Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

KHALIF ABDUL MATEEN,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:25-CV-299-CCB-SJF

L. SMITH, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Khalif Abdul Mateen, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the

merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.

Mateen alleges that, on December 6, 2023, around 5:00 p.m., he was returning

from recreation and walked into the staff office to retrieve a roll of toilet paper. As he

was leaving, Lt. Walton (a female correctional officer) began to “horseplay” with

Mateen by slapping the roll of toilet paper out of his hands. ECF 1 at 3. After a couple of

times, Mateen became frustrated. As she bent over to pick up the toilet paper, he

grabbed Lt. Walton by the waist and tried to move her out of the way to obtain the toilet

paper. He was later accused of “pelvis thrusting” Lt. Walton. Id.

Following the incident, Mateen was housed in a Special Management Cell

(“SMC”) for twelve days under conditions that Mateen describes as harsh and

unsanitary. He was only permitted to wear a smock and his boxers, and he was

monitored by camera. He was fed finger foods, and he could only drink water or flush

the toilet with assistance from an officer. This meant that urine and feces were

sometimes in the toilet for extended periods. He was not permitted to have a

toothbrush, soap, pens, or eating utensils.

After the twelve days, Mateen was moved to a regular segregation cell.

Approximately 60 days later, a screening order was served on him charging him with

assault and battery on staff (a violation of offense A117) with serious bodily injury.

Thirty days after that, a hearing was held before Lt. Draper. The charge was reduced to

a non-consensual sexual contact on staff. He was found guilty and sanctioned with 90

days segregation and a 30-day loss of telephone privileges. He had already served 90

days in segregation, so he was moved to administrative segregation.

He appealed the finding of guilt. At the second level of appeal, his finding of

guilt was vacated, and he was granted a rehearing. Mateen does not describe any

shortcoming in the hearing process or indicate the basis for his appeal or the decision to

vacate the finding of guilt.

The rehearing took place before Sgt. L. Smith. Mateen explained to Sgt. Smith

that the charge had been lowered by Lt. Draper. He asked that video footage be

reviewed because none had been available at the first hearing. And, he explained that

he had already served the 90 day sanction. Sgt. Smith found Mateen guilty of battery on

an officer,1 and claimed that video evidence supported the finding. Sgt. Smith

sanctioned Mateen with 365 days in segregation and a 45-day loss of telephone

privileges. Mateen appealed the guilty finding. On appeal, he argued that he should not

have been found guilty of battery causing serious bodily injury because, according to

Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) policy there must be a photo or other

documentation of the injury to support the finding.2 But a violation of A-117 does not

require serious bodily injury where the sanction does not include forfeiting the balance

of an inmate’s good time credits. Both Warden Ron Neal and Executive Assistant Mark

Newkirk were involved in the appeal, which was denied.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides state officials shall not “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. That said, due process is only required when punishment extends the duration

of confinement or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

1 The Appendix to the IDOC’s Adult Disciplinary Process defines an A-117 offense as

“[c]omitting battery against a staff person, volunteer, independent contractor, or visitor.”

https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/ADP-Attachment-I-Offenses-3-1-2020.pdf (last visited January 27, 2026).

2 A review of the current version of the IDOC’s Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders, which can

be found at https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101-ADP-3-1-2020.pdf (last viewed January 27, 2026),

shows that an offender convicted of an A117 battery offense can lose all accumulated good time credit in

addition to other sanctions. However, “to take the entire balance of the offender’s accumulated earned

credit time, if possible, photographs or other documentation of the bodily injury should be included as

evidence to support a Report of Conduct alleging a violation of A117 or A115 or A100 involving bodily

harm to a staff person[.]” Id. at 40-41. There is no indication in Matteen’s complaint that the hearing

officer found that Mateen caused a serious bodily injury.

(1995). In other words, “disciplinary segregation can trigger due process protections

depending on the duration and conditions of segregation.” Jackson v. Anastasio, 150 F.4th

851, 858 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697

(7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original)). Both the duration and the severity of the

conditions themselves must be considered when determining whether the prisoner’s

placement in solitary confinement triggers due process protections—the length of time

must be “substantial” and the conditions must be “unusually harsh.” Id.

Similarly, while inmates do not generally have a liberty interest in “avoiding

transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for administrative,

protective, or investigative purposes[,]” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir.

2008) (emphasis added) (citing Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608–09 & 608 n.4 (7th Cir.

2005), the same analysis applies with regard to duration and the harshness of the

conditions. See e.g., Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prisoners do not

have a constitutional right to remain in the general population, . . . but both the

duration and the conditions of the segregation must be considered in determining

whether due process is implicated.”) (internal quotation marks, parenthesis, and

citations omitted; emphasis in original); Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98 & nn.2–3 (collecting

cases that held segregation of two to ninety days does not trigger due process concerns

and stating, “In a number of other cases, we have explained that a liberty interest may

arise if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that

the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.”) (emphasis added); Lekas, 405 F.3d

at 612 (finding that up to ninety days in segregation does not affect liberty); see also

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (recognizing “duration” is a component that

plays a part in determining whether a liberty interest exists). Once an inmate shows a

particular non-disciplinary placement implicates a liberty interest, he has a right to a

meaningful review, which periodically “evaluates the prisoner’s current circumstances

and future prospects, and, considering the reason(s) for his confinement to the program,

determines whether that placement remains warranted.’” Isby, 856 F.3d at 527

(quoting Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2012)).3

Even where due process protections apply, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings

are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in

such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The

Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners the following procedural due process

rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an

opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call

witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with

institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder

of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 563-73 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” in

the record to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S.

3 Of note, “for any term of solitary confinement lasting more than days but less than years,

qualified immunity will often apply to claims for damages. For segregation terms measured in months,

even if an inmate’s segregation amounted to a deprivation of a liberty interest, it is unlikely that prison

officials could be held responsible for incorrectly guessing otherwise due to the ambiguity of the

parameters of the law.” Jackson, 150 F.4th at 858–59 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

However, because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, this question is best left to a later stage of

the litigation.

445, 455 (1985). It is with this backdrop that the court considers whether Mateen is

entitled to due process protections and, if so, whether he received those protections.

Mateen’s initial placement in SMC for twelve days was too short to implicate due

process concerns. The conditions he describes likewise do not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation. “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable

prisons....” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Conditions that merely cause

inconveniences and discomfort or make confinement unpleasant do not rise to the level

of Constitutional violations. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 108-109 (7th Cir. 1971).

Conditions of confinement must be severe to support an

Eighth Amendment claim; “the prison officials’ act or

omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer [v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994)] (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981)). See also, Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1579 (7th

Cir. 1994) (the Eighth Amendment only protects prisoners

from conditions that “exceed contemporary bounds of

decency of a mature, civilized society.”); Jackson [v.

Duckworth,] 955 F.2d [21,] 22 [(7th Cir. 1992)].

Morissette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1995) (parallel citations omitted). Being

required to wear only a smock and boxers, being monitored by camera, being limited to

finger foods, requiring the assistance of an officer to obtain water or flush the toilet, and

being denied a toothbrush, soap, pens, and eating utensils for twelve days is

unpleasant, to be sure, but these conditions did not deny Mateen the minimum measure

of life’s necessities.

Mateen also complains about a variety of conditions while he was housed in D

cell house. First, he complains that D cell house did not have an updated fire prevention

or sprinkler system in place. He asserts that one staff person has one key and, in the

event of a fire, would need to unlock 33 separate cells on each tier with that key.

Mateen was also unhappy with how Ramadan meals were handled in D cell

house. Inmates participating in Ramadan received only two meals a day, although a

memorandum circulated in February 2025 indicated that the two meals were the

equivalent of the three meals served to other inmates. Mateen disagrees. He asserts that

inmates celebrating Ramadan receive repetitive meals of cold cut sandwiches and

vegetables, with no access to a microwave to warm their meals, which sometimes have

ice on them due to refrigeration. Instead of taking Ramadan meals, this year Mateen

decided to save his lunch and dinner trays by putting them up until sunset, even

though he knew that the food could spoil while sitting out for extended periods of time.

It is unclear if Mateen would have received different options for Ramadan if he had

been housed elsewhere or if this is how Ramadan meals are handled throughout the

prison.

Mateen also complains that the prison serves an Easter Passover meal to

everyone and a Jewish Passover meal to everyone, but Eid al-Fitr is neglected. But this

does not appear to be an issue that is limited to D cell house.4

He also complains about problems with the grievance system in D cell house.

Grievances are allegedly ignored or returned for minor errors, and grievance receipts

4 To the extent these allegations suggest a violation of the Establishment Clause, Mateen cannot

proceed because he has not alleged that any particular defendant is responsible for the alleged violation.

are not always provided. Again, it is unclear that these problems are limited to D cell

house.

These allegations, either standing alone or taken together, do not support a

finding that Mateen endured an atypical or significant hardship in relationship to the

ordinary incidents of prison life while he was housed in D cell house. Therefore, he may

not proceed on a due process claim based on his placement in D cell house following

disciplinary proceedings where he was found guilty.

Likewise, it cannot be plausibly inferred from the allegations in Matteen’s

complaint that conditions in D cellhouse violated the Eighth Amendment. Being housed

in a facility that does not have an updated fire prevention system does not exceed

contemporary bounds of decency.

His allegations regarding the meals provided to inmates participating in

Ramadan likewise do not violate the Eighth Amendment. “Prisoners have a right to

adequate food, but not to food that is tasty or even appetizing.” Isby, 856 F.3d at 522

(quoting Williams v. Berge, 102 F. App’x 506, 507 (7th Cir. 2004)). Mateen does not allege

that consuming the food provided for Ramadan violated his religious beliefs; he alleges

only that he found it lacking in variety and undesirable. This does not amount to a

constitutional violation.

While Mateen faults Alicia Wildfang for the shortcomings in the grievance

system, he has no constitutional right to access the grievance process. See Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that there is not a Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate grievance procedure).

Therefore, he cannot proceed against Alicia Wildfang,

Finally, even if, considering the length of time Mateen was housed in D-cell

house, due process rights were required, Mateen hasn’t alleged that any of the due

process guarantees set forth in Wolff were lacking. He received advance written notice

of the charges and an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker. He

has not presented any facts suggesting he lacked an opportunity to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence in his defense. He has not presented any facts

suggesting that he did not receive a written statement by the fact-finder of evidence

relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. It appears that he did, because he

indicates that the hearing officer asserted that the video evidence supported the finding

of guilt.

Due process requires that there must also be “some evidence” in the record to

support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).

Mateen has not argued that the guilty finding was not supported by any evidence. He

complains only that there was no picture or documentation of an injury to the officer, but

due process does not require this. At most, this is a violation of IDOC’s policy, but “42

U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws

or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.” Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d

752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, as noted earlier, the IDOC’s policy provides that a

picture of documentation is required when all good time is taken away, and Mateen was not

sanctioned with a loss of good time credit.

This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Mateen

believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described in this

complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil

cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least

where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738

(7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a

Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his law

library. He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title

“Prisoner Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Khalif Abdul Mateen until March 2, 2026, to file an amended

complaint; and

(2) CAUTIONS Khalif Abdul Mateen that, if he does not respond by the

deadline, this case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice

because the current complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.

SO ORDERED on January 28, 2026.

/s/Cristal C. Brisco

CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT