Gravenstein 116, LLC v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

GRAVENSTEIN 116, LLC,

Plaintiff, No. 25-997

v. Filed: January 30, 2026

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Christina Tallulah Lanier of Brotman Law, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

Joseph R. Longenecker of the United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington,

D.C., for Defendant. With him on the briefs was Jason Bergmann of the United States Department

of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Federal tax law denies any “deduction or credit” to a taxpayer whose business “consists of

trafficking in controlled substances.” See I.R.C. § 280E (Section 280E bar). Marijuana is a

controlled substance for purposes of the Section 280E bar. See 21 U.S.C. § 812. Plaintiff

Gravenstein 116, LLC (Gravenstein or Plaintiff), which operates cannabis dispensaries in

California, argues it is entitled to the refundable portion of the Employee Retention Credit (ERC),

I.R.C. § 3134, for the first and second quarters of 2021. Plaintiff acknowledges that its business

is subject to the Section 280E bar and accordingly that it cannot claim any “deduction or credit.”

Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that the refundable portion of the Employee Retention Credit is

not a tax credit subject to Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code. Defendant United States

(Defendant) moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant contends that

Section 280E’s prohibition applies to the refundable portion of the Employee Retention Credit,

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barring Plaintiff from eligibility for the tax credit as Plaintiff’s business consists of selling

marijuana. Defendant is correct. For the reasons stated below, Section 280E’s anti-trafficking bar

squarely applies to the Employee Retention Credit, including the refundable portion of the credit.

As a trafficker of a federally controlled substance, Plaintiff is ineligible to receive this tax credit.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

Complaint is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiff’s Marijuana Business

Plaintiff alleges that in 2020, when the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic began, Plaintiff

operated three cannabis dispensaries in California, operating under the name “Solful.” ECF No. 1

(Complaint or Compl.) ¶ 26. Plaintiff does not claim to have any other line of business besides

selling marijuana. See id. Plaintiff claims that for nearly two years—through most of 2020 and

all of 2021—state and local health departments issued orders that “significantly limited” Plaintiff’s

ability to engage in commerce. Id. ¶¶ 32–66. Plaintiff alleges that during this time, it had to

transition from in-person retail operations to “almost exclusively” curbside pickup orders. Id. ¶ 70.

Plaintiff further alleges that it adopted pandemic safety practices that increased costs and blunted

output. Id. ¶ 72.

II. The Employee Retention Credit

On March 27, 2020, Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security

Act (CARES Act). P.L. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281. The CARES Act was one of several laws that

Congress passed in the spring of 2020 to address the economic impacts of COVID-19. See Margot

Crandall Hollick, Cong. Rsch. Serv., The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act

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(CARES) Act—Tax Relief for Individuals and Businesses 1 (2020). The CARES Act included the

Employee Retention Credit (ERC), a refundable tax credit 1 that subsidized employers who were

forced to close or suspend operations due to COVID-19-related public health orders. P.L. 116-

136 § 2301, 134 Stat. 281, 347–51 (CARES Act § 2301) (codified, as amended, at 26 U.S.C.

(I.R.C.) § 3134). Using the ERC, eligible employers can reduce the amount paid in employment

taxes by 70% of the amount paid to employees during the pandemic-related shutdowns. I.R.C.

§ 3134(a). If the credit exceeds the amount of employment taxes paid, employers can claim the

difference as a cash refund:

(a) In general.--In the case of an eligible employer, there shall be allowed as a

credit against applicable employment taxes for each calendar quarter an amount

equal to 70 percent of the qualified wages with respect to each employee of such

employer for such calendar quarter.

(b) Limitations and refundability.—

(1) In general.-- . . .

(2) Credit limited to employment taxes.--The credit allowed by subsection (a)

with respect to any calendar quarter shall not exceed the applicable employment

taxes (reduced by any credits allowed under sections 3131 and 3132) on the

wages paid with respect to the employment of all the employees of the eligible

employer for such calendar quarter.

(3) Refundability of excess credit.--If the amount of the credit under

subsection (a) exceeds the limitation of paragraph (2) for any calendar quarter,

such excess shall be treated as an overpayment that shall be refunded

under sections 6402(a) and 6413(b).

I.R.C. § 3134(a)–(b).

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“[R]efundable tax credit programs are structured to create the legal fiction that recipients make

‘overpayments’ on their taxes, thereby entitling them to the resulting tax ‘refunds,’ as a mechanism

for achieving certain social policy goals.” Sarmiento v. United States, 678 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.

2012) (citing Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 864). “Most tax credits can reduce your tax only until it

reaches $0. Refundable credits go beyond that to give you any remaining credit as a refund.” See

Refundable Tax Credits, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/refundable-tax-

credits.

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The ERC is only available for wages paid before October 1, 2021. I.R.C. § 3134(n).

Generally, eligible employers qualify for the ERC if their operations were “fully or partially

suspended . . . due to orders from an appropriate governmental authority due to the coronavirus

disease 2019.” Id. § 3134(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Alternatively, an employer qualifies for the Employee

Retention Credit if its gross receipts during a quarter were “less than 80 percent of the gross

receipts” of the same quarter in 2019. Id. § 3134(c)(2)(A)(ii)(II). The CARES Act grants the

Secretary of the Treasury of the United States (Treasury Secretary), whose purview includes the

Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the ability to issue regulations and forms to implement the ERC.

Id. § 3134(m). The ERC does not specify a suspension of any rules related to a taxpayer’s general

eligibility to claim credits or deductions. See id. § 3134.

III. Procedural History

Plaintiff argues that it is eligible to claim the ERC for the first and second quarters of 2021

because it paid qualifying wages and was harmed by COVID-19-related shutdowns. Compl. ¶¶ 81,

93. Plaintiff claims that it met all requirements to claim the refundable ERC during that time

period. Id. ¶¶ 81, 93.

Plaintiff states that on or about May 10, 2021, it filed its original Form 941 for employment

taxes for the first quarter of 2021 and that it “has no outstanding employment tax liability for Q1

2021.” Compl. ¶¶ 76, 77. Plaintiff also states that on August 7, 2024, it filed a Form 941-X—an

amendment to its previous Form 941—claiming a refund for the ERC for the first quarter of 2021.

Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiff avers that it paid qualifying wages of $215,408.84 in that quarter and contends

that it was entitled to a refundable ERC of $150,786.19. Id.

Additionally, Plaintiff states that on or about August 9, 2021, it filed its original Form 941

for employment taxes for the second quarter of 2021, and that it “has no outstanding employment

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tax liability for Q2 2021.” Compl. ¶¶ 88, 89. Plaintiff states that it filed a Form 941-X claiming

a refund for the ERC for the second quarter of 2021 on August 7, 2024. Id. ¶ 91. Plaintiff claims

that it paid qualifying wages of $244,614.37 in that quarter, and accordingly that it was entitled to

a refundable ERC of $171,230.06. Id.

On June 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed this suit seeking a tax refund, based upon its alleged

entitlement to the ERC, for both the first and second quarters of 2021, totaling $322,016.25, plus

interest. See Compl. at 14. Plaintiff contends that the IRS failed to adjudicate Plaintiff’s refund

claim for either the first quarter or second quarters of 2021 within six months of receipt. Id. ¶¶ 83,

95.

On August 15, 2025, Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

on the basis that Plaintiff, as a business subject to the Section 280E bar, is ineligible to claim the

refundable portion of the ERC. See ECF No. 6 (Motion to Dismiss or Motion) at 1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“The Court of Federal Claims may properly grant a motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6) when

a complaint does not allege facts that show the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought.”

Steffen v. United States, 995 F.3d 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing Lindsay v. United States, 295

F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims

(Rules) (allowing a party to assert the Complaint’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted” as a defense).

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At the motion to dismiss stage, this Court must “take all factual allegations in the complaint

as true and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Boyd v. United

States, 134 F.4th 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting Jones v. United States, 846 F.3d 1343, 1351

(Fed. Cir. 2017)). The Court, however, need not “accept the asserted legal conclusions.” Am.

Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

DISCUSSION

Resolution of this Motion turns on one question of law: whether Internal Revenue Code

Section 280E prevents a business “trafficking in controlled substances” from claiming the

refundable portion of the Employee Retention Credit. As noted, Plaintiff acknowledges that it

traffics in controlled substances and is therefore covered by Section 280E’s prohibition on

claiming any deduction or credit; however, it nevertheless contends that it is still eligible to claim

the ERC. See ECF No. 9 (Response) at 2 (“Plaintiff’s status, under current federal law, as a

business ‘trafficking in controlled substances’ should not preclude it from claiming ERCs for the

first and second quarters of 2021.”).

Section 280E prevents certain businesses from taking tax deductions or credits in particular

circumstances:

No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the

taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the

activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in

controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled

Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which

such trade or business is conducted.

I.R.C. § 280E. see N. Cal. Small Business Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 73 (2019)

(“‘No deduction or credit shall be allowed.’ Congress could not have been clearer in drafting this

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section of the Code.” (cleaned up)). This statute enacts a “federal public policy against the

allowance of business expenses for certain drug-trafficking activity,” including the sale of

marijuana. High Desert Relief, Inc. v. United States, 917 F.3d 1170, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019). If, as

Defendant contends in its Motion, Section 280E applies to the ERC, then Plaintiff is ineligible for

the ERC tax credit and will be owed no funds in this action as a matter of law. Mot. at 2. The

parties note that one other court has considered the issue and determined that Section 280E applies

to the ERC. Mot. at 3; Resp. at 3–4; see Receivership Est. of Solstice Grp., Inc. v. United States,

No. 2:24-cv-01522, 2025 WL 2988841, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2025). Plaintiff raises an

argument not argued or considered in that prior case: “that at least the refundable portion of the

ERC is not a deduction or credit for taxes at all.” Resp. at 4. The Court concludes that, to the

contrary, the Employee Retention Credit, including its refundable portion, is a tax credit, which

Section 280E unequivocally bars Plaintiff from claiming.

I. Application of Section 280E to the ERC

To determine whether the ERC is a tax “credit,” the Court begins with the text of the statute.

See Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 457 (2022) (“As always, we begin with the

text.”). “If the statutory language is plain, [the Court] must enforce it according to its terms.” King

v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 474 (2015). When considering whether the language is plain, “[the

Court] must read the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory

scheme.” Id. (quotations omitted); see also West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697,

721 (2022). Words that are used multiple times in the same statute have the same meaning each

time in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. See Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S.

851, 860 (1986) (“The normal rule of statutory construction assumes that identical words used in

different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” (cleaned up)); Mil.-

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Veterans Advocacy v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th 1110, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is a well-

established canon of statutory construction that Congress is presumed to have intended for

identical words used in different parts of the same act to have the same meaning.” (cleaned up));

Libbey Glass v. United States, 921 F.2d 1263, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he presumption of

identical meaning readily yields to the controlling force of the circumstance that the words, though

in the same act, are found in such dissimilar connections as to warrant the conclusion that they

were employed in the different parts of the act with different intent.” (cleaned up)).

The text of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) here is unambiguous: the ERC is a

tax credit. The Code unequivocally labels the ERC as “a credit.” I.R.C. § 3134(a) (“[T]here shall

be allowed as a credit . . .”). The Code describes the refundable portion of the ERC as one part of

this “credit.” Id. § 3134(b)(2) (“If the amount of the credit under subsection (a) exceeds the

limitation of paragraph (2) for any calendar quarter, such excess shall be treated as an overpayment

that shall be refunded under sections 6402(a) and 6413(b).” (emphasis added)). The same word is

used in Section 280E: “credit.” Id. § 280E (“No deduction or credit . . .”). Plaintiff does not raise

any evidence, and the Court can find none, that the term “credit” in the Internal Revenue Code

differs in meaning when describing the ERC or the Section 280E bar. See Resp. Indeed, the

section of the Code addressing the ERC does not provide a separate definition of “credit” that

would indicate a different definition than elsewhere in the Code. See I.R.C. § 3134(c) (providing

definitions specific to the ERC). Accordingly, as it is evident that the term “credit” has the same

meaning in the ERC as in the rest of the Internal Revenue Code, Section 280E’s bar on eligibility

for tax credits must be read to encompass the ERC. See Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 860; Mil.-Veterans

Advocacy, 7 F.4th at 1147; A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

170 (2012) (“[A] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text.”); id. at

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172 (“The presumption of consistent usage applies also when different sections of an act or code

are at issue.”); see also ERC Today LLC v. McInelly, 782 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (D. Ariz. 2025)

(“The ERC is a tax credit[.]”).

II. Plaintiff’s Structural Argument

Plaintiff further contends that even if the ERC is a tax credit, the refundable portion of the

ERC is not a tax credit due to its structure as a refundable credit. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

“while the form of the ERC is that of a tax credit, the substance of the amounts in excess of an

employer’s tax liabilities is that of a non-tax refund of wages paid.” Resp. at 3 (emphasis in

original). Plaintiff characterizes the ERC’s refundable portion as a subsidy for employment, rather

than a tax credit. Id. at 5. Plaintiff cites no authority for the purported “meaningful distinction” it

asserts between the refundable ERC and other credits. See Resp. at 4 (“[T]his Court should

consider the meaningful distinction between the ERC, refundable portion[s] of which acts as a

non-tax refund of wages paid by an eligible employer, and the types of credits and deductions

section 280E clearly prohibits.” (emphasis in original)).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, it is well-established that refundable tax credits are still

tax credits subject to restrictions in the Internal Revenue Code. Indeed, the Supreme Court

considered this issue in Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, which involved the applicability of

overpayments arising due to the refundable Earned Income Credit (EIC) to a law that permitted

the IRS to intercept tax refunds of individuals who had failed to make child-support payments.

See Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 853–54. The Court held that the refundable credit was subject to the

intercept law because the Code defined the refundable EIC as an “overpayment” of taxes and the

intercept law applied to any “overpayment.” Id. at 859 (“The refundability of the earned-income

credit is thus inseparable from its classification as an overpayment of tax.”). The Court specifically

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rejected an argument that the refundable nature of the EIC changed the definition of

“overpayment”; instead, the Court held that the structure of a refundable credit did not change the

meaning of words in the Code. Id. at 863 (“[J]ust as eligibility for an earned-income credit does

not depend upon an individual’s actually having paid any tax, the Code’s classification of the credit

as an ‘overpayment’ to be refunded is similarly independent of the individual’s actually having

made any payment.”). Here, Plaintiff advances nearly the same argument the taxpayers in

Sorenson: claiming that the word “credit” means something different in the ERC because the ERC

is structured as a refundable credit. See Resp. at 4. However, the Internal Revenue Code does not

discriminate between a refundable credit and other credits, and Plaintiff makes no credible,

supported argument to the contrary. Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 863.

Plaintiff’s contention that the ERC is somehow structurally different than other tax credits

because it supports a policy of subsidizing employment similarly fails. See Resp. at 4. Indeed,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a similar structural argument

concerning the EIC in Israel v. United States. See Israel v. United States, 356 F.3d 221, 223–24

(2d Cir. 2004). There, taxpayers argued that a timeliness requirement applicable throughout the

Internal Revenue Code should not apply to the refundable EIC because the refundable EIC “is

essentially not a tax refund, but rather ‘an antipoverty mechanism’ through which the government

subsidizes low-income families.” Id. The Israel court, citing Sorenson, held that the Code does

not make such a distinction, and held that the relevant term had the same meaning for refundable

credits as in other parts of the Code. Id. at 224. Here, Plaintiff argues that the ERC purportedly

is structurally a “non-tax refund” and is thus beyond the reach of the Section 280E bar. Resp. at

4. Like the Israel taxpayers, Plaintiff cannot identify any authority for this asserted distinction in

the Code. Id. Thus, the same result applies here as in Israel: terms used in provisions elsewhere

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in the Internal Revenue Code retain their same meaning when applied to a refundable credit even

where it supports a social policy, like the ERC. See Israel, 356 F.3d at 223–24; Sorenson, 475

U.S. at 864. Accordingly, the term “credit” in the ERC has the same meaning in the Code as the

term “credit” in Section 280E and as noted above, the Section 280E bar thus applies to the ERC,

including any refundable portion of the credit.

III. Plaintiff’s Policy Argument

Finally, Plaintiff seeks to salvage its argument with an appeal to the ERC’s policy aims.

See Resp. at 5. Where statutory text and structure are clear, the Court will not engage in a

purposivist analysis that undermines the statute. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588

U.S. 427, 436 (2019) (“In statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s proper starting point lies in a

careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself. Where, as here, that

examination yields a clear answer, judges must stop.” (internal citations omitted)). The Supreme

Court in Sorenson rejected an argument that public policy considerations prevented the application

of provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to refundable credits. See Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 865.

There, taxpayers argued that the law requiring the interception of tax refunds of people who miss

child support payments “should be read narrowly to avoid frustrating the goals of the earned-

income credit program.” See id. at 864. The Supreme Court rejected this argument as beyond the

role of the courts to consider: “[t]he ordering of competing social policies is a quintessentially

legislative function.” Id. at 865. Similarly, here, Plaintiff argues that the ERC’s social-support

purposes should override Section 280E’s bar on providing tax credits to businesses engaged in

drug trafficking. Resp. at 5. As in Sorenson, the Court will not consider policy arguments that

seek to undermine the unambiguous text of Section 280E. See Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 865.

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Furthermore, even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s policy arguments, those

arguments would fail to support Plaintiff’s claim. For example, Plaintiff contends that the ERC’s

purpose was “keeping Americans employed and paid during a national public health emergency,”

and that Plaintiff fulfilled that purpose by retaining employees and accordingly should be eligible

for the refundable portion of the tax credit. Resp. at 5. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish its own

business from that of an “illegal cocaine dealer” whose business is illegal under state law and

argues that its business is more deserving of federal support than the cocaine dealer. Id. (“Plaintiff

actually contributed to the American economy, at a significant expense no less.”).

Even if the Court were to engage with Plaintiff’s analysis, which it does not, Plaintiff’s

distinction between itself and the “illegal cocaine dealer” has no basis in the law. See Resp. at 5.

Section 280E does not distinguish between different types of drug traffickers but rather applies

equally to any business that “consists of trafficking in controlled substances.” 2 I.R.C. § 280E.

Plaintiff acknowledges that it qualifies as such a business “under current federal law,” which is the

law that this Court applies. 3 See Resp. at 2. Plaintiff does not identify any other relevant authority

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In fact, insofar as there is a distinction between Plaintiff, as a seller of marijuana, and illegal

cocaine dealers, the distinction does not reflect well upon Plaintiff. The Section 280E bar defines

“controlled substances” as those drugs listed in Schedules I and II of the Controlled Substances

Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812. I.R.C. § 280E. Marijuana is currently listed on Schedule I, which is more

restrictive than Schedule II, on which cocaine is listed. See 21 U.S.C. § 812.

3

On December 18, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order directing the Department of

Justice to accelerate the process to reschedule marijuana to Schedule III under the Controlled

Substances Act. See Exec. Order No. 14,370, Increasing Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol

Research, 90 Fed. Reg. 60,541 (Dec. 18, 2025). However, the Department of Justice has yet to

publish a final rule reclassifying marijuana. See Drug Enforcement Agency, Schedules of

Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Marijuana, https://www.regulations.gov/docket/DEA-

2024-0059 (last accessed Jan. 28, 2026). This Court must “apply the law in effect at the time it

renders its decision,” and marijuana remains on Schedule I, as it did in 2021, the tax year at issue

in this action. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994); see also Bradley v.

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suggesting that the ERC grants special treatment to drug traffickers who pay their employees or

contribute to the economy. 4 See Resp. at 5. Congress did not grant this Court the authority to

weed through different types of trafficking and determine that only some are subject to Section

280E’s bar based on policy rationales. See High Desert Relief, 917 F.3d at 1196. Accordingly,

this Court declines Plaintiff’s policy-based invitation to engage in judicial engraftment of an

unambiguous Code. Plaintiff cannot escape the conclusion that, at least for purposes of Section

280E, it traffics in federally illegal drugs and thus is not eligible to claim the ERC in any regard.

* * * * *

Sch. Bd. Of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974); Doyon v. United States, 58 F.4th 1235, 1245

(Fed. Cir. 2023).

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Plaintiff cites Congressional testimony from years after the ERC was passed to divine the

statute’s purpose. See Resp. at 5. This citation cannot help Plaintiff: “Post-enactment legislative

history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.” Bruesewitz

v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011).

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CONCLUSION

Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code applies to the refundable ERC created in the

Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, prohibiting a business whose “trade or

business . . . consists of trafficking in controlled substances” from claiming this tax credit. I.R.C.

§ 280E. As Plaintiff, which runs a business selling marijuana, acknowledges that its business

“traffic[s] in controlled substances,” it cannot claim the ERC, including its refundable portion, as

a tax credit. See Resp. at 2. Plaintiff’s claim that it is owed a tax refund therefore fails as a matter

of law. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Eleni M. Roumel

ELENI M. ROUMEL

Judge

January 30, 2026

Washington, D.C.

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