Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

AYLA C.R.,!

Plaintiff, Case No. 6:23-cv-00661-MC

v. OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

MCSHANE, Judge:

Plaintiff brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider whether the Administrative

| Tn the interest of privacy, this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the non-

governmental party in this case and any immediate family members of that party.

1 OPINION AND ORDER

Law Judge (“ALJ”): (1) erred in evaluating persuasiveness of all medical opinions; (2) erred in

evaluating Plaintiff’s testimony; and (3) erred in rejecting competent lay testimony.

Because the ALJ erred, and because the record as a whole reveals Plaintiff is disabled under

the Act, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for

calculation and award of benefits.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for SSI on June 11, 2020, alleging disability starting March 16, 2012.

Tr. 254.2 Her claim was initially denied on May 26, 2021, and upon reconsideration on September

3, 2021. Tr. 167–70, 146–56. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ and participated in a

telephone hearing before the Honorable Steven A. DeMonbreum on March 10, 2022. Tr. 65–97,

185–87. ALJ DeMonbreum denied Plaintiff’s claim by a written decision dated April 11, 2022.

Tr. 12–27. Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals Council and was denied on March 10, 2023,

rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 1–6. Plaintiff now seeks

judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.

Plaintiff was thirty years old on the date of her application. Tr. 25. She has at least a high

school education and does not have past relevant work experience. Tr. 25, 73. She had not

participated in substantial gainful activity since the date of her application. Tr. 17. The ALJ

determined Plaintiff had the following severe, medically determinable impairments: schizophrenia

spectrum disorder; bipolar disorder; schizoaffective disorder; anxiety disorder; eating disorder;

cannabis use disorder, severe, dependence; alcohol use disorder, moderate, in remission; and

2 “Tr.” refers to the Transcript of Social Security Administrative Record provided by the Commissioner. ECF No. 7-1.

2 – OPINION AND ORDER

history of methamphetamine abuse. Tr. 18. The ALJ found Plaintiff had no impairment that met

or equaled the severity of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id.

The ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a “full range of work at all exertional levels, but

with the following nonexertional limitations”: “simple, routine, repetitive tasks; no fast-paced

assembly line type of work; occasional interaction with public, co-workers, and supervisors; and

needs a static work environment with few changes in work routines and settings.” Tr. 21. Finally,

the ALJ concluded based on the testimony of a vocational expert that Plaintiff was capable of

performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 25–26. The ALJ

then found Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act since her application date. Tr. 27.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper legal

standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Ahearn v.

Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but

less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997)). To determine whether substantial

evidence exists, we review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. Davis v. Heckler, 868 F.2d 323, 326

(9th Cir. 1989). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing, ‘the

reviewing court may not substitute its judgment’ for that of the Commissioner.” Gutierrez v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 740 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157

3 – OPINION AND ORDER

F.3d 715, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1996)).

DISCUSSION

The Social Security Administration utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation to determine

whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920 (2012). The initial burden of

proof rests upon the claimant to meet the first four steps. If the claimant satisfies their burden with

respect to the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner for step five. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the claimant is capable of making an

adjustment to other work after considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”),

age, education, and work experience. Id. If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, then the

claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v). If, however, the

Commissioner proves that the claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant

numbers in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d

949, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff raises three issues on review (Pl.’s Brief 5, ECF No. 10):

1. Whether the ALJ erred in finding the medical opinions of Chris McFarland, QMHA, and

Dayna Svendsen, LCSW, less than fully persuasive, and whether that evidence should be fully

credited as true.

2. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, and

whether that evidence should be fully credited as true.

3. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the competent lay testimony in the case record, and

4 – OPINION AND ORDER

whether that evidence should be fully credited as true.

Because the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony without clear and

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ committed reversible error.

I. The ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to identify specific, clear and convincing reasons to reject

her subjective symptom testimony. Pl.’s Brief 14. The Commissioner argues the ALJ properly

discounted Plaintiff’s testimony based on the objective medical evidence, improvement with

treatment, unwillingness to follow prescribed treatment, and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living.

Def.’s Brief 10–13, ECF No. 12.

An ALJ must consider a claimant’s symptom testimony, including statements regarding

pain and workplace limitations. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). The ALJ is not “required

to believe every allegation of disabling pain.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir.

2012) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). When there is objective medical

evidence in the record of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce

the pain or symptoms alleged and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must

provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting the claimant’s testimony. Carmickle v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d

1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). “If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence

in the record,” this Court “may not engage in second-guessing,” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), and “must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

5 – OPINION AND ORDER

First, to the extent the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s testimony because it was inconsistent with

the objective evidence (Def.’s Brief 10), the ALJ failed to identify the specific testimony he found

not credible and unsupported. It is proper for the ALJ to consider the objective medical evidence

in making a credibility determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2). However, “we

require the ALJ to specify which testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and

convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the record, to support that credibility

determination.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ may

discredit subjective testimony “[w]hen objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent

with the claimant’s subjective testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022)

(emphasis in original). In particular, an ALJ may not make a negative credibility finding “solely

because” the claimant’s symptom testimony “is not substantiated affirmatively by objective

medical evidence,” as opposed to contradicted by it. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

883 (9th Cir. 2006).

In addition to misstating the standard regarding inconsistency with the objective medical

evidence, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence

and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and

other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision” is not accompanied by

specific reasons tying the inconsistent testimony to the disproving evidence. Tr. 22. While the ALJ

provided a general review of the medical record (see Tr. 22–23), this is insufficient to satisfy the

ALJ’s burden. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (holding summary of medical evidence

supporting RFC determination is “not the sort of explanation or the kind of ‘specific reasons’”

required). The ALJ did not “show his work” to establish a clear and convincing reason to discount

6 – OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s testimony. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498–99. Accordingly, the ALJ’s discounting of Plaintiff's

subjective symptom testimony based on the objective medical evidence is not supported by

substantial evidence.

The Commissioner’s additional bases in support of the ALJ decision also fail in the face of

Plaintiff’s challenge. Upon review, the Court is limited to the reasoning and factual findings

offered by the ALJ, not post-hoc explanations that attempt to “intuit what the adjudicator may have

been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009);

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (stating reviewing court is “constrained to review the reasons the

ALJ asserts”). The ALJ must “identify the testimony [he] found not credible” and “link that

testimony to the particular parts of the record supporting [his] non-credibility determination.”

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494. The Commissioner argues the ALJ also properly discounted

Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony based on her improvement with treatment, her failure to

follow treatment instructions, including by using cannabis, and her activities of daily living.

Def.’s Brief 10–13. Although the ALJ referred to each element of the Commissioner’s argument

during the discussion of the RFC, the ALJ nowhere ties the purportedly discrediting evidence now

identified by the Commissioner to a particular aspect of Plaintiff’s testimony to reach specific

conclusions discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. See Tr. 21–24. Far from demanding a paragon of

clarity from the ALJ, in this case, without more, the ALJ’s decision borders on an arbitrary

discrediting of Plaintiff’s testimony and denial of benefits. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493–94.

Because the Court cannot “substitute [its own] conclusions for the ALJ’s, or speculate as to the

grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions,” the ALJ erred where his decision lacks specific explanations

of its bases for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.

7 – OPINION AND ORDER

The Court further emphasizes Plaintiff’s activities of daily living do not constitute

substantial evidence to discount Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. In general, there are

two grounds on which an ALJ may use a plaintiff’s daily activities to question a plaintiff’s

credibility as to her subjective symptoms: (1) when daily activities demonstrate the plaintiff has

transferable work skills, and (2) when daily activities contradict the plaintiff’s testimony as to the

degree of functional limitation. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). However,

“disability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their

limitations.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.7 (9th Cir.

1996) (“The Social Security Act does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be

eligible for benefits, and many home activities may not be easily transferable to a work

environment where it might be impossible to rest periodically or take medication.”). And “the mere

fact that a claimant has carried on certain daily activities . . . does not in any way detract from

[their] credibility as to [their] overall disability.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 639 (quoting Vertigan v. Halter,

260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001)).

The Commissioner points to Ahearn v. Saul, where the claimant had testified “his

depression, cognitive impairments, and other issues resulted in severe limitations on his ability to

work, including an inability to concentrate for a sustained period and to work fast enough to satisfy

his employers.” 988 F.3d at 1116. In Ahearn, the ALJ properly found that the claimant’s “ability

to play video games and watch television for sustained periods, to use a library computer a few

times a week for two hours at a time (the maximum time permitted by the library), to use public

transportation, to shop at stores, to perform personal care, to prepare meals, to socialize with

friends, and to perform household chores” undermined his subjective testimony. Id. at 1117. In

8 – OPINION AND ORDER

this case, however, Plaintiff’s mental impairments arise in part from substance abuse and

encompass schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, anxiety disorder, and eating

disorder. Tr. 22. The ALJ recognized these impairments created “symptoms including an anxious

and depressed mood, a tearful affect, and slowed behavior” that continued “even after

stabilization.” Id. Plaintiff’s daily activities do not directly contradict these impairments or their

symptoms as was the case in Ahearn. Instead, Plaintiff’s activities here represent the kind of

evidence the Ninth Circuit has cautioned should not detract from a claimant’s credibility. E.g.,

Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The mere fact that a plaintiff has carried

on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise,

does not in any way detract from [their] credibility.” (quoting Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050)).

The ALJ committed reversible error in Plaintiff’s case. An error is harmless only if it is

“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted), or if despite the legal error, “the agency’s path may

reasonably be discerned,” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir.

2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming the ALJ properly evaluated

the medical opinions and lay testimony, the ALJ arrived at an RFC determination that justified the

finding of nondisability by finding Plaintiff was not as limited as in her testimony. Tr. 23;

cf. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (collecting cases). Accordingly, in failing to articulate valid reasons

for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the ALJ’s error was not harmless. Brown-Hunter,

806 F.3d at 494–95 (finding ALJ’s failure to provide specific reasons to discredit specific

testimony was not harmless error); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (collecting cases).

II. Remedy

9 – OPINION AND ORDER

Generally, “when an ALJ’s denial of benefits is not supported by the record, ‘the proper

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or

explanation.’” Hill, 698 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir.

2004)). However, an award of benefits can be directed “where the record has been fully developed

and where further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1292. Remand for calculation of benefits is only appropriate where the credit-as-true standard has

been satisfied, which requires:

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings

would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and

(3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014).

Further proceedings would not serve a purpose in this case and award of benefits is

appropriate. The record is fully developed such that there are no ambiguities for further

administrative proceedings to resolve and, as explained, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Further, Plaintiff’s testimony

speaking to “panic attacks when given assignments,” “difficulties in accomplishing daily tasks,”

and “require[ing] a 2-3 hour nap once a day” (Tr. 22) is not consistent with employment. See Tr. 96

(Vocational Expert Testimony) (“Q[:] And being off task 15 percent or more in a 7.5-hour

workday, that would exceed acceptable on task/off task ranges that you’ve given me, correct? A[:]

Yes.”). Accordingly, credited as true, Plaintiff’s testimony combined with the vocational expert’s

testimony establish that Plaintiff is disabled under the Act.

CONCLUSION

10 – OPINION AND ORDER

For these reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is REVERSED and this matter is

REMANDED for calculation and award of benefits. Final judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 28th day of January 2026.

s/ Michael J. McShane

Michael J. McShane

United States District Judge

11 – OPINION AND ORDER