GODMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

TAMMY GODMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25cv2657-TKW-HTC

PENNYMAC LOAN

SERVICES, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tammy Godman, proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint (Doc. 1)

and motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction (Docs. 3

& 4). She seeks to prevent enforcement of a judgment of foreclosure entered in state

court on July 29, 2025. Upon consideration, the undersigned concludes: (1) this case

should be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, as it barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine1; and (2) the pending motions should be DENIED as

moot.

1 The doctrine derives its name from two cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)

and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

I. Background

Godman sues Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, Pennymac Corporation, and

Pennymac Financial Services, LLC (collectively, “Pennymac”). On September 13,

2023, Pennymac filed suit in state court to foreclose on a property in Okaloosa

County owned by Godman.2 See Okaloosa Cnty. Case No. 2023 CA 3402.3 On July

29, 2025, the state court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of

Pennymac, and Pennymac purchased the property at auction on December 18, 2025.

Godman alleges in this suit that Pennymac: (1) “asserted control and enforcement

authority over Estate4 property without producing verified proof of standing,

ownership, or authority”; (2) “did not originate the alleged obligation, were not

parties to the original closing, and did not suffer any verified loss”; and (3) failed “to

provide a complete accounting despite notice that the alleged obligation was

disputed and that the property was under fiduciary administration.” Doc. 1 at 9.

Godman takes issue with Pennymac’s “continued foreclosure and enforcement

activity.” Id.

2 Godman is identified as “Tammy Belinda Arcos” in the state court litigation.

3 The Court may take judicial notice of the state court docket for the foreclosure proceeding. See

Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652-53 (11th Cir. 2020).

4 Some aspects of Godman’s complaint, such as the reference to her being “the duly accepted

Executor and Intended Beneficiary of the Estate(s) of Tammy Belinda Godman and Tammy

Belinda Arcos,” are associated with the sovereign citizen movement. Courts have routinely

rejected that movement’s legal theories as frivolous. See United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228,

233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Courts have been confronted repeatedly by [sovereign citizens’]

attempts to delay judicial proceedings and have summarily rejected their legal theories as

frivolous.”).

Based on the foregoing, Godman claims Pennymac violated the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and deprived her of property without due

process. As relief, Godman asks the Court to: (1) declare that Pennymac lacks

“lawful standing or authority absent verified proof and accounting”; (2) “order a full

equitable accounting of all transactions, proceeds, credits, and offsets related to

Estate property”; and (3) enjoin Pennymac “from foreclosing upon, selling,

transferring, encumbering, or enforcing any interest in Estate property.” Id. at 10.

II. Discussion

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a district court from exercising

subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint “brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005). The doctrine bars claims where “the source of the plaintiff’s injury is

the state-court judgment itself,” Efron v. Candelario, 110 F.4th 1229, 1236 (11th Cir.

2024), “whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal of the judgment or tries

to call the appeal something else.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir.

2021) (citation omitted).

Here, the state court entered a final judgment of foreclosure on July 29,

2025—before Godman filed this federal action on December 19, 2025.5 The thrust

of Godman’s complaint is that the state court foreclosure judgment is invalid because

Pennymac failed to establish the prerequisites for the judgment. And she specifically

seeks to stop enforcement of the judgment. Because Godman wants this Court to

nullify the judgment of foreclosure and allow her to relitigate issues already decided

in state court, this case should be dismissed without prejudice under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. See Froncek v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 2015 WL 12838166,

at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2015) (concluding court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-

Feldman doctrine to stop foreclosure sale and consider propriety of state foreclosure

order); see also, Leathers v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 3:25cv51TKW/HTC

(February 7, 2025) (Doc. 5) (adopting, over objection, report and recommendation

for dismissal of suit attacking foreclosure judgment as violating due process rights

based on Rooker-Feldman).

In addition, while Godman makes the conclusory allegation that Pennymac

violated RESPA by not providing her a full accounting after she made a qualified

written request (Doc. 1-1 at 3), that reference to RESPA does not move her claims

5 No appeal has been filed in the state court action that would preclude application of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (“state

proceedings have not ended for purposes of Rooker–Feldman when an appeal from the state court

judgment remains pending at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action”).

outside the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because: (1) she asserts the failure

to provide the accounting should prevent enforcement of the foreclosure judgment;

and (2) nothing indicates she could not have made this argument in state court.6 See

Doc. 1 at 9 (“Plaintiff seeks equitable relief to … compel full accounting before any

enforcement may proceed.”); see also Cavero v. One West Bank FSB, 617 F. App’x

928, 930 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of complaint under Rooker-Feldman

because deciding RESPA claim would have required the district court to effectively

nullify the state court’s final judgment recognizing the validity of the debt and

authorizing foreclosure on the … property”).

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

1. That this case be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of

jurisdiction.

2. That all pending motions (Docs. 3 & 4) be DENIED as moot.

3. That the clerk close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 29th day of December, 2025.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon

HOPE THAI CANNON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

6 Godman’s due process claim is also frivolous because Pennymac is not a state actor. See Harvey

v.Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining that to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a person acting

under color of state law and (2) deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”) (citation omitted).

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.  Any different

deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only

and does not control.  An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all

other parties.  A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions.  See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.