The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
THE ESTATE OF JAMES SHEETS, ) CASE NO. 4:23-cv-00693-JRA
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) JUDGE JOHN ADAMS
CITY OF STRUTHERS, et al., )
)
)
Defendants. )
) ORDER AND OPINION
)
)
Pending before this Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
City of Struthers and Police Chief Roddy (Doc. 56) and Defendants Matthew Haus and Thomas
Schneeman (Doc. 59). Plaintiff Estate of James Sheet has filed an opposition (Doc. 66) only to the
motion filed by Defendants Matthew Haus and Thomas Schneeman (Doc. 59). Both Defendants
filed their reply (Doc. 69). The matter is fully briefed. Having reviewed the briefing, the Court
hereby GRANTS both motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, this matter is DISMISSED.
I. Facts
On April 1, 2022, at around 5:00 p.m., Captain Matthew Haus (“Haus”) of the Struthers
Police Department became suspicious of a tan 2000 Chevrolet Malibu on Park Avenue. Dep. of
Matthew Haus, Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 270-72. Haus based his suspicion on the vehicle being
parked in the middle of the road, behind Macejko's Towing, an area known for increasing catalytic
converter thefts and “criminal elements.” Id., PageID# 270. Haus described the location as a high-
crime area. Id. Based on his suspicion, Haus ran the vehicle’s plate and found evidence that the
registered owner of the vehicle had an expired license. Id., PageID# 272. Armed with this
knowledge, Haus attempted a traffic stop on the vehicle. Id.
A. The Chase
Haus initiated his lights and chirped his sirens on State St. Id. PageID# 273. The suspect
vehicle made a right turn onto Short St. and entered the parking lot of Wildcat Drive-Thru. Id. At
this point, there are videos of what happens next.1 A tan 2000 Chevrolet Malibu can be seen
entering the Wildcat Drive-Thru, followed by a police cruiser, at 5:06:28 PM. Wildcat Drive-Thru
Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:00:38. The Plaintiff confirms that the suspect vehicle was driven by
James Sheets (“Sheets”) and did, in fact, make a turn into the Wildcat Drive-Thru. Pl.’s Opp’n To
Mot. For Summ. J., Doc. No. 66, PageID# 633. This is corroborated by the account of Haus, who
explained that he attempted to pull over Sheets’ vehicle at the Wildcat Drive-thru. Doc. No. 55-1,
PageID# 273.
The suspect vehicle pulls into the Wildcat Drive-Thru and stops for four seconds before
attempting to pull away from Haus’s patrol vehicle. Wildcat Drive-Thru Video Exhibit, Doc. No.
65, 0:00:40-44. The suspect vehicle pulls forward and then aggressively reverses out of the parking
lot, coming into close proximity to Haus’s patrol vehicle and nearly clipping the driver’s side
engine block. Id., 0:00:45-50. The car came so close to Haus’s patrol vehicle that the officer
believed he had been struck. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 273. The aggression with which the suspect
vehicle sped out of the parking lot, Haus felt as if Sheets both attempted to hit him and was driving
1كAn exhibit was manually filed with the Court containing a flash drive with two videos. Doc. No.
65. The first video is named “Video Exhibit Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Footage from the
April 1, 2022 incident” which contains Officer Schneeman’s body camera footage of the car chase,
use-of-force, and the immediate aftermath of the use-of-force. The second video is named “Exhibit
2 Wildcat Drive Thru Surveillance Footage” and it is from the perspective of a security camera
from the Wildcat Drive-Thru.
with total disregard for anybody else who could have been on the road. Id., PageID# 274. The
suspect vehicle then proceeds to drive away from Haus’s patrol vehicle, at no point showing any
compliance with the traffic stop. Wildcat Drive-Thru Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:00:50-58.
Haus initiated a pursuit because the suspect vehicle, driven by Sheets, was a “danger to
[Haus] as well as others,” stating that the underlying felony for the chase was assault or attempted
assault on a law enforcement officer. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 280. The suspect vehicle was
continuing to flee from Haus when Detective Thomas Schneeman (“Schneeman”) joined the
pursuit on State Street. Id., PageID# 283. It is not immediately clear where Schneeman’s body
camera footage begins; however, the beginning timestamp is 17:08:09 (5:08:09 PM), and the
officer can be seen and heard driving at a high rate of speed with sirens on. Officer Schneeman’s
Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:00:00-0:05.
At timestamp 17:08:32-40, a radio callout can be heard from Haus stating that they were
going towards Center Street bridge, and a patrol vehicle with lights and sirens can be seen as
Schneeman turns right onto the Center Street bridge. Id., 0:00:24-0:32. In his deposition,
Schneeman stated that he joined the pursuit from State Street, and he was far behind. Dep. Of
Thomas Schneeman, Doc. No. 55-2, PageID# 434. Schneeman had to maintain a high rate of speed
to catch up to Haus and maintain the pursuit with Sheets. Id., PageID# 434-35. To pursue Sheets,
Haus stated that he was driving on Center Street at “a speed I'm not comfortable doing.” Doc. No.
55-1, PageID# 282.
The pursuit would continue from Center Street to Wilson Avenue, then to Himrod Avenue.
Id., PageID# 283. The chase would go from Himrod to U.S. Route 62, known as the freeway. Doc.
Id., PageID# 284. The timestamp on Schneeman’s bodycam shows that the pursuit continued onto
the Freeway at 17:10:35 (5:10:35 PM). Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No.
65, 0:02:20-02:27. From the freeway, Sheets would then immediately take the ramp to get on
Interstate 680 heading northbound. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 284; Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam
Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:02:54-03:15. The pursuit would continue from Interstate 680 to the
Salt Springs Road exit. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 284; Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video
Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:03:56-04:15.
From Salt Springs Road, Sheets would then turn west onto Oneta Avenue and thereafter
turn north onto Steel Street. Doc. No. 55-2, PageID# 438. Sheets would continue to drive north to
the intersection of Steel Street and Salt Springs Road when Haus attempted a PIT maneuver.2 Id.
Haus initiated the PIT due to the location being an industrial area with few homes and because he
knew Sheets would have to slow down for an upcoming bend in the road. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID#
290-91. Haus can be seen initiating the PIT maneuver on bodycam at timestamp 17:13:26 (5:13:26
PM). Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:16.
Haus attempted the PIT on Sheet’s vehicle “at the rear tire and the rear quarter panel near
the rear bumper to initiate the spin-out.” Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 291. The PIT was successful,
and Sheets’ vehicle spun out. Id., PageID# 292. Schneeman assisted in the PIT by hitting Sheets’
driver door, causing Haus’s airbag to go off because Haus’s patrol vehicle was connected to Sheets’
vehicle. Id., PageID# 292-93. Schneeman’s patrol vehicle was immediately located next to Sheets’
driver door as a result of Schneeman’s attempt to pin Sheets’ vehicle. Doc. No. 55-2, PageID# 444;
Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:17-05:21.
2كPIT stands for Precision Immobilization Technique. In police pursuit terms, a PIT maneuver
typically involves an officer striking a fleeing vehicle in its rear quarter panel to cause the car to
spin and come to a controlled stop.
B. The Shooting from Haus’s Perspective.
As a result of the airbag going off, Haus states that he was disoriented. Doc. No. 55-1,
PageID# 293. He had difficulties leaving his patrol vehicle and was scared because—at that
moment—he was unsure where Sheets or Sheets’ vehicle was located. Id., PageID# 293-94. Haus
managed to get out of his patrol vehicle and positioned himself to the rear of Sheets’ vehicle when
he heard Schneeman yelling commands. Id., PageID# 294. Haus believed that there was a potential
that Sheets’ vehicle was still operational because Haus could hear the car’s motor was revving and
he saw Sheets moving inside the automobile. Id. Haus, seeing wiring, understood that Schneeman
had deployed his taser on Sheets; however, Haus states that Sheets was still moving. Id., PageID#
294-95.
Haus pulled his taser and, seeing that Schneeman’s taser was not having any effect,
deployed his taser through the passenger side window on Sheets. Id., PageID# 296-98. Haus did
so after having moved from his patrol vehicle, relocating from his cruiser to close to the back of
Sheets’ vehicle, ultimately positioning himself at the front passenger side door. Id., PageID# 298;
Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:25-05:30. From his vantage
point, Haus could not see Sheets’ hands as Sheets had pointed his body towards Schneeman and
away from Haus. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 299-300. Haus focused on Sheets’ center mass as Sheets
was turned away from Haus. Id., PageID# 301. Haus would then deploy his taser—in what he
described as the perfect shot—on Sheets. Id., PageID# 302.
Haus believed that his taser made contact and explained that it would automatically
discharge a five-second interval on Sheets. Id., PageID# 303-04. However, at the same time that
Haus fired his taser, Schneeman began yelling that Sheets had a gun. Id., PageID# 303. Haus
completely discarded his taser and retreated to avoid a crossfire situation. Id. Haus turned away
from the car and did not see whether or not Sheets had a gun. Id., PageID# 304. Haus also states
that, based on his vantage point and because Sheets turned away from Haus, “I can't say for certain
one way or the other whether or not he had the firearm.” Id., PageID# 304-05. However, Haus
remarked that he had no reason to believe that Sheets did not possess a firearm in his hand given
the subsequent investigation conducted by the Ohio BCI. Id., PageID# 305. Schneeman would
then open fire on Sheets, with Haus withdrawing back to cover, drawing his service weapon, and
staying on point to cover Schneeman. Id., PageID# 310-11.
C. The Shooting from Schneeman’s Perspective and Bodycam Footage.
Schneeman would open his door and step out of the vehicle. Doc. No. 55-2, PageID# 446;
Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:19-05:23. Schneeman would
draw his Taser in his left hand and his service weapon in his right hand. Doc. No. 55-2, PageID#
447; Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:23-05:26. Schneeman
would get out of his vehicle and command Sheets to “Show me your hands” twice. Doc. No. 55-
2, PageID# 441; Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:23-05:27.
Schneeman stated that he heard Sheets revving the engine and saw that Sheets was attempting to
get the vehicle into gear. Doc. No. 55-2, PageID# 441-42. Schneeman deployed his taser, but it
had a negative effect. Id., PageID# 442. As the taser was deployed, Schneeman states that he saw
Sheets turn towards him, remove his right hand from the gear shift, and raise a firearm with that
same hand. Id., PageID# 442-43. Schneeman would then yell “gun” three times in rapid
succession. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 310; Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc.
No. 65, 0:05:26-05:30. Schneeman proceeded to shoot until his service weapon ran out of
ammunition—exactly eighteen rounds—and he had to reload. Doc. No. 55-2, PageID# 448-49;
Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:30-05:40.
D. Aftermath of the Shooting
The shooting ended at 17:13:50 (5:13:50 PM). Officer Schneeman’s Body Cam Video
Exhibit, Doc. No. 65, 0:05:40. Haus and Schneeman slowly approached the vehicle and observed
the situation. Id., 0:05:40-5:55. Schneeman approaches Sheets and audibly states gun. Id., 0:08:05-
08:11. Schneeman went to the rear of his patrol vehicle, opened the trunk, grabbed a shield,
returned to Sheets’ door, and audibly stated that he saw the gun on the floorboard of the vehicle.
Id., 0:08:40-9:30.
As a result of the shooting, Sheets passed away after receiving twenty-eight gunshot
wounds; the coroner’s report listed the cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds. Doc No. 69-3,
PageID# 715-16. An investigation conducted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office Bureau of
Criminal Investigations found that a black handgun (Make: Taurus, Model: G2C, Serial Number:
ABG663394) was located on the driver’s side front floorboard with one round in the chamber and
eleven rounds in the magazine. Doc. No. 69-1, PageID# 702. Subsequent DNA analysis of that
black handgun tested positive for Sheet’s DNA, with no other major contributors involved. Doc.
No. 69-2, PageID# 711-14.
II. Standards of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The moving party must demonstrate to the
court through reference to pleadings and discovery responses the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. This is so that summary judgment can be used to dispose
of claims and defenses which are factually unsupported. Id. at 324. The burden on the nonmoving
party is to show, through the use of evidentiary materials, the existence of a material fact which
must be tried. Id. The court's inquiry at the summary judgment stage is "the threshold inquiry of
determining whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are any genuine
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably
be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
The court's treatment of facts and inferences in a light favorable to the nonmoving party
does not relieve that party of its obligation "to go beyond the pleadings" to oppose an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(e). See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
The nonmoving party must oppose a proper summary judgment motion "by any kinds of
evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves ..." Id. Rule 56(c)
states, "... [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." A scintilla of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party is not sufficient; there must be
evidence that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “When
videotape footage exists, the reviewing court need not credit the version of a party who asserts
facts ‘blatantly contradicted’ by the videotape; rather it should view the facts in the light depicted
by the videotape.” Cunningham v. Shelby Cnty., Tennessee, 994 F.3d 761, 763 (6th Cir. 2021); see
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); see also Rudlaff
v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 2015).
III. Analysis
The analysis begins with the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, addressing first
whether a constitutional violation occurred. Then, the Court will consider whether a clearly
established right existed at the time of the violation.
A. Does Qualified Immunity Apply to Haus and Schneeman Against the Claim of
Excessive Force, Wrongful Death, and Supervisory Liability?
“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct ‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78-79 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). A
clearly established right is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless every
“reasonably competent” officer in his position would have known that his actions were unlawful.
Fried v. Garcia, No. 24-3330, 2024 WL 5040629, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2024) (citing Chappell v.
City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009)). Put simply, qualified immunity protects “all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986).
Qualified immunity entails two non-consecutive steps: (1) whether the public official's
conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the
time of the events. Stewart v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 970 F.3d 667, 672 (6th Cir. 2020); see also
Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2015). When a defendant invokes qualified
immunity in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to create
a genuine dispute of fact that the defendant violated a clearly established right. DiLuzio v. Vill. of
Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 608–09 (6th Cir. 2015). “We do not require a case directly on point, but
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”
Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
i. Did Haus’s or Schneeman’s Conduct Violate the Fourth Amendment?
“A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is
‘analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). An
officer’s use of deadly force violates the Fourth Amendment when it is not “objectively
reasonable.” Id. at 397. The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’” as
measured in objective terms. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). The inquiry into
reasonableness, as held by the United States Supreme Court, is the “totality of the circumstances.”
Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1356 (2025). The analysis must also consider whether force was
justified from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” taking due account of both
the individual interests and the governmental interests at stake. Id. at 1358; see Graham, 490 U.S.,
at 396; County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 428 (2017). The Sixth Circuit has set the
Fourth Amendment inquiry as follows:
In assessing whether a constitutional violation has occurred, we undertake a "fact-
specific, case-by-case inquiry,’ considering whether the force used was reasonable
“from the perspective of the reasonable official on the scene.” Reasonableness in
the context of deadly force is a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, based on the
three Graham factors: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) active resistance to
law enforcement, and (3) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the
safety of officers or others.
Redrick v. City of Akron, No. 21-3027, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33892, at *8 (6th Cir. Nov. 15,
2021) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly stated that the use
of deadly force, regardless of other factors, must be accompanied by “probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of severe physical harm, either to the officer or others.” Untalan v.
City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2005). “This circuit has held that police may still be
justified in using deadly force on a suspect who had been actively threatening others with a
dangerous weapon (guns or knives) but, unbeknownst to police, ultimately dropped the weapon
and that the danger had already abated.” Sterusky v. Cooper, No. 24-5820, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS
18563, at *11-12 (6th Cir. July 23, 2025); see also Id. n.3.
To begin the Court’s analysis, Haus attempted to pull over Sheets as a result of a suspicion
Haus had about where Sheets was located. Sheets’ car was parked in a high-crime area. When Haus
ran the plate of the vehicle and saw that the owner of the vehicle had an expired license, Haus had
probable cause to pull Sheets over. Haus attempted to pull over Sheets at the Wildcat Drive-Thru.
As the security camera footage shows, Sheets did not comply and instead fled. Sheets argues that
pursuing him violated departmental policy. “[S]uch pursuit would [violate] the Struthers Vehicle
Pursuit Policy, which prohibits ‘high-speed pursuit with a vehicle over a misdemeanor infraction.’”
Doc. No. 66, PageID# 634. Sheets is incorrect.
Nowhere in the policy does it prohibit “high-speed pursuit with a vehicle over a
misdemeanor infraction,” nor has Sheets provided a citation for the source of this rule. Instead, the
citation offered indicates that Officer Haus initially stopped Sheets based on suspicion of driving
with an expired license and initiated the pursuit because he believed Sheets attempted to assault
him. Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 279–80. The Struthers vehicle pursuit policy states that the decision
to initiate a chase depends on several factors, such as “the seriousness of the known or reasonably
suspected crime…” or “the apparent nature of the fleeing suspect.” Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 347–
48. The policy does not contain a blanket ban on misdemeanor car chases.
The videotape footage of the security camera shows Sheets wildly exiting the Wildcat
Drive-Thru by reversing out of the parking lot, nearly striking Haus’s patrol vehicle in the process.
Haus reasonably believed Sheets’ vehicle struck or attempted to strike him. This gave Haus reason
to suspect that Sheets had attempted to assault him—a felony in the fourth degree.3 Further, Haus
at that point reasonably believed that Sheets was a danger to himself and the general public. Even
if the chase fell outside of Struthers’ pursuit policy, Sheets fails to identify any law as to how
Haus’s conduct creates a constitutional violation necessary to overcome the burden of qualified
immunity.
From the beginning at Wildcat Drive-Thru (5:06:28 PM) to when Sheets’ vehicle was
disabled by a PIT technique (5:13:26 PM), the chase lasted for seven minutes. During that time,
Sheets engaged in behavior that placed Haus, Schneeman, and the general public in danger. Haus
successfully ended the chase via the PIT technique. Both officers attempted to place Sheets under
arrest. Schneeman ordered Sheets to raise his hands. Both officers noted hearing that the vehicle
was revving and that they thought Sheets would continue to attempt his evasion. They both
attempted to use tasers on Sheets to negative effect, and Sheets continued to resist. Despite their
efforts to contain and detain Sheets, Sheets managed to draw a gun and pose a threat of severe
physical harm.
Having considered Sheets’ claims in the light most favorable to him, it is now clear that the
allegations of excessive force and wrongful death against Haus fail due to qualified immunity. The
extent of force Haus used against Sheets was limited to his taser. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, Haus would be protected by qualified immunity because he met the criteria for
objective reasonableness established in Graham. Sheets also alleges supervisor liability in Count
Three of the complaint, often referred to as a Monell claim. Our circuit has long held that
supervisory liability requires a level of “active unconstitutional behavior” on the part of the
3 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.13 (No person shall attempt to cause harm to another person.
When the victim of the offense is a peace officer, it is a felony of the fourth degree.)
supervisor. Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241–42 (6th Cir. 2016); (citing Bass v.
Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)). Because this Court finds no evidence of
unconstitutional conduct by Haus, he is entitled to qualified immunity for all claims in this suit.
Schneeman is also entitled to qualified immunity because no genuine dispute of material
fact exists regarding whether his use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
The record establishes that Schneeman reasonably believed Sheets posed an immediate threat of
serious physical harm to himself and Officer Haus. For qualified immunity not to apply, the alleged
force must be a constitutional violation. “Individuals ‘have a right not to be shot unless they are
perceived as posing a threat to officers or others[.]’” Sterusky, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 18563, at
*10 (quoting King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 664 (6th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court requires courts
evaluating excessive force claims to consider the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
The undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Sheets, demonstrate that Sheets
fled from police for seven minutes prior to the shooting, creating a dangerous situation for officers
and the public. Upon approaching the vehicle, Schneeman drew his weapons and attempted to
subdue Sheets with a taser, an attempt that proved ineffective. Crucially, Schneeman observed
Sheets raise a firearm. Immediately following this observation, Schneeman discharged his weapon.
Minutes later, a firearm belonging to Sheets, confirmed to be his by DNA evidence, was discovered
on the driver’s side floorboard. Haus corroborated the existence of a threat, stating he had "no
reason to believe that [Sheets] did not have the firearm in his hand.” Doc. No. 55-1, PageID# 305.
The presence of the weapon on the floorboard further supports the reasonableness of
Schneeman’s belief that Sheets posed an imminent threat. Even accepting Sheets’ arguments
regarding the timing and effect of Haus’s taser, the observation of the firearm justified Schneeman's
use of force. Assuming the credible danger had abated because of Haus’s “perfect” taser shot, the
fact that the danger existed in the totality of the circumstances cannot be denied. Further, the time
between the “perfect” taser shot and the shooting itself is mere seconds. The scene must be
considered from the perspective of an officer of the scene, not with the retrospection that this Court
is currently afforded. Schneeman saw a weapon in Sheets’ hand—creating a deadly threat—and
acted reasonably to that threat. No reasonable jury could conclude that Schneeman’s actions were
anything other than objectively reasonable. Schneeman objectively believed Sheets was armed,
dangerous, and posed a threat of serious physical harm. Thus, his use of deadly force was
reasonable under the circumstances and therefore protected by qualified immunity. Consequently,
all claims against Schneeman must fail as a matter of law.
ii. Alternative Analysis on Whether Schneeman Violated a Clearly Established
Right
Alternatively, even if Sheets could sufficiently make a showing that a constitutional right
had been violated, it would still fail as a matter of summary judgment because that right was not
clearly established at the time of the shooting. Assuming, arguendo, that Sheets’ claim overcomes
the first burden that qualified immunity creates, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the officers’
use of force did not violate a clearly established right.
Haus initiated a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Sheets fled
from law enforcement. While escaping, Sheets drove recklessly, nearly striking Officer Haus’s
patrol vehicle. Sheets led officers on a seven-minute pursuit at high speeds. Crucially, after the PIT
maneuver was successfully deployed, Sheets drew a firearm in his hand. This occurred within
seconds of the chase ending.
Sheets argues that there is a factual dispute regarding whether the gun is visible on the
bodycam footage or if Haus observed it. However, this argument misconstrues the standard for
summary judgment. Even viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the Plaintiff, the
undisputed fact remains that Sheets drew a firearm. The absence of a clear, unobstructed view of
the gun on the bodycam does not create a genuine dispute as to whether it occurred. The location
of the weapon is critical. It was discovered by Officer Schneeman immediately after the shooting
on the driver’s side floorboard, as can be heard from body camera footage. It was later established
that there was one round in the chamber and eleven rounds in the magazine. DNA analysis
confirmed that the firearm belonged to Sheets. The focus is not whether the entire event is captured
with perfect clarity; rather, the question is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, demonstrates
that a reasonable jury could find in favor for Sheets. In this instance, no reasonable jury could find
that Sheets did not draw the weapon given its location immediately after the shooting, the DNA
evidence, and Officer Schneeman’s testimony regarding Sheets use of it.
To establish that Schneeman’s use of deadly force violated clearly established federal law,
Sheets relies on Sigley. Sigley involved several factual disputes that precluded summary judgment,
leading to its reversal and remand to the district court. Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d
527, 532 (6th Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit, in its analysis, moved to resolve the facts in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 537. In doing so, they found that shooting the plaintiff in the
back when he did not pose an immediate threat to other officers was unlawful and violated a clearly
established right. Id. Unlike Sigley, however, Sheets confronted Schneeman while armed inside
his vehicle and he was not fleeing on foot. When Sheets drew a firearm, he turned towards
Schneeman. Sheets’ back faced Haus, not Schneeman. Schneeman shot Sheets while they were
facing each other. Therefore, Sigley is not analogous to the case presented before this Court and
does not support a denial of summary judgment. We decline to extend Sigley’s holding regarding
a clearly established right to Sheets. Consequently, Sheets does not point to any precedent showing
a violation of a clearly established right.
B. Claims Abandoned by Plaintiff for Want of Prosecution.
A plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in
response to a motion for summary judgment. Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 F. App'x 368, 372
(6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “Sheets does not oppose summary judgment on all claims
against Defendants City of Struthers, Struthers City Police Department, and Timothy Roddy.” Doc.
66, PageID# 642. Consequently, the Court deems that Sheets has abandoned his claims against
Defendants City of Struthers and Police Chief Roddy. 4 Therefore, the Court finds in favor of the
Defendants on their motion for summary judgment (Doc. 56) and grants dismissal of all claims
made against them.
IV. Conclusion
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of all
Defendants on every claim in the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 28, 2026 /s/ Judge John R. Adams_______
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 The Struthers City Police Department had already been removed as a named defendant as a
result of the amended complaint being filed on September 1st, 2023. Doc. No. 19.