Scott

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DANIEL R. SCOTT, B80603, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 25-cv-2077-DWD

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE, )

DR. GORDON, )

A. DESAI, )

JANE DOES 1-5, )

JOHN DOE 1, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Daniel Scott, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc.

1). Plaintiff filed a complaint and a supplemental complaint. Plaintiff alleges that the

defendants have violated his rights by failing to provide treatment for his cervical spinal

issues. Plaintiff’s pleadings (Docs. 1, 12-1) are now before the Court for preliminary

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-

(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by

law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff filed his “supplemental complaint” (Doc. 12-1)

within about a month of filing his original complaint, and he filed it before his pleadings

were served on anyone. Based on the Motion for Leave to Supplement (Doc. 12), he

clearly wishes to replace the original complaint with the updated pleading (Doc. 12-1).

Plaintiff was within his right to submit an amended pleading as a matter of course under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), so the Court will review his Amended Pleading

(Doc. 12-1).

Plaintiff alleges that he first began to seek treatment at Pinckneyville for symptoms

of cervical spine compression in October of 2023. (Doc. 12-1 at 9). Specifically, he alleges

that during sick call in October of 2023, he told Jane Doe 1 (a nurse) that he was

experiencing numbness in his left hand and pinky. Jane Doe 1 merely informed him he

would have to submit two more sick call requests about the issue before he could be seen.

(Doc. 12-1 at 9). Plaintiff alleges that on his third sick call visit, Jane Doe 2 then “moved

the goal post” by informing him that he had to be seen for three consecutive sick call visits

within a month before he could be referred to a doctor. (Doc. 12-1 at 10). Plaintiff

complains that the requirement for an inmate to be seen at sick call three times before a

doctor’s visit is a Wexford policy and an intentional delay tactic. (Doc. 12-1 at 9-10).

He alleges that the sick call policy created an obstacle course, during which he was

forced to endure an eleven-month delay before he was sent off-site for an EMG test that

revealed a compressed ulnar nerve in his right arm. He further alleges that an additional

six months lapsed before he was sent off-site to an orthopedic specialist who found

paralysis of his left index finger and muscle atrophy in his left hand that were too

advanced for surgical or therapeutic intervention. (Doc. 12-1 at 10).

Admist the delays, Plaintiff alleges that from May of 2024 onward he saw

Defendants Desai, Dr. Gordon, and John Doe 1 (a nurse practitioner). He claims he

showed the providers visible muscle atrophy, but they failed to take reasonable steps to

ensure treatment. Plaintiff specifically alleges that he saw Desai beginning in June of

2024, and that he saw her three times between then and March of 2025. (Doc. 12-1 at 12).

He claims that he vividly described neck pain, whole-body tremors, and muscle atrophy

in his hands and arms. He alerted her that a previous MRI of his cervical spine revealed

arthritis. Despite his reported symptoms, Desai’s sole course of action was to refer him

for an EMG nerve test. He claims Desai choose this option to cut costs, and it was not

sufficient to assess his medical needs. (Doc. 12-1 at 12).

Plaintiff further alleges that he saw Dr. Gordon over the course of three or four

months. (Doc. 12-1 at 12). He says he saw Dr. Gordon on May 10, 2025, and described

many symptoms, but all that Dr. Gordon did was recommend a third off-site EMG test.

(Doc. 12-1 at 8). Plaintiff saw Dr. Gordon again for a third time in July of 2025, and during

the appointment he confronted Dr. Gordon about his suspicion that he was suffering

from cervical spine nerve compression, which would only be detectable via an MRI.

(Doc. 12-1 at 8). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Gordon conceded an MRI would be necessary,

but stated he could not make a referral to any sort of specialist until he had been seeing

Plaintiff for at least nine months. Dr. Gordon indicated that this limitation existed

because Wexford admonished Pinckneyville medical staff for sending patients to off-site

specialists too quickly. (Doc. 12-1 at 8-9).

By way of background, Plaintiff also alleges that from October of 2023-May 2024,

and from June 2024-October 2024, Jane Does 1-5 were responsible for collecting sick call

slips in his housing unit and they regularly disregarded his sick call requests. (Doc. 12-1

at 11). He claims that their failure to regularly run sick call is indicative of the larger

healthcare failures at Pinckneyville.

Near the end of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in July of 2025 Centurion

Health took over for Wexford Health Source. (Doc. 12-1 at 13). He claims that although

a nurse practitioner referred him to an off-site neurologist for an MRI, four months lapsed

without the visit taking place. (Doc. 12-1 at 13). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id.).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court will designate the following

claims:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 for their insistence

that Plaintiff adhere to the sick call visit policy;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Desai, Dr. Gordon, and John Doe 1 for their alleged role in

Plaintiff’s care from March of 2024-July of 2025;

Claim 3: Monell claim against Wexford for implementing the three

sick call policy and directing medical staff to delay

specialist appointments to cut costs.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissal

Plaintiff faults Jane Does 1-5 for their alleged mishandling of the sick call slips that

he alleges he submitted from October 2023 onward. A blanket assertion that one or more

defendants caused a harm is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See e.g., Brooks v.

Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (the assertion that “one or more of the Defendants”

engaged in harmful conduct does not adequately connect specific defendants to illegal

acts). To the extent that Plaintiff has more specific allegations about encounters with Jane

Does 1 and 2, those will be analyzed in association with Claim 1, but the umbrella

assertion against Jane Does 1-5 is insufficient to proceed and Jane Does 3-5 will be

dismissed as this is the only mention of them in the factual allegations.

Analysis

Claim 1

An Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of medical care consists of

an objective and a subjective component. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir.

2010). A plaintiff must show that he suffered from a serious medical condition (i.e., an

objective standard) and also show that each defendant responded with deliberate

indifference (i.e., a subjective standard). Id. To satisfy the subjective component, a

prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

inmate health. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Neither medical

malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment will amount to

deliberate indifference. Id. Additionally, an inmate is not entitled to demand specific

care, and a medical professional may choose from a range of acceptable courses of care.

Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff alleges that he presented to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 during the prison’s

sick call process. He claims that when he saw Jane Doe 1 he reported left hand and pinky

numbness, signs of ulnar nerve compression. He does not indicate if Jane Doe 1 offered

any treatment options, and instead just alleges that she told him he would have to

complete two more sick call visits before he could be referred to a doctor. As for Jane

Doe 2, Plaintiff alleges that when he eventually saw her for a third sick call visit, she

moved the benchmark, alleging that he had to have three visits in a single month. He

does not indicate she offered any care. Though an inmate is not entitled to demand

specific care, his allegations suggest that Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 offered no care at all

and simply insisted he keep following a repetitive process that was not affording him any

relief. At this early stage of review, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed against Jane

Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 on the premise that they offered no care and simply instructed

Plaintiff to proceed with what they knew would be a slow and drawn out process to seek

a doctor’s referral. Plaintiff also alleges Jane Does 1 and 2 participated in disregarding

countless sick call slips, which further supports the notion that they played a role in his

delayed access to care despite knowing that he sought care frequently.

Claim 2

Plaintiff alleges that he saw Defendants Desai and Dr. Gordon on multiple

occasions from June of 2024-July of 2025, and he discussed deteriorating symptoms with

them, but they offered nothing other than an EMG. He alleges Dr. Gordon even admitted

an MRI would be appropriate but stated he could not yet make the referral due to

Wexford’s instructions to delay specialist visits. Plaintiff may proceed against Desai and

Gordon.

By contrast, Plaintiff also alleges that sometime in or after March of 2024 he saw

John Doe 1, a nurse practitioner. Plaintiff does not provide any greater specificity about

when he saw John Doe 1, what he told John Doe 1 or showed him about his symptoms,

or how John Doe 1 responded. As such, the allegations against John Doe 1 are insufficient

to plausibly establish his personal responsibility for the harms Plaintiff alleges. John Doe

1 will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead a sufficient claim.

Claim 3

Plaintiff alleges that he was harmed by Wexford’s policy requiring inmates to visit

sick call three times before they could be seen by a doctor. He additionally alleges that

providers would not send him out to a specialist in an effort to cut costs at Wexford’s

behest. These allegations are sufficient to proceed under Monell on the theory that

Wexford’s direct policy regarding sick call, or their policy, custom, or practice concerning

specialist visits or testing caused Plaintiff harm by delaying his access to timely care.

Plaintiff further alleges that when he eventually saw an orthopedic specialist, he was told

that his left ring finger and left hand had suffered permanent deformities or atrophy that

could not be repaired via surgery or therapy. These allegations are sufficient to proceed

at this preliminary juncture.

By contrast, to the extent that Plaintiff complains of recent conduct by Centurion,

he has not pled a sufficient claim because Centurion is not listed as a party in the case

caption, and he does not seek any relief specific to Centurion.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 survives against Jane Doe 1 and 2,

Claim 2 survives against Desai and Dr. Gordon, and Claim 3 survives against Wexford

Health Source. By contrast, Claim 2 is insufficient to proceed against John Doe 1. Plaintiff

has also failed to state a claim against Jane Does 3-5. The Clerk of Court shall

TERMINATE Defendants John Doe 1, and Jane Does 3-5.

The Clerk of Court shall ADD the Warden of Pinckneyville in official capacity only

to help identify Jane Does 1 and 2. Plaintiff has already provided a physical description

of Jane Does 1 and 2 in his complaint (Doc. 12-1 at 3). Once the Warden has entered an

appearance, next steps will be set to identify John Doe.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Desai, Dr. Gordon,

and Warden of Pinckneyville (official capacity for Jane Doe identification): (1) Form 5

(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6

(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of

the Complaint (Doc. 12-1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of

employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the

Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

Plaintiff’s Motion to for Leave to Supplement (Doc. 12) is GRANTED and the

Court reviewed his Amended Pleading (Doc. 12-1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2026 /s/ David W. Dugan

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.