Ofer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-22154-CIV-WILLIAMS/D’ANGELO

RAZIEL OFER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PAM BONDI,

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant United States of America’s Motion to

Dismiss filed on August 28, 2025 (DE 20).1 Plaintiff Raziel Ofer filed his response in opposition

on September 8, 2025 (DE 22), and Defendant replied on September 15, 2025 (DE 23). Having

considered the Parties’ arguments, the relevant legal authorities, and the pertinent portions of the

record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, for the reasons stated below, it is

respectfully recommended that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a pending lawsuit in this District, in which Plaintiff sues United States

Bankruptcy Judge Laurel Isicoff (“the Bankruptcy Judge”), who presided over the bankruptcy

proceedings involving two of Plaintiff’s entities. See generally, Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CIV-24738

(S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2023). Plaintiff brings this suit against the United States, alleging that as the

1 This Motion was referred the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation

on September 4, 2025 (DE 21).

employer of the Bankruptcy Judge, Defendant is liable for tort and civil rights violations that

Plaintiff purportedly suffered as a result of the acts of the Bankruptcy Judge.2 The relevant facts

alleged in the Complaint follow.

Plaintiff owned and operated several limited liability companies within Florida that owned

real estate (DE 1 ¶ 1). As Plaintiff operated his real estate business, he became subject to litigation

in Florida, in which third-parties brought claims to enforce alleged liens and other encumbrances

against his properties (id. ¶ 3). According to Plaintiff, in one case, these third-parties purportedly

“bought in a Judicial sale a $50M property for merely $5.00 (Five USD), by far the biggest

miscarriage of Justice in US history” (id.). As a result of the litigation, in 2023, Plaintiff, with the

advice of lawyers, filed petitions for reorganization related to two entities in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (id. ¶¶ 4, 6). Allegedly, before Plaintiff filed

his petition for reorganization, “several private actors . . . conspired to cause the appointment of a

very specific judge to become appointed to preside over the matters in the bankruptcy court prior

to the petition being filed” (id. ¶ 7). According to Plaintiff,

It was recorded, in a public place, that [the Bankruptcy Judge] would be appointed

to the bankruptcy matter months before the filing of the petition and gave rise to an

employee of the United States being placed in a position to cause the loss of the

property to Ofer. The recording was between the other party to the litigation, where

they clearly implicated [the Bankruptcy Judge] with their crimes and admitted they

2 Although the Complaint names Pam Bondi, Attorney General for the United States of America,

as Defendant, Plaintiff stated in his opposition that “the Complaint clearly states allegations that

[the Bankruptcy Judge] is an employee of the United States[,] and the United States is the

Defendant” (DE 22 at 6). See Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th

Cir. 2018) (explaining that a pro se plaintiff might state a claim if given leave to amend to include

specific allegations against the correct defendant). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court

interprets the allegations and claims as if they were brought against the United States and notes

that Plaintiff’s failure to name the proper party is not a basis to dismiss this action in its entirety.

If given the opportunity to amend, Plaintiff could substitute the United States as the proper

defendant. See Alberto v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 770 F. App’x 467, 469 (11th Cir. 2019)

(stating “a pro se plaintiff’s failure to include a proper defendant is a curable defect” through

amendment to the complaint).

committed a Grand Theft of Ofer’s properties. When the plaintiff reported to [the

Bankruptcy Judge] that he’s in possession of a recording implicating her with their

crimes (grand theft), she threatened the plaintiff that he committed a felony by

causing to record this discussion. [The Bankruptcy Judge] repeated these baseless

threats despite knowing that the recording took place in a public place, which is

legal in Florida.

(id. ¶ 8).

Plaintiff alleged that the Bankruptcy Judge caused Barry S. Mukamal, an “agent of the

United States,” to become the trustee of the bankruptcy estate, and that “the employee of the United

States [referring to the Bankruptcy Judge] and the Agent of the United States [referring to Mr.

Mukamal] conspired together to cause the loss of the property through conduct which was based

upon the race, ethnicity, and religion of the Plaintiff as he is Jewish” (id. ¶¶ 9-10). According to

Plaintiff, the Bankruptcy Judge was presented “with the shocking antisemitic affidavits,” stating

that another party in the bankruptcy proceedings claimed that “persons of Jewish origin own[ed]

too much real estate in this country and it therefore need[ed] to be confiscated” (id. ¶ 12). The

Bankruptcy Judge was also supposedly presented with a “voice recording of the private persons

discussing her appointment to preside over the bankruptcy matters . . . and her implicated with

their crimes (grand theft)” (id. ¶ 13). According to Plaintiff, “[a]ny impartial Judge who would

have been presented with such recording and the antisemitic affidavits, would have immediately

arranged an evidentiary hearing, but not [the Bankruptcy Judge]” (id.). Instead, the Bankruptcy

Judge purportedly “threatened Ofer with criminal conduct . . . and ordered him not to mention the

matters again . . . or he would be sanctioned” (id. ¶ 15).

Plaintiff alleges that “[w]hile performing her duties as an employee of the United States,

[the Bankruptcy Judge] ignored this evidence that reflected how she was improperly appointed to

the bankruptcy cases . . . and how Ofer was being targeted in the loss of his properties through

antisemitic hateful crimes and criminal conduct” (id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff further claims that the

Bankruptcy Judge “participat[ed] in the conduct herself and “engaged in illegal payments to her

personally” (id. ¶¶ 18-19). According to Plaintiff, “it is clear that [the Bankruptcy Judge] not only

presided over the criminal conspiracy, but was in fact a partner in this scheme, as demonstrated by

an email from the other party confirmed that [the Bankruptcy Judge] has received $2M bribe for

her role in this criminal conspiracy” (id. ¶ 20).3 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that “[e]ven after being

notified of this conduct, the United States has failed to terminate its relationship with [the

Bankruptcy Judge], commence impeachment[,] or otherwise end it employment relationship . . . .”

(id. ¶ 22). Based on these allegations, the instant Complaint asserts three causes of action. In

Count One, Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence (id. ¶¶ 25-30). In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts

a civil rights violation claim (id. ¶¶ 31-38). In Count Three, Plaintiff brings a claim for negligent

retention (id. ¶¶ 39-46). Defendant moved to dismiss all counts, contending the Court does not

have subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

(DE 20 at 4-10).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“‘Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys’

and are liberally construed.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011).

“[A]lthough we are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, ‘we nevertheless

have required them to conform to procedural rules.’” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829

(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)). “[I]n liberally

construing a litigant’s arguments, we will not act as de facto counsel.” Freeman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of

Corr., 679 F. App’x 982 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); see also Toussaint v. U.S. Attorney’s

3 Plaintiff states that his evidence, including the voice recording and the antisemitic affidavits,

have “already been delivered to the FBI” (DE 1 ¶ 16).

Off., No. 24-10116, 2025 WL 2237376, at *5 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (“It was not the district

court’s responsibility to ‘act as counsel’ for a self-represented litigant, nor review [the plaintiff’s]

filings for possible claims.” (citation omitted)).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this plausibility standard, a plaintiff must “plead []

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but

it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. On a motion to dismiss, “the court

must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable

to plaintiff.” Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016). “A court

is generally limited to reviewing what is within the four corners of the complaint on a motion to

dismiss.” Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1329 n.7 (11th Cir. 2006).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant offers four arguments for dismissal (DE 20). First, Defendant contends

Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous and fantastical (id. at 2). Second, Defendant suggests that

Plaintiff’s claims under Title VI should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (id. at

4). Third, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, Defendant explains that they should also

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (id. at 6). Finally, Defendant maintains that

Plaintiff fails to state an actionable claim for Counts One and Three (id. at 8). Plaintiff disagrees

and claims his Complaint is not frivolous and fantastical (DE 22 at 7). Plaintiff also argues that

the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his Title VI claim and his tort claims (id. at 8-12).

Lastly, Plaintiff maintains his Complaint adequately states a claim for the torts and the civil rights

violation (id. at 12-14).

A. The Claims in the Complaint are Frivolous

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are “frivolous and fantastical,” and the Court

should exercise its inherent authority to dismiss the action (DE 20 at 3). Defendant explains that

the claims have no basis in fact, are “clearly removed from reality[, and] are patently frivolous”

(id. at 3-4). Defendant argues that Plaintiff puts forth allegations that the Bankruptcy Judge

participated in a criminal scheme with the bankruptcy trustee and others to steal $120 million

worth of property from Plaintiff, because he is Jewish, in exchange for a $2 million bribe, with no

support for his allegations beyond two irrelevant affidavits and “a non-functioning link to a

purported recording” (id. at 4; DE 23 at 2). Therefore, Defendant contends that dismissal is

appropriate. Plaintiff counters that his Complaint is not frivolous and fantastical, as it “properly

alleges the facts which the affidavit[s] themselves support” (DE 22 at 7). Plaintiff contends “the

allegations cannot be frivolous and fantastical when the evidence shown, e.g. the affidavits and

recording, support the allegations” (id.).

“A complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989). Indeed, “a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts

alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ a category encompassing allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’

and ‘delusional’ . . . . As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate

when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346,

1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[F]rivolous claims include claims ‘describing fantastic or delusional

scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.’” (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328)). “It is important to keep frivolity distinct from mere improbability.” Guthrie v. U.S. Gov’t,

618 F. App’x 612, 617 (11th Cir. 2015). “[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very

remote and unlikely.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citation omitted).

“A determination of frivolity is best left to the district court, and the decision will not be disturbed

so long as the district court stays within its range of choice and is not influenced by any mistake

of law.” Jibrin v. Abubakar, 814 F. App’x 480, 484 (11th Cir. 2020).

In light of the overlapping allegations between this case and Plaintiff’s pending suit against

the Bankruptcy Judge, any discussion of frivolousness should also include the Court’s assessment

of Plaintiff’s allegations in that action. In Ofer v. Isicoff, the Court made the following

observations:

Plaintiff’s Complaint has no arguable basis in fact. According to Plaintiff,

Defendant is a corrupt judge who has been acting in concert with an undisclosed

number of antisemitic co-conspirators for over 20 years. This largely unidentified

antisemitic ‘mafia’ includes multiple federal judges and attorneys who believe that

‘Jews . . . own too many properties and [Jewish] properties need to be confiscated.’

Thus, when given the chance during Plaintiff’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy (which was

itself allegedly set up through the ‘gross corruption’ of an Eleventh Circuit Judge),

‘[Defendant] awarded her partners an $18M building for $5.00.’ Defendant

purportedly did so despite being fully aware that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”) had launched an investigation into her corruption. Plaintiff

maintains that this is ‘one of the worst [antisemitic] cases in [United States] history.’

Still, he presents no support for these fantastical conspiracy accusations. The Court

finds them to be delusional and malicious. . . .

The grand judicial conspiracy Plaintiff complains of is simply unbelievable. . . .

Amendment would be futile here due to the delusional nature of Plaintiff’s

allegations.

No. 23-CIV-24738, DE 25 at 4-6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2024) (citations omitted). Plaintiff correctly

points out that this Order was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice and remanded the case for

further proceedings, as discussed supra (DE 22 at 5 n.2). Nevertheless, in its unpublished decision

the Eleventh Circuit stated:

[W]e (like the district court) express serious doubt that an amendment would save

his claims, see Padilla v. Smith, 53 F.4th 1303, 1317 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[A] district

court may dismiss a baseless ‘claim’ under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim for relief . . . where such a claim is wholly

insubstantial and frivolous.”); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)

(explaining that claims are frivolous if they “lack[] an arguable basis . . . in fact”

such as claims “describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.”) . . . .

Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 24-11542, 2025 WL 2466579, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (per curiam).4

Plaintiff relies heavily on two affidavits and a link to a voice recording to rebut Defendant’s

argument that his claims are frivolous and fantastical. But, neither of the affidavits mention the

Bankruptcy Judge or help establish her participation is the purported conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff

of his assets, even if the Bankruptcy Judge did “ignore” this evidence as Plaintiff suggests (DE 1

at 13-14); see also Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CIV-24738, DE 25 at 5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2024) (stating

the “‘antisemitic affidavits’ . . . do not reference or in any way implicate [the Bankruptcy Judge]”).

And as Defendant asserts, the link to the alleged voice recording implicating the Bankruptcy Judge

is now defunct (see DE 22 at 2 n.1). Tellingly, any specific information regarding the substance

of this recording, which could have been stated in the Complaint, is absent. Plaintiff alleges he “is

4 The Court recognizes that the Eleventh Circuit issued an unpublished decision and is mindful

that “[u]npublished decisions are not binding authority and they are ‘persuasive only to the extent

that a subsequent panel finds the rationale expressed in that opinion to be persuasive after an

independent consideration of the legal issue.’ . . . [W]e caution district courts from relying on our

unpublished decisions purely because they are our decisions . . . .” Koletas v. United States, 159

F.4th 813, 820 (11th Cir. 2025) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

in possession of other email evidence which mentions that [the Bankruptcy Judge] engaged in

illegal payments to her personally,” which is also absent from the Complaint (id. ¶ 18). Instead,

Plaintiff directs the Court to a document filed in the pending litigation against the Bankruptcy

Judge and asks the Court to take judicial notice of it (DE 22 at 8 n.4).5 Notwithstanding that it is

unclear if the document is what Plaintiff purports it to be, the Court in that case described the

attachments as “largely consist[ing] of additional unsupported claims which seek to recast

Plaintiff’s prior bankruptcy and court proceedings as a wide-ranging conspiracy to dispossess and

steal Jewish property” and “fantastical.” Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CIV-24738, DE 25 at 5 (S.D. Fla.

Apr. 30, 2024). Finally, Plaintiff attached to his opposition an alleged “affidavit” from Mark S.

Roher, Esq., who Plaintiff states was his lawyer in the bankruptcy proceeding and a “‘drinking’

friend of [the Bankruptcy Judge’s] husband,” in which Mr. Roher purportedly admits to

“committing malpractice and stealing money from Plaintiff’s Credit Card” (DE 22 at 13-14).

These allegations are missing from the Complaint and are not incorporated by reference. Even if

this affidavit was attached to the Complaint, it too is as fantastical and unconnected to the claims

in this case as Plaintiff’s other documents.6

5 “The taking of judicial notice of facts is, as a matter of evidence law, a highly limited process.

The reason for this caution is that the taking of judicial notice bypasses the safeguards which are

involved with the usual process of proving facts by competent evidence in district court.” Paez v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation omitted).

“Rule 201 does not require courts to warn parties before taking judicial notice of some fact, but,

upon the party’s request, it does require an opportunity to be heard after the court takes notice.”

Id.

6 In the purported Roher affidavit, “the parties agree that this agreement shall remain strictly

confidential and if any party wishes to submit this agreement to any court, it must be filed under

seal for an in-camera review and shall not be filed in any such case.” (DE 22 at 19 ¶ 24). The

affidavit supposedly has a provision calling for steep damages if confidentiality is breached (id. at

20 ¶ 30). Plaintiff did not file the Roher affidavit under seal, as it was attached to his unsealed

response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

The undersigned shares the Court’s view in the pending litigation against the Bankruptcy

Judge that the claims are wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Here, too, the Complaint lacks any

“arguable basis in fact” and still “presents no support for these fantastical conspiracy accusations[,]”

which continue “to be delusional and malicious.” Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CIV-24738, DE 25 at 4-

5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2024). The Complaint in this case fares no better, and the Court has yet

another action by Plaintiff that attempts to perpetuate clearly baseless conspiracy theories resting

upon damaging and unsupported allegations. See Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1350 (“On the question of

frivolousness, a litigant’s history of bringing unmeritorious litigation can be considered.”).7

Furthermore, beyond the factual frivolousness of Plaintiff’s allegations, as discussed below,

Plaintiff’s claims also lack legal merit.

7 On December 17, 2025, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida issued an Order to Show

Cause in Ofer v. Metropolitan Mortgage Co., LLC, et al., No. 3D24-1845 (Dec. 17, 2025). There,

the Court “impose[d] the following sanction: Raziel Ofer is barred from any filing before this

Court absent the review and signature of a member in good standing of the Florida Bar.” Id. at 5.

The Third District Court of Appeal imposed sanctions after finding “[a]t its core, this starts and

ends with the copy of the purported email Ofer attached to a court filing in this Court, accusing

Drexel’s counsel and a judge of bribery.” Id. at 4. After an evidentiary hearing at the trial level,

“[t]he commissioner concluded that Ofer failed to provide any evidence that Drexel’s counsel

created the email and that instead, it is likely that Ofer fabricated or caused the email to be

fabricated.” Id. at 3.

In this District, Plaintiff currently has five open cases. See Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CIV-24738 (S.D.

Fla. Dec. 13, 2023), Ofer v. Miami Dade Property Appraiser’s Off. et al., No. 26-CIV-20292 (S.D.

Fla. Jan. 15, 2026), Ofer v. Scales, III et al., No. 25-CIV-26133, (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2025), Ofer v.

Ruiz, No. 25-CIV-26134 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2025), Ofer v. Attorney Gen. for the United States of

America, No. 25-CIV-22154 (S.D. Fla. May 8, 2025). Ofer v. Isicoff and this case appear to be

the only actions involving allegations regarding the purported conspiracy in which the Bankruptcy

Judge is involved. In Ofer v. Scales, III et al., Plaintiff seeks to challenge the ruling of the Third

District Court of Appeal imposing sanctions against him. See No. 25-CIV-26133, DE 1 at 5 (S.D.

Fla. Dec. 29, 2025). Ofer v. Miami Dade Property Appraiser’s Off. et al., appears to involve

allegations of title defect to real property. See No. 26-CIV-20292, DE 1 ¶ 7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15,

2026). Ofer v. Ruiz, involves a defendant, a Florida state court judge, where the plaintiff suffered

damages “through the entry of unlawfully obtained judgments in violation of due process, Statute

[sic] and the Constitution . . . due to the conduct of the Defendant’s corrupt and unlawful and

fraudulent conduct.” See No. 25-CIV-26134, DE 4 at 2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2026).

B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Title VI Claim

in Count Two

Defendant asserts that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s

claim in Count Two under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., because

Title VI does not waive sovereign immunity for the United States (DE 20 at 5). Defendant argues

that absent a clearly evidenced waiver of immunity in the statutory language, the federal

government cannot be sued, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Title

VI claim (id.). Alternatively, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under

Title VI, because the statute requires that no person be subjected to discrimination based on a

protected characteristic under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance (id.).

According to Defendant, the statutory definition of program or activity does not include the federal

government; instead, the proper defendant in a Title VI action is the entity that receives federal

financial assistance (id. at 5-6). As a result, Defendant maintains that even if the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over Count Two, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim (id. at 6). Plaintiff

counters that there is subject matter jurisdiction under federal question jurisdiction, because “[t]he

United States has waived its Sovereign Immunity in this matter” (DE 22 at 9).8

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies

from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citation omitted). “Sovereign immunity

is jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, the terms of the United States’ consent to be sued in any court

8 Even though Plaintiff labels Count Two of the Complaint as “Civil Rights Violation,” it contains

similar allegations to Counts One and Three, which are tort claims (compare DE 1 ¶¶ 26-30 with

¶¶ 32-38). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act “prohibits any recipient of federal financial assistance

from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any federally funded program.”

Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999). Given Plaintiff’s pro se

status, construing the Complaint liberally as it must, the Court analyzes Count Two under Title VI.

To the extent the allegations in Count Two more closely resemble the tort claims set forth in Counts

One and Three, those claims are addressed supra.

define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted and cleaned

up). “According to the Supreme Court, ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally

expressed in statutory text.’” Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting

FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012)).

Courts have routinely found that no such explicit waiver of the federal government’s

immunity is contained in Title VI. See, e.g., Dorsey v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 41 F.3d 1551, 1555

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding no explicit language in Title VI waiving the government’s sovereign

immunity); Keener v. United States, No. 22-CIV-1640, 2023 WL 2478367, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 13,

2023) (“The provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not waive sovereign

immunity or provide grounds for liability against the United States.”); Johnson v. Fed. Emergency

Mgmt. Agency, No. 23-CIV-1818, 2025 WL 465323, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 11, 2025) (“[C]ourts

have expressly found that the United States did not waive its sovereign immunity for claims

under . . . Title VI . . . .”) (citation omitted)). Despite Plaintiff’s allegation that “[t]he United States

has waived Sovereign Immunity in this matter,” the United States has not, and Plaintiff provides

no authority, nor can the Court locate any, to the contrary. Since Defendant has not waived its

immunity with respect to the Title VI claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate Count Two. See Tindall v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab. Adminstrative Rev. Bd., No. 22-11770,

2023 WL 2733480, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (“‘Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional,’ and

absent a waiver of the immunity, the court lacks ‘jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” (citation

omitted)). Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that Count Two be DISMISSED for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

C. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Tort Claims in

Counts One and Three

Turning to Counts One and Three of the Complaint, which allege negligence and negligent

retention, respectively, Defendant contends that the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) only

allows a plaintiff to sue the United States for a tort when a private person would be similarly liable

under the relevant state law (DE 20 at 7). Defendant contends that there is not subject matter

jurisdiction over Counts One and Three, as Plaintiff “failed to identify a state-tort analogue or

failed to establish a claim under a controlling state-tort analogue” (id.). Defendant argues that

Plaintiff alleges “a duty ‘not to take actions which violate [Plaintiff’s] civil rights and engage in

conduct which is based upon his race, ethnicity, or religion as a person of Jewish origin’” (id.).

But, Plaintiff fails to identify any state tort analogue, which recognizes a similar duty imposed

upon private citizens (id.); (see also DE 1 ¶¶ 26, 32, 40).9 Plaintiff counters that the United States

has waived its sovereign immunity under Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1346(b) and 2674

(DE 22 at 10). Plaintiff further argues that Florida Statute Sections 768.28 and 760.01 provide

two state analogues that demonstrate a right of action under the FTCA (id. at 11-12).

The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States if injures are “caused by

the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within

the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or

omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2013). Similarly, Section 2674 provides, “The

9 Defendant also argues that Counts One and Three are not tort claims but rather, are repackaged

Title VI claims, for which the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity (DE 20 at 6-7). While

Counts One and Three reiterate largely the same allegations as the Title VI claim in Count Two,

construing the Complaint liberally as it must, the Court analyzes these claims as sounding in tort.

To the extent Counts One and Three are construed as Title VI claims, they should be dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons stated infra.

United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the

same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .” 28

U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). “The FTCA was not intended to create new causes of action; nor was it

intended as a means to enforce federal statutory duties.” Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915,

917 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). “[T]he Supreme Court has determined that Congress, in

drafting the FTCA, was concerned primarily with providing redress for the garden variety common

law torts recognized by state law.” Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 1983)

(citation omitted). So, “[u]nless, according to the law of Florida, the United States could be liable

for this alleged tort of its employee if it were a private person, then not only is the sovereign’s

immunity intact, but the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the

suit.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

“[B]etween § 1346(b)(1) and [§ 2674], there are numerous prerequisites to, and limitations

on, the grant of jurisdiction over tort suits against the United States.” Zelaya v. United States, 781

F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Indeed, “both §§ 1346(b)(1) and 2674 preclude liability of the

federal government absent a showing by the plaintiff that a private individual who had acted as

did the federal employee, in like circumstances, would be liable for the particular tort under

governing state law where the tort occurred.” Id. In Count One, Plaintiff asserts negligence,

arguing the United States owed “a duty of care to Plaintiff for its employee and agent not to take

actions which violate[d] his civil rights . . .” (DE 1 ¶ 26). “This duty of care was not to deprive

[Plaintiff] of the various protections afforded him under the Constitution and laws of the United

States” (id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff then seemingly alleges that Defendant’s employee “failed to protect

Plaintiff from . . . antisemitic conduct while performing her official duties as an employee of the

United States” and “failed to suppress [this antisemitic conduct] . . . allowing the losses incurred

by Plaintiff” (id. ¶¶ 28-29).

Defendant argues that no such state-tort analogue has been identified by Plaintiff, because

the duty Plaintiff alleges arises under federal law. To the extent Plaintiff is relying on the

Bankruptcy Judge’s purported violation of his rights under Title VI as the duty that was breached,

a violation of federal civil rights is insufficient to establish liability under the FTCA. See Sellfors,

697 F.2d at 1365 (“The FTCA was not intended to redress breaches of federal statutory duties.”);

Zelaya, 781 F.3d at 1324 (“[T]he fact that a federal employee has failed to perform duties imposed

by federal law is insufficient by itself to render the federal government liable under the FTCA.

Instead, a state tort cause of action is a sine qua non of FTCA jurisdiction . . . .” (citation omitted)).

Rather, Plaintiff must identify corresponding duties under Florida law that would provide for a

negligence claim against a private individual for failure to protect Plaintiff from an alleged

violations of his civil rights under like circumstances.

Florida law dictates that the threshold inquiry for a negligence claim is whether the

defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff. Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1046 (Fla. 2009).

“No common law duty exists, absent a special relationship, for one person to come to the aid of

another or to intervene in the misconduct of a third person to prevent the possibility of harm to

another.” Laskey v. Martin Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 708 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998),

cause dismissed, 797 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2001). In Trianon Park Condo. Association, Inc. v. City

of Hialeah, the Florida Supreme Court unequivocally stated, “[T]here is not now, nor has there

ever been, any common law duty for either a private person or a governmental entity to enforce

the law for the benefit of an individual or a specific group of individuals. In addition, there is no

common law duty to prevent the misconduct of third persons.” 468 So. 2d 912, 918 (Fla. 1985).

The Florida Supreme Court explained,

How a governmental entity, through its officials and employees, exercises its

discretionary power to enforce compliance with the laws duly enacted by a

governmental body is a matter of governance, for which there never has been a

common law duty of care. This discretionary power to enforce compliance with the

law, as well as the authority to protect the public safety, is most notably reflected

in the discretionary power given to judges . . . .

Id. at 919. Plaintiff does not allege the existence of any special relationship that would give rise

to a legal duty establishing tort liability. Nor has Plaintiff identified any cases or doctrines under

Florida law to which the Court can analogize this case, and the Court cannot locate any cases on

its own review. See Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 938 (Fla. 2004)

(holding “a determination that a governmental actor owed a duty of care with regard to the

allegedly negligent conduct is a prerequisite” to determining tort liability). Where no cognizable

state law tort claim could be sustained against a private individual in like circumstances, the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim under the FTCA.

In his opposition, Plaintiff contends that Florida Statute Sections 768.28 and 760.01

provide the necessary state analogues to support a waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA

(DE 22 at 11-12). But, Plaintiff’s reliance on Florida Statutes Sections 768.28 and 760.01 is

misplaced. Section 768.28 states, “In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the

state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability

for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.” FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (2014). In other

words, Section 768.28 is the analogous state statute to the FTCA, which waives Florida’s sovereign

immunity in certain instances. See Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 917 (Section 768.28’s “sole

purpose was to waive that immunity which prevented recovery for breaches of existing common

law duties of care.”). Section 768.28 does not establish tort liability or otherwise supply a cause

of action that could be brought against a private person under similar circumstances to those here.

Similarly, Section 760.01 is Florida’s Civil Rights Act, which mirrors a federal Title VI claim, and

as discussed above, the United States has not waived its immunity through the FTCA for claims

arising under federal or state anti-discrimination laws. See Ochran v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315,

1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he FTCA was not intended as a mechanism for enforcing federal

statutory duties. In6stead, the FTCA was designed ‘to provide redress for ordinary torts recognized

by state law.’” (citation omitted); Goode v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 815 F. App’x

643, 645 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding the FTCA does not waive immunity for claims under state anti-

discrimination laws).

Just as with his negligence claim in Count One, Plaintiff’s negligent retention claim in

Count Three also fails to plead a valid state tort cause of action to support a waiver of sovereign

immunity. “Negligent retention . . . [is] cognizable under Florida law ‘when, during the course of

employment, the employer becomes aware, or should have become aware, of problems with an

employee that indicates his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further action such as

investigation, discharge, or reassignment.’” Samedi v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320,

1352 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citations omitted). “To state a claim of negligent supervision and retention,

[the plaintiff must] plead facts that established the [employer] should have foreseen, based on its

employees’ work history, that they would commit the current tort.” Bello v. Johnson, 442 F. App’x

477, 480 (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]he underlying wrong allegedly committed by an employee in a . . .

negligent retention claim must be based on an injury resulting from a tort which is recognized

under common law.” Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Servs., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1348 (M.D.

Fla. 1999); Gutman v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331 (S.D.

Fla. 2010) (same) (citing Footstar Corp. v. Doe, 932 So.2d 1272, 1278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).

Once again, Plaintiff alleges that the United States owed “a duty of care to Plaintiff for its

employee . . . not to . . . violate his civil rights,” which “deprive[d] [Plaintiff] of the various

protections afforded him under the Constitution and laws of the United States[,]” and Defendant’s

employee “failed to protect Plaintiff from . . . antisemitic conduct while performing her official

duties as an employee of the United States” (DE 1 ¶¶ 40-42). Plaintiff supplies additional

allegations that the United States was or became aware of the problems with the Bankruptcy Judge,

indicating “her unfitness [sic] to hold office” and failed to take further action, causing harm to

Plaintiff (id. ¶¶ 43-45). These allegations point to underlying discriminatory conduct as the basis

for Defendant’s alleged negligent retention of its employee. Yet, “discrimination [is] not

recognized under Florida law as [a] tort[] that can support a claim for negligent . . . retention.”

Mighty v. Genesis Eldercare Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 18-CIV-80440, 2018 WL 5113965, at *2

(S.D. Fla. May 24, 2018); Fernandez v. Bal Harbour Vill., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1153 (S.D. Fla.

2014) (same) (citation omitted); see also McElrath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1998) (stating claims for discrimination did not exist at common law and protection from

discrimination under Florida law is a statutory right legislatively created). Since Plaintiff has failed

to plead a state-tort analogue sufficient to trigger a waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA,

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Counts One and Three.

The cases that Plaintiff relies on are equally unavailing. In Limones, the plaintiffs sued a

school district for its failure to apply an automated external defibrillator after a student collapsed

while playing soccer. Limones v. Sch. District of Lee County, 161 So. 3d 384, 387 (Fla. 2015).

The Florida Supreme Court found that the special relationship between a school and its students

gave rise to the school’s duty to reasonably supervise its students. Id. at 390. Mallory involved a

defendant’s employee retrieving a gun and shooting the plaintiff, a tenant at the defendant’s

apartment complex. Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954). There, the Court found

that the complaint stated a claim for negligence, as the defendant committed the alleged tort outside

the scope of his employment. Id.; see also Wilkie v. Alutiiq 3SG, LLC, No. 11-CIV-20454, 2011

WL 13223675, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2011), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Wilkie v. Alutiiq, LLC, No. 11-CIV-20454, 2011 WL 13223676 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2011) (“Where,

as here, a plaintiff alleges and a defendant admits that alleged torts took place during the course

and scope of employment, employer liability can only be pursued on the basis of respondeat

superior and not on the basis that the employer was negligent.” (citing Mallory, 69 So. 2d at 315)).

Finally, in Rolland, the plaintiff claimed that a security firm’s employee falsely reported that the

plaintiff made a bomb threat. International Sec. Management Group, Inc. v. Rolland, 271 So. 3d

33, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). The Court discussed Florida law’s recognition of a cause of

action for an individual who is injured because of a false report of criminal behavior to law

enforcement. Id. at 48. These cases cited by Plaintiff do not speak to the FTCA or a Florida tort

that lies under similar circumstances. Because the FTCA “preclude[s] liability of the federal

government absent a showing by the plaintiff that a private individual who had acted as did the

federal employee, in like circumstances, would be liable for the particular tort under governing

state law where the tort occurred[,]” Zelaya, 781 F.3d at 1323, and Plaintiff has failed to plead

allegations establishing such a tort under Florida law, it is respectfully recommended that Counts

One and Three be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1).10

10 Plaintiff’s failure to plead an analogous state-tort cause of action as required by the FTCA might

also be construed as a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).

See Zelaya, 781 F.3d at 1325 (“Unless Plaintiffs can identify corresponding state law duties, they

have, at the least, failed to state a claim, and arguably their lapse deprives the court of even subject

D. Leave to Amend the Complaint would be Futile

Typically, “a pro se plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint

before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice—at least, that is, where a more

carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123,

1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). But that “extra dose of grace” is not warranted if

amendment would be futile. Id. at 1133. Moreover, granting a Plaintiff leave to amend is

unnecessary if the claim is “patently frivolous.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th

Cir. 2011). Leave to amend is futile “if an amended complaint would still fail at the motion-to-

dismiss or summary-judgment stage.” L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1332

(11th Cir. 2020). We do not ask whether the plaintiff “has otherwise stated a claim” but “whether,

when all is said and done, he can do so.” Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1133 (emphasis in original). We

look to “whether the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper

subject of relief.” Hernandez, 982 F.3d at 1332 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, because the claims in the Complaint are frivolous for the reasons discussed

above, Plaintiff is not entitled to an opportunity to amend the Complaint, notwithstanding his pro

se status. See Toussaint, 2025 WL 2237376, at *6 (“The district court’s finding that [the

plaintiff’s] suit was ‘frivolous’ is, by definition, a finding that amendment would be futile because

matter jurisdiction over the action.”). To the extent the deficiencies identified herein do not

implicate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is respectfully recommended that those

deficiencies warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

Defendant alternatively argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

under Rule 12(b)(6), because Plaintiff fails to allege any facts in the Complaint showing that the

United States had any actual or constructive knowledge that the Bankruptcy Judge was unable to

perform her job (DE 20 at 10). Defendant also argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction,

because Plaintiff failed to allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies (id. at 8). Since it

is respectfully recommended that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims

for the reasons stated above, the undersigned does not reach the merits of these arguments.

his claim was ‘without arguable merit either in law or fact,’ and that his ‘realistic chances of

ultimate success are slight.’” (citations omitted)). Moreover, the claims are completely devoid of

legal merit, such that even if Plaintiff incorporated the more detailed allegations from his

opposition into the Complaint, Plaintiff still could not show that the alleged discrimination is

cognizable as a tort under Florida law to invoke a waiver of immunity under the FTCA. See

McCree v. Griffin, No. 19-14646, 2020 WL 2632329 (11th Cir. May 20, 2020) (“[A] district court

need not allow even a pro se plaintiff leave to amend where amendment would be futile.” (citing

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007))); Alberto v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

770 F. App’x 467, 469 (11th Cir. 2019) (“A court may nevertheless dismiss a pro se complaint

with prejudice where any amendment would be futile—that is, where even ‘a more carefully

drafted complaint could not state a claim.’” (citation omitted)). The circumstances here counsel

against granting Plaintiff leave to amend, because the Complaint would still fail to establish the

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a necessary pre-requisite to any suit. Any amendment would

therefore be futile.

Notably, the procedural posture of this case is different than Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 24-11542

(11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025). In that case, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Plaintiff was

entitled to amend his complaint “as a matter of course,” within twenty-one days after the defendant

filed a motion to dismiss. Id. at 3. The defendant filed its motion to dismiss while the case was

stayed, and the court “granted the motion [to dismiss] at the same time it lifted the stay.” Id. The

Eleventh Circuit noted that “at no time before the case was dismissed was the clock ticking for

Ofer to amend his complaint. Ofer was at day one of the twenty-one-day deadline to amend his

complaint as a matter of course under rule 15(a).” Id. By contrast, Defendant filed its Motion to

Dismiss on August 28, 2025 (DE 20), giving Plaintiff until September 18, 2025 to file an amended

complaint “as a matter of course.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Plaintiffs right to amend has lapsed.

At this time, Plaintiff would need leave of court for any amendment, which as discussed 1s futile.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

(DE 20) be GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). It is further

respectfully recommended that the Complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE due to the

frivolousness of the claims contained therein and that any amendment would be futile. It 1s further

respectfully recommended that any pending motions be DENIED AS MOOT and that this case

be CLOSED.

OBJECTIONS

The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommendation

to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Kathleen M. Williams, United States District

Judge. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the

District Judge of an issue covered in this Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report, except upon grounds of plain

error, if necessary, in the interest of Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 US.

140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 26th day of

January, 2026.

Cc

Elta Dll”

ELLEN F. D’ANGELO~

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CC: Pro se Plaintiff Raziel Ofer

All Counsel of Record

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