State of Louisiana v. Jermaine Donald

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2026-K-0058

VERSUS *

COURT OF APPEAL

JERMAINE DONALD *

FOURTH CIRCUIT

*

STATE OF LOUISIANA

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APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO

CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH

NO. 560-269, SECTION “J”

Honorable Franz Zibilich, Judge, AD HOC

******

Judge Daniel L. Dysart

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(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Paula

A. Brown)

BROWN, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS.

Jason R. Williams, District Attorney

Brad Scott, Assistant District Attorney, Chief of Appeals

Peter J. Vesich, Assistant District Attorney

ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

619 S. White Street

New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPLICANT

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED

JANUARY 29, 2026

DLD The state seeks review of the trial court’s December 10, 2025 ruling granting

RML a motion to suppress statements made by the defendant, Jermaine Donald. For the

following reasons, this writ is granted and the trial court’s judgment suppressing

the statements is reversed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 7, 2023, a grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging the

defendant with second degree murder with a firearm; obstruction of justice in a

second degree murder investigation; and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon. The defendant filed a motion to suppress statements, evidence, and

identifications.

As to the motion to suppress statements, the defendant averred the statements were

obtained after he was in custody and without his first being advised of his Miranda

rights. On November 12, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to

suppress statement and requested post-hearing briefs. On December 10, 2025, the

trial court granted the motion to suppress statements. The state filed a notice of

intent on December 10, 2025, and the trial court set January 9, 2026 as the return

date. On January 8, 2026, the state filed a motion for an extension of time to file

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writ application, and the trial court extended the return date to January 16, 2026.

The state timely filed its writ application.

Detective Stewart testified that he was assigned as the lead detective in the

July 12, 2023 homicide of Sidney Brown in the 1800 block of Marais St. He stated

that surveillance videos revealed that three vehicles were involved in the homicide,

including a black Chevy Impala (Impala). The detective averred that he obtained

the license plate number of the Impala from surveillance videos and license plate

readers tracked the vehicle. On July 18, 2023, the vehicle was tracked to the

Stonebridge Apartments on the Westbank. The detective indicated officers

surveilled the Impala parked in the Stonebridge Apartments lot, and noted that an

individual who was not the defendant opened and closed the trunk. Thereafter, the

defendant and this other individual left an apartment and entered the vehicle. The

detective and other officers followed the vehicle for some time. Eventually, the

defendant stopped for a snowball and the officers apprehended him. As the

officers approached the vehicle, they asked the passenger to exit the vehicle. The

detective noted the officers observed a firearm in the driver’s seat and a firearm in

the passenger’s seat. He testified that the gun from the driver’s seat was

ballistically matched to the homicide. The defendant was transported to the station

to be questioned by Detective Stewart who identified the first videotaped interview

of the defendant (S-1) taken on July 18, 2023.

The video depicts officers handcuffing the defendant to a table in an

interrogation room where he is then left alone for a period of time. The pertinent

portion of the video starts at 17:30:46 when Detective Stewart enters the room and

asks the following questions:

Def: Man, what’s this about?

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Det. Stewart: We gonna talk. What’s a good address for you?

Defendant: 8730 Deacon Street.

Det. Stewart: That’s where you live now?

Defendant: Yeah.

Det. Stewart: Who you live with there?

Defendant: My mom.

Det. Stewart: Who lives on the Westbank?

Defendant: The Westbank? Where on the Westbank?

Det. Stewart: Stonebridge?

Defendant: Stonebridge.

Det. Stewart: Stonebridge Apartments? That’s where you left today, right?

Defendant: I went over there to pick my nephew up.

Det. Stewart: Ok, so that’s where your nephew living at? Your girlfriend

don’t live there?

Defendant: No, my little nephew. . .

Det. Stewart: Alright. What’s a good phone number for you?

Defendant: For me?

Det. Stewart: Mhm.

Defendant: 504-388-0359

The detective then immediately begins to explain that he has to review the

defendant’s Miranda rights before they can speak regarding the investigation. The

defendant indicated he was trying to see what was going on, and the detective

stressed he could not speak with the defendant unless he waived his rights. The

defendant indicated he understood his rights, executed a Miranda acknowledgment

form (S-2), and agreed to speak with the detective. The detective asked about the

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Impala, noting it was at the scene of homicide on Marais St. in the seventh ward.

The defendant contended that he had only been in possession of the vehicle for two

days after purchasing it from “Big Booty Fancy.” He noted he had no contact

information for her. The detective questioned the defendant about who lived at the

Stonebridge Apartments. When the defendant claimed that he just pulled up to

pick up his nephew, the detective indicated he was lying as the vehicle was there

for some time that day. The detective again asked what lady lived at the

Stonebridge Apartments, whether it was a girlfriend or ex-girlfriend.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress the pre- and post-Miranda

statements from the July 18, 2023 interview. The trial court agreed with the

defendant’s argument regarding the applicability of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.

600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004)(discussed infra).

DISCUSSION

This Court recently indicated that,

When a trial court finds facts based on the weight and

credibility of witnesses’ testimony, a reviewing court may not

overturn those findings unless there is no evidence to support them.

State v. Wells, 2008-2262, p.5 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577, 581. On the

other hand, a trial court's holdings on questions of law are reviewed de

novo. Id. at p.4, 45 So.3d at 580.

State v. Atkins, 2025-0186, p.7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/21/25), -- So.3d --, --, 2025 WL

1462073, *4.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966),

the Supreme Court determined that,

the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or

inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant

unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to

secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial

interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement

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officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

The jurisprudence has long noted that “Miranda only applies if three conditions are

met: (1) the defendant is in ‘custody’ or significantly deprived of freedom, (2)

there is an ‘interrogation,’ and (3) the interrogation is conducted by a ‘law

enforcement officer’ or someone acting as their agent.” State v. Bernard, 2009-

1178, p.5 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1025, 1029. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.

291, 301; 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689–90; 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Supreme Court

expounded on Miranda and determined that, “the term “interrogation” under

Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)

that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

response from the suspect.”

In this instance, the state does not contest that the defendant was in custody

during the July 18, 2023 questioning of the defendant. Rather, the state argues the

pre-Miranda questions were routine booking questions that did not rise to level of

an “interrogation” implicating Miranda.

An exception to Miranda permits a custodial suspect to be questioned

regarding basic biographical data or routine booking questions, without first

receiving Miranda warnings. See United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276,

293 (5th Cir. 2001)(“There is a routine booking question exception to the Miranda

rule that covers a person's name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth,

and current age. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110

L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality opinion)”). In State v. Landry, 2015-0485, p.2 (La.

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App. 4 Cir. 8/7/15), 216 So.3d 917, 918, this Court recognized the routine booking

questions exception as follows,

although it is undisputed that the defendant was not advised of his

Miranda rights in conjunction with the stop and search in this case or

prior to being asked his name, age, and address, the police officer's

field interview (recorded by his body-camera) asked for no more

information than an individual might supply in response to booking

questions as a routine incident of arrest and, therefore, did not amount

to interrogation for Miranda purposes. State v. Smith, 2000–1838, p.4

(La.5/25/01), 785 So.2d 815, 818 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446

U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)).

In this instance, the detective questioned the defendant about his address;

who he lived with; who lived at the Stonebridge Apartment and whether it was a

girlfriend; and his telephone number, prior to advising the defendant of his

Miranda rights. Arguably, these questions do not implicate Miranda as they were

routine booking questions. Nothing about the questions demonstrated that the

detective should have known that they were reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the defendant. Thus, the detective did not interrogate

the defendant prior to the defendant waiving his Miranda rights.

Admittedly, Detective Stewart again asked the defendant who lived at the

Stonebridge Apartments after issuing the Miranda warnings and obtaining a

waiver. The defendant argued, and the trial court agreed, that pursuant to Seibert,

the two-step interrogation by the detective violated Miranda. The defendant

averred the detective asked questions about who lived at the Stonebridge

Apartments both before and immediately after the detective obtained a waiver of

Miranda rights.

In Seibert, police arrested Patrice Seibert and the arresting officer did not

provide a Miranda warning pursuant to an instruction from Officer Richard

Hanrahan. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604; 124 S.Ct. at 2606. After she arrived at the

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station, Officer Hanrahan interrogated her for approximately thirty to forty

minutes, also without providing Miranda warnings, during which she confessed.

After a twenty-minute break, Officer Hanrahan advised Ms. Seibert of her rights

pursuant to Miranda and confronted her with her pre-Miranda confession. Ms.

Seibert again confessed. After being charged with first-degree murder, Ms. Seibert

sought to suppress her statements. During the suppression hearing,

Officer Hanrahan testified that he made a “conscious decision” to

withhold Miranda warnings, thus resorting to an interrogation

technique he had been taught: question first, then give the warnings,

and then repeat the question “until I get the answer that she's already

provided once.” He acknowledged that Seibert's ultimate statement

was “largely a repeat of information ... obtained” prior to the warning.

Id., 542 U.S. at 605–06; 124 S.Ct. at 2606.

The plurality opinion determined warnings given in the midst of a

coordinated and continuing interrogation would

mislead and “depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his

ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of

abandoning them.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424, 106 S.Ct.

1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). By the same token, it would ordinarily

be unrealistic to treat two spates of integrated and proximately

conducted questioning as independent interrogations subject to

independent evaluation simply because Miranda warnings formally

punctuate them in the middle.

Id., 542 U.S. at 613–14; 124 S.Ct. at 2611.

In discussing the extent to which lower courts are bound by Seibert, the Fifth

Circuit explained that,

Seibert is a plurality decision. The U.S. Supreme Court has held

regarding such decisions: “When a fragmented Court decides a case

and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five

Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position

taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the

narrowest grounds....’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97

S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, federal circuit courts have recognized that the holding of

Seibert is found in Justice Kennedy's opinion concurring in judgment.

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See United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir.2006);

United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir.2006);

United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 231–32 (3d Cir.2005). In

Justice Kennedy's concurrence, he noted that he “would apply a

narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case ... in which the

two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to

undermine the Miranda warning.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct.

at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He added: “If the deliberate two-

step strategy has been used, postwarning statements that are related to

the substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless

curative measures are taken before the postwarning statement is

made.” Id.

Based on this, the jurisprudence holds that “Seibert requires the

suppression of a post-warning statement only where a deliberate two-

step strategy is used and no curative measures are taken....” Courtney,

463 F.3d at 338; see also Williams, 435 F.3d at 1158 (“where law

enforcement officers deliberately employ a two-step interrogation to

obtain a confession and where separations of time and circumstance

and additional curative warnings are absent or fail to apprise a

reasonable person in the suspect's shoes of his rights, the trial court

should suppress the confession.”) (Emphasis original).

State v. Bruce, 14-877, pp.13-14 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So.3d 671,

678.

In Bruce, an officer handed the defendant a notebook while he was at the

correctional center and asked him to write down what occurred on the day in

question. Thereafter, the officer issued Miranda warnings and obtained a recorded

statement from the defendant. The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court ruling

admitting both the written and recorded statements. The Fifth Circuit

distinguished Seibert by noting that there was no admission from the detective that

he deliberately employed the two-step technique nor any indication that he

deliberately employed the two-step technique. Bruce, 14-877, p.13, 169 So.3d at

678.

Unlike Seibert and Bruce, the defendant did not confess during a custodial

interrogation to the crime being investigated prior to the issuance of Miranda

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warnings. Rather, the defendant stated he picked up his nephew at the Stonebridge

Apartments and that his girlfriend did not live there. The detective herein did not

attempt to have the defendant repeat a confession following the issuance of

Miranda warnings. Instead, the detective questioned the defendant regarding who

lived in the apartment. The officers were not surveilling the apartment. They were

surveilling the Impala. Similar to Bruce, the detective did not testify that he

deliberately employed the two-step technique or that his training included the two-

step technique. Further, a careful review of Detective Stewart’s questioning does

not indicate that he deliberately employed the two-step technique. Indeed, when

the defendant indicated he was trying to figure out what was going on, the

detective specifically informed the defendant he could not discuss the matter unless

the defendant waived his rights and agreed to speak to him. The detective did not

question the defendant in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warnings.

As there was no two-step technique, the detective did not need to perform a

curative measure prior to questioning the defendant, as the Court instructed in

Seibert. Under the particular facts of this case, the trial court abused its discretion

in granting the motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons, this writ is granted and

the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to suppress is reversed.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED

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