins alleges that he and his friends saw both officers

brandishing firearms at them.

Hankins alleges that he asked the reason for the stop and that Officer Wheeler stated he

had run a license plate check and the BMW was registered to a woman in New Orleans East.

According to Hankins, Officer Wheeler demanded to know what the group was doing in the

neighborhood. Hankins alleges that he explained that he resided in the neighborhood, that Tahj

Pierre was visiting, and that the car was registered to Tahj Pierre’s mother. Hankins alleges that

he suggested that Officer Wheeler check the address on Tahj Pierre’s driver’s license because it

would match the address on the car’s registration.

When Officer Wheeler returned from his vehicle, his whole demeanor had allegedly

changed. He asked Hankins to repeat the details about the lost dog and to provide his address. He

1 Officer Wheeler was an off-duty employee of the Orleans Levee District-Police Department (“OLD”). Hankins

alleges that the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East (“SLFPA-E”) and the Lakefront Management

Authority (“LMA”) exercise control over the OLD-PD.

2 Officer Pierre was an off-duty employee of the police department of the Housing Authority of New Orleans

(“HANO”).

then allegedly told Hankins that he thought “you guys were yanking my chain” and allegedly joked

“you know, three young men, in a nice car, in this neighborhood.”

Hankins alleges that following the incident, Officer Wheeler and Officer Pierre conspired

to coverup their conduct by submitting false narratives in their police report and in post-incident

incident interviews.

Hankins filed this lawsuit on June 10, 2021, asserting various civil rights claims against

Officers Wheeler and Pierre; Hurstville; HANO; SLFPA-E; Kerry Najolia, Michael Brenckle,

Darnell Laurent, Thaddeus Petit, Jamel Brown, Carl Perilloux, Tyrone Martin, Demetrius Jackson,

Tommy Mercadal, Leontine Mullins; and LMA.

The defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

The Court granted the motions as to Hankins’ federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the state law claims. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The HANO

supervisors (Martin, Jackson, Mercadel, and Mullins) filed a renewed motion for summary

judgment, which the District Court granted, dismissing Hankins’ claims against them. The Fifth

Circuit affirmed on January 5, 2026, and the judgment was issued as the mandate on January 26,

2026.

Meanwhile, although trial has not been set, the deadline to complete discovery is March

19, 2026. Presently, the SLFPA and Hurstville defendants seek an independent medical

examination of Hankins’ mental health (“IME”) by Megan Alsop, Psy.D., ABPP of Jefferson

Neurobehavioral Group. There appears to be no dispute that defendants are entitled to an IME.

Indeed, Hankins alleges that he suffered emotional injury and psychiatric distress as a result of the

incident. First Amend. Complaint, Rec. Doc. 22, ¶¶ 123, 131, 135, 140. And he has produced

documentation of mental health treatment since at least April 2025.

The issue, though, is the parameters. Defendants insist enough information has been

provided about the scope of the examination. The following information has been provided by Dr.

Alsop:

Psychological conditions such as depression, anxiety, and stress-related disorders

(e.g., adjustment disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder) can cause problems with

day-to-day functioning and quality of life by disrupting behavior, thinking and

concentration, and active participation in life activities. Sometimes there may be

pain (e.g., headaches, muscle tension) even in the absence of physical injuries.

Therefore, the assessment tools used in a psychological evaluation are selected to

objectively assess the common psychological, emotional, cognitive, and physical

complaints of persons presenting with psychological disorders.

The psychological evaluation begins with clinical interview followed by the

administration of standardized psychological tests and procedures. A detailed

review of available records are included. The core of the assessment battery consists

of psychological questionnaires that objectively assess a broad range of symptoms

and complaints as well as features of personality that may influence psychological

functioning. Tests designed to screen cognitive ability (e.g., attention, memory)

may also be included depending on the specific nature of the presenting problems

and the specific referral questions. However, this assessment of cognition does not

represent a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation. The goal of the

psychological evaluation is to characterize the individual’s current psychological

state that can lead to detailed recommendations regarding the management of the

any psychological disorder that is identified. Note that as a matter of practice, we

do not provide a specific list of instruments to be administered because research

has shown that this may facilitate practices that could result in invalid test results.

However, the instruments used in this evaluation are standard psychological tests,

which are in common use by psychologists.

Completion of this evaluation may take up to six to eight hours but may take much

less. The clinical interview typically takes from one to two hours. The exact amount

of time required to complete the formal testing depends on the specific issues to be

assessed and examinee’s pace.

The patient will have an hour break for lunch. Additional breaks are allowed as

needed.

Rec. Doc. 269-15, at 2. Dr. Alsop also delivered a letter explaining:

It is my understanding that the claimant in this case is alleging psychological

injuries. A psychological evaluation is a comprehensive assessment of social,

emotional, and behavioral functioning. The evaluation’s purpose is to objectively

document a person’s mental health status, using objective psychometric tests that

include methods to determine the presence and magnitude of response bias (over-

or under- reporting of subjective symptoms) to determine whether a mental health

condition exists (First, 2014). If a mental health condition exists, it is then necessary

to describe its nature (specific diagnoses or constellations of symptoms), its

severity, and its cause(s). The evaluation is specific to that which is being alleged

from a psychological perspective.

The psychological test battery is comprised of a number of procedures designed to

evaluate functioning in the following domains: general intelligence,

attention/concentration, academic skills, effort, and emotional, functional and

behavioral status.

The assessment tools used in a psychological evaluation are selected to objectively

assess the common psychological, emotional, cognitive, and physical complaints

of persons presenting with psychological disorders. In conducting a psychological

evaluation, it is essential to ensure that real and meaningful impairment is not

missed. Therefore, my test battery is comprehensive and requires approximately 6-

8 hours to complete; the variability in time depends on the specific issues to be

assessed and the examinee’s pace. The patient will have an hour break for lunch,

with additional breaks allowed as needed.

Rec. Doc. 269-16, at 2.

Hankins insists he is entitled to receive a list of the tests that may be administered. He

argues this is necessary so that he can object to any tests that are irrelevant, unduly invasive, or

beyond the scope of the injuries claimed. He adds that he would agree to production of this

information on an attorneys’ eyes only basis so there is no risk that plaintiff might prepare or

rehearse answers.

Law and Analysis

1. Independent Medical Examinations

Upon good cause shown by the moving party, the court may order a physical or mental

examination of a party by a suitably licensed or certified examiner when the party’s physical or

mental condition is in controversy. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 35(a)(1). While conclusory allegations in

the pleadings are not sufficient to meet the “good cause” and “in controversy” requirements of

Rule 35, the Supreme Court has recognized that in some cases, the pleadings alone will satisfy the

Rule’s requirements. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 119 (1964). Thus, “[a] plaintiff in a

negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury, places that mental or physical injury

clearly in controversy and provides the defendant with good cause for an examination to determine

the existence and extent of such asserted injury.” Id. (citation omitted).

If the Court finds good cause, the order “must specify the time, place, manner, conditions,

and scope of the examination, as well as the person or persons who will perform it.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 35(a)(2). As a result, courts may require the parties to provide sufficient detail regarding the

proposed examination so that the Court can adequately delineate the manner, conditions, and scope

of the examination. See Kador v. City of New Roads, No. CIV.A. 07-682-D-M2, 2010 WL

2133889, at *3 (M.D. La. May 27, 2010). Such details can also provide “a certain degree of

direction regarding those examinations, thereby providing him the opportunity to bring to the

Court's attention those tests he deems irrelevant or harmful.” Ornelas v. S. Tire Mart, LLC, 292

F.R.D. 388, 398 (S.D. Tex. 2013). Thus, in some instances, courts have required defendant to

provide plaintiff with a list of the possible tests that may be conducted during the examination. See

id. at 399; Carr v. IF&P Holding Co., LLC, No. CV 22-480, 2024 WL 263511, at *5 (E.D. La.

Jan. 24, 2024), on reconsideration in part, No. CV 22-480, 2024 WL 838212 (E.D. La. Feb. 28,

2024). However, there is nothing within the text or purpose of Rule 35 that requires this result in

every case. See Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 605, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1995)

(concluding that the psychologist’s declaration setting forth the nature of the examination to be

conducted was sufficient and finding that “[i]t would serve no purpose to require [him] to select,

and disclose, the specific tests to be administered in advance of the examination”);3 Daigle v.

3 The only reported case cited by the plaintiff in support of his “list of potential tests” argument is Ornelas, which

relied on Newman v. San Joaquin Delta Community College District for that holding. Orenelas, 292 F.R.D. at 388-

89. But the Newman court did not order the disclosure of potential tests. 272 F.R.D. 505, 512 (E.D. Cal. 2011). There,

the psychologist had identified 26 potential tests sua sponte. The court held that “[a]bsent evidence that a certain test

would cause actual harm to [plaintiff], the court cannot itemize tests that are truly unnecessary or appropriate” and

ordered that he “conduct the tests he deems necessary.” 272 F.R.D. at 512. In considering whether to limit the tests

that the psychologist could conduct, the Newman court relied on Ragge, which as noted supra, rejected a request that

potential tests be disclosed. id.; see Ragge,165 F.R.D. at 609.

Nabors Drilling USA, LP, No. CIV.A. 05-0336, 2007 WL 580781, at *2 (W.D. La. Feb. 15, 2007)

(finding the psychologist’s explanation of the nature of the tests to be performed satisfies the notice

requirement of Rule 35). Indeed, courts often find that deferring to the examiner is the more

appropriate course of action. Tillman v. Masse Contracting Co., No. CV 06-2480, 2006 WL

8456492, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 2006) (“This Court finds no reason to specify the tests that

examinee should undergo, that decision is best left to the examiner.”); Ragge, 165 F.R.D. at 609

(C.D. Cal. 1995) (“Because the mental examination provides one of the few opportunities for a

defendant to have access to a plaintiff, and the only opportunity for a defendant to have a plaintiff

examined by defendant's expert, some preference should be given to allowing the examiner to

exercise discretion in the manner and means by which the examination is conducted, provided it

is not an improper examination.”).

2. Analysis

All of the requirements to order an independent mental examination are present here. There

is no dispute that there is good cause for a mental examination of Hankins in light of his allegations

of emotional and psychiatric distress resulting from the incident at issue. There is no dispute that

Dr. Alsop is suitably certified. There appears to be no dispute as to the time or place of the

examination—defendants say they will facilitate a time and place that will not impose an undue

burden on Hankins, and Hankins raises no issue with regard to time or place. Finally, the Court

cannot discern a live dispute as to the manner, conditions, and scope of the examination. A detailed

description of the evaluation has been provided, and Hankins does not claim that the proposed

examination is inappropriate in anyway. Nor does he suggest how a mental examination might

exceed the scope called for by the emotional and psychiatric injury alleged in this case. He does

not request any particular limits or conditions be placed on the examination itself.

Instead, he argues that he must be provided with a list of all potential examinations that

may be conducted by Dr. Alsop so that he can properly assess the scope. He submits the case law

supports his request. He argues that a list of potential examinations is necessary so that he can raise

timely objections4 to any tests that are irrelevant, unduly invasive, or beyond the scope of the

injuries claimed. Yet, he does not suggest that Dr. Alsop might, in exercising her professional

expertise, administer an unduly invasive test or one that seeks information beyond the scope of the

injuries claimed.

Although it is true that some courts have ordered disclosure of all potential examinations

to be conducted, the Court finds that such a disclosure is not called for in this case. First, Dr. Alsop

has provided a detailed description of her examination, as recounted verbatim above. She explains

that “[a] psychological evaluation is a comprehensive assessment of social, emotional, and

behavioral functioning.” Rec. Doc. 269-16, at 2. The evaluation she will conduct “begins with

clinical interview followed by the administration of standardized psychological tests and

procedures.” Rec. Doc. 269-15, at 2. “The psychological test battery is comprised of a number of

procedures designed to evaluate functioning in the following domains: general intelligence,

attention/concentration, academic skills, effort, and emotional, functional and behavioral status.”

Rec. Doc. 269-16, at 2. The “ instruments used in this evaluation are standard psychological tests,

which are in common use by psychologists.” Rec. Doc. 269-15, at 2.

Given the emotional and psychiatric injury alleged in this case, the Court finds that the use

of standard psychological tests to assess Hankins’ functioning in general intelligence,

attention/concentration, academic skills, effort, and emotional, functional, and behavioral status is

an appropriate scope for his mental examination. Further, the Court finds that Dr. Alsop’s

4 Although he seeks the ability to raise timely objections, he does not seek the list far enough in advance of the

examination to allow for such objections to be made.

description of the examination and identification of the types of testing to be conducted is sufficient

to have alerted Hankins’ counsel to any anticipated testing that might be harmful or outside the

scope of the injuries claimed. To be clear, there is no suggestion at all that Dr. Alsop’s evaluation

may harm Hankins. And as to the scope, Hankins has not raised any concern with the proposed

subject matter of the evaluations. Importantly, Dr. Alsop will submit a report of her examination.

If any of her opinions or tests have exceeded the scope of the injuries claimed or her expertise,

Hankins can seek to exclude her findings from any trial or dispositive motion in this matter.

3. Attorneys’ Fees

If the Court grants a motion to compel pursuant to Rule 37, it must “after giving an

opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the

party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred

in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However, fees are

not to be awarded where: ”(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain

the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response,

or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses

unjust.” Id.

By its terms, Rule 37 fees are not implicated when a motion for an IME pursuant to Rule

35 is filed. See Terry v. Promise Hosp. of Ascension, Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-128-SDD, 2014 WL

1239397, at *4 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2014) (“[T]he motion for an IME is authorized pursuant to Rule

35. Rule 35 has no provision for the awarding of expenses as requested by the Defendant and Rule

37 does not provide for the reimbursement of costs associated with filing a motion under Rule

35.”). Nonetheless, defendants have cited a case where a court compelled an IME and ordered the

opposing party to pay the movant’s attorneys’ fees and costs. Smith v. Diamond Offshore Co., No.

CIV.A. 07-3954, 2009 WL 1107717, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2009). Indeed, the court has inherent

authority issue sanctions. Barcia v. ENI US Operating, Co., No. CIV.A. 05-4501, 2006 WL

1236053, at *3 (E.D. La. May 4, 2006).

Although the Court has found the case law relied on by Hankins to be distinguishable, the

Court finds that his attempt to obtain a list of all potential test is not sanctionable. Accordingly,

the Court declines to issue an attorneys’ fee award.

Conclusion

The Court finds good cause for an independent medical examination of Hankins’ mental

health by Megan Alsop, Psy.D., ABPP of Jefferson Neurobehavioral Group, to be conducted at a

time and place to be agreed upon by the parties and in accordance with the scope as described by

Dr. Alsop in Rec. Doc. 269-15 and Rec. Doc. 269-16. It is therefore ORDERED that defendants’

Motion to Compel (Rec. Doc. 269) is GRANTED and the independent medical examination of

Hankins shall proceed as ordered herein. Defendants’ request for sanctions in the form of

attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30th day of January, 2026.

Dante var Mocowel sl

Janis van Meerveld

United States Magistrate Judge

10