Nataren

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

OSIRIS YOLANY MUNOZ ) Case No. 4:26-cv-212

NATAREN, )

) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

Petitioner, )

) Magistrate Judge Reuben J. Sheperd

v. )

)

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Director of the )

Detroit Field Office, U.S. )

Immigration and Customs )

Enforcement, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Osiris Yolany Munoz Nataren, a citizen of Honduras illegally

present in the United States since arriving in 2018, has been in immigration

detention since January 9, 2026. She petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES the petition

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

According to Petitioner, Ms. Munoz-Nataren entered illegally in 2018. (ECF

No. 1, ¶¶ 4 & 20, PageID #2 & #5.) She is 29 years old and resides in Kentucky. (Id.,

¶ 27, PageID #6.) Ms. Munoz-Nataren has a daughter who is seven years old and a

U.S. citizen. (Id., ¶ 28, PageID #7.) In July 2018, Ms. Munoz-Nataren was

apprehended at the border, detained, then released. (Id., ¶ 29.) On January 9, 2026,

she was arrested during a traffic stop in which she was a passenger in the car. (Id.,

¶ 30.) She is detained in Mahoning County, Ohio, and the Department of Homeland

Security has commenced removal proceedings. (Id., ¶ 31.) Reportedly, she has no

criminal history. (Id., ¶ 35, PageID #8.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Since Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated removal proceedings,

it has held her without bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id., ¶ 34, PageID #7.)

Through counsel, Ms. Munoz-Nataren petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on January 27, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) She alleges that her detention

violates: (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act; and (2) the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment. (Id., ¶¶ 62–69, PageID #17–18.)

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a court shall forthwith issue a writ or order the

respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue, “unless it appears from the

application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled” to a writ of habeas

corpus. This statute requires an initial screening of a petition. See Alexander v.

Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). At this stage of

the proceedings, a court accepts as true the allegations in the petition and construes

them in favor of the petitioner. Id. “If it plainly appears from the petition and any

attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the

judge must dismiss the petition.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

(applicable to petitions under Section 2241 through Rule 1(b)).

JURISDICTION

Section 2241(c)(3) extends the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to

persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United

States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) provides that no court has jurisdiction to review any

immigration matter except as provided by statute: “Notwithstanding any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any

other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall

have jurisdiction to review” immigration cases.

As relevant here, judicial review is available in two circumstances. First, a

final order of removal is subject to judicial review by “the court of appeals for the

judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” not the

district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2); see also id. § 1252(b)(9). This provision does not

apply here.

Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves the ability to petition for a writ of

habeas corpus to raise a constitutional issue. In such a case, however, Congress

significantly limited judicial review and the ability of courts to engage in fact-finding:

no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of

title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . or by any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order [a

final order of removal] or such questions of law or fact [those involving

interpretation and application of statutory provisions, arising from any

action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United

States].

Id. § 1252(b)(9). This statute encompasses challenges to the decision to seek removal

and the decision to detain an alien in the first place. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583

U.S. 281, 294 (2018); see also Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). Significantly,

Congress specifically divested courts of jurisdiction to review bond determinations

and other discretionary determinations pending removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

As Petitioner notes (ECF No. 1, ¶ 38, PageID #8), determinations of bond or

detention are discretionary, even under administrative policy in effect until the

middle of 2025. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For this reason, the Court finds that Congress

has not conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts to interpret or apply Section

1225 or Section 1226 of the INA. Divesting federal district courts of jurisdiction over

such determinations makes sense. After all, Congress created an administrative

process intended to act quickly (though in practice its actions have been anything

but) in a field requiring specialized knowledge generally outside the experience of the

inferior federal courts.

I. Split of Authority in the Inferior Courts

Notwithstanding the sharp jurisdictional limits in Section 1252, federal

district courts have scarcely noticed that the statute exists. That is odd. In every

other civil case, federal judges routinely invoke the maxim that federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only the jurisdiction that Congress gives

them pursuant to the Constitution.

Whatever the reason judges in the inferior courts have skirted analysis of the

jurisdictional limits of Section 1252, they have taken competing approaches to

whether petitioners are entitled to a bond hearing pending removal. The majority of

courts agree with Petitioner that such a hearing is warranted. See, e.g., Rodriguez v.

Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-

11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *9 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); Paredes Padillia v. Galovich,

et al., No. 25-cv-863, 2025 WL 3251446, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2025); Diaz-

Villatoro v. Larose, et al., No. 25-cv-3087, 2025 WL 3251377, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21,

2025). However, at least three courts have taken a contrary position, agreeing with

the Administration’s reading of the statute. See, e.g., Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-

cv-00168, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump,

No. 8:25CV526, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Chavez v. Noem,

No. 3:25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).

In the Court’s view, both approaches are mistaken. The statutory framework

provides a limited role for district courts to review a habeas petition in the

immigration context not concerning a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

That is, Section 1252 preserves the ability of district courts to review a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus regarding a constitutional issue. Id. For example, such claims

might challenge the conditions of confinement or what amounts to indefinite

detention. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (recognizing the

serious constitutional concerns of indefinite detention following a final order of

removal); but see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297 (finding no statutory right to periodic

bond hearings for aliens detained during the pendency of removal proceedings).

Outside of such limited and narrow constitutional claims, which Petitioner

does not raise, other constitutional challenges quickly implicate and often become

entwined with interpretation and implementation of the statutory framework and its

associated procedures. Such is the case with Petitioner’s claims here. Indeed, her

first cause of action asserts a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. And,

taken as a whole, her petition pursues that issue to a far greater degree than it

outlines a claimed due-process violation. There might well be good reason for that.

In the immigration context, Congress has broad discretion to determine what process

is due. See, e.g. Department of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107

(2020); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309 (1993). Put another way, a constitutional

challenge to detention pending removal and entitlement to a bond hearing collapse

into analysis of the statutory and regulatory regime—whether, for example, Section

1226(a) entitles an alien to a bond hearing pending removal or whether Section 1225

mandates that the government detain an alien. Congress has made clear that district

courts lack the jurisdiction to make such determinations, even on a habeas petition

under Section 2241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). As the Supreme Court has long

recognized, these statutory provisions aim “at protecting the Executive’s discretion

from the courts—indeed, that can fairly be said to be the[ir] theme.” Reno v.

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999).

Nonetheless, the federal district courts that have considered the issues raised

in the petition have not hesitated to wade into interpretation of a statutory scheme

where Congress has made clear they have little, if any, place. The Court fails to see

how it has jurisdiction to consider the petition.

II. Exhaustion

Out of an abundance of caution, if the Court is mistaken in its read of the

interplay between Section 1252 and Section 2241, the Court proceeds. If vested with

jurisdiction, the familiar principles of habeas practice and procedure apply. In light

of the congressional limitations on jurisdiction, prudential principles of exhaustion

counsel that a petitioner pursue her administrative remedies to a final judgment from

the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Because

of the expertise that the Board of Immigration Appeals and the immigration courts

more generally have in the statutory and administrative regime governing the

admission and removal of foreigners, “‘many of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’

may be served by permitting agency review in the first instance.” Ba v. Director of

Detroit Field Off., No. 4:25-cv-02208, 2025 WL 2977712, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,

2025) (quoting Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-

01621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)); see also Beharry v.

Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the benefits of limiting judicial

interference in agency affairs in the immigration context).

II.A. Prudential Exhaustion

“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court

ordinarily should either dismiss the [habeas] petition without prejudice or stay the

proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is

excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). In Leonardo, the petitioner pursued habeas review of the Immigration

Court’s adverse bond determination before he appealed to the Board of Immigration

Appeals. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that filing a habeas petition in federal

district court was improper because the petitioner “should have exhausted

administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district

court to review the IJ’s decision.” Id. (citing Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814,

819 (9th Cir. 2003)).

The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this procedure for challenging bond

determinations, albeit in a short, unpublished order. See Rabi v. Sessions, No. 19-

3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1–2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018) (citing Leonardo,

646 F.3d at 1160); see also Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (applying

the Ninth Circuit’s test for prudential exhaustion). Previously, the Court has done

so as well. See Tecum Pastor v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs

Enf’t, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 4: 25-cv-2761, 2025 WL 3746495, at *3 (N.D. Ohio

2025); Monroy Villalta v. Greene, 794 F. Supp. 3d 528, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Laguna

Espinoza v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 4:25-cv-

02107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025); Ba, 2025 WL 2977712, at *2.

In this case, Ms. Munoz-Nataren has available to her proceedings before an

immigration judge and an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. As in

Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160, prudential principles of exhaustion counsel that

Petitioner pursue her administrative remedies to a final judgment from the Board of

Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas corpus. In her petition, count

one alleges violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Though styled as a

Fifth Amendment due process claim, count two also invites review of the process due

under the statute and its associated procedures. Further, Petitioner seeks review of

the application and interpretation of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA

2025). In other words, any determination regarding detention here turns on

interpretation and application of the governing removal regime.

In the first instance, such review should proceed before the Board of

Immigration Appeals to “apply its experience and expertise without judicial

interference.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other

grounds); see also Rojas-Garcia , 39 F.3d at 819 (acknowledging that a “petitioner

must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims in a

habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”); Monroy

Villalta, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 531; Laguna Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2; Ba, 2025

WL 2977712, at *2.

II.B. Futility

Petitioner argues that an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals would

be time consuming and futile in light of Matter of Yajure Hurtado. But courts in this

Circuit have determined that even where there is a “high probability of denial” of a

petitioner’s appeal of an Immigration Judge’s bond decision, such a probability “does

not weigh in favor of waiving exhaustion.” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114,

at *11. Indeed, the Attorney General remains free to exercise her discretion to use

an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals to change or modify the policy about

which Petitioner complains.

In Hernandez Torrealba, the petitioner sought relief from the exhaustion

requirement based on a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the

denial of bond. But the court was “not certain how the BIA will rule on Petitioner’s

appeal given the particular circumstances of her case, and it would be presumptuous

of this Court to simply assume that the BIA will rule against Petitioner.” Id. So too

here. Petitioner presents relevant background of Ms. Munoz-Nataren that appears

particularly sympathetic. For this reason, her case might well prove to be one in

which the agency changes or refines its policy announced in Matter of Yajure Hurtado

through agency adjudication. That prerogative belongs in the first instance to the

agency, which also has the knowledge and ability to adopt policies that are more

tailored to the statutory scheme it is tasked with implementing in a way that courts

are not.

“[M]any of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’ may be served by permitting

agency review in the first instance.’” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11

(quoting Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62). Indeed, courts outside this Circuit acknowledge

that the purposes of requiring exhaustion in the immigration context “include

protecting the authority of administrative agencies, limiting interference in agency

affairs, developing the factual record to make judicial review more efficient, and

resolving issues to render judicial review unnecessary.” Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62

(citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); McKart v. United States, 395

U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)). In any event, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the

decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Hurtado. That authority rests, if

anywhere, with the Sixth Circuit. For these reasons, the Court cannot say that

exhaustion is futile or a waste of time or that prudential reasons apply for excusing

it. Nor does requiring prudential exhaustion “create[] hardship for hardship’s sake,”

as Petitioner suggests. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 100, PageID #32.) To the contrary, it promotes

judicial restraint, separates the powers and proper roles of the agency and the courts

in the administrative regime Congress created, and reserves judicial review from

decisions of the agency for the Sixth Circuit.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition but if it had

jurisdiction would require exhaustion as a prudential matter. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2026

J.Philip Calabrese”

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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