The opinion
2026 IL 131340
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 131340)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
WILLIAM P. HEINTZ, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 28, 2026.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Overstreet, Holder White, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
Justice O’Brien specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Neville and Justice Cunningham.
OPINION
¶1 At issue in this appeal is whether evidence of Brianne Szalaj’s alleged violent
conduct that postdated the charged offenses against defendant, William Heintz, was
admissible under Illinois Rule of Evidence 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
Additionally, we must consider whether the Kankakee County circuit court abused
its discretion in barring evidence that defendant was acquitted of one of the four
prior alleged acts of domestic violence against Szalaj, which was introduced by the
State at trial. The appellate court vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded for
a new trial. 2024 IL App (3d) 230161-U, ¶ 39. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the appellate court’s judgment and remand to the appellate court to consider
defendant’s remaining claims.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was charged in connection with his conduct toward Szalaj on August
6, 2020, with attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a) West
2020)), aggravated domestic battery (id. § 12-3.3(a-5)), unlawful restraint (id. § 10-
3(a)), and domestic battery (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)).
¶4 Prior to trial, the State and defendant both sought leave to introduce evidence
of other acts of violent conduct committed during defendant’s multiyear
relationship with Szalaj.
¶5 The State filed a motion in limine, pursuant to section 115-7.4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 (West 2020)). That statute
applies in domestic violence cases and allows the admission of “evidence of the
defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence,”
which can be considered for any relevant purpose. See id. § 115-7.4(a). The State
sought to admit testimony detailing defendant’s previous alleged acts of domestic
battery. The trial court granted the State’s motion and allowed evidence of four
separate incidents that all occurred prior to the charged offenses in this case. The
first incident occurred in February 2019, the second in July 2019, the third in
February 2020, and the fourth on July 3, 2020. In the fourth incident, defendant was
charged with domestic battery and was later acquitted of the charge.
¶6 Defendant also filed a motion in limine to introduce home surveillance videos
showing two separate incidents to illustrate the alleged violent character of Szalaj.
One set of videos was taken on November 5, 2020, three months after the charged
offenses in this case, and showed Szalaj throwing a beer can at defendant’s face.
The second set of videos was taken on February 9, 2021, and showed Szalaj
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straddling defendant’s body, hitting him with her purse and punching him. The trial
court denied defendant’s motion in limine because the conduct recorded in the
videos postdated the charged offenses.
¶7 A jury trial commenced on December 12, 2022. During opening arguments,
defense counsel stated, inter alia, that Szalaj had defendant arrested for
misdemeanor domestic battery in relation to an incident on July 3, 2020, and that
he was tried on the offense in Iroquois County. The court sustained the State’s
objection.
¶8 The evidence established that Szalaj and defendant began a relationship after
meeting at work around 2017. The two maintained separate residences. Defendant
lived in Iroquois County, and Szalaj lived in Kankakee County. Over the course of
their relationship, they began to fight, accusing each other of infidelity. The couple
would repeatedly break up and then reconcile.
¶9 Szalaj testified that on August 5, 2020, she returned to her home after 10 p.m.
to find defendant waiting for her in the kitchen. He demanded her cell phone, and
when she refused, he grabbed her upper lip, causing it to bleed. She fled upstairs to
the bathroom and locked the door. Defendant then kicked the door down, threw her
into the bathtub, stepped on her neck and chest, and began to run water over her
face. Defendant had her cell phone and repeatedly told her that, if she would give
him the password, he would stop. Defendant became more forceful and stepped on
her neck again. Szalaj could not breathe and blacked out.
¶ 10 Szalaj further testified that, when she regained consciousness, defendant was
beating her and punching her in the face. He held her head under the running water
and demanded her password. Defendant pulled out a knife and threatened to kill
her. Szalaj raised her hand, and defendant cut her thumb. She testified that she was
held in the bathroom for hours. Eventually, defendant let her out of the bathroom,
and she went to sleep. She further testified that she had screamed for help out of
her bedroom window. Defendant told her they would discuss it later and instructed
her to go to bed. When she woke up in the morning, defendant was still there. Szalaj
was able to log on to her work computer and send a message to a coworker to send
the police. When the police arrived, defendant fled out the garage door.
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¶ 11 Szalaj’s blood was found on defendant’s shirt, and her phone was in defendant’s
car. Police took photographs of her injuries, including a black eye, a bleeding lip,
marks on her chest, a cut on her thumb, and bruises all over her body. The police
photographed the bathroom door and the blood in the bathtub. After the attack,
Szalaj found the knife under her bed. DNA from both Szalaj and defendant was
found on the knife.
¶ 12 Defendant advanced a claim of self-defense. He testified that the two were still
in a relationship in August 2020 and were planning to meet at Szalaj’s home on the
evening of August 5. When he arrived there after midnight, she was sleeping, and
he woke her. He questioned Szalaj and asked to see her cell phone because her
answers were evasive. Defendant testified that he grabbed her cell phone, saw that
she had changed her password, and asked why. Szalaj then grabbed defendant’s
cell phone, threw a beer in his face, and fled to the bathroom with his phone.
Defendant chased her, he used his body to “hit [the door] with some force,” and the
doorjamb “popped.” After he forced the door open, Szalaj began to punch him and
tried to knee him in the groin. He grabbed her arms to protect himself, and she fell
into the tub during the struggle. He testified that he pinned her in the tub with his
boot. When he let her up, she began punching him again. The two fell back into the
tub, and he put his boot on her chest to restrain her until she settled down. Defendant
denied that he slapped, kneed, or kicked Szalaj or stepped on her neck. Eventually
she stopped fighting, and they went to bed.
¶ 13 Defendant called Jeff Wedwick without objection by the State. He testified that
he was a longtime friend of defendant’s father. Wedwick testified that he and his
wife went on a trip to Mexico with defendant and Szalaj in February 2019. During
the trip, he observed Szalaj approach defendant from behind at a bar and said she
“cracked him in the back of the head.”
¶ 14 Consistent with the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine, Szalaj and
defendant both testified about four other occasions of domestic violence that all
occurred prior to the charged offenses in this case. The first incident occurred in
February 2019. Szalaj testified that she and defendant were at his home. They were
arguing after she confronted him about e-mail messages between him and an ex-
girlfriend. Defendant pointed a gun at her and then beat her in the back of the head
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with it. Defendant testified that she started the argument and threw a drink in his
face and that he did not touch her.
¶ 15 The second incident occurred in July 2019. She testified that defendant hit her
multiple times “all over [her] body” because she would not give him access to her
phone. He pointed a gun at her and threatened to kill her but later apologized and
blamed her for escalating the dispute. He stated that it would not have happened if
she had just given him her phone. Defendant admitted at trial that they argued
during the July 2019 incident, but he denied hitting her or pointing a gun at her.
¶ 16 The third incident occurred in February 2020. Szalaj testified that defendant
destroyed her cell phone when she refused to give him her password. She tried to
take money from defendant’s wallet to pay for the phone, and defendant attacked
her, threw her to the ground, pushed her face into the floor, and pinned her body
with his knees, breaking her ribs. Defendant denied shattering her cell phone or
attacking her in February 2020.
¶ 17 The fourth incident occurred on July 3, 2020, and is central to the first issue on
appeal. Szalaj testified that the two argued as they drove to defendant’s home after
a party. The argument continued inside defendant’s home until he pushed Szalaj
out and locked the door. Szalaj testified that her dog, cell phone, and work items
remained in the house. She reentered the home through a basement window and
confronted defendant. Szalaj testified that defendant pushed her down a hallway
and the two fell down the stairs into a gun cabinet, which shattered. He then pushed
her outside and slammed her face into the ground. She called 911 using her car’s
emergency assistance function. Following the incident, Szalaj had bruises all over
her body. When asked about the nature of her relationship with defendant after July
3, 2020, she responded, “Didn’t really have a relationship. There was the ***
communication in regards to the Iroquois County case.” Later, in identifying a
certain photo admitted into evidence, Szalaj testified that she had previously seen
it during the trial in Iroquois County.
¶ 18 Defendant testified that on July 3, 2020, he tried to physically remove Szalaj
from his home after he had locked the door and she entered through a window. He
testified that she fought him and, while trying to remove her, the two tripped at the
front threshold and he fell on top of her. Defendant was permitted to present three
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videos taken on July 3, 2020, by his motion-activated doorbell camera. None of the
three selected videos showed defendant pushing Szalaj out the door.
¶ 19 Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel sought leave to introduce
evidence of defendant’s acquittal of the criminal charges arising from the July 3,
2020, incident. The trial court denied defendant’s request and ruled the evidence of
the acquittal of domestic battery in Iroquois County was not admissible because a
jury finding defendant not guilty did not mean that he was innocent of the charge.
The trial court offered to reconsider the issue if counsel could find a case holding
such evidence admissible. Defendant did not revisit the issue during the trial.
¶ 20 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery, unlawful
restraint, and domestic battery and acquitted him of attempted first degree murder.
He was sentenced to three years in prison.
¶ 21 Defendant filed a posttrial motion and argued, in pertinent part, that the trial
court erred in precluding evidence of the two incidents that occurred after the
charged offenses. He also challenged the denial of his request to admit evidence of
his acquittal of the criminal charges arising from his conduct on July 3, citing
People v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, for support. The trial court denied his posttrial
motion. Concerning the latter issue, the trial court found Ward distinguishable and
stated, inter alia:
“I think about the different methods used in two different counties to try a case
as to why one case might be an acquittal, and one case might be a guilty. So,
*** I still believe my ruling was right *** and knowing from both sides that the
case in Iroquois County was—it included the same defendant and the same
victim. But their rules of evidence [in Iroquois County] are very different for
whatever reason because of that state’s attorney and it did not involve a 7.4 or
a 7.20 [matter].”
¶ 22 On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by barring evidence of
Szalaj’s violent conduct after the charged offenses as well as evidence of his
acquittal of domestic battery. The appellate court held that Rule 405 permits
evidence of specific instances of the victim’s prior conduct regardless of whether
those specific instances occurred before or after the incident in question. 2024 IL
App (3d) 230161-U, ¶ 26. The court found the error was not harmless, determining
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that this case came down to credibility and that the evidence was not overwhelming.
Id. ¶ 28.
¶ 23 In addition, for completeness on remand, the appellate court held it was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendant’s request to admit evidence
of his acquittal following the July 3 incident. Id. ¶ 34. The appellate court
determined that the denial enhanced the undue prejudice already found generally in
propensity evidence. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. The failure to admit the evidence had the
increased risk of misleading or overpersuading the jury. Id. ¶ 34. The appellate
court therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial and did not consider
defendant’s remaining claims. Id. ¶ 39.
¶ 24 This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)
(eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
¶ 25 ANALYSIS
¶ 26 We first address whether the trial court properly barred evidence of Szalaj’s
alleged violent conduct that postdated the charged offenses. The State contends that
the trial court adhered to the plain language of Illinois Rule of Evidence 405(b)(2)
(eff. Jan. 1, 2011) and that the appellate court erred in holding that under the rule
the timing of Szalaj’s alleged violent conduct was irrelevant to show her propensity
for aggression.
¶ 27 In addressing this issue, we must interpret Rule 405, and in doing so we apply
the same principles that govern statutory construction. People v. Gorss, 2022 IL
126464, ¶ 10. “Our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
drafters,” and “[t]he most reliable indicator of that intent is the language used,
which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Deroo, 2022 IL
126120, ¶ 19. Where the plain language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, we
must apply the language used without further aids of construction. Id. The
interpretation of a rule of this court is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
¶ 28 Generally, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion. See Ill. R. Evid. 404(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The rule bars such character
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evidence except in certain limited circumstances including “a pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused.” Ill. R. Evid.
404(a)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). This court has previously recognized that evidence of
a victim’s aggressive and violent character may tend to support a theory of self-
defense in two ways: (1) the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s violent
tendencies necessarily affects the defendant’s perceptions of and reactions to the
victim’s behavior, and (2) evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence tends to
support the defendant’s version of the facts where there are conflicting accounts of
what happened. People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 199-200 (1984).
¶ 29 In cases where Rule 404 permits the admission of character evidence, Rule 405
limits the means by which a party may use and present such evidence. People v.
Smart, 2025 IL 130127, ¶ 45. Specifically, Rule 405(b)(2) provides:
“In criminal homicide or battery cases when the accused raises the theory of
self-defense and there is conflicting evidence as to whether the alleged victim
was the aggressor, proof may also be made of specific instances of the alleged
victim’s prior violent conduct.” Ill. R. Evid. 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
¶ 30 The State maintains that the appellate court did not adhere to the plain language
of the rule, instead finding that, logically, the timing of the violent conduct was
irrelevant to show the victim’s propensity for aggression. Instead, the court
mistakenly relied on People v. Degrave, 2023 IL App (1st) 192479, to find that
subsequent violent acts that postdate the charged offense were admissible.
Defendant argues, consistent with Degrave, that Rule 405(b)(2) should not be read
to create a temporal limitation on the admissibility of the evidence of the alleged
victim’s conduct.
¶ 31 In Degrave, the trial court allowed the defendant to testify about three incidents,
all predating the charged offense for domestic battery, but barred evidence,
including a video, concerning a fourth incident involving the defendant and the
alleged victim, which postdated the offense. Id. ¶¶ 42, 50. The appellate court held
that, although Rule 405(b)(2) refers to “prior violent conduct,” the term “prior”
should not be read to confine admissible acts to only those occurring before the
charged incident. Id. ¶¶ 81, 87. The court reasoned that one’s character is revealed
by actions, regardless of timing, and that a temporal restriction would be
inconsistent with this court’s rationale in Lynch and with the rights of a defendant
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in self-defense cases. Id. ¶¶ 79-80. The court found even acts that postdated the
charged incident may therefore be admissible when there is a genuine factual
dispute about who initiated the violence. Id. ¶ 81. The court reasoned that whether
the incident occurred before or after the charged offense does not affect whether
evidence of the incident tends to prove the alleged victim’s violent character. Id. In
reversing and remanding for a new trial, the Degrave court found that it was plain
error to exclude the evidence because it was especially probative and the case was
closely balanced. Id. ¶¶ 95, 99.
¶ 32 In contrast, in People v. Evans, 2018 IL App (4th) 160686, ¶ 26, the defendant
argued that the trial court improperly restricted his ability to fully present his self-
defense case by prohibiting him from introducing evidence relating to the victim’s
combative behavior that occurred after the charged domestic battery offense. The
defendant claimed that he should have been allowed to introduce evidence of a
pending case against the victim where she was charged with damaging defendant’s
siding and vehicle. Id. Defendant also claimed the court erred in denying his request
to use a “ ‘phone video’ ” purportedly showing the victim pouring liquid on the
defendant and setting fire to his beard with a cigarette. Id. The trial court held that
he could not introduce evidence of the victim’s actions that occurred after the
charged incident. Id. ¶ 6. The court held that, for purposes of asserting self-defense,
information showing a victim’s aggressive and violent character is relevant to show
who was the aggressor and that the defendant may show it by appropriate evidence,
regardless of when he learns it. Id. ¶ 30. The court found, however, also relying on
the rationale of Lynch, that information unknown to a defendant at the time of the
incident could not have impacted the defendant’s perceptions of the victim’s
actions. Id. The Evans court concluded that, regardless of forfeiture, the defendant
had not established the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing evidence of
the victim’s alleged actions that occurred after the charged incident. Id. ¶ 34.
¶ 33 Turning to the proper construction of Rule 405(b)(2), the language explicitly
limits the evidence to “instances of the alleged victim’s prior violent conduct.”
(Emphasis added.) Ill. R. Evid. 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The word “prior” is
defined as “earlier in time or order.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prior (last visited Jan. 7, 2026), [https://
perma.cc/4DUQ-WW39]. As the State contends, the rule cannot be reasonably read
to mean prior to trial, as the appellate court found, because all trial evidence is
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necessarily limited to evidence that existed prior to trial. To interpret the rule to
allow evidence of the victim’s conduct at any point before a trial began would
render the word “prior” superfluous and conflict with the basic principles of
statutory construction. See Schultz v. St. Clair County, 2022 IL 126856, ¶ 27 (“An
established principle of statutory interpretation provides that every clause of a
statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered
meaningless or superfluous.”). We find the plain language of the rule bars evidence
of the victim’s propensity for violence that occurred after the charged offense.
¶ 34 Additionally, enforcing Rule 405(b)(2)’s plain language does not conflict with
Lynch, which predated the adoption of the Illinois Rules of Evidence, and where
this court did not consider or speak on any conduct that occurred after the crime.
On the contrary, in Lynch, this court found that the victim’s three convictions for
battery were admissible to show the victim’s propensity for violence, and to support
the defendant’s contention that the victim was the aggressor, but that all of the
conduct at issue occurred prior to the charged offense. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 199-201.
We agree with the State that enforcing the rule’s plain language does not lead to an
absurd result. Such a limitation potentially acknowledges that a victim’s conduct
after a violent attack may be a result of the trauma of the attack itself and not a
preexisting predisposition to violence. This could be especially true in a case where
the victim’s conduct after the charged offense is directed at the victim’s attacker.
¶ 35 Consequently, we hold the trial court properly found evidence of Szalaj’s
conduct after the charged offenses was inadmissible and barred it. To the extent
that Degrave is inconsistent with our holding today, it is overruled.
¶ 36 We next turn to the State’s contention that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of his acquittal of the
charges surrounding his conduct on July 3, 2020. The State argues that the evidence
of his acquittal was irrelevant to whether he attacked Szalaj on July 3, 2020, or
unnecessary to cure any undue prejudice resulting from the State’s evidence.
¶ 37 This court reviews the trial court’s ruling on the admission of acquittal evidence
for an abuse of discretion. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 21. An abuse of discretion
occurs when the ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or when no reasonable
person would adopt the trial court’s view. Id. (citing People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d
353, 364 (1991)).
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¶ 38 As this court has long recognized, evidence relating to a defendant’s propensity
to commit crimes has generally been excluded from criminal trials because it tends
to be overly persuasive to a jury, who may “ ‘convict the defendant only because it
feels he or she is a bad person deserving punishment.’ ” Id. ¶ 24 (quoting People v.
Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137 (1980)). Our legislature, however, has chosen to
provide limited exceptions to this general rule of inadmissibility for other-crimes
evidence to show, pertinent to this appeal, a defendant’s propensity to commit
offenses of domestic violence. See 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 (West 2020). Such evidence
may be considered for its bearing on any relevant matter. See id. § 115-7.4(a).
Section 7.4(b) provides that, before evidence of the defendant’s commission of
another offense or offenses of domestic violence may be admitted, the court applies
a test, weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the
defendant. See id. § 115-7.4(b). Section 7.4(b) lists three factors the court may
consider in weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice:
specifically, the proximity in time between the two alleged acts of domestic
violence, the factual similarity between the acts, or other relevant facts and
circumstances. Id.
¶ 39 In Ward, the defendant was convicted of the criminal sexual assault of M.M.
after raising the defense of consent at trial. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶¶ 2, 16. Prior
to trial, the court had granted the State’s motion and allowed the State to admit
evidence, pursuant to section 115-7.3(c) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c) (West
2002)), that the defendant had also been involved in the criminal sexual assault of
another woman, L.S., to show that he had a propensity to commit sex crimes. Ward,
2011 IL 108690, ¶ 8. The trial court, however, denied the defendant’s request to
admit evidence of his acquittal in L.S.’s case. Id. ¶ 1. During L.S.’s testimony, a
reference to her prior testimony was made during cross-examination by defense
counsel. Id. ¶ 14. He made another brief reference to the prior testimony during
closing arguments. Id.
¶ 40 On appeal to this court, the defendant argued that the trial court erred because
its refusal to admit evidence that he had been acquitted of sexually assaulting L.S.
unfairly prejudiced his defense. Id. ¶ 21. The State asserted that the trial court’s
refusal to admit the acquittal evidence was proper because the prior verdict had
been based on different evidence and “could simply be attributable to more adroit
‘lawyering.’ ” Id. ¶ 22.
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¶ 41 In finding that the trial court’s preclusion of the acquittal evidence was an abuse
of discretion, this court conducted a balancing test under which we weighed the
probative value of admitting the acquittal evidence against the undue prejudice to
the defendant if the other-crimes evidence were admitted without the admission of
the acquittal evidence. Id. ¶ 35.
¶ 42 With respect to the probative value of the acquittal evidence, this court held
that,
“[w]ithout the benefit of even the general knowledge that defendant was
acquitted of assaulting L.S., the jury could easily have been swayed after
hearing only parts of the story. Here, the probative value of the acquittal
evidence is in its ability to provide the jury with a more complete context for
L.S.’s testimony. While the M.M. jury still had an independent duty to
determine the credibility of her testimony and evaluate its weight, the acquittal
evidence would have provided another part of the picture that was otherwise
sorely absent.” Id. ¶ 40.
¶ 43 In addressing the potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant if the other-
crimes evidence were admitted without the admission of the acquittal evidence, this
court reiterated that “[p]rejudice means ‘an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, such as sympathy, hatred,
contempt, or horror.’ ” Id. ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 329
(1995), quoting Michael H. Graham, Cleary and Graham’s Handbook of Illinois
Evidence § 403.1 (4th ed. 1984)). We held that, under this court’s definition in
Lewis, the prejudicial impact of not informing the jury about the defendant’s
acquittal in the L.S. case was obvious. Id. ¶ 44. “A jury would have likely reacted
to L.S.’s testimony describing her violent attack with sympathy for her and hatred
or contempt for the alleged perpetrator, here, defendant. This reaction would have
seriously prejudiced the jury against defendant.” Id.
¶ 44 This court found that, “[d]ue to the inherently high, and often overly persuasive,
probative value of such propensity evidence, the need to avoid unfair prejudice by
providing a full context for the other-crimes testimony is readily apparent.” Id. ¶ 46.
We held that, “[g]iven the real possibility the jury would convict defendant based
on his alleged prior bad acts alone, barring the acquittal evidence further enhanced
the already high danger of undue prejudice against him.” Id. We concluded that,
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“[b]ecause the proper application of the balancing test firmly establishes the serious
risk of undue prejudice to defendant created by the admission of the other-crimes
evidence in the absence of any acquittal evidence, ‘[t]he risk of misleading or
overpersuading the jury is palpable.’ ‘Fairness requires disclosure,’ ” and barring
the evidence was an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 48 (quoting People v. Bedoya, 325
Ill. App. 3d 926. 943 (2001)).
¶ 45 The State attempts to distinguish Ward on the basis that, unlike section 115-7.3,
this case fell under section 115-7.4 of the Code, which does not specifically
authorize a defendant to present rebuttal evidence. Compare 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(b)
(West 2020), with id. § 115-7.4. The State further contends that, unlike the earlier
acquittal in Ward, defendant’s acquittal in the Iroquois County case was not
relevant to whether he committed these offenses and defendant was permitted to
introduce detailed evidence placing Szalaj’s testimony about the prior incident into
context. In sum, the State argues that, because the evidence of defendant’s acquittal
was neither probative of whether he attacked Szalaj on July 3, 2020, nor necessary
to cure any undue prejudice to defendant resulting from the State’s evidence of his
prior conduct on July 3, the trial court’s decision to bar the acquittal evidence was
proper. We disagree.
¶ 46 In this case, the State was allowed to elicit evidence under section 115-7.4
detailing multiple other alleged instances of domestic violence involving defendant
and Szalaj. If the trial court allows the admission of other-crimes evidence under
section 115-7.4 and the defendant seeks to introduce acquittal evidence from the
prior case, the trial court should conduct a balancing test weighing the probative
value of the acquittal evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant if the
evidence is precluded. Here, the trial court did not conduct any balancing test.
Instead, at trial, the court denied defendant’s request on the basis that a jury finding
him not guilty did not amount to a finding that he was innocent of the charges.
Later, in denying his posttrial motion raising the issue again and citing Ward, the
court reasoned that, while both cases involved defendant and Szalaj, “the rules of
evidence [in Iroquois County] are very different for whatever reason because of
that state’s attorney, and did not involve [the same statutory] matter.” The court
apparently viewed the acquittal in Iroquois County as less reliable evidence because
it was not rendered in Kankakee County.
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¶ 47 We recognize that Ward concerned highly emotional testimony involving a
sexual assault of another alleged victim and that the propensity evidence in that
case was admitted under section 115-7.3 of the Code, rather than section 115-7.4.
There is nothing in Ward, however, that somehow limited our rationale concerning
the admission of acquittal evidence to other-crimes sexual assault cases admitted
under section 115-7.3. As in Ward, if the acquittal evidence had been admitted, the
jury could have been informed that a verdict of “not guilty” may have been
attributed to a number of factors and does not conclusively establish defendant’s
actual innocence. See Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 47. “As our courts have long
recognized, jurors tend to find propensity evidence overly persuasive and to give it
too much weight, prompting them to prejudge defendants based on their generally
bad records.” Id. (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948), and
Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d at 137).
¶ 48 We find that the evidence of defendant’s acquittal had probative value because
it would have provided the jury with a more complete context for Szalaj’s detailed
testimony, which included references to the Iroquois County case, a case that had
gone to trial as defense counsel had informed the jury in opening statements. While
the jury “still had an independent duty to determine the credibility of her testimony
and evaluate its weight, the acquittal evidence would have provided another part of
the picture” that was otherwise absent. See id. ¶ 40.
¶ 49 Similarly, we find unfair prejudice to defendant because the other-crimes
evidence was admitted without the allowance of the acquittal evidence. The jury
was instructed that the defendant had “been involved in conduct other than that
charged in the indictment” and that it was the jury’s responsibility “to determine
whether the defendant was involved in the conduct and, if so, what weight should
be given to this evidence on the issues of propensity.” The jury presumably knew
from Szalaj’s testimony that charges had been brought against defendant in Iroquois
County and that a trial had occurred on those charges. Barring the acquittal
evidence, as in Ward, ran the risk of further enhancing the danger of undue
prejudice due to the inherently persuasive, probative value of the propensity
evidence. And, as in Ward, juror confusion may have similarly been minimized by
providing the jury with a more complete context for considering her testimony.
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¶ 50 We reiterate that, “[b]ecause the proper application of the balancing test firmly
establishes the serious risk of undue prejudice to defendant created by the
admission of the other-crimes evidence in the absence of any acquittal evidence,
‘the risk of misleading or overpersuading the jury is palpable.’ ‘Fairness requires
disclosure.’ ” Id. ¶ 48 (quoting Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 943). For these reasons,
we find the trial court abused its discretion in barring the acquittal evidence.
¶ 51 An evidentiary error by the trial court is subject to harmless error analysis.
Smart, 2025 IL 130127, ¶ 90. This court has established that an evidentiary error is
harmless if the other evidence in the record overwhelmingly supports the
conviction. People v. Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 95; see People v. Nevitt, 135
Ill. 2d 423, 447 (1990) (holding that evidentiary error is harmless “where there is
no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent
the” error).
¶ 52 As the State asserts, although defendant was barred from introducing evidence
of the acquittal, he was able to present his own testimony concerning the events of
July 3, 2020, as well as three videos taken by his motion-activated doorbell camera,
which detailed portions of the incident. Additionally, the testimony concerning the
July 3 incident was one of four incidents of domestic violence about which Szalaj
and defendant testified. The jury was well aware of the volatile and violent nature
of the relationship, and the evidence surrounding the July 3 incident played a
cumulative and minimal role in the overall evidence presented and considered by
the jury.
¶ 53 Additionally, while defendant advanced a theory of self-defense, his version,
even if believed by the jury, could not plausibly support the affirmative defense. To
raise a claim of self-defense, a defendant must present evidence supporting each of
the following elements that justify the use of force in defense of a person:
“(1) that force had been threatened against [the] defendant; (2) that [the]
defendant was not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of harm was imminent;
(4) that the force threatened was unlawful; (5) that [the] defendant actually
believed that a danger existed, that the use of force was necessary to avert the
danger, and that the kind and amount of force actually used was necessary; and
(6) that [the] defendant’s beliefs were reasonable.” People v. Morgan, 187 Ill.
2d 500, 533 (1999).
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Based upon defendant’s own testimony, any danger that Szalaj posed after she
threw a beer in his face ceased once she fled to the bathroom in her own home and
closed or locked herself inside. Defendant admitted that he chased after her, used
his body to hit the bathroom door with some force, and caused the doorjamb “to
pop.” Consequently, defendant, by his own testimony, became the aggressor after
Szalaj’s retreat, making his claim of self-defense implausible.
¶ 54 Consequently, we find the trial court’s error in barring the acquittal evidence
harmless because there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have
acquitted defendant had the evidence been admitted.
¶ 55 CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and
the cause remanded to the appellate court to consider defendant’s remaining claims.
¶ 57 Appellate court judgment reversed and remanded.
¶ 58 JUSTICE O’BRIEN, specially concurring:
¶ 59 I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in barring
defendant’s acquittal evidence. See supra ¶ 50. In conducting a proper balancing
test, the risk of undue prejudice to defendant created by the admission of the other-
crimes evidence in the absence of any acquittal evidence is clear due to the
inherently high and overly persuasive probative value of the other-crimes
testimony. See supra ¶ 50. I write separately to disagree with the majority’s finding
with respect to Illinois Rule of Evidence 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). See supra
¶ 34. Because a temporal limitation for evidence of the victim’s violent character
is plainly inconsistent with the purpose behind admitting propensity evidence, I find
that the only logical reading of the word “prior” in Rule 405(b)(2) is “prior to trial”
and not “prior to the charged offense.” See People v. Degrave, 2023 IL App (1st)
192479, ¶ 81.
¶ 60 The majority holds that the plain language of Rule 405(b)(2) bars evidence of
the victim’s propensity for violence that occurs after the charged offense. Supra
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¶ 33. The majority reasons that defining the word “prior” in Rule 405(b)(2) as “prior
to trial,” instead of “prior to the charged offense,” renders it superfluous given all
evidence must necessarily be presented before trial. Supra ¶¶ 33-34. I disagree with
this limited reasoning, as such a conclusion not only conflicts with both this court’s
previous reasoning for allowing a defendant to seek admission of evidence of a
victim’s propensity for violence (see People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 199-201
(1984)) and the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 405(b)(2), but it also
conflicts with the logical reality that a defendant’s right to present evidence of a
victim’s violent conduct is grounded in his constitutional right to present a defense.
And clearly, evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence is crucial to a
defendant’s claim of self-defense.
¶ 61 In Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 199-200, we held that evidence of the victim’s
aggressive and violent character may be offered to support the defendant’s theory
of self-defense to show that (1) “the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s violent
tendencies necessarily affects his perceptions of and reactions to the victim’s
behavior” and (2) “evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence tends to support
the defendant’s version of the facts where there are conflicting accounts of what
happened.” In determining that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the
victim’s three convictions for battery, we reasoned that in order “[t]o decide what
really occurred the jury needed all the available facts, including evidence of [the
victim’s] prior convictions for battery.” Id. at 200. We also stated that “[t]he
defendant was entitled to have the jury judge the reasonableness of his behavior in
light of all the relevant facts.” Id. at 201.
¶ 62 The second Lynch basis is codified in Rule 405(b)(2) (Ill. R. Evid. 405(b)(2)
(eff. Jan. 1, 2011)). Rule 405(b)(2) identifies when a victim’s prior violent conduct
may be admitted in a criminal homicide or battery case. Id. Specifically, Rule
405(b)(2) contains three questions: (1) Is the case before us one of criminal
homicide or battery? (2) Has the defendant raised a theory of self-defense? and
(3) Is there conflicting evidence as to whether the victim was the aggressor? Id. If
the answer to all three questions is in the affirmative, then the defendant may seek
admission of the victim’s “prior violent conduct” under Rule 405(b)(2). Id.
Significantly, the word “prior” is the only qualifying word regarding what type of
violent conduct may be admitted. See id. The majority, however, proceeds to
narrow the type of “violent conduct” that may be admitted by limiting its admission
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to violent conduct that occurred prior “to the charged offense,” as opposed to
simply evidence of “prior violent conduct” as Rule 405(b)(2) prescribes. Supra
¶ 33. Stated differently, the majority finds Rule 405(b)(2) to be unambiguous, yet
it arbitrarily proceeds to impose a temporal limitation upon when “prior violent
conduct” may be admitted. See supra ¶ 33. Such an action plainly violates the
cardinal rule of statutory construction that, when the statutory text is clear and
unambiguous, a court may not depart from the plain language and meaning of the
statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature
did not express. People v. Grant, 2022 IL 126824, ¶ 25. The majority’s added
temporal limitation also abrogates the trial court’s discretion in determining the
relevance and admissibility of evidence. See People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 101
(2010); People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455 (2001) (holding it is within the trial
court’s discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible).
Accordingly, interpreting “prior” as “prior to trial” would allow the trial court to
determine if the three prerequisites are met without placing a wholesale, arbitrary
bar on the victim’s postoffense conduct as the majority does.
¶ 63 In an effort to ignore the above reality, the majority cites People v. Evans, 2018
IL App (4th) 160686, a 2018 Fourth District case, in support of its decision to limit
evidence of an alleged victim’s prior acts of violence to those acts that predate the
charged incident. Supra ¶ 32. I believe Evans was incorrectly decided and instead
find that Degrave, 2023 IL App (1st) 192479, a First District case decided in 2023,
further illustrates why Rule 405(b)(2) cannot reasonably be read to apply only to
the victim’s violent conduct prior to the charged offense.
¶ 64 The Degrave court noted that Lynch was decided long before the adoption of
the Illinois Rules of Evidence (id. ¶ 55) and was devoid of “any hint that there is a
timing element regarding the character evidence” (id. ¶ 81). The Degrave court
proceeded to then review the history and logical underpinnings of Rules 404(b) (Ill.
R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)) and 405(b)(2) in conjunction with our holding
in Lynch. Degrave, 2023 IL App (1st) 192479, ¶¶ 84-87. Under Rule 404(a),
character evidence is generally prohibited to prove a person acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except under limited circumstances. Ill. R. Evid.
404(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Rule 405(b)(2) is an exception to the general rule that
allows a defendant to present evidence of specific instances of the “alleged victim’s
prior violent conduct” in homicide and battery cases where he “raises the theory of
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self-defense and there is conflicting evidence as to whether the alleged victim was
the aggressor.” Ill. R. Evid. 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Another such exception is
found in Rule 404(b), which prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for
propensity purposes except as provided by sections 115-7.3, 115-7.4, and 115-20
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3, 115-7.4, 115-20
(West 2020)), which allow other-act evidence to show a defendant’s propensity. Ill.
R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The Degrave court highlighted how the language
used in Rule 404(b), which refers to “ ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ ” (emphasis
in original) (Degrave, 2023 IL App (1st) 192479, ¶ 73), and the statutes
incorporated into Rule 404(b) 1 do not have a temporal limitation (id. ¶¶ 73-76),
allowing evidence of a defendant’s other criminal acts to show defendant’s
propensity regardless of whether those other acts predate or postdate the incident
in question (id. ¶ 77). The Degrave court then concluded that it would be logically
inconsistent to now allow the State to introduce evidence of a defendant’s
postoffense conduct via Rule 404(b) but not similarly allow the defendant, whose
constitutional rights are at stake, to introduce evidence of a victim’s postoffense
conduct via Rule 405(b)(2). Id. ¶ 86. The Degrave court also correctly noted how
there was no timing element in Lynch regarding character evidence, which
comports with the purpose behind propensity—to provide evidence of a character
trait for violence. Id. ¶ 81.
¶ 65 While the majority believes that its interpretation of “prior” as “prior to the
charged offense” is not inconsistent with Lynch (supra ¶ 33), which only involved
the victim’s violent conduct that predated the charged offense, Lynch also held that
a defendant could introduce evidence of the victim’s violent conduct, “regardless
of when and how [the defendant] learned of” the victim’s aggressive and violent
character. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 200. Thus, even when presented with the opportunity
1
Section 115-7.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which utilizes similar
language to Rule 405(b)(2), admits “evidence of the defendant’s commission of another
offense or offenses of domestic violence.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4(a) (West
2020). Section 115-7.3(b) admits “another offense or offenses” of the defendant’s sexual
abuse. Id. § 115-7.3(b). Section 115-20 admits “evidence of a prior conviction of a
defendant for domestic battery” or related offenses but further clarifies that “prior
conviction” may be used in a “later criminal prosecution” with no language suggesting that
the “prior conviction” must have occurred prior to the events that form the current charged
offense. Id. § 115-20.
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to impose a temporal limitation based on when the defendant learned of the victim’s
violent behavior, we chose not to, specifically noting the danger of prejudice to the
defendant if such evidence is barred. 2 See id.
¶ 66 Additionally, Degrave specifically addressed the deficiencies of the analysis in
Evans. Degrave, 2023 IL App (1st) 192479, ¶¶ 66-67. Evans merely reiterated that
Lynch did not involve a victim’s postoffense conduct, unlike the instant case before
this court. Evans, 2018 IL App (4th) 160686, ¶¶ 29-31. The Evans court then
summarily found that the defendant failed to provide further authority to support
his expansion of Lynch, despite the State conceding that the postoffense evidence
of the victim’s violent character should have been found admissible per Lynch. Id.
¶¶ 30-31. While acknowledging the State’s concession, 3 the Evans court curiously
refused to accept it, merely stating that, “[l]ike defendant, the State failed to address
the fact that the alleged incident on the phone video—which we note is not part of
the record for this court to review—occurred after the charged incident in this case.”
Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 67 Simply put, Degrave’s holding best aligns with this court’s previous precedent
and policy regarding the purpose behind the admission of propensity evidence.
Degrave held that “[o]ne’s character is revealed by one’s actions, but there is no
particular reason why that person’s character would be revealed more or less,
depending on whether the acts revealing this character took place before or after
2
“ ‘Convictions for crimes of violence, such as [the alleged victim’s] three convictions
for battery, are reasonably reliable evidence of a violent character. Such evidence is
ordinarily inadmissible against a defendant for the purpose of proving the offense charged,
because the danger of prejudice outweighs the relevance of the evidence where the
defendant stands to lose his liberty or even his life if convicted. Where the victim’s
propensity for violence is in question, however, the danger of prejudice to the defendant
lies in refusing to admit such evidence, while its high degree of relevance and reliability
remains constant.’ (Emphases added.)” Degrave, 2023 IL App (1st) 192479, ¶ 85 (quoting
Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 201-02).
3
“We note the State appears to concede that the trial court erred in not allowing
defendant’s use of the phone video. According to the State:
‘The State concedes that the trial court should have found admissible Lynch
evidence if a video showed the victim pouring liquid on defendant and “setting fire to
his beard with a cigarette.” [Citation.] Such evidence would have been relevant to show
“who was the aggressor.” Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 200, 470 N.E.2d at 1020.’ (Emphasis
added.)” Evans, 2018 IL App (4th) 160686, ¶ 31.
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the charged incident.” 2023 IL App (1st) 192479, ¶ 81. The majority, however,
adopts the State’s argument, claiming that “a [temporal] limitation potentially
acknowledges that a victim’s conduct after a violent attack may be a result of the
trauma of the attack itself and not a preexisting predisposition to violence.” Supra
¶ 34. However, the standard is not “a preexisting predisposition to violence”; it is
simply a character for violence, with no reference to how that character trait was
formed or developed. See Ill. R. Evid. 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The reasoning
the majority provides fails to account for the agency victims possess in controlling
their own violent behavior and unnecessarily places full responsibility, and
subsequent punishment, on the defendant for any transgressions his victim may
commit following the charged offense. While there may be cases in which a victim
is merely retaliating against the defendant for the defendant’s past history of abuse,
such is not always the case, as evidenced by the majority’s use of the word “may”
in asserting that a victim’s attack may, or may not be, the result of trauma from the
defendant’s violent behavior. Supra ¶ 34. Moreover, by reading “prior” to mean
“prior to trial,” I do not mandate that all evidence postoffense must be admitted; if
the trial court finds such evidence to be irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, the
trial court is well within its authority to exercise its own discretion regarding
evidentiary admissions. See Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 455. Rather, I believe that such
evidence should not be arbitrarily barred on the sole basis that it occurred after the
offense and that the judiciary should not preemptively forbid such evidence out of
an overabundance of concern for how and when a victim’s violent character
developed.
¶ 68 However, the inquiry does not end here, as retrial is only warranted if the
evidentiary error by the trial court is not harmless. For the harmless error analysis
for this issue, as well as the acquittal issue, I would agree with the majority.
Defendant conceded to chasing Szalaj upstairs into the bathroom and hitting the
closed bathroom door with some force. His own testimony undermines his claim of
self-defense when he pinned Szalaj to the tub with his boot to restrain her.
Additionally, given the breadth of the violent attacks that defendant and Szalaj
presented, it was well documented that the two were engaged in a tumultuous and
violent relationship. Thus, even with the admittance of Szalaj’s postoffense
conduct, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted
defendant had the evidence been admitted.
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¶ 69 Accordingly, I agree with the majority’s ultimate decision to reverse the
judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the appellate court to
consider defendant’s remaining claims.
¶ 70 CHIEF JUSTICE NEVILLE and JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM join in this
special concurrence.
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