The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
SARAH LEYLA POWELL, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00641-JAW
)
ADRIAN MAURICE POWELL JR., )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The court denies the respondent’s motion for summary judgment in this Hague
Convention case because there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude
judgment as a matter of law, including whether the respondent wrongfully retained
the children and, if so, when.
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an international custody dispute between a German mother and an
American father over two minor children under the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of Child Abduction, art. 2, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S.
89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986) (the Hague Convention), as
implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22
U.S.C. §§ 9001-9011 (formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601 et seq.). In this dispute, the mother
petitions this Court for an order allowing her to return to Germany with her two her
children and for enforcement of the custody order of a German court. Verified Pet. for
Return of Children to Germany and for Issuance of Show Cause Order (ECF No. 1)
(Pet.). On January 22-23, 2026, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on an
expedited basis consistent with the Hague Convention requirements. Min. Entry
(ECF Nos. 50, 52). The father, seeking judgment in his favor and against the mother,
moved for summary judgment after the hearing had been set but before the hearing
had been held. Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 30) (Resp’t’s Mot.; RSMF).
Given the immediacy of the evidentiary hearing and the apparent factual
controversies between the parties, the Court suggested to the father that the hearing
would be the preferred way to handle the dispute, but the father objected to
dismissing the motion for summary judgment and demanded a ruling. Min. Entry
(ECF No. 33). The Court expedited the mother’s response, and the father waived
reply. Id. At the opening of the evidentiary hearing before the Court, the Court orally
denied the father’s motion for summary judgment because he had failed to show there
are no genuine disputes as to any material facts and therefore he is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Min. Entry (ECF No. 50). This order provides the
Court’s reasoning.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 22, 2025 Petitioner Sarah Leyla Powell filed her verified petition
pursuant to the Hague Convention directing the return of her two minor children (the
Children), N.P. and Z.P. to Germany, Pet., along with her motion for expedited
consideration of the petition and the issuance of an order to show cause against the
Respondent, Adrian Maurice Powell Jr. See Mot. for Expedited Consideration of
Verified Pet. for Return of Children to Germany and Issuance of Show Cause Order
(ECF No. 3). The Petitioner alleges that the Respondent unlawfully kept the
Children in the United States. Pet. ¶ 52. The Petitioner attached to her verified
petition a Custody Power of Attorney dated November 18, 2021, Pet., Attach. 1,
Custody Power of Att’y, a Divorce Agreement recorded September 6, 2023, Pet.,
Attach. 2, Divorce Agreement, and a Decision of the Mannheim Local Court, Family
Court, dated May 16, 2024, Pet., Attach. 3, Decision, all under German law. Based
on those German court documents before August 2024, when the Children came to
the United States, the Petitioner had sole custody of the Children.
On December 23, 2025, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
preventing the Respondent from removing the Children from the Court’s jurisdiction
and directing the Respondent to relinquish the Children’s passports. TRO (ECF No.
5).1
The Court held a telephonic conference of counsel on this matter on January
9, 2026 at 3:30 p.m. EST. Min. Entry (ECF No. 14), and scheduled an expedited
evidentiary hearing for January 22-23, 2026 in federal court in Portland, Maine. Id.
Following the telephone conference, the Court issued a report of conference and
scheduling order outlining deadlines for the evidentiary hearing on the verified
petition, staying any state court proceedings, and directing the parties to notify that
state court that its proceedings have been stayed. Report of Conf. and Scheduling
Order (ECF No. 16).
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that on January 21, 2026, the Respondent complied
with this order and the Children’s passports are now retained by the Court. Receipt for Surrender of
Passports (ECF No. 48).
On January 16, 2026, the Petitioner filed her trial brief. Pet’r’s Pre-Hearing
Brief (ECF No. 26). Also on January 16, 2026, the Respondent filed his answer,
Resp’t’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses (ECF No. 27), his amended answer and
counterclaim for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, Resp’t’s Am. Answer,
Affirmative Defenses, and Countercl. (ECF No. 28), and his trial brief. Resp’t’s Pre-
Hearing Brief (ECF No. 29). The Petitioner opposes Respondent’s request for
attorney’s fees and costs given that ICARA only provides an award of fees to
prevailing petitioners. Answer to Countercl. at 1, n.1 (ECF No. 31).
On January 17, 2026, after the Court scheduled the expedited evidentiary
hearing consistent with the Hague Convention requirements, the Respondent filed a
motion for summary judgment, seeking summary judgment against the Petitioner’s
verified petition and listing the Respondent’s statement of material fact. Resp’t’s
Mot.; RSMF. As noted earlier, on January 20, 2026, the Court held a telephone
conference with the parties and explained that the evidentiary hearing would be the
preferred way to handle the dispute, but the Respondent objected to dismissal of the
motion for summary judgment and the Court expedited the Petitioner’s response.
Min. Entry (ECF No. 33). The Respondent waived reply. Id.
Accordingly, on January 20, 2026, the Petitioner filed her opposition, Pet’r’s
Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 36) (Pet’r’s Opp’n), and an opposing statement of
fact with additional facts. Opposing Statement of Material Facts and Statement of
Additional Material Facts (ECF No. 37) (PRRSMF; PSAMF). On the first day of the
evidentiary hearing, the Court orally denied the Respondent’s motion for summary
judgment. Min. Entry (ECF No. 50). This written order provides the Court’s
reasoning.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Motion for Summary Judgment and the Local Rule
The United States District Court for the District of Maine promulgated a local
rule controlling the filing of motions for summary judgment and specifically
statements of material fact. D. ME. LOC. R. 56. Regarding statements of material
fact, the Rule requires the proponent to file a statement of material facts “as to which
the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried.” D.
ME. LOC. R. 56(b)(1). The Respondent incorporated a statement of material facts in
his motion.2 Resp’t’s Mot. at 2-3. On January 20, 2026, the Petitioner filed her
response to the Respondent’s statement of material facts in accordance with Local
Rule 56(c)(1) and presented a separately titled statement of additional material facts.
PRRSMF; PSAMF. At the January 20, 2026 telephone conference with the Court,
the Respondent waived the right to file a reply to the Petitioner’s opposition to his
motion. Min. Entry (ECF No. 33). Thus, the Respondent did not file any reply
statement of material fact pursuant to Local Rule 56(d).
Local Rule 56(g)(1) sets forth the effect of a party’s failure to respond to an
opposing party’s statement of material facts:
2 Technically, this is a violation of the Local Rule, because it requires that the statements of
material facts be “supported by a separate, short, and concise statement of materials facts.” D. ME.
LOC. R. 56(b)(1). However, the Petitioner responded, and the Court has treated the incorporated
statement as if filed separately.
Facts in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if
supported by record citations, will be deemed admitted unless properly
controverted.
D. ME. LOC. R. 56(g)(1). The Respondent’s decision not to reply to the Petitioner’s
statement of additional material facts requires the Court to accept as asserted each
of the Petitioner’s additional facts, so long as they were properly submitted. Fox v.
Makin, No. 2:22-cv-00251-JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224080, at *12-14 (D. Me.
Nov. 14, 2025); Woods v. Barnies, No. 2:21-cv-00364-GZS, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
176645, at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 2, 2023). Although it is not impossible to prevail in a
motion for summary judgment where the movant fails to respond to the non-movant’s
statement of additional material facts, it is more difficult to do so. See Almodovar v.
Wilkie, No. 1:19-cv-166-LEW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240747, at *26-27 (D. Me. Dec.
22, 2020) (“Given the evidentiary presentation, which includes an admission by dint
of his failure to file a proper responsive statement of material fact, Plaintiff has failed
to raise a genuine issue of fact that his engagement in protected activity influenced
his non-selection”).
B. Statement of Facts
In August of 2024, the Petitioner consented for the Children to travel from
Germany to the United States so they could enroll in school in Maine. RSMF ¶ 2;
PRRSMF ¶ 2. The Petitioner alleges that she intended to return to Germany with
the Children after she completed her education. RSMF ¶ 3; PRRSMF ¶ 3.3 The
3 The Respondent’s paragraph four states that the Petitioner reiterated to him after February
8, 2025 that “this [the children residing in the US] was only agreed upon for the time I am in school,
see visa paperwork.” RSPM ¶ 4. The Petitioner objected to this paragraph because the exhibit
supporting the statement was not attached to the Respondent’s statement of material facts. The Court
Respondent promised the Petitioner that he would return the Children’s passports to
her when she arrived in the United States. PSAMF ¶ 1.
Before the Petitioner arrived in the United States, the Respondent also
promised to support the Petitioner and the Children by paying for the Petitioner’s
education and her housing in an apartment by herself as well as providing her with
a car for transportation and an allowance of $500 per week. PSAMF ¶¶ 3-4. The
Petitioner could not afford to pay for school, or to live in the United States because
the F-1 student visa severely restricted her ability to work and earn wages. Id. ¶ 5.
In December of 2024, the Petitioner traveled from Germany to the United
States and then began classes at York Community College in January 2025. RSMF
¶ 5; PRRSMF ¶ 5. The Petitioner alleges that she intended to go back to Germany
with the Children after the Petitioner finished her own education. RSMF ¶ 3;
PRRSMF ¶ 3.
The Petitioner alleges that the Respondent’s wrongful date of retention began
on February 8, 2025 and continues. RSMF ¶ 1; PRRSMF ¶ 1.4 On February 8, 2025,
the Petitioner demanded the return of the Children’s passports and told the
Respondent that she would return to Germany with the Children, but the Respondent
sustains the Petitioner’s objection. See D. ME. LOC. R. 56(b)(1) (“Each fact asserted in the
statement . . . must be supported by a record citation as required by subsection (f)”); D. ME. LOC. R.
56(f) (“An assertion of fact in a statement of material facts must be followed by a citation to the specific
page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion”).
4 The Respondent’s paragraph one states that the Petitioner alleges the date of wrongful
detention is February 8, 2025. RSMF ¶ 1. The Petitioner interposed a qualified response, noting that
she contends that the wrongful detention began on February 8, 2025 and continues. PRRSMF ¶ 1. As
the Court is required to view disputed facts in a light most favorable to the non-movant, the Court has
included the Petitioner’s qualification.
refused to return the passports and subsequently declared that he wanted the
Petitioner to return to Germany and leave the Children with him. PSAMF ¶¶ 10-12.
The Petitioner would have withdrawn from York Community College and returned
to Germany in February 2025 if the Respondent had given back the Children’s
passports to her. PSAMF ¶ 2.
Also as of February 8, 2025, the Respondent informed the Petitioner that he
was not bound by his declarations of support, he reduced her allowance from a weekly
to a twice per month payment of $500, and the Respondent and his now wife urged
the Petitioner to get a job, in violation of her visa status, and informed her that she
would need to get roommates or student housing. PSAMF ¶¶ 6-9. As of February 8,
2025, the Petitioner remained enrolled in and continued to attend college classes, and
she still had housing, transportation, and a regular financial allowance. RSMF ¶¶ 6-
7; PRRSMF ¶ 6-7.5
The Respondent has since cut off all housing and education payments. PSAMF
¶ 14. The Petitioner feared being separated from her children and had to remain in
school or lose her visa status, but she does not have resources to stay in the United
States so she will soon be unenrolled and forced to leave the country. PSAMF ¶¶ 13,
5 The Respondent claims that “Petitioner reiterated her commitment to her US school in March
17, 2025.” RSMF ¶ 8. Petitioner objected to this paragraph because the exhibit supporting the
statement was not attached to the Respondent’s statement of material facts. PRRSMF ¶ 8. The Court
sustains the Petitioner’s objection. See D. ME. LOC. R. 56(b)(1) (“Each fact asserted in the
statement . . . must be supported by a record citation as required by subsection (f)”); D. ME. LOC. R.
56(f) (“An assertion of fact in a statement of material facts must be followed by a citation to the specific
page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion”).
15-17.6 The Petitioner did not consent to remaining in the United States or to have
her access to the Children restricted by the Respondent. PSAMF ¶ 18.
IV. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. The Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The Respondent argues that he and the Petitioner agreed that the Children
would live in the United States at least until the Petitioner completed her education.
Resp’t’s Mot. at 4. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner’s claim for wrongful
retention is not possible given that she had not completed her education by February
8, 2025, the alleged date of wrongful retention. Id. at 5. The Respondent also argues
“that the date of wrongful retention can only be one day and cannot be continuing”
and so there was no wrongful retention as of February 8, 2025 because the “Petitioner
had her tuition paid, she had housing, transportation, and a regular financial
allowance.” Id. at 7.
B. The Petitioners Opposition
The Petitioner argues that the issues the Respondent raised—“that he did not
wrongfully retain the children in the United States,” “an agreement of the parties,
and the intentions of the parties”—“are factual issues in dispute which require an
evaluation of witness testimony and determinations of credibility.” Pet’r’s Opp’n at
1.
6 Several additional facts appear to use “Respondent” where “Petitioner” should be the proper
subject, given context and use of pronouns. See id. ¶¶ 15-17. The Court takes the Petitioner to be
referring to herself in these paragraphs, despite writing “Respondent.”
V. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Genuine issues of fact are those that a factfinder could
resolve in favor of the nonmovant, while material facts are those whose ‘existence or
nonexistence has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.’” Green Mountain
Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Tropigas de P.R.,
Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011)).
When the movant “has made a preliminary showing that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the nonmovant must ‘produce specific facts, in suitable
evidentiary form, to . . . establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.’” McCarthy v.
City of Newburyport, 252 F. App’x 328, 332 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999)).
The nonmoving party must provide “‘enough competent evidence’ to enable a
factfinder to decide in its favor on the disputed claims.” Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294
F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Goldman v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 985 F.2d
1113, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993)). Then, a “court views the facts and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” Ophthalmic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Paychex,
Inc., 632 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2011), disregarding “[c]onclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, acrimonious invective, or rank speculation.” Mancini v. City
of Providence ex rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Ahern v.
Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2010)).
VI. DISCUSSION
In his dispositive motion, the Respondent cites Toren v. Toren, 191 F.3d 23 (1st
Cir. 1999) for the proposition that a district court faced with a Hague Convention case
must make a “threshold determination” as to “whether there had been any retention
of the children at all.” Rep’t’s Mot. at 3 (quoting Toren, 191 F.3d at 27). Noting that
the Petitioner and the Respondent had agreed that the Children would remain in the
United States until at least when the Petitioner completed her education, the
Respondent says that the Petitioner cannot prove any retention of the Children under
Toren and her petition must be dismissed. The Respondent supports his position by
noting that as of February 8, 2025, the Petitioner had not completed her education
and that her unilateral retraction of the agreement did not create a retention. Id.
Moreover, the Respondent points to February 8, 2025 as the critical date, arguing
that for purposes of the Hague Convention retention of a child “is a singular and not
a continuing act.” Id. at 5 (quoting Marks ex rel. SM v. Hochhauser, 876 F.3d 416 (2d
Cir. 2017)).7
The problem with the Respondent’s argument is that the facts as set forth in
the statements of material facts clearly reveal that there is a factual dispute as to
whether the Respondent had retained the Children as of February 8, 2025. It is true
that the Petitioner was enrolled in school as of February 8, 2025, and that the
7 The Court accepts only for purposes of this order the Respondent’s contention concerning
whether a retention must be a singular as opposed to a continuous act. Respondent’s citation is to a
Second Circuit case, which may or may not be the law in the First Circuit. However, as the Court does
not need to resolve this legal issue to rule on the pending motion, the Court accepts the Respondent’s
argument for purposes of the motion only.
Petitioner intended to remain in the United States until she completed her education.
However, there was no agreement as to the point at which she would have completed
her education.
What appears in the record is that on February 8, 2025, the Petitioner
demanded that the Respondent return her Children’s passports so that she could
return to Germany. PSAMF ¶ 10. The Respondent refused to give the Petitioner the
Children’s passports, and he subsequently confirmed that he wanted her to return to
Germany alone and leave the Children with him. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The Petitioner also
states that if the Respondent had returned the Children’s passports to her in
February 2025, she would have withdrawn from community college and returned to
Germany with the Children. Id. ¶ 2.
The Court need go no further. In the context of a motion for summary
judgment, the Court is obligated to view contested facts in the light most favorable to
the non-movant, here the Petitioner. It is apparent that if the Court accepts the
Petitioner’s version of the events, as of February 8, 2025, the Respondent had
retained the Children, had refused to turn over their passports to allow their return
to Germany, and that the Petitioner would have returned to Germany with the
children, if the Respondent had turned over the passports. For the Respondent to
refuse to turn over the passports constitutes, in the Court’s view, a retention under
Toren that precludes granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondent.
The Court has now held a two-day evidentiary hearing and has listened to the
testimony of both the Petitioner and the Respondent and has reviewed voluminous
exhibits. This decision, which is made under the constraints of the procedures and
requirements of a motion for summary judgment, does not presage what the Court
may determine once the matter is submitted to the Court on the merits.
The Court denies the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment because the
parties dispute genuine issues of material fact, which precludes summary judgment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Respondent Adrian Maurice Powell Jr.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of January, 2026