Erickson

CENRTROACLK DISILSTARNIDC TD OIVFI SILIOLNIN OIS

HEIDI ERICKSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-04136-SLD-RLH

)

MICHAEL INMAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiff Heidi Erickson’s motion for leave to file a first amended

complaint, ECF No. 15; motion for disability accommodations, ECF No. 16; motion to

reconsider the Court’s October 3, 2025 Order, ECF No. 17; motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint, ECF No. 18; and motion to correct an error in her second amended

complaint, ECF No. 20. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion for leave to

file a first amended complaint; DENIES the motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint; and finds MOOT the motion for accommodations, the motion to reconsider, and the

motion to correct the error in the second amended complaint. The Court also conducts a merit

review of Erickson’s First Amended Complaint, Mot. Leave to File First Am. Compl. Ex. 1, ECF

No. 15-1, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and DISMISSES IN PART the First Amended

Complaint.

BACKGROUND1

I. Factual Background

Erickson owns a home located at 13 Hickory Grove, Macomb, Illinois 61455. This case

stems from a series of actions taken against Erickson by the City of Macomb (“the City”),

McDonough County (“the County”), the officers and agents and agents of each, and several

private parties. As best the Court can understand Erickson’s wide-ranging complaints, the issues

began when Erickson received a service dog to assist with her disabilities. After receiving her

service dog, Erickson regularly butted heads with her neighbors, Steven and Amanda Silberger

and Korri2 and Samantha Cameron, as well as several employees or officers of the City and

County. The disputes with her neighbors include trespassing over her property, blocking her

driveway, interfering with the training of her service dog, not cleaning up after their own

animals, and not paying for her groceries that their animals damaged. Erickson complained to

Chief of the Macomb Police Department Jeff Hamer about her troubles with her neighbors, but

he failed to assist her. Erickson then complained to the City’s mayor, Michael Inman.

Subsequently, Erickson alleges, the City and County began harassing her. Erickson

alleges that she attempted to register her service dog with the County, but County Treasurer

Dana Moon refused. Bryce Herrick, an officer of the Macomb Police Department, fabricated a

story about regular complaints of odors coming from Erickson’s house and concerns about her

treatment of her service dog and her clowder of Persian cats. The fabricated story included that

1 The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard applies when determining if a complaint fails to state a

claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 2017).

Under that standard, the court takes all well-pleaded allegations as true and views them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the facts relayed in the background

are from the First Amended Complaint.

2 In the caption, Erickson spells this name Korri, First Am. Compl. 1, but later in the First Amended Complaint, she

spells it Korrie, see id. at 22. There are many other Defendants whose names are spelled differently throughout the

First Amended Complaint. The Court will use the spellings from the caption at this time for ease of reference and

consistency.

Herrick had visited Erickson requesting to inspect her property, but she had denied him

permission. Herrick put this fabricated story in an affidavit provided to Judge Heidi Benson of

the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Illinois and obtained a search warrant to enter and search

Erickson’s property.

On May 2, 2025, Herrick, Hamer, over a dozen other police officers, and Code Officials

Miranda Lambert and Billy McMillin executed this warrant. The search allegedly began with

either Herrick or Hamer kicking down Erickson’s front door and ordering her to sit down on the

floor, despite Erickson’s polite but firm insistence that they were not allowed in her home.

Though the exact order of events is unclear, at some point the McDonough County Animal

Shelter (“the Animal Shelter”) was called and animal control officers Zack Welch, Wendy

Hughes, and Joe Rossmiller came to the site. The animal control officers seized Erickson’s

service dog and Persian clowder and brought them to the Animal Shelter.

The search ended in Erickson’s arrest. Herrick, knowing that Erickson had arthritis, and

despite her respectful and peaceful actions, twisted her arms behind her back to put handcuffs on

her. The remaining officers stood by and did nothing. From there, Herrick brought her to the

emergency room at McDonough District Hospital. Knowing that she did not present a danger to

himself or anyone else, Herrick then made an agreement with Megan Clemens to lie on the form

for involuntary admission to state that Erickson was a danger to herself. As a result, Erickson

was involuntarily confined for approximately a month at Lake Behavioral Hospital, which she

alleges is owned and operated by V. Covington, LLC d/b/a Lake Behavioral Hospital and V.

Covington, Realty, LLC d/b/a Lake Behavioral Hospital. For conciseness, the Court uses Lake

Behavioral Hospital to refer to the two LLC entities.

After the events of May 2, 2025, the City marked her home for a violation of the property

maintenance code, preventing Erickson from accessing it except during certain hours to abate the

violations. As a result, Erickson has been functionally homeless. On June 9, 2025, the City of

Macomb brought an action in Illinois state court requesting abatement and an entry order based

on sanitation violations. The action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on July 22,

2025. A notice of property code violations was issued by Lambert on July 24, 2025. Erickson

appealed the City’s decision that her home violated the property code, and a hearing was set

before the Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”). Erickson requested accommodations for this

hearing based on her disabilities, including for the hearing to be set early enough in the day so

she could travel back to where she had been living at the time by train during daylight. She

never received a response to these accommodations requests and the hearing was conducted

without her presence.

II. Procedural Background

Erickson first filed a complaint with this Court on July 29, 2025. See generally Compl.,

ECF No. 1. This complaint, spanning 245 pages with exhibits, named over fifty defendants and

asserted over thirty causes of action. Two weeks later, she submitted a motion to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”), Mot. Proceed IFP, ECF No. 5, which the Court granted, Oct. 3, 2025

Order 1, ECF No. 12. As the Court was reviewing her complaint, Erickson filed several

additional motions, including a motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 9. The Court

dismissed her complaint on October 3, 2025, for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2). Oct. 3, 2025 Order 7. It found that the complaint was excessively long,

redundant, confusing, inconsistent, and failed to meaningfully put the dozens of defendants on

notice about what they were being sued for. Id. at 4–6. The Court found the remaining motions

moot as there was no operative complaint and gave Erickson leave to file an amended complaint.

Id. at 7.

On October 22, 2025, after the deadline the Court set and then extended for Erickson to

file an amended complaint had passed, Erickson submitted her proposed First Amended

Complaint along with a motion for leave to file. This complaint spans 125 pages, inclusive of

exhibits, and asserts dozens of claims against over seventy defendants.

While the motion for leave to file remained pending, Erickson filed a motion for

accommodations, a motion to reconsider, an unprompted motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint, and then a motion to correct an error in the proposed second amended

complaint. The several complaints seem to be different primarily in organization, though they

also vary in their precise characterization of the events in question as well as the specific counts

brought. The facts set out above, however, seem to fairly characterize the gist of Erickson’s

allegations.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

In its order dismissing Erickson’s first complaint, the Court granted her leave to file an

amended complaint by October 17, 2025. Oct. 3, 2025 Order 7. Upon Erickson’s request, see

Mot. Extension Time, ECF No. 14, the Court extended this deadline to October 21, 2025. Oct.

17, 2025 Text Order. On October 22, 2025, Erickson filed a motion for leave to file her proposed

First Amended Complaint. See Mot. Leave to File First Am. Compl. 1. Because Erickson was

already granted leave to file an amended complaint, the Court construes her motion as a motion

for extension of time filed after the deadline has expired under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

6(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 6.1.

Federal Rule 6(b)(1)(B) allows a court to, for good cause, extend a deadline “on motion

made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” The

determination of whether a party’s neglect is excusable “is at bottom an equitable one, taking

account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Raymond v. Ameritech

Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). Factors to be considered in

determining whether there is excusable neglect include: the danger of prejudice to the

nonmoving party, the length of the delay and its impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for

the delay (and whether it was within the control of the moving party), and the moving party’s

good faith. Id. The Civil Local Rules state that motions for an extension of time filed after the

original deadline “will be denied, unless the presiding judge determines that such denial would

create a substantial injustice.” Civil LR 6.1.

Erickson first requested an extension of time to file an amended complaint because of

health difficulties and because her ADHD causes difficulties with writing and organization. Mot.

Extension Time 1. In the instant motion, Erickson submits that she was “editing and work[ing]

through the night and through th[e] morning” of October 22, 2025. See Mot. Leave to File First

Am. Compl. 1. If the Court were to deny the extension, it would essentially end Erickson’s case

as there would be no operative complaint. Because Erickson’s submission was only one day late,

because she indicates that she made substantial efforts to file by the deadline, and because failure

to grant the one-day extension would end Erickson’s case, the Court finds that Erickson failed to

meet the deadline because of excusable neglect and that failure to grant her an extension would

result in a substantial injustice. Accordingly, it GRANTS the motion for leave to file the First

Amended Complaint. The Clerk is directed to file the First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 15-1,

on the docket.

II. Motion to Reconsider

Erickson submitted a motion to reconsider the October 3, 2025 Order which she states “is

filed in case this Honorable court refuses 1st Amended Complaint.” See Mot. Reconsider 1.

Because the Court has granted Erickson leave to file the First Amended Complaint, the motion to

reconsider is MOOT.

III. Motion for Accommodations

Erickson also filed a motion for disability accommodations. The Court does not

understand exactly what relief seek Erickson seeks through this motion. The Court referred the

motion to the Central District of Illinois’s Access Coordinator to begin the process of considering

accommodations for communications disabilities. Otherwise, it appears that Erickson’s request

was prompted by a concern that the Court misunderstood her initial complaint and made findings

of fact against her in its October 3, 2025 Order. See Mot. Accommodations 1. But the Court’s

October 3, 2025 Order made no finding of facts. See generally Oct. 3, 2025 Order. Instead, the

Court merely found that Erickson’s complaint did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8. Id. at 7. It gave her leave to file an amended complaint, id., which Erickson has

now filed. Because the Court did not make findings of fact, Erickson’s concerns appear to be

unfounded. Any request for accommodations beyond those considered through the Access

Coordinator is MOOT.

IV. Merit Review

a. Legal Standard

The court must dismiss a complaint brought by an individual proceeding IFP if it

determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2015). The Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard applies when determining if a complaint fails to state a

claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461,

468 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus, the court takes all well-pleaded allegations as true and views them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). A

complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While

pleadings filed by self-represented plaintiffs must be liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the court must still dismiss a complaint that fails to put the defendants on

notice of the claims against them, see Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 632 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he

purpose of Rule 8 is to provide a defendant with fair notice of the claims against him.”); Taha v.

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020) (“If a complaint falls short

of [Rule 8(a)(2)’s] requirement, it risks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for ‘failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.’”). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff

“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

b. Analysis

Although Erickson’s First Amended Complaint suffers from some of the same flaws as

the complaint the Court dismissed under Rule 8, the Court endeavors to identify plausible claims

in the First Amended Complaint to comply with its duty to liberally construe pro se pleadings

and so that this case can proceed.

i. Defendants to Be Dismissed Entirely

1. Defendants Not Mentioned Beyond Caption

First, the Court DISMISSES the following Defendants named in the First Amended

Complaint from this suit because they are not mentioned beyond being listed in the caption:

Larry Aurelio, Dustin Berg, Eric Chapman, Clayton Cook, David Cortelyou, Craig Foster, Mike

Cox, Travis Hiel, Vicky Kipling, Michael Kirby, Ryan Litchfield, Terra Litchfield, Jack

Lowderman, Clayton Murphy, Jerry Raby, Jarad Royer, Terry Thompson, and Dana Roy Walker.

See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against

a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”); Schorey v. Greer, No. 1:24-CV-

494-HAB-SLC, 2024 WL 4891897, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2024) (finding a case could not

proceed against a defendant because the plaintiff did not “mention him in the body of the

complaint” or “explain how [the defendant] was personally involved” in the events at issue).

2. Humane Society of McDonough County

Erickson names the Humane Society of McDonough County (“Humane Society”) as a

Defendant, First Am. Compl. 1, but it is not clear what she alleges the Humane Society itself did.

The Humane Society is only mentioned in the “Defendants” section of the First Amended

Complaint, see id. at 9–20, and most times Erickson mentions the Humane Society she also

refers to “it[]s Animal Shelter,” e.g., id. at 14. But she also sues the Animal Shelter. See id. at

1.3 The Court cannot discern what Erickson is suing the Humane Society for, so any claim

against the Humane Society fails under Rule 8’s notice requirement.

3 According to the Humane Society’s website, it is a not-for-profit organization that “supports, but is completely

separate from, the McDonough County Animal Shelter.” Who We Are, Humane Society of McDonough Cnty.,

https://www.hsmcil.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2026).

3. Members of the McDonough Humane Society Board of Directors,

McDonough County Board Members, Karen Blakeley, and

Members of the Macomb ZBA

Erickson sues the members of the Humane Society’s Board of Directors, the McDonough

County Board, and the Macomb Zoning Board of Appeals individually. See id. at 12–20. But as

to all members except Dana Moon, Erickson makes no allegations of personal wrongdoing. For

example, she merely alleges that through operation of the Animal Shelter, each member of the

Humane Society’s Board of Directors holds her “sentient property Therapy Animals and Service

Dog.” See, e.g., id. at 14. Similarly, she alleges that the County Board members are responsible

by virtue of being on the Board that oversees the Animal Shelter rather than that they had any

individual involvement in violating her constitutional rights. See id. at 12–13. And finally, she

alleges that the ZBA members discriminated against her and deprived her of her due process

rights but fails to allege any ways each member was personally involved. See id. at 19–20.

Erickson also sues Karen Blakeley, wife of County Board member Eric Blakeley and

veterinarian for the Animal Shelter. Id. at 12–13. But Erickson makes no allegations that Karen

Blakeley took any actions to violate her rights. Besides Moon, none of these Defendants are

mentioned beyond the “Defendants” section of the First Amended Complaint.4 Erickson alleges

that Moon, the County Treasurer and a member of the Humane Society’s Board of Directors,

refused to register her service dog, id. at 14, and that she spoke to Moon about getting her

animals back, id. at 57. These limited allegations are not sufficiently connected to any of the

claims Erickson asserts she is bringing to state a claim for relief against Moon. To the extent

Erickson alleges that these these Defendants are liable under a conspiracy theory, she does not

4 Eric and Karen Blakeley are also mentioned in an annotation Erickson provides with one of her exhibits, but all the

annotation says is that Erickson’s sister copied Eric Blakeley on an email in May 2025 about Erickson’s requests to

get her animals back. See May 9, 2025 Email, First Am. Compl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 15-1 at 103.

sufficiently allege facts from which the Court could conclude that any of these Defendants

agreed with others to violate her rights. See infra Section IV.b.ii.1.c.

The following Defendants are DISMISSED under this reasoning: Eric Blakeley; Karen

Blakeley; Ken Durkin; Joe Erlandson; Bonnie Scripps; Dana Moon; Terri Hare; Amy Betz; J.

Biernbaum; Dave Monninger; Felix Chu; Patti Douglas; Ann Stites; Jennifer Tibbits; Sharon

Lindahl; Candice Biswell; Brian Waller; Brandi Baker; Savannah Ballard; Tina Belz; Kate Cobb;

Carl Ervin; Susan Nash; and Ron Runser.

4. McDonough District Hospital, Bill Murdock, and Patrick

Osterman

Erickson sues McDonough District Hospital. First Am. Compl. 1, 18. She asserts that it

is being sued for breaching the standard of care, condoning malpractice and fraud, issuance of

fraudulent medical records, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 18. But she

does not set forth any factual allegations regarding these claims. The only factual allegations

relating to McDonough District Hospital are allegations of Megan Clemens’s conduct, but

Erickson nowhere suggests that McDonough District Hospital can be liable for Clemens’s

actions. Erickson also sues Bill Murdock and Patrick Osterman, the Chief Executive Officer and

Vice President of Business Strategy, respectively, for McDonough District Hospital, id. at 1, 18,

but her allegations of wrongdoing on their part is too vague and conclusory to state a claim to

relief. To the extent Erickson argues these Defendants are liable under a conspiracy theory, she

does not sufficiently allege facts from which the Court could conclude that any of these

Defendants agreed with others to violate her rights. See infra Section IV.b.ii.1.c. Accordingly,

McDonough District Hospital, Bill Murdock, and Patrick Osterman are DISMISSED as

Defendants.

5. Judge Heidi Benson

Next, the Court DISMISSES all claims against Judge Heidi Benson. “[G]enerally, a

judge is immune from a suit for money damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per

curium). “[Judicial immunity] confers complete immunity from suit, not just a mere defense to

liability . . . .” Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2005). But a judge is only

entitled to immunity for judicial acts. Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d 987, 997 (7th Cir. 2018).

“[T]hree factors generally govern the determination of whether a particular act or omission” is

judicial:

(1) whether the act or decision involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, or

is rather a ministerial act which might as well have been committed to a private

person as to a judge; (2) whether the act is normally performed by a judge; and (3)

the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether the parties dealt with the judge as

judge.

Dawson, 419 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks omitted).

Erickson alleges that Judge Benson issued the search warrant that Herrick and others then

executed. See First Am. Compl. 57. She argues that Judge Benson failed in her duty to ensure

that there was a proper return filed with an inventory. See id. at 57–58. Though Erickson calls

this an “administrative function,” id., the Court concludes that Erickson is suing Judge Benson

for judicial acts. “[T]he issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial act.” Burns v.

Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991). The Court sees no reason a judge’s review of the execution of a

search warrant she issued would not also be a judicial act. Indeed, Erickson even argues that

“the law requires the Judge to review the return to ensure the officer executing it is held

accountable for anything seized.” First Am. Compl. 57. Because Judge Benson is entitled to

judicial immunity for any claim arising out of the conduct Erickson complains about, the Court

DISMISSES all claims against Judge Benson.

6. Western Illinois University, Kriste Mindrup, and Darcie

Shinberger

Erickson alleges that Darcie Shinberger is a reporter. Id. at 54. Erickson complains that

Shinberger published articles that were defamatory and libelous. Id. She also complains that

Shinberger “failed to report on the serious discrimination and unfair processes of the ZBA and

the City attacking a senior citizen.” Id. at 8. Erickson alleges that Shinberger’s “defamation and

liable [sic]” was “supported by Western Illinois University[(“WIU”)], and it[]s new President

Mindrup.” Id. at 46. She argues that “WIU[] is supporting a campaign[] of biased defamatory

and libelous reporting by Defendants Shinberger and Mindrup.” Id. at 8.

“Defamation is the publication of any statement that ‘tends to cause such harm to the

reputation of another that it lowers that person in the eyes of the community or deters third

persons from associating with him.’” Madison v. Frazier, 539 F.3d 646, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2008)

(alteration omitted) (quoting Seith v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 861 N.E.2d 1117, 1126 (Ill. App. Ct.

2007)). Illinois law recognizes two forms of defamation: per se and per quod. Id. at 653. “A

statement is defamatory per se if its harm is obvious and apparent on its face.” Green v. Rogers,

917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (Ill. 2009). A plaintiff alleging defamation per se does not have to identify

the exact language of the allegedly defamatory statement in her complaint, but she must plead

“the substance of the statement . . . with sufficient precision and particularity so as to permit

initial judicial review of its defamatory content.” Id.; Bergman v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 3:24-CV-

02374-NJR, 2025 WL 2694908, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2025) (holding that this is a substantive

requirement for Illinois defamation claims so it applies even in federal court). A plaintiff

alleging defamation per quod must allege “both extrinsic facts to establish that the statement is

defamatory” and that she suffered pecuniary damages from the statement. Bergman, 2025 WL

2694908, at *3 (quotation marks omitted).

Whether Erickson is intending to bring per se or per quod claims, she fails to state a

claim. She cannot state a defamation per se claim because she simply alleges that Shinberger

published defamatory articles containing falsehoods and that WIU and Mindrup distributed

“falsehoods” without identifying the substance of the falsehoods with any particularity. See, e.g.,

First Am. Compl. 46. She cannot state a defamation per quod claim because she fails to allege

that she suffered any monetary damages because of the allegedly defamatory reporting. To the

extent Erickson is alleging that they conspired with government actors, she fails to include

sufficient allegations to state a claim of conspiracy. See infra Section IV.b.ii.1.c. Accordingly,

any claims against Shinberger, WIU, and Mindrup are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

7. Gene Curtis and REMAX Realty

Erickson alleges that Gene Curtis is a licensed real estate broker who owns REMAX

Realty. First Am. Compl. 19. She states that she sues Curtis and REMAX for “provid[ing] false

and misleading information” and for breach of contract and fiduciary duty. Id. But the only

factual allegations regarding Curtis and REMAX are that Curtis stated that Erickson’s house

shared a driveway with her neighbor’s house and that the “deeds between the parties” created an

easement for a shared driveway. Id. at 11, 41. It appears that Erickson is complaining that Curtis

falsely reported that there was a shared driveway in connection with Erickson’s purchase of her

home. But the First Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient details to “present a story

that holds together” as to Curtis and REMAX. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th

Cir. 2010). Erickson does not allege, for instance, the nature of her relationship with these

entities. To the extent Erickson is alleging that they conspired with government actors, she fails

to include sufficient allegations to state a claim of conspiracy. See infra Section IV.b.ii.1.c. The

Court DISMISSES any claims against Curtis and REMAX.

8. McDonough County Board, McDonough County Treasurer’s

Office, and McDonough County Animal Shelter

Erickson names as Defendants the McDonough County Board, the McDonough County

Animal Shelter, and the McDonough County Treasurer’s Office. First Am. Compl. 1. Capacity

to be sued for an entity like a county or government agency is determined by “the law of the state

where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). “To be sued in Illinois, a defendant must

have a legal existence, either natural or artificial.” DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cnty., 209

F.3d 973, 976 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). Courts have held that subdivisions

of a county “do not have a legal existence separate from the [c]ounty and thus are not proper

parties” to a federal suit. Harris v. Dart, No. 20 C 7602, 2023 WL 2988816, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill.

Apr. 18, 2023); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 73 ex. rel. Condon v. County of Cook, No. 13 cv

2935, 2014 WL 793114, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2014) (“[A]s subdivisions or departments of

Cook County, neither [the Cook County Health and Hospital Systems or Cermak Health

Services] are suable entities separate from Cook County.”). Courts have also held that county

boards “are not suable entities because they do not enjoy separate legal existence independent of

[a] [c]ounty.” Appel v. LaSalle Cnty. State’s Att’y Felony Enf’t Unit, No. 18-cv-2439, 2019 WL

4189461, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2019) (quotation marks omitted). As the McDonough County

Board, the McDonough County Animal Shelter, and the McDonough County Treasurer’s Office

have no separate legal existence from the County, they are not suable entities. Accordingly, they

are DISMISSED as Defendants. Any claims against these parties are construed as being brought

against McDonough County.

9. Neighbors

Erickson names her neighbors Korri Cameron, Samantha Cameron, Amanda Silberger,

and Steven Silberger as Defendants. First Am. Compl. 1, 11–12. But while they are mentioned

throughout the First Amended Complaint, the complaint does not make clear whether and what

claims are brought against them. Erickson is primarily complaining about government

misconduct, but her neighbors are private actors.5 To the extent Erickson is alleging that they

conspired with government actors, she fails to include sufficient allegations to state a claim of

conspiracy. See infra Section IV.b.ii.1.c. As the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim

for relief against the Camerons or Silbergers, they are DISMISSED as Defendants.

10. Remaining Parties

The following parties remain: the City; Inman; Scott Coker; Lisa Scalf; Lambert;

McMillin; Hamer; Herrick; Officers Jane Doe #1 through 5; Officers John Doe #1 through 5; the

County; Welch; Hughes; Rossmiller; Clemens; Lake Behavioral Hospital; and Cindy Marcedo.

ii. Claims Against Remaining Parties

Plaintiff lists twenty-four counts in her First Amended Complaint. Significant

organization issues with the complaint hinder the Court’s ability to assess these claims. For

example, Erickson labels her claims with an alleged legal basis, like “4TH AMENDMENT, 42

U.S.C.§ 1983 CIVIL CONSPIRACY” (for Count I) and “4th AMENDMENT 42 U.S.C. § 1983

UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE” (for Count VIII). First Am. Compl. 26, 37. But then

within each count, many other legal doctrines are mentioned. For example, in Count I, which

purports to be about a Fourth Amendment violation, Erickson alleges that Defendants violated

her due process rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fair Housing Act. See id. at

26. There are also repetitive counts. For example, there are numerous Fourth Amendment

5 Though Erickson alleges that Korri Cameron is a police officer, First Am. Compl. 11, the only conduct Erickson

attributes to Korri Cameron via well-pleaded factual allegations is clearly conduct she undertook in her personal

capacity at her home, see, e.g., id. at 22–23 (alleging that Korri Cameron’s dog “broke open a 3lb ~$21[]Chuck

Roast” on Erickson’s front porch and Korri told Erickson she would not replace the roast because the dog did not eat

all of it).

claims that seem to be about the same events. See, e.g., id. at 32–39 (bringing separate counts

for warrantless entry, unlawful search and seizure of impressions, and unlawful search and

seizure). Moreover, Erickson fails to identify against whom many counts are asserted, simply

alleging that “Defendants” took certain actions against her without specifying which Defendants.

The Court reads the First Amended Complaint as a whole and, where appropriate, addresses

claims by subject-matter rather than strictly by count.

1. Counts that are Dismissed in their Entirety

a. Count IV: Monell Liability against the City

Count IV, id. at 29–30, is DISMISSED because Monell liability is a theory by which a

municipality can be held responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions of its employees. See

generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It is not a standalone

constitutional claim. The Court will consider whether Erickson states a claim against the City in

the analysis of each relevant substantive claim.

b. Counts XXIII and XXIV: Perjury

Counts XXIII and XXIV are both brought under 720 ILCS 5/32-2. First Am. Compl. 63–

68. But this is a criminal statute for which there is no private right of action, so these counts are

DISMISSED.

c. Counts I and XIII: Civil Conspiracy

In Count I, Erickson alleges that “Defendants conspired to deprive [her] of her

constitutional rights by coordinating actions between police officers, municipal officials, and

third-party civilians, which included falsifying legal documents and misrepresenting facts to

judicial officers.” Id. at 27. In Count XIII, Erickson alleges that Defendants conspired to

unlawfully search and seize her. Id. at 43. For claims brought via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy

is merely a theory of liability. It is not a standalone claim, see Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211

F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the lack of constitutional injury “forecloses relief

on [a] conspiracy claim”), but a mode of ”spreading the net of liability to additional persons.”

Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 531–32 (7th Cir. 1992). The same is true of civil conspiracy in

Illinois—it is a theory for holding individuals beyond the most immediate wrongdoer liable. See

McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 720 N.E.2d 242, 258 (Ill. 1999) (“The civil

conspiracy theory has the effect of extending liability for a tortious act beyond the active

tortfeasor to individuals who have not acted but have only planned, assisted, or encouraged the

act.”). Because civil conspiracy is merely a way to hold someone responsible for an underlying

wrongdoing, Counts I and XIII are DISMISSED as standalone claims.

The Court notes, however, that to allege conspiracy liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for

federal constitutional claims) or under Illinois law (for Illinois law claims), a plaintiff must allege

that individuals reached an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of his rights and that an act in

furtherance of that agreement deprived him of his rights or injured him. See Beaman v.

Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015) (§ 1983); Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.,

477 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing McClure, 720 N.E.2d at 258) (Illinois law). “[A]n

allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Instead, a plaintiff must allege specific facts warranting

inferences that the parties came to an agreement and that each person alleged to be part of the

conspiracy was a member. See id. at 557; Davidson v. Worldwide Asset Purchasing, LLC, 914 F.

Supp. 2d 918, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

The bulk of Erickson’s allegations of conspiracy are conclusory—she merely alleges that

certain parties conspired without setting forth any specific facts that makes that conclusion

plausible. See, e.g., First Am. Compl. 7 (“[The County is] in concert with the conspiracy with

the City [sic] to retaliation [sic] and discriminate against Ms.[ ]Erickson based on disability and

age[.]”); id. at 11 (alleging Korri Cameron “conspired with the Defendants to take [Erickson’s]

property”); id. at 27 (“Defendants conspired to deprive [Erickson] of her constitutional rights by

coordinating actions between police officers, municipal officials, and third-party civilians . . . .”);

id. at 43 (“Defendants agreed to unlawfully search Ms. Erickson without reasonable suspicion or

probable cause . . . .”); id. at 46 (“[T]he Defendant Officers, officials, agents, lawyer(s) and

Reporter’s [sic] acting as investigators, agents and/or legal advisors individually, jointly, and

with conspiring minds set out a conspiracy with one another . . . .”). Merely concluding that

parties conspired together is not sufficient to state a claim against any party using conspiracy

liability.6

2. Count II: Replevin

Replevin is a cause of action under Illinois law against the one who has wrongful

possession of goods. See 735 ILCS 5/19-101; Landwer v. Deluxe Towing, Inc., 249 N.E.3d 1039,

1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024) (“[R]eplevin is now a purely statutory cause of action . . . .”). A

complaint seeking replevin must “describe[] the property to be replevied,” state that the plaintiff

is the owner of the property and is lawfully entitled to its possession, that the defendant is

wrongfully detaining the property, and that the property has not been “seized under any lawful

process against the goods and chattels of such plaintiff.” 735 ILCS 5/19-104. The property at

issue in Count II is “a Persian clowder and a Service Dog.” First Am. Comp. 27. Erickson

6 There is one instance where Erickson alleges sufficient facts to support a plausible inference of a conspiracy: that

Herrick and Clemens conspired to falsify medical records and hold Erickson in involuntary commitment. Erickson

alleges that Herrick “encouraged” and “suborned” Clemens to place false information in an involuntary commitment

petition and that Clemens was “a willing participant” who “intended” to keep Erickson detained. First Am. Compl.

63, 65. Erickson alleges that “[b]y [n]oon [on May 2] Clem[e]ns and Herrick agreed to work together.” Id. at 66.

But as the Court will discuss below, Erickson sufficiently alleges that each was personally involved in this conduct

that conspiracy liability is not crucial to the claim.

alleges that she owns this property and that “Defendants wrongfully detained” the property. Id.

And Erickson contests the lawfulness of the process by which the property was seized—she

alleges that the warrant to search her home was issued based on misrepresentations and

omissions. Id. at 27–28. Erickson’s replevin claim can proceed against the County, the entity

that she alleges is holding her property. See id. at 12 (alleging that the Animal Shelter is holding

Erickson’s property)

3. Counts III and V: Discrimination and Retaliation under the

Americans with Disabilities Act7

Erickson broadly alleges discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, see First Am. Compl. 28–29, 31–32. She alleges that she

has a qualifying disability as she has arthritis, epilepsy, ADHD, and dyslexia. See id. at 63. The

disability discrimination claims fall into two buckets: first, discrimination or retaliation in the

alleged search and seizure on May 2, 2025; and second, failure to provide accommodations

during the ZBA appeal. See id. at 28–29, 54.

First, the Court notes that Title II of the ADA applies only to public entities like local

governments, not individuals. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132. A plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to

sue individual defendants for ADA violations. See Tri-Corp Hous. Inc. v. Bauman, 826 F.3d 446,

449 (7th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, only the City and the County are potentially proper

defendants for Title II claims. Title III of the ADA applies to public accommodations, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(a), which includes hospitals, id. § 12181(7)(F). Lake Behavioral Hospital is a

potentially proper defendant for a Title III claim.

7 Erickson mentions the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as well, see, e.g., First Am. Compl. 28, but that law

prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by federal executive agencies and programs or entities that receive

federal financial assistance, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Erickson does not allege that any Defendant receives federal

financial assistance.

Erickson’s first broad claim of disability discrimination is that “Defendants” seized her

service dog and therapy animals, obtained the administrative search warrant, and sought her

involuntary commitment because of “discriminatory animus towards [her] disability” or “in

response to [Erickson’s] protected activity of asserting her rights under the ADA . . . including

her complaints to the Mayor and Police Chief regarding the discriminatory treatment she

endured.” First Am. Compl. 28–29. At this stage, the Court finds that Erickson’s ADA claim

against the City can proceed—Erickson is essentially alleging that the City, through Chief Hamer

or Herrick, sought to search her home, seized her animals, and detained her because of her

disability. Erickson can also proceed on an ADA claim against Lake Behavioral Hospital as she

alleges that Lake Behavioral Hospital would not release her due to her use of a wheelchair. See

id. at 21–22. But the Court sees no allegations based on which the County could be found liable

for violating the ADA.

Erickson does not state a claim under the ADA that the City retaliated against her for

complaining to Mayor Inman and Police Chief Hamer about discriminatory treatment. The ADA

prohibits discrimination against individuals “because such individual has opposed any act or

practice made unlawful” by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The complaints Erickson made to

Inman and Hamer were about issues she was having with her private party neighbors. See First

Am. Compl. 6 (stating that her protected activity was complaints about her neighbors). Because

she was not complaining about discrimination that could possibly be covered by the ADA, she

cannot state a retaliation claim under the ADA.

Erickson’s other ADA claim is that City officials “refus[ed] to initiate an interactive

process to determine appropriate accommodations for [her] disabilities” and ignored her requests

for reasonable accommodations for her hearing before the ZBA. Id. at 29, 53. She alleges that

she sent emails to Scalf and Coker requesting accommodations—including that the hearing take

place during the day and in a wheelchair accessible room, id. at 56—to which they did not

respond. Id. at 54. A public entity is required to “make reasonable modifications in policies,

practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the

basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). “[F]ailure to accommodate is an independent

basis for liability under the ADA.” Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737,

750 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). Erickson can proceed on a claim that the City violated

the ADA by failing to make reasonable accommodations for her in the zoning appeals process.

4. Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, and XIV: Unlawful

Search and Seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Article

I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution

The majority of Erickson’s claims are of unlawful search and seizure under the United

States and Illinois Constitutions. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects an individual’s right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. Article I, Section 6 of Illinois’s Constitution also protects individuals from

“unreasonable searches[ and] seizures.” Ill. Const. art. I, § 6. These claims will be addressed

together because Illinois courts construe Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution in

lockstep with the Fourth Amendment unless certain narrow criteria are met. See People v.

Fitzpatrick, 986 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Ill. 2013).

Erickson alleges that searches and seizures of her home and property were conducted

without a warrant or probable cause “on dates including but not limited to April 17, 23, 24, 28,

29, May 1, and May 2, 2025.” First. Am. Compl. 26. But she provides further factual

allegations about only a search on May 2, 2025 and seizures arising out of that search.

Accordingly, any claims arising out of earlier searches are DISMISSED for failure to state a

claim.

a. Unreasonable Search

Judge Heidi Benson issued an administrative search warrant for Erickson’s home, 13

Hickory Grove, on May 1, 2025, after reviewing Herrick’s affidavit. Order & Admin. Search

Warrant, First Am. Compl. Ex. 1a, ECF No. 15-1 at 77. She found probable cause existed “to

believe that violations of municipal ordinances and/or the Humane Care for Animals Act may

[have been] occurring” at Erickson’s home. Id. The warrant authorized officers to enter the

premises to “investigat[e] violations related to the care, treatment, and housing of animals as well

as property maintenance in a sanitary condition.” Id. Erickson alleges that Herrick’s affidavit

contained “numerous misrepresentations and omissions of material facts.” E.g., First Am.

Compl. 34. The alleged misrepresentations include that he asked Erickson for permission to

search her home and she refused and that the County Treasurer’s office had no registrations for

Erickson’s animals. Id. at 32. The omissions included context about Erickson’s disabilities and

physical condition, about her complaints about her neighbors, and about her prior encounters

with courts. Id. at 32–34. The warrant was executed on May 2, 2025. Id. at 38. Erickson

alleges that Herrick and other officers entered her home after Herrick or Hamer kicked down her

door, that she was arrested, and that her animals were seized. Id.

Erickson can proceed on a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim against Hamer,

Herrick, Lambert, and McMillin based on the May 2, 2025 search. While she acknowledges that

these officers executed the search pursuant to a warrant, she alleges, with supporting factual

allegations, that Herrick made knowing and intentional false statements and omissions in his

affidavit, rendering it an unconstitutional search. See Greenpoint Tactical Income Fund LLC v.

Pettigrew, 38 F.4th 555, 567 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[A] request for a warrant violates the Fourth

Amendment if an officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, makes

false statements in requesting the warrant and the false statements were necessary to the

determination that a warrant should issue.” (quotation marks omitted)). The case can proceed

against the John and Jane Doe officers involved in executing the search as well. See Billman v.

Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a “plaintiff has been

injured as the consequence of the actions of an unknown member of a collective body” and

“identification of the responsible party may be impossible without pretrial discovery,” an “initial

inability to identify the injurers is not by itself a proper ground for the dismissal of the suit”).

Erickson also sufficiently alleges Scalf’s personal involvement—by advising Herrick on his

affidavit—that she states a claim against Scalf too despite her not being present at the scene. See

First Am. Compl. 7. As Erickson alleges that Hamer is a final policymaker for the City, see id. at

30, an unreasonable search claim survives against the City at this stage as well.

b. Unreasonable Seizure of Property

Erickson alleges that Hamer and Herrick invited animal control officers Welch, Hughes,

and Rossmiller to her home and that those officers seized her animals, impounded them, and

transported them to the Animal Shelter. See id. at 35, 58. The warrant issued on May 1, 2025

explicitly did “not authorize the removal or seizure of animals or property unless such removal

[wa]s required under exigent circumstances or authorized under a separate warrant or statutory

provision.” Order & Admin. Seach Warrant 1 (emphasis omitted). The return of the warrant,

filed by Scalf on May 13, 2025, indicates that “[d]uring the execution of the warrant, numerous

animals were discovered within the premises in various stages of health, unsanitary conditions

and some appearing malnourished” and that officers contacted the Animal Shelter and

“impounded the animals[ and] obtained medical evaluations.” Return, First Am. Compl. Ex. 1c,

ECF No. 15-1 at 82. The City represented that the Animal Shelter was “currently housing [the

animals] pursuant to impoundment procedures.” Id. Erickson, however, alleges that at the time

of the search her animals were thriving, her house was clean, and there was plenty of food for the

animals. See First Am. Compl. 61–62.

Erickson can proceed on an unreasonable seizure claim against Hamer, Herrick, Welch,

Hughes, and Rossmiller as they allegedly participated in seizing her animals without a warrant

and in the absence of exigent circumstances. Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir.

2001) (holding that “removal of an animal constitutes a ‘seizure’ for purposes of the Fourth

Amendment”); id. at 657–58 (noting that “[e]xigent circumstances may justify a warrantless

seizure of animals” when the animals are “in imminent danger” or in “dangerous or inhumane”

conditions). And, again, as Hamer is alleged to be final policymaker for the City, a claim for

unreasonable seizure against the City survives as well.

c. Excessive Force During Arrest

Erickson alleges that she was arrested during execution of the search and that Herrick

placed her in handcuffs with her arms behind her back. First Am. Compl. 39. She alleges that

Herrick knew she had arthritis and that she complained that she was in pain but that Herrick

refused to remove her handcuffs. See id. at 39, 43, 59. She alleges that she was cooperative with

the officers and was not a threat throughout the encounter. Id. at 37.

“[A]n officer may not knowingly use handcuffs in a way that will inflict unnecessary pain

or injury on an individual who presents little or no risk of flight or threat of injury.” Stainback v.

Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009). Erickson’s allegations support an inference that

Herrick knew the handcuffs were causing Erickson pain and that handcuffing her was

unnecessary and, accordingly, that Herrick’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

Erickson also alleges that “bystander Defendants” were present and “had a realistic

opportunity to do something to prevent harm from occurring to” her. First Am. Compl. 42. An

officer can be held liable for failure to intervene in this context if that officer had reason to know

“that excessive force was being used . . . and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene

to prevent the harm from occurring.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). Erickson

alleges that Herrick handcuffed her “under the supervision of” Hamer. First Am. Compl. 39.

Taking that allegation together with the allegation that Hamer was present that day in the light

most favorable to Erickson, the Court finds that there are sufficient allegations to hold Hamer

liable under a failure-to-intervene theory. As he is alleged to be a policymaker for the City, his

actions provide a basis to proceed on a claim against the City. Erickson alleges that the John and

Jane Doe officers saw Herrick handcuff her as well, see id. at 59 (“Herrick then asked his

approximately 10-15 uniformed officers to surround Erickson on her porch . . . handcuffed

Erickson[’]s hands behind her back while she cried out in immense pain . . . .”), so the Court

finds that an excessive force claim can proceed against those officers too.

d. Wrongful Arrest or Seizure of Person

Erickson alleges that after officers entered her home, she was “ordered . . . to sit down on

the floor” and not move. Id. at 37. She was handcuffed by Herrick under the supervision of

Hamer, then placed in Herrick’s squad car. Id. at 43. Herrick took her to the McDonough

District Hospital emergency room. Id. at 59. Erickson alleges that Herrick then worked together

with Clemens, a nurse at the emergency room, to file a petition for Erickson’s involuntary

judicial admission. Id. at 40. She alleges that Clemens and Herrick falsely alleged that she “was

a harm to herself or others” based only on the fact that she was upset. Id. She further alleges

that pursuant to the petition, which was without a judicial signature, she was transported to Lake

Behavioral Hospital and detained until June 3, 2025. See id. at 37, 40.

An arrest is a seizure of a person. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 312 (2021). “Arrests

must be supported by probable cause . . . .” Molina v. Latronico, 430 F. Supp. 3d 420, 434 (N.D.

Ill. 2019) (citing United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2018)). Erickson can

proceed on a claim for wrongful arrest against Herrick because she alleges that he seized her and

detained her in handcuffs and in his squad car when there was no probable cause to believe she

committed a crime or violated a law. She alleges compliance with the officers’ orders, First Am.

Compl. 39, and adequate treatment of her animals, compare id. at 61–62 (describing them as

“raised with love and in a trusting environment, that allowed them to thrive and be happy”), with

Mahnke v. Garrigan, 428 F. App’x 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding probable cause to arrest for

violation of animal welfare statute based on “the sight of five emaciated horses confined without

ready access to food, water, and shade”). For the same reasons an excessive force claim against

them survives, a wrongful arrest claim can proceed against Hamer, the City, and the John and

Jane Doe officers.

Erickson can also proceed on a claim for wrongful seizure against Herrick and Clemens

arising out of the petition for involuntary commitment. “The Fourth Amendment of the

Constitution governs mental-health seizures.” Bruce v. Guernsey, 777 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.

2015). An involuntary mental-health seizure may be made “only if there are reasonable grounds

for believing that the person seized is subject to seizure under the governing legal standard.”

Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992). Under the Illinois Mental Health Code,

an adult shall not be given mental health services that they refuse “unless such services are

necessary to prevent the recipient from causing serious and imminent physical harm to the

recipient or others and no less restrictive alternative is available.” 405 ILCS 5/2-107(a).

Erickson alleges that Herrick and Clemens “falsely alleg[ed] that [she] was a harm to herself or

others,” and that Clemens signed the certificate for involuntary admission “with knowingly false

and misleading information that she attested to without further facts except that Erickson was

upset.” First Am. Compl. 40. Accepting these allegations as true, there was no probable cause to

believe that Erickson was subject to seizure under the Illinois Mental Health Code since

detention was not necessary to prevent serious physical harm to Erickson or others. Because

Lake Behavioral Hospital is a private entity, it is not subject to a Fourth Amendment claim.

5. Count XV: False Imprisonment

Count XV, labeled “Excessive Detention,” is brought against Lake Behavioral Hospital

and Marcedo and is based on her alleged involuntary detention at Lake Behavioral Hospital. Id.

at 44–46. The Court construes this as a common law false imprisonment claim as Erickson

brings the claim against non-state actors. Because of Herrick and Clemens’s alleged roles in

Erickson’s involuntary detention, and because Erickson references them in this count, see id. at

45, the Court also construes the claim to be against them.

“The common law tort of false imprisonment is defined as an unlawful restraint of an

individual’s personal liberty or freedom of locomotion.” Lopez v. Winchell’s Donut House, 466

N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). To prevail on a false imprisonment claim, a plaintiff

must prove that “her personal freedom was curtailed against her wishes” and that “her detention

was unreasonable or unlawful.” Irvin v. S. Ill. Healthcare, 128 N.E.3d 1149, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct.

2019). To be liable for false imprisonment, a defendant’s actions must have “caused or procured

the restraint.” Arthur v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 1238, 1243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)

(quotation marks omitted). There must also be intent to restrain the plaintiff. Lopez, 466 N.E.2d

at 1311.

Erickson alleges sufficient facts to proceed on a false imprisonment claim against Lake

Behavioral Hospital, Herrick, and Clemens. Taking her allegations as true, her freedom was

curtailed against her wishes when she was involuntarily detained at Lake Behavioral Hospital.

See First Am. Compl. 40. Her allegations support a finding that the detention violated the

Illinois Mental Health Code, and that the actions of Lake Behavioral Hospital, Herrick, and

Clemens each “caused or procured the restraint.” Arthur, 692 N.E.2d at 1243 (quotation marks

omitted). She was actually restrained at Lake Behavioral Hospital. Even if undertaken believing

that they were acting lawfully, the actions Erickson alleges each of these Defendants took were

conscious, showing they intended to restrain Erickson.

There are not sufficient allegations, however, from which Marcedo could be held

personally liable for false imprisonment. Erickson alleges that Marcedo was notified of her false

detention and “did nothing,” First Am. Compl. 44, filed three involuntary judicial admission

petitions which were denied, id. at 45, and violated a duty to investigate Erickson’s claims that

she was wrongly being held against her will, id. These facts do not make for a plausible claim

that Marcedo “caused or procured” Erickson’s restraint at Lake Behavioral Hospital, Arthur, 692

N.E.2d at 1243—the petitions were denied, so they did not cause Erickson’s detention, and the

other allegations show only a failure of Marcedo to take action. The Court is not aware of any

basis for holding Marcedo liable based on her inaction.

6. Count XVI: Malicious Prosecution

In Count XVI, Erickson alleges that the civil action filed in state court by the City

seeking abatement of the code violation and a right to enter Erickson’s property was brought

maliciously. First Am. Compl. 46. A federal malicious prosecution claim “is housed in the

Fourth Amendment” so “the plaintiff . . . has to prove that the malicious prosecution resulted in a

seizure of the plaintiff.” Neita v. City of Chicago, 148 F.4th 916, 939 (7th Cir. 2025) (quotation

marks omitted). Erickson does not allege that the civil action resulted in her being seized, so she

cannot assert a federal malicious prosecution claim.

Even if the Court construes the claim as being one for malicious prosecution under

Illinois common law, Erickson still fails to state a claim. The elements of a common law

malicious prosecution claim are: “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal

or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the

plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and

(5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 564 N.E.2d 1222,

1231 (Ill. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] favorable termination is limited to only those

legal dispositions that can give rise to an inference of lack of probable cause.” Cult Awareness

Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 685 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (Ill. 1997). A dismissal solely on

technical or procedural grounds does not give rise to a lack of probable cause. Id. (citing 54

C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 54 (1987)). The civil suit against Erickson was dismissed

voluntarily by the City of Macomb without prejudice, Order Granting Mot. Dismiss, First Am.

Compl. Ex. 4a, ECF No. 15-1 at 93, because Erickson “refuse[d] personal jurisdiction of the

court.” 2025OV118, Judici: McDonough Cnty., IL,

https://judici.com/courts/cases/case_history.jsp?court=IL055015J&ocl=IL055015J,2025OV118,I

L055015JL2025OV118D1 (last visited Jan. 27, 2026). Because the civil suit was not dismissed

in a way that creates an inference of lack of probable cause, Erickson cannot maintain an Illinois

malicious prosecution claim. Count XVI is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

7. Counts XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, and XXI: Failure to Provide

Due Process of Law

Erickson alleges that “Defendants” deprived her of liberty and property without due

process of law in four distinct ways: 1) failing to provide notice before obtaining a warrant and

conducting a search of her property, e.g., First Am. Compl. 49; 2) failing to provide notice before

taking court action to enforce the municipal code, e.g., id. at 49–50; 3) failing to provide

impoundment documents after confiscating her service dog and Persian clowder, id. at 31, 38,

56; and 4) failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her hearing before the Zoning

Board of Appeals, id. at 53–56. To state a claim for a Due Process Clause violation, a plaintiff

must allege (1) that she had a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) that

she was deprived of that interest without sufficient procedural protection. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The amount of process due is determined by balancing a

plaintiff’s interest in the liberty or property deprived and the value of additional safeguards

against the burden additional procedure would place on the government. See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

a. Failure to Give Notice Before Obtaining a Search

Warrant

This claim is governed by the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. See

Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 884–85 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Dressing a Fourth Amendment

claim up in due process language does not transform it into a Fourteenth Amendment claim.”

(citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975))); City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525

U.S. 234, 246 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e have never before

suggested that procedural due process governs the execution of a criminal search warrant.”).

And the Fourth Amendment does not require “prior notice and hearing in connection with the

issuance of search warrants.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978). Erickson

appears to believe that City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015), stands for the

proposition that precompliance hearings are necessary before an administrative search warrant

may be effectuated. First Am. Compl. 3, 51. But that is not what Patel says. At issue in Patel

was a Los Angeles ordinance providing that hotel operators must make their guest records

available to any Los Angeles Police Department officer for inspection. Patel, 576 U.S. at 413.

The Supreme Court characterized the ordinance as allowing for warrantless searches and held

that it was “facially unconstitutional because it fail[ed] to provide hotel operators with an

opportunity for precompliance review.” Id. at 419. Patel is irrelevant because a warrant to

search Erickson’s property was obtained. This claim is DISMISSED.

b. Failure to Provide Notice Before Taking Court Action

Erickson alleges that the City violated her due process rights by failing to provide her

with notice of suspected ordinance violations concerning property maintenance and zoning

before filing an action against her in court. See First Am. Compl. 50–51. She indicates that such

notice is required by the International Property Maintenance Code which was adopted by the

City in its local ordinances. Id. But “the Constitution does not require state and local

governments to adhere to their procedural promises.” River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park,

23 F.3d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1994). The Court has found no authority suggesting that the

Constitution requires a municipality to enforce its municipal code before commencing a civil suit

or to provide notice prior to initiating a civil action. This claim is DISMISSED.

c. Failure to Provide Impoundment Documents

Erickson complains that “Defendants” failed to provide her with impoundment

documents and notices “required by law following the seizure of her animals.” First Am. Compl.

52. The laws she refers to are “the Illinois Animal Welfare Act, Animal Control Act, Illinois

Humane Care for Animals Act, and related statutes.” Id. Again, the failure to follow state or

local law cannot itself form the basis of a due process claim. But the Due Process Clause does

require government officials to give notice of the manner by which an owner of seized property

might seek its return. See Perkins, 525 U.S at 240 (“[W]hen law enforcement agents seize

property pursuant to warrant, due process requires them to take reasonable steps to give notice

that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for its return.”).

Erickson alleges that she has never received “any impoundment documents” and that this has

“deprived [her] of the necessary information to understand the basis of the impoundment, the

condition and location of her impounded property, and the procedural steps available to contest

the impoundment and seek the return of her property.” First Am. Compl. 58–59. At this stage,

the Court finds that Erickson has included enough allegations to proceed on a due process claim

against those involved in the seizure of her animals: Hamer, Herrick, Welch, Hughes, and

Rossmiller. As Hamer is alleged to be a final policymaker for the City, the claim survives

against the City too.

d. Failure to Receive a Fair Hearing before the ZBA

Erickson alleges that she was not provided reasonable accommodations for the hearing

before the ZBA and, accordingly, she was deprived of the opportunity to participate in a hearing

to pursue her appeal. Id. at 53. The accommodations at issue are the same as discussed with

respect to the ADA claim. Erickson also alleges that she was not informed of the issues or the

“itinerary . . . to be discussed that pertained to her property.” Id. The procedure due in zoning

cases is typically minimal. See River Park, Inc., 23 F.3d at 166. However, greater due process

protections are provided when a zoning procedure is “adjudicative in nature.” Coniston Corp. v.

Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1988). The appeal described in the First

Amended Complaint is adjudicative in nature because the ZBA made a determination specific to

Erickson’s property and was enforcing, rather than creating, a generally applicable rule. L C &

S, Inc. v. Warren Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 244 F.3d 601, 604–05 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding relevant, for

the purposes of determining whether an action was legislative or adjudicative, “the generality

and consequences” of the enactment and whether it operated purely prospectively or also

sanctioned past conduct). A hearing (generally pre-deprivation) is “the core principle of federal

due process protections.” Luster v. Village of Ashmore, 76 F.4th 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2023). In the

context of other constitutionally mandated hearings, disability accommodations are necessary to

satisfy due process. See, e.g., Holmes v. Godinez, 311 F.R.D. 177, 238–39 (N.D. Ill. 2015)

(denying a motion to dismiss because issues of fact would determine whether an American Sign

Language interpreter was necessary to protect inmates’ due process rights in disciplinary

proceedings).

The Court finds that, at this stage, Erickson has sufficiently alleged that the City violated

her procedural due process rights by failing to provide her accommodations in conjunction with

the ZBA hearing. The claim can also proceed against Lambert, Scalf, Coker, and Inman because

Erickson alleges that she made requests for accommodations to these Defendants and did not

receive a response. See First Am. Compl. 25, 48–49.

8. Count XXII: Conspiracy to Falsify Medical Records

In Count XXII, Erickson asserts a claim for conspiracy to falsify medical records under

405 ILCS 5/2-601(c). First Am. Compl. 59. Presumably, Erickson means to refer to 405 ILCS

5/3-601(c) which states that “[k]knowingly making a material false statement in [a] petition [for

involuntary admission] is a Class A misdemeanor.” But there is generally no private right of

action for enforcement of criminal laws. See Chapa v. Adams, 168 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir.

1999) (“Criminal statutes, which express prohibitions rather than personal entitlements and

specify a particular remedy other than civil litigation, are accordingly poor candidates for the

imputation of private rights of action.”). Illinois courts have declined to imply private rights of

action for similar statutes criminalizing fraudulent conduct. O’Malley v. Adams, 227 N.E.3d 800,

811 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023) (criminal forgery statute).

Even if the Court construed the claim as one for fraud under Illinois common law,

Erickson would fail to state a claim for relief. A plaintiff must “state with particularity the

circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). That means a plaintiff must allege “the

who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud.” United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental

Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, Erickson alleges that Clemens and

Herrick made false statements or misrepresentations about her in her medical records or in the

petition for involuntary admission they filled out. See First Am. Compl. 59–63. But she does

not allege with particularity who reviewed the statements and relied on them to cause Erickson

harm. Essentially, the complaint does not allege the “how” of the fraud. This claim is

DISMISSED.

9. Violation of Illinois Animal Welfare Act

Though Erickson does not explicitly bring a claim for violation of the Illinois Animal

Welfare Act, 225 ILCS 605/1–605/22, she references it throughout the First Amended

Complaint, asserting that the seizure of her animals violated the Act. See, e.g., First Am. Compl.

35. But the Illinois Animal Welfare Act provides that anyone who violates the Act “is guilty of a

Class C misdemeanor and every day a violation continues constitutes a separate offense.” 225

ILCS 605/20. There is no private right of action for violation of this Act, so any asserted claim

under the Illinois Animal Welfare Act is DISMISSED.

V. Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and Motion for Leave to

Correct Error in Second Amended Complaint

On November 17, 2025, while her motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint

remained pending, Erickson submitted a motion for leave to file another amended complaint,

attaching a proposed complaint running 139 pages and bringing thirty counts against a nearly

identical set of more than six dozen defendants. See Proposed Second Am. Compl., Mot. Leave

File Ex. 1, ECF No. 18-1. Her motion does not provide any detail about the difference between

the First Amended Complaint and the proposed additional complaint. To the extent Erickson

intended this additional complaint to further address the issues raised in the Court’s October 3,

2025 Order, she provides no explanation for her failure to file the motion for leave to file until

almost a month past the deadline for filing an amended complaint.

The Court DENIES the request for leave to file another amended complaint. If

considering this under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the Court concludes that justice

does not require granting leave to file this amended complaint. Erickson’s original complaint

was dismissed because it was unduly long and confusing. See Oct. 3, 2025 Order 4–5. The new

proposed complaint is even longer than the First Amended Complaint that the Court has already

allowed to be filed and reviewed. And the proposed amended complaint was drafted without the

benefit of the Court’s merit review of the First Amended Complaint—there are many claims in

the proposed amended complaint that the Court has dismissed in this Order. To the extent the

Court considers the motion a belated motion for an extension of the October 21, 2025 deadline to

file an amended complaint, Erickson does not identify any excusable neglect for her nearly one-

month delay. Although the Court understands that Erickson suffers from disabilities that make it

challenging to write quickly, she had already filed one motion for leave to file an amended

complaint just one day after the deadline. And she filed two motions a week before filing the

instant motion. See generally Mot. Reconsider; Mot. Accommodations. This litigation activity

suggests that the extra time was not necessary. As the Court has denied leave to file the proposed

second amended complaint, the motion to correct an error in that complaint is MOOT.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Heidi Erickson’s motion for leave to file a first

amended complaint, ECF No. 15, is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the First

Amended Complaint, Mot. Leave to File First Am. Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 15-1, on the docket.

Her motion to reconsider the Court’s October 3, 2025 Order, ECF No. 17, is MOOT. Her

motion for accommodations, ECF No. 16, is also MOOT. Her motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint, ECF No. 18, is DENIED. Her motion to correct an error in her second

amended complaint, ECF No. 20, is MOOT. After reviewing her First Amended Complaint, the

Court allows the following claims to proceed against the Defendants identified according to the

following table:

Claim Defendants

Replevin McDonough County

ADA Discrimination City of Macomb, V. Covington, LLC d/b/a Lake Behavioral

Hospital, V. Covington Realty, LLC d/b/a Lake Behavioral

Hospital

ADA Failure to City of Macomb

Accommodate

Fourth Amendment: Jeff Hamer, Bryce Herrick, Miranda Lambert, Billy McMillin,

Search John/Jane Doe officers, Lisa Scalf, City of Macomb

Fourth Amendment: Jeff Hamer, Bryce Herrick, Zack Welch, Wendy Hughes, Joe

Seizure of Property Rossmiller, City of Macomb

Fourth Amendment: Jeff Hamer, Bryce Herrick, John/Jane Doe officers, City of

Excessive Use of Force Macomb

Fourth Amendment: Jeff Hamer, Bryce Herrick, John/Jane Doe officers, Megan

Seizure of Person Clemens, City of Macomb

False Imprisonment: Bryce Herrick, Megan Clemens, V. Covington, LLC d/b/a Lake

Behavioral Hospital, V. Covington Realty, LLC d/b/a Lake

Behavioral Hospital

Fourteenth Amendment City of Macomb, Jeff Hamer, Bryce Herrick, Zack Welch,

Due Process: Wendy Hughes, Joe Rossmiller, Lisa Scalf, Michael Inman, Scott

Coker, Miranda Lambert

All other claims and Defendants are DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

1) This case is now in the process of service on the remaining Defendants: McDonough

County, City of Macomb, V. Covington, LLC d/b/a Lake Behavioral Hospital, V.

Covington Realty, LLC d/b/a Lake Behavioral Hospital, Jeff Hamer, Bryce Herrick,

Miranda Lambert, Billy McMillin, Lisa Scalf, Zack Welch, Wendy Hughes, Joe

Rossmiller, Megan Clemens, Michael Inman, and Scott Coker. Plaintiff Heidi

Erickson is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the remaining Defendants

before filing any motions so that Defendants have notice and an opportunity to

respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel have filed

appearances will generally be denied as premature.

2) The Court orders the U.S. Marshal to serve Defendants McDonough County, City of

Macomb, and Michael Inman. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). The Clerk is DIRECTED to

prepare and issue summonses for the City of Macomb, Michael Inman, and

McDonough County and forward them along with copies of the First Amended

Complaint and this Order to the U.S. Marshal for service. The U.S. Marshal shall

serve the City of Macomb by delivering the summons, Order, and First Amended

Complaint to the City of Macomb’s Mayor Michael Inman or the city clerk in

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) and 735 ILCS 5/2-211. The

U.S. Marshal shall serve Michael Inman with those documents pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). The U.S. Marshal shall serve McDonough County by

delivering those documents to the chairperson of the McDonough County Board or

the County Clerk in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) and 735

ILCS 5/2-211.

3) The Court will attempt to obtain waivers of service for the remaining Defendants. The

Clerk is DIRECTED to update the below-identified notices of lawsuit and request to

waive services of summons forms Erickson filed and send them along with two

copies of the waiver of service of summons form (one of which is to be signed by

Defendant or its counsel and returned to the Court within sixty days), a copy of the

First Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order to the addresses listed here or in

the notices. The notices can be found at the docket locations listed below.

a. For Scott Coker: ECF No. 4-13.

b. For Jeff Hamer: ECF No. 4-22.

c. For Bryce Herrick: ECF No. 4-24.

d. For Joe Rossmiller: ECF No. 4-33.

e. For Miranda Lambert: ECF No. 4-44.

f. For V. Covington Realty, LLC: ECF No. 4-48. This is to be mailed to V.

Covington Realty, LLC.’s registered agent C T Corporation System 208 S.

Lasalle St. Suite 814 Chicago, IL 60604.

g. For V. Covington, LLC: ECF No. 4-49. This is to be mailed to V. Covington,

LLC’s registered agent C T Corporation System 208 S. Lasalle St. Suite 814

Chicago, IL 60604.

h. For Megan Clemens: ECF No. 4-53.

i. For Zack Welch: ECF No. 30-6.

4) The Court was unable to locate proposed notices with mailing addresses for Wendy

Hughes, Billy McMillin, or Lisa Scalf. Erickson is DIRECTED to submit proposed

notices of lawsuit and requests to waiver service of summons addressed to Hughes,

McMillin, and Scalf that include their mailing addresses. These must be filed by

February 10, 2026.

5) The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate the following parties who are currently listed

on the docket as Defendants: Larry Adams, Julia Albarracin, Belinda Carr, Kali

Foxall, Julie Flynn, Brandon Nelson, Lorette Oden, Doug Rossio, Korri Cameron,

McDonough County Board, McDonough County Treasurers Office, Humane Society

of McDonough County, McDonough County Animal Shelter, Eric Blakely, Karen

Blakely, Bonnie Scripps, Dana Moon, Ken Durkin, Terri Hare, Amy Betz, J

Biernbaum, Dave Monninger, Felix Chu, Patti Douglas, Ann Stites, Jennifer Tibbitts,

Sharon Lindahl, Candice Biswell, Brian Waller, Brandi Baker, Savannah Ballard,

McDonough District Hospital, Bill Murdock, Patrick Osterman, Cindy Marcedo,

Heidi Benson, Gene Curtis, ReMax Realty, Amanda Silberger, Steven Silberger, and

Samantha Cameron.

6) The Clerk is DIRECTED to email a copy of this Order to Erickson.

Entered this 27th day of January, 2026.

s/ Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE