GUILLERMO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

CHRISTIAN YAIR DE LA CRUZ )

GUILLERMO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 2:26-cv-00040-JAW

)

DERRICK STAMPER, in his )

official capacity as Chief Patrol )

Agent of Houlton Sector, )

U.S. Border Patrol, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen violates due process, the

court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and orders the

government provide the noncitizen a bond hearing within fourteen days. The court

further orders the government to produce the warrant authorizing the noncitizen’s

initial arrest.

I. BACKGROUND1

Christian Yair De La Cruz Guillermo, a resident of Middlesex County,

Massachusetts, is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without

inspection on or about July 21, 2023. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶¶ 1-2, 23-25

(ECF No. 1) (Pet.). On January 15, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs

1 For the purposes of Mr. Guillermo’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, upon agreement of the

parties, the Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in his verified petition and accompanying

attachments.

Enforcement arrested Mr. Guillermo at a construction worksite in Bethel, Maine. Id.

¶¶ 3, 28-29. On January 22, 2026, Mr. Guillermo filed a verified petition for writ of

habeas corpus and an emergency motion seeking a temporary restraining order

(TRO) against his removal from the District of Maine and to ensure his access to

counsel pending his habeas proceedings. Id.; Emer. Mot. for TRO to Stop Transfer

Without Prior Consent (ECF No. 2) (Mot. for TRO). That same day, the Court issued

a seventy-two-hour emergency order, enjoining Respondents from transferring Mr.

Guillermo outside the District of Maine. Emer. Order Concerning Stay or Transfer of

Removal (ECF No. 4).

At the teleconference of counsel on January 23, 2026, Respondents informed

the Court that Mr. Guillermo had been removed from Maine to Massachusetts before

Mr. Guillermo filed his petition and, therefore, when the Court issued its seventy-

two-hour emergency stay order, it was without jurisdiction to do so. Min. Entry (ECF

No. 5). However, later that same day, Respondents informed the Court that Mr.

Guillermo had in fact been in the District of Maine at the time of the filing of the

habeas corpus petition and that he remained in the District of Maine, and

Respondents conceded both that the Court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Guillermo’s

habeas petition and that the January 22, 2026 emergency order remained in effect.

Order (ECF No. 6).

On January 26, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Mr.

Mr. Guillermo’s petition should not be granted, O.S.C. (ECF No. 7), and issued a TRO

barring Respondents from removing Mr. Guillermo from the District of Maine and

ordering Respondents to provide Mr. Guillermo with reasonable access to counsel

during his period of detention. Order on Mot. for TRO (ECF No. 8). That same day,

Respondents filed their response to the show cause order, opposing Mr. Guillermo’s

petition, Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF

No. 9) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n), and Mr. Guillermo filed his reply on January 28, 2026. Pet’r’s

Reply to Resp’ts’ Resp. to O.S.C. (ECF No. 10) (Pet’r’s Reply). The parties also agreed

there were no factual disputes for the Court to resolve in this matter and stipulated

to the facts in Mr. Guillermo’s verified petition and its exhibits, and that the Court

may resolve Mr. Guillermo’s petition on their briefing, without oral argument.

Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 2; Pet’r’s Reply at 3.

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

Mr. Guillermo alleges his detention violates the Immigration Nationality Act

(INA) and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 40-49. Mr. Guillermo maintains he is illegally categorized as a

mandatory detainee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), rather than a discretionary

detainee under § 1226(a) who is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration

Judge. Id. ¶¶ 43-45. Pointing to recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

precedent he interprets as likely foreclosing his request for a bond hearing, Mr.

Guillermo anticipates being denied a bond hearing in violation of his Fifth

Amendment due process rights. Id. ¶¶ 38-39, 45. Mr. Guillermo also maintains he

was arrested without a warrant. Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Guillermo seeks, among other

remedies, a writ of habeas corpus ordering his immediate release, or in the

alternative, an order requiring an Immigration Judge to provide him a bond hearing

as soon as possible. Pet. 10-11.

In their opposition, Respondents maintain Mr. Guillermo is properly

categorized as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling

agency precedent. Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 2. However, Respondents acknowledge that

“recent caselaw from this Court [has] uniformly sustain[ed] challenges to DHS’s

interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Mr. Guillermo’s case is not substantially

distinguishable from that line of cases. Id. Respondents do not contest Mr.

Guillermo’s allegation that he was arrest without a warrant.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Mr.

Guillermo’s habeas petition. “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief

‘within their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to

relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always

been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting

Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). Furthermore, under habeas law,

jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically

present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on his behalf.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);

Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over

this matter, because, as Respondents now concede, Mr. Guillermo filed his habeas

petition when he was in custody in the District of Maine.

B. The Merits

Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar

facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Mr. Guillermo, and he

is therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond

hearing. However, Mr. Guillermo alleges he was arrested without a warrant, and the

Court orders Respondents to produce the warrant authorizing Mr. Guillermo’s arrest.

1. Statutory Framework

Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen

“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two

categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings

v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (plurality opinion). Relevant here is

§ 1225(b)(2).2 Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall

be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,

§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297

2 Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially

determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to

expediated removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).

Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,

if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of

persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),

(B)(iii)(IV).

(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond

hearings”).

By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary

hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591

U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue

an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or

release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

Section 1226(a) thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework for

noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11571, 2025 Dist. LEXIS 128085, at *4-5

(D. Mass. Jul. 7, 2025). However, § 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one

exception: immigration authorities “shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved

in certain enumerated criminal activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those

criminal activities is at issue here.

Once arrested under § 1226(a), immigration authorities make an

individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to

release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer

that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien

is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). If the

immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of

that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)

(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and

convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by

preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-

Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). An immigration judge’s decision to

continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).

In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between

the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain

certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes

the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.

at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the

country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).

2. Applicability of Section 1226(a)

As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First

Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of

§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See

Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,

n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have

prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by

over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the

United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)

mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));

Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (D. Me.

Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases).

At bottom, the district courts consistently hold that § 1225(b)(2) applies only

to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission,” and a noncitizen

continuously residing in the United States for more than two years cannot be

considered actively seeking admission. See, e.g., Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-

00437-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *35 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025). Rather,

a noncitizen “already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings” is

subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. As Mr.

Guillermo explains in his petition, and Respondents do not contest, he has resided in

the United States since July 2023. Pet. ¶ 2. Therefore, Mr. Guillermo cannot be

categorized under § 1225(b)(2) as actively seeking admission. Instead, as a noncitizen

already in the country, he is properly categorized under § 1226(a)’s discretionary

detention scheme. Accordingly, Mr. Guillermo is entitled to a bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.

3. Due Process

Because Mr. Guillermo is currently in the United States, he is “entitled to the

full procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”

Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *25 (D.

Mass. Sept. 9, 2025), which provides that he will not be “deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an alien enters the country, the

legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within

the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,

temporary, or permanent”). As the petitioner, however, Mr. Guillermo bears the

burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that his detention

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See De Oliveira v. Joyce,

2:25-cv-00291-LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8 (D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing

Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025) (collecting

authority)).

To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply

the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Chogllo

Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *29 (analyzing procedural due process

challenge to the detention of noncitizen held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews

test); Sampiao, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *26 (same); Hernandez-Lara, 10

F.4th at 27-28 (same). Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three

factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3)

“the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement

would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

a. Private Interest

In his petition, Mr. Guillermo asserts “the most elemental of liberty interests—

the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.” Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom

from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due Process

Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates their due

process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who requires the

government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen

poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence

that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency of their

removal proceedings. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. In this case, Respondents

have refused Mr. Guillermo the bond hearing he is guaranteed under § 1226(a) and

have failed to meet their burden for his continued detention as due process requires.

Mr. Guillermo has therefore clearly established the first Mathews factor weighs in

his favor.

b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk

of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing

that Mr. Guillermo presents any public safety or flight risk. Accordingly, the second

Mathews factor also weighs heavily in his favor.

c. Government Interest

Finally, the third Mathews factor considers the “Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. Respondents do

not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Guillermo’s continued detention

without a bond hearing. See Chogllo Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *34

(identifying governmental interest in favor of immigration habeas petitioners’

continued detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an

inapplicable statute”). In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without

a hearing. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of

noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”). Thus, the third Mathews factor

weighs against Respondents and in favor of Mr. Guillermo. Respondents’ detention

of Mr. Guillermo without a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates Mr.

Guillermo’s due process rights.

4. Cristian Yair De Le Cruz Guillermo’s Warrantless Arrest

Allegation

Mr. Guillermo alleges Respondents arrested him without a warrant, Pet. ¶ 29,

which is required to detain a noncitizen under § 1226(a). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) (“On

a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States”

(emphasis supplied). However, Respondents failed to address this argument in their

opposition. Accordingly, the Court orders Respondents to produce the Mr.

Guillermo’s arrest warrant in accordance with the terms of this order.

IV. CONCLUSION

Finding Respondents’ continued detention of Mr. Guillermo without a bond

hearing violates federal law and the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, the Court GRANTS Cristian Yair De La Cruz Guillermo’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and ORDERS Respondents shall provide Mr.

Guillermo a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) within fourteen

days of the date of this order. The Court further enjoins Respondents from denying

Mr. Guillermo a bond hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to him.

The Court ORDERS Respondents to file a status report within five days of Mr.

Guillermo’s bond hearing, stating whether Mr. Guillermo has been granted bond,

and, if his request was denied, the reasons for that denial.

Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to produce by no later than January

30, 2026, the arrest warrant authorizing Mr. Guillermo’s January 15, 2026 arrest.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 28th day of January, 2026