GARCIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

SELVIN SAIAS SITUJ GARCIA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 2:26-cv-00025-JAW

)

DERRICK STAMPER, in his )

official capacity Chief Patrol Agent, )

U.S. Border Patrol, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen violates due process, the

court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and orders the

government first to return the noncitizen to the District of Maine and then provide

the noncitizen a bond hearing in accordance with the terms of this order.

I. BACKGROUND1

Selvin Isaias Situj Garcia, a resident of Middlesex County, Massachusetts, is

a Guatemalan citizen who arrived in the United States in September 2021. Pet. for

Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ¶¶ 1-2 (ECF No. 1) (Pet.). On

January 15, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and

detained Mr. Garcia while he was working at a construction site in Bethel, Maine.

Id. ¶ 3. On January 18, 2026, alleging his immigration detention violates federal law

1 For the purposes of Mr. Garcia’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, upon agreement of the

parties, the Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in his verified petition and accompanying

attachments.

and the United States Constitution, Mr. Garcia filed a verified petition for writ of

habeas corpus and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order blocking

his removal from the District of Maine. Pet. at 1-11; Emer. Mot. for TRO to Stop

Transfer Without Prior Consent (ECF No. 3). That same day, the Court issued a forty-

eight-hour emergency order, enjoining Respondents from transferring Mr. Garcia

outside the District of Maine. Emer. Order Concerning Stay or Transfer of Removal

(ECF No. 4).

At the teleconference of counsel on January 20, 2026, Respondents explained

that after Mr. Garcia filed his habeas petition but before the Court issued its

emergency order, Respondents moved Mr. Garcia to Jackson Parish Correctional

Center in Jonesboro, Louisiana.2 Min. Entry (ECF No. 6). Given this development,

the parties agreed to amend Mr. Garcia’s motion for TRO to block his removal from

the country and ensure his reasonable access to counsel. Id. The parties also agreed

there were no factual disputes for the Court to resolve in this matter and stipulated

to the facts in Mr. Garcia’s verified petition and its exhibits. Id.

2 Mr. Garcia filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus at 11:22 a.m. on Sunday, January 18,

2026. Pet. The Court issued its emergency order barring Respondents from removing Mr. Garcia from

the District of Maine at 1:59 p.m. the same day. Respondents have represented that Mr. Garcia

departed the state of Maine “on a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) flight, roughly

two hours before the Court’s issuance of the Emergency Order.” Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n

to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1 (ECF No. 9).

It is of course possible that Respondents removed Mr. Garcia from the District of Maine

between 11:22 a.m. and 1:59 p.m. on January 18, 2026, and ordinarily the Court would accept the

Respondents’ factual representation at face value. However, given Respondents’ disobedience of a

court order and misrepresentation of critical facts to the Court regarding another immigration case,

Da Silva-O’Leary v. Hyde, No. 2:26-cv-00036-JAW, Resp. to Mot. (ECF No. 9), the Court ORDERS

Respondents to submit an affidavit or sworn declaration confirming the exact time of Mr. Garcia’s

departure from the District of Maine on January 18, 2026 within seven days of the date of this order.

On January 21, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Mr.

Mr. Garcia’s petition should not be granted, including whether the Court can and

should order Mr. Garcia’s return to the District of Maine, O.S.C. (ECF No. 7), and

issued a TRO blocking Respondents from removing Mr. Garcia from the United States

and ordering Respondents to provide Mr. Garcia with reasonable access to counsel

during his period of detention. Order on Mot. for TRO (ECF No. 8) (TRO). That same

day, Respondents filed their response to the show cause order, opposing Mr. Garcia’s

petition, Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF

No. 9) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n), and Mr. Garcia filed his reply. Pet’r’s Reply to Resp’ts’ Resp.

to O.S.C. (ECF No. 10) (Pet’r’s Reply).

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

Mr. Garcia alleges his detention violates the Immigration Nationality Act

(INA) and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 41-51. Mr. Garcia maintains he is illegally categorized as a

mandatory detainee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), rather than a discretionary

detainee under § 1226(a) who is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration

Judge. Id. ¶¶ 45-47. Pointing to recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

precedent he interprets as likely foreclosing his request for a bond hearing, Mr.

Garcia anticipates being denied a bond hearing in violation of his Fifth Amendment

due process rights. Id. ¶¶ 39-40, 47. Mr. Garcia also maintains, “in the interest of

justice,” the Court should order Respondents return him to the District of Maine

because his transfer to Louisiana violates “the strict letter and underlying spirit of

the [Court’s] TRO.” Pet’r’s Reply at 2-3. Mr. Garcia seeks, inter alia, a writ of habeas

corpus ordering his immediate release, or in the alternative, an order requiring an

Immigration Judge to provide him a bond hearing as soon as possible. Pet. 10-11.

In their opposition, Respondents maintain Mr. Garcia is properly categorized

as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling agency

precedent. Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 2. However, Respondents acknowledge that “recent

caselaw from this Court [has] uniformly sustain[ed] challenges to DHS’s

interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Mr. Gracia’s case is not substantially

distinguishable from that line of cases. Id. Respondents also maintain, “[a]s a matter

of practicality,” the Court should not order Mr. Garcia’s return to the District of

Maine. Id. at 2-3. Given the accelerated briefing schedule, Respondents explain, a

merits determination in Mr. Garcia’s favor would divest Respondents of custody

before they could arrange his return to the District of Maine. Id. at 2. Additionally,

Respondents maintain the Court’s TRO resolved “the underlying concerns” in the

court’s emergency stay order, which was issued approximately two hours after Mr.

Garcia departed for Louisiana, by ensuring Mr. Garcia reasonable access to counsel

and preventing his removal from the United States, which “obviat[es] any need for

[Mr. Garcia] to be physically present in Maine pending the resolution of his case.” Id.

at 3.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Mr.

Garcia’s habeas petition. “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief ‘within

their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to relieve an

individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always been that

the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting Carbo v.

United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). Furthermore, under habeas law,

jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically

present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on his behalf.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);

Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over

this matter, because Mr. Garcia filed his habeas petition when he was in custody in

the District of Maine.

B. The Merits

Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar

facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Mr. Garcia, and he is

therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond

hearing. For the reasons explained below, the Court orders Respondents to return

Mr. Garcia to the District of Maine.

1. Statutory Framework

Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen

“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two

categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings

v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (plurality opinion). Relevant here is

§ 1225(b)(2).3 Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall

be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,

§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297

(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond

hearings”).

By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary

hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591

U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue

an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or

release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

Section 1226(a) thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework for

3 Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially

determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to

expediated removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).

Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,

if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of

persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),

(B)(iii)(IV).

noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11571, 2025 Dist. LEXIS 128085, at *4-5

(D. Mass. Jul. 7, 2025). However, § 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one

exception: immigration authorities “shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved

in certain enumerated criminal activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those

criminal activities is at issue here.

Once arrested under § 1226(a), immigration authorities make an

individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to

release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer

that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien

is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). If the

immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of

that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)

(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and

convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by

preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-

Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). An immigration judge’s decision to

continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).

In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between

the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain

certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes

the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.

at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the

country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).

2. Applicability of Section 1226(a)

As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First

Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of

§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See

Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,

n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have

prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by

over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the

United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)

mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));

Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (D. Me.

Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases).

At bottom, the district courts consistently hold that § 1225(b)(2) applies only

to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission,” and a noncitizen

continuously residing in the United States for more than two years cannot be

considered actively seeking admission. See, e.g., Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-

00437-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *35 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025). Rather,

a noncitizen “already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings” is

subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. As Mr.

Garcia explains in his petition, and Respondents do not contest, he has resided in the

United States since September 2021. Pet. ¶ 1. Therefore, Mr. Garcia cannot be

categorized under § 1225(b)(2) as actively seeking admission. Instead, as a noncitizen

already in the country, he is properly categorized under § 1226(a)’s discretionary

detention scheme. Accordingly, Mr. Garcia is entitled to a bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.

3. Due Process

Because Mr. Garcia is currently in the United States, he is “entitled to the full

procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” Sampiao

v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *25 (D. Mass.

Sept. 9, 2025), which provides that he will not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an alien enters the country, the legal

circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the

United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,

temporary, or permanent”). As the petitioner, however, Mr. Garcia bears the burden

of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that his detention violates the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-

LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8 (D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H.

v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025) (collecting authority)).

To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply

the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Chogllo

Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *29 (analyzing procedural due process

challenge to the detention of noncitizen held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews

test); Sampiao, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *26 (same); Hernandez-Lara, 10

F.4th at 27-28 (same). Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three

factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3)

“the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement

would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

a. Private Interest

In his petition, Mr. Garcia asserts “the most elemental of liberty interests—

the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.” Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom

from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due Process

Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates their due

process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who requires the

government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen

poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence

that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency of their

removal proceedings. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. In this case, Respondents

have refused Mr. Garcia the bond hearing he is guaranteed under § 1226(a) and have

failed to meet their burden for his continued detention as due process requires. Mr.

Garcia has therefore clearly established the first Mathews factor weighs in his favor.

b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk

of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing

that Mr. Garcia presents any public safety or flight risk. Accordingly, the second

Mathews factor also weighs heavily in his favor.

c. Government Interest

Finally, the third Mathews factor considers the “Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. Respondents do

not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Garcia’s continued detention

without a bond hearing. See Chogllo Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *34

(identifying governmental interest in favor of immigration habeas petitioners’

continued detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an

inapplicable statute”). In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without

a hearing. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of

noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”). Thus, the third Mathews factor

weighs against Respondents and in favor of Mr. Garcia. Respondents’ detention of

Mr. Garcia without a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates Mr.

Garcia’s due process rights.

4. Selvin Isaias Situj Garcia’s Return to the District of Maine

Lastly, the Court orders Respondents to return Mr. Garcia to the District of

Maine. The Court finds that Mr. Garcia’s return to the District of Maine is necessary

to ensure he has meaningful access to counsel consistent with the Court’s January

21, 2026 TRO, particularly the Court’s order that Respondents provide Mr. Garcia a

bond hearing. Mr. Garcia is represented by pro bono counsel located in Portland,

Maine, Pet’r’s Reply at 2, and he maintains a statutory right to select his own counsel.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . the

person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the

Government) by such counsel . . . as he shall choose”). The First Circuit has described

§ 1362 as an “integral part” of due process. Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir.

2007) (citation omitted). Thus, under First Circuit law, Mr. Garcia has both a

statutory and constitutional right to counsel now and at the upcoming bond hearing.

As the Court has determined that Mr. Garcia is entitled to a bond hearing and

entitled to counsel at the bond hearing, the Court concludes that the burden imposed

on Mr. Garcia and his local counsel to prepare for a bond hearing if he remains in

Louisiana, more than 1,600 miles from Portland, “raises grave concerns as to his [due

process] right to access to counsel.” Cruz-Santana v. Gonzalez-Ramos, No. 26-1028

(GMM), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12121, at *13 (D.P.R. Jan. 22, 2026) (barring the

Government from transferring a detainee from Puerto Rico to a detention facility on

the mainland because of the impact on the detainee’s right to counsel).

Although the information about Mr. Garcia before the Court is limited, there

is no suggestion in the filings that Mr. Garcia has a past criminal history in the

United States or that criminal charges are pending against him. Pet. ¶¶ 26-31.

According to his petition, Mr. Garcia has been living in Massachusetts since roughly

September 2021 and he was working at a construction job in Bethel, Maine when

Respondents detained him. Id. Under § 1226(a), Mr. Garcia is entitled to a bond

hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). As noted earlier,

“[i]n order to continue detaining a noncitizen under section 1226(a), the government

must either (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a

danger to the community or (2) prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a

noncitizen poses a flight risk.” Doe v. Tompkins, 11 F.4th 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2021);

Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. The Court acknowledges that the law entrusts an

Immigration Judge with decision-making authority concerning whether to continue

to detain Mr. Garcia or release him on bond; however, the Court observes that based

on this limited record, Mr. Garcia’s request for release raises a legitimate issue before

the Immigration Judge.

Furthermore, under these unusual circumstances, allowing Respondents to

continue detaining Mr. Garcia outside the District of Maine, rather than ordering his

return, would incentivize Respondents in the future to transfer similarly situated

immigration detainees outside the District of Maine after the Court has retained

jurisdiction over a detainee’s habeas petition.

Accordingly, the Court orders Respondents to return Mr. Garcia to the District

of Maine where he may remain detained pending his bond hearing.4

IV. CONCLUSION

Finding Respondents’ continued detention of Mr. Garcia without a bond

hearing violates federal law and the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, the Court GRANTS, in part and defers in part, Selvin Isaias Situj

Garcia’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No.

1) and ORDERS Respondents to return Mr. Garcia to the District of Maine within

five days of the date of this order. The Court otherwise DEFERS action on the merits

of the pending Petition. The Court ORDERS Respondents to file a status update

within twenty-four hours of the date of Mr. Garcia’s return to the District of Maine,

confirming his return consistent with this order.

The Court further ORDERS Respondents to submit within seven days of the

date of this order an affidavit or sworn declaration confirming the exact time of Mr.

Garcia’s departure from the District of Maine on January 18, 2026.

4 The Court will schedule a conference of counsel to discuss logistics and timing. In DuPont v.

Meserve, 2:25-cv-00593-JAW, the government proposed such a roundabout and delayed return from

Louisiana to Maine that the Court ordered the noncitizen released, and he obtained documentation

that allowed him to take a commercial flight back to Maine.

In this case, one alternative would be for Respondents to agree that Mr. Garcia could be

released on personal recognizance bond. If so, Mr. Garcia could be released to Massachusetts and

could obtain his bond hearing there. At this point, the Court is reluctant to release Mr. Garcia prior

to his bond hearing without Respondents’ acquiescence.

The Court will discuss these issues with counsel at the to-be-scheduled conference.

Upon Mr. Garcia’s return to the District of Maine, the Court further enjoins

Respondents from denying Mr. Garcia a bond hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2) applies to him and ORDERS Respondents shall provide Mr. Garcia a

bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) within fourteen days of the

date of his return to the District of Maine. Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents

to file a status report within five days of Mr. Garcia’s bond hearing, stating whether

Mr. Garcia has been granted bond, and, if his request was denied, the reasons for

that denial.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 28th day of January, 2026