O'Neal Johnson v. Ryan Edwards

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-1503

ONEAL JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RYAN EDWARDS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:21-cv-00738 — Lindsay C. Jenkins, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2025 — DECIDED JANUARY 27, 2026

____________________

Before SCUDDER, PRYOR, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.

KOLAR, Circuit Judge. Oneal Johnson sued four Chicago po-

lice officers alleging they violated his rights under the U.S.

Constitution and subjected him to malicious prosecution un-

der Illinois law. All his claims arise from the same incident in

April 2019, when police arrested him for disorderly conduct

and he was injured on the way to the police station. Police

arrested Johnson because they concluded he refused to depart

an active crime scene. And he was injured when, after

2 No. 24-1503

refusing officers’ attempts to fasten his seatbelt in the backseat

of a police car, the officer transporting him braked suddenly

and sent him head-first into a plexiglass divider in the police

car. The district court entered summary judgment against

Johnson on all his claims, which he appeals. We affirm.

I. Background

We first outline the underlying facts, then turn to this

case’s procedural history. We present the facts in the light

most favorable to Johnson, and draw all reasonable inferences

in his favor, because he opposes summary judgment. See

James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2020).

A. Underlying Facts

Around 3:00 a.m. on April 21, 2019, Johnson was walking

toward 75th Street and Champlain Avenue in Chicago. He en-

countered an active crime scene where the defendants, and

other Chicago Police Department personnel, were investigat-

ing a shooting. Police tape had been placed around the scene

by the time Johnson arrived. Several officers’ body-worn cam-

eras captured this encounter.

The police ordered Johnson to leave the scene—telling him

he could not cross into the crime scene—which angered him.

And the situation escalated quickly. Johnson yelled at the of-

ficers, used racial slurs, and swore repeatedly; some officers

yelled and swore in response. Police told Johnson they would

arrest him if he did not leave. They ordered him to depart

many times.

Johnson sent mixed messages on whether he would com-

ply with these orders. At one point he took a few steps away

from the crime scene, suggesting he was leaving; at another

he pointed toward the crime scene, said “I’m trying to go that

No. 24-1503 3

way[,]” “you don’t tell me sh*t[,]” and “I’m going the other

way… But I’m gonna check you b**ches in the door before I

go, so I ain’t trying to go that way, brother.” It was after this

last statement that police arrested Johnson.

Johnson was agitated as police put him in the police car

and told them repeatedly to stop touching him. After he was

in the car, officer Monica Mata (a defendant here) tried to put

on his seatbelt. But Johnson refused, saying “I don’t need that,

get that sh*t off around me.” Mata then asked if Johnson

wanted a seatbelt, to which he said, “[h]*ll no. Get that sh*t

off[.]” So Mata left Johnson’s seatbelt unfastened.

Officers Ryan Edwards and Dennis Hecker, Jr. (also de-

fendants here) took Johnson to the police station; Hecker

drove. The car’s dashboard camera recorded the drive from

the perspective of the hood of the car, showing the hood and

the street in front of the car, but nothing inside the car. The

camera also recorded audio.

During the drive, officer Hecker drove quickly with the

police lights on and passed through multiple red lights and

stop signs without coming to a full stop. About two and a half

minutes into the trip, as the car neared another red-light in-

tersection, Johnson (who had been chattering the whole drive)

told officer Hecker to slow down. Officer Hecker did so, brak-

ing harder than he had at prior stops. The stop was abrupt

enough that the hood of the car pitched forward. This hard

stop caused Johnson, whose hands were cuffed behind his

back, to lurch forward in his seat and hit his head on the di-

vider between him and the officers in the front seats. Hecker,

presumably because he heard the impact, said “I’m sorry.”

Johnson cried out, then fell silent for the rest of the drive.

4 No. 24-1503

The car pulled into the police station around two and a

half minutes after Johnson hit his head. It was then, after of-

ficers tried to get Johnson out of the car, that they realized he

was unconscious. They tried to rouse him, and a minute later

called for an ambulance. Johnson came to and requested to be

taken to a hospital. When paramedics arrived they took him

to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with and treated for a

cut lip.

Though Johnson was later charged with disorderly con-

duct under the Municipal Code of Chicago for failing to obey

an order of a peace officer, the charges were dropped in May

2019.

B. Procedural History

In February 2021, Johnson (pro se) sued (among others) the

four officers directly involved in his arrest and transport to

the police station: Timothy Balasz, Ryan Edwards, Monica

Mata, and Dennis Hecker, Jr. In March 2023, Johnson, now

with pro bono counsel, filed an amended complaint that dis-

missed all but the defendants still named here. The amended

complaint asserted four federal-law claims via 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and one state-law claim. The federal-law claims allege:

(1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment

(against all defendants);

(2) state-created danger in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause (against Hecker and

Mata);

(3) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment

(against Hecker); and

No. 24-1503 5

(4) failure to provide adequate medical care in violation of

the Fourth Amendment (against Edwards and

Hecker).

As for Illinois law, Johnson alleged malicious prosecution

against all defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the

district court granted. Johnson, through his pro bono counsel,

appealed. We thank pro bono counsel for their able advocacy

on Johnson’s behalf.

II. Discussion

We review the district court’s decision on summary judg-

ment de novo, viewing all facts and drawing all reasonable in-

ferences in favor of Johnson, the nonmovant. James, 959 F.3d

at 314. Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party “is en-

titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At

summary judgment, we do not weigh evidence or make cred-

ibility determinations. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th

Cir. 2014).

Johnson challenges summary judgment for defendants.

We consider his claims below and ultimately affirm. But be-

fore doing so, we explain qualified immunity because it is the

principal reason we must affirm.

A. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity

Johnson brings his federal-law claims via 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

a procedural vehicle to seek damages from a state official who

violates constitutional rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

393–94 (1989). To succeed, Johnson must overcome the “high

6 No. 24-1503

bar” of qualified immunity, which shields government offi-

cials from liability unless they violate clearly established law.

Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook County, 993 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2021).

To determine whether qualified immunity attaches, we

ask: (1) “whether the plaintiff’s allegations make out a depri-

vation of a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right

was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged mis-

conduct.” Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir.

2021) (cleaned up). If the answer under either prong is “no,”

immunity attaches and bars a claim. Qualified immunity is a

question of law for courts, Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 734

(7th Cir. 2021), and we may discuss these two prongs in either

order, Tousis v. Billiot, 84 F.4th 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2023).

The first prong gets at the merits of Johnson’s claim—

whether a defendant in fact violated a constitutional right.

The second prong, whether the right was clearly established,

gets at whether the right was “sufficiently clear that every rea-

sonable official would have understood that what he is doing

violates that right.” Lopez, 993 F.3d at 988 (quoting Reichle v.

Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663–65 (2012)). Accordingly, “qualified

immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). A right is clearly established when:

(1) “a closely analogous case” finds “the alleged violation

unlawful[;]”

(2) the relevant caselaw shows such a clear trend “that we

can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the

right by a controlling precedent was merely a question

of time[;]” or

No. 24-1503 7

(3) in rare cases, the defendant’s conduct was “so egre-

gious and unreasonable that no reasonable official

could have thought he was acting lawfully.”

Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 620–21 (7th Cir.

2022) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has told us

many times to look for rights “defined with specificity[;]”

rights defined only at “a high level of generality” are not

clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity.

Weiland v. Loomis, 938 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting

cases).

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—

the need to hold public officials accountable when they exer-

cise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009). “At the heart of this justification for a qualified im-

munity for the individual official is the concern that the threat

of personal monetary liability will introduce an unwarranted

and unconscionable consideration into the decisionmaking

process, thus paralyzing the governing official’s decisiveness

and distorting his judgment on matters of public policy.”

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655–56 (1980) (em-

phasis removed).

With these principles in mind, we turn first to Johnson’s

false-arrest claim.

B. False Arrest

In Count I of his amended complaint, Johnson alleges all

defendants arrested him without probable cause and thus vi-

olated the Fourth Amendment’s bar against unreasonable sei-

zures. We do not need to address, however, whether officers

8 No. 24-1503

in fact had probable cause to arrest Johnson. Regardless of

whether probable cause existed, defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity because probable cause was at least argu-

able.

“To prevail on a Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, a

plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his

arrest.” Braun v. Village of Palatine, 56 F.4th 542, 548 (7th Cir.

2022) (cleaned up). In the context of qualified immunity, if

probable cause is arguable, a plaintiff cannot show an officer

violated her clearly established right to be free from arrest.

Accordingly, “a reasonable officer [who] could mistakenly

have believed that he had probable cause to make the arrest”

is entitled to qualified immunity. McComas v. Brickley, 673

F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis removed). “Arguable

probable cause” exists where “a reasonable officer in the same

circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the of-

ficer in question could have reasonably believed that probable

cause existed in light of well-established law[.]” Mwangangi v.

Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816, 825 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

To determine whether defendants arguably had probable

cause to arrest Johnson, we must look to the offense underly-

ing his arrest. See Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2023).

That offense is disorderly conduct as defined by the Munici-

pal Code of Chicago. A person commits disorderly conduct

under the code when he knowingly “[f]ails to obey an order

by a peace officer … issued under circumstances where it is

reasonable to believe that the order is necessary to allow pub-

lic safety officials to address a situation that threatens the pub-

lic health, safety, or welfare[.]” Chi., Ill., Mun. Code § 8-4-

010(e).

No. 24-1503 9

We conclude defendants had at the very least arguable

probable cause to arrest Johnson for disorderly conduct—for

failing to obey police’s orders to depart, which they issued to

protect an active crime scene. When Johnson encountered de-

fendants, they were investigating a recent shooting in the area

and guarding an active crime scene. That context carries sig-

nificant weight. Crime scenes are sensitive places, and law en-

forcement may take reasonable steps to “secure crime scenes

and accident sites” to “protect the integrity and confidential-

ity of investigations.” ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th

Cir. 2012). Though police told Johnson repeatedly he could

not enter the active crime scene, he stayed put and sent mixed

messages about whether he would comply with officers’ or-

ders. Police were understandably concerned about preserving

the scene and ordered Johnson to depart many times, yet he

remained. On these facts, probable cause arguably existed to

arrest Johnson for disorderly conduct as the Municipal Code

of Chicago defines it. We certainly could not conclude officers

had no arguable basis to find probable cause on such facts.

Johnson, in opposing that probable cause was arguable,

analogizes his case to two others, one from a Massachusetts

district court and another from the Eighth Circuit. Setting

aside that neither case binds us, each is distinguishable.

In Waterman v. City of Taunton, 742 F. Supp. 3d 144, 159–60

(D. Mass. 2024), the district court held a defendant lacked

even arguable probable cause to arrest a plaintiff—who

screamed profanities at officers from his front porch—for dis-

orderly conduct. But unlike the case before us, officers in Wa-

terman arrested plaintiff outside his home, not adjacent to an

active crime scene. Id. at 152–53. The Eighth Circuit case John-

son cites, Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465 (8th Cir.

10 No. 24-1503

2010) (per curiam), is similarly inapt. It too does not address

police guarding an active crime scene. Rather, police there ar-

rested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct after plaintiffs pro-

tested “mindless consumerism” by “dress[ing] in zombie cos-

tumes, walk[ing] erratically, and broadcast[ing] anti-consum-

erism statements over” a speaker. Id. at 477.

Given law enforcement’s many orders to depart the crime

scene and their strong interest in preserving it, defendants

could have reasonably concluded they had probable cause to

arrest Johnson for disorderly conduct under the Municipal

Code of Chicago. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity for Johnson’s false-arrest claim.

C. State-Created Danger

In Count II, Johnson alleges officers Hecker and Mata vio-

lated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by ex-

posing him to a state-created danger: failing to fasten his seat-

belt while knowing he was handcuffed and could not brace

himself against sudden movements of the police car. Because

we conclude defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on

this claim as well, we affirm.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

says that “[n]o state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1. “[D]ue process ‘generally confer[s] no affirmative

right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be nec-

essary to secure life, liberty, or property interests[.]’” Doe v.

Village of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489

U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has cau-

tioned that the Clause “does not transform every tort

No. 24-1503 11

committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.”

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202. That said, “[t]here are two recog-

nized exceptions to the DeShaney rule.” Est. of Her v. Hoeppner,

939 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019). The one at issue here is the

state-created-danger doctrine.

“[W]hen a public official affirmatively places a particular

individual in a position of danger the individual would not

otherwise have faced, the official may be liable for a due-pro-

cess violation if injury results.” Id. (cleaned up). This is a “nar-

row” doctrine that is “reserved for ‘egregious’ conduct by

public officials.” Id. (citation omitted). To recover for injuries

resulting from a state-created danger, a plaintiff must prove

that the state created or increased the danger to them, that its

failure to protect them caused their injury, and that its behav-

ior shocked the conscience. King v. East St. Louis School District

189, 496 F.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007).

Merits aside, Johnson cannot overcome qualified immun-

ity because he has not shown he had a clearly established

right to be free from the unbelted car ride he suffered. He has

pointed to no case discussing state-created danger based on

facts like these. Rather, the precedent he relies on primarily

discusses Eighth Amendment claims, which involve a distinct

(if somewhat analogous) analysis from state-created danger

under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Est. of Her, 939 F.3d at

876 (observing the “shocks the conscience” element of a state-

created-danger claim “requires a culpable state of mind

equivalent to deliberate indifference,” but listing other ele-

ments not required for an Eighth Amendment claim).

Even setting this difference aside, the Eighth Amendment

cases Johnson cites are inapplicable because they address far

worse conduct. For example, Johnson cites Thompson v.

12 No. 24-1503

Virginia, 878 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2017). In Thompson, defendants

subjected the plaintiff, a Virginia prisoner, to a “rough ride”

while transporting him to a hearing. Id. at 94. During the ride,

plaintiff said defendants intentionally drove erratically—by

speeding, stopping suddenly, and turning sharply—to throw

him about the back of the van. Id. “Meanwhile, [plaintiff’s] re-

straints prevented him from protecting himself from slam-

ming against the walls of the van” repeatedly. Id. Plaintiff

pled with officers to stop, but they did not; they instead

“laughed and taunted him.” Id. at 94–95.

Though we do not doubt Johnson here suffered a painful

injury during his ride to the police station, his facts fall far

short of those in Thompson. Remember, Johnson was not seat-

belted because he refused officers’ attempt to secure him. The

officer driving apologized for the single stop that injured

Johnson, revealing a less culpable state of mind than the offic-

ers possessed in Thompson. And perhaps most importantly,

the plaintiff in Thompson was subjected to multiple driving

tactics apparently intended to cause harm by throwing the

plaintiff about the back of the van. Accordingly, we cannot

say Thompson clearly established Johnson’s right to be free

from the ride he underwent at defendants’ hands. Thus, we

hold defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on his

state-created-danger claim.

D. Excessive Force

In Count III, Johnson alleges officer Hecker used excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment while transport-

ing him to the police station. Specifically, he alleges officer

Hecker subjected him to a “rough ride” by “intentionally”

coming “to a sudden stop,” causing him “to lurch forward”

and hit his head. But whether officer Hecker in fact used

No. 24-1503 13

excessive force in braking too hard, Johnson’s claim on this

front—like his state-created-danger claim—fails for qualified

immunity.

We determine whether force is excessive in violation of the

Fourth Amendment by asking whether the officer’s actions

are “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circum-

stances confronting” the officer. Lopez, 993 F.3d at 987 (quot-

ing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a partic-

ular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a rea-

sonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision

of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. We conduct this anal-

ysis “without regard” for the officer’s “underlying intent or

motivation.” Id. at 397.

What force is reasonable is highly fact-bound, making it

“especially important” to define rights specifically as we ana-

lyze qualified immunity in this context. Kisela v. Hughes, 584

U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “Use of

excessive force is an area of the law in which the result de-

pends very much on the facts of each case, and thus police

officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing

precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue.” Id.

(cleaned up).

Johnson argues he had a clearly established right against

“the gratuitous use of force on an unarmed, restrained misde-

meanant arrestee.” But this defines the inquiry too broadly. In

Sallenger v. Oakes (a case Johnson cites), for example, officers

“delivered repeated, closed-fist blows and blows with flash-

lights” to a plaintiff after he was already handcuffed, and

“continued to strike [him] … after he had stopped trying to

kick or move[.]” 473 F.3d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted). In analyzing qualified immunity, we asked

14 No. 24-1503

specifically whether it was clearly established that: “adminis-

tering closed-fist punches and flashlight blows, including

ones to the head, after the arrestee was handcuffed, continu-

ing to strike him after he had stopped resisting arrest and fail-

ing to place him in the proper position after hobbling him”

violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 742.

As in Sallenger, we must determine whether Johnson had

a clearly established right to be free from the specific conduct

at issue—here, braking too hard at a red light while he was

not wearing a seatbelt. We conclude he did not. None of the

precedent Johnson cites would put officer Hecker on notice

that Hecker’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

For example, Johnson cites Stockton v. Milwaukee County,

44 F.4th 605 (7th Cir. 2022). Setting aside that this case arose

under the Eighth Amendment and after the events at issue in

this case, it did not address an alleged “rough ride” at all.

There, we held qualified immunity did not protect a defend-

ant who propped up a stumbling inmate, then intentionally

let the inmate fall to the ground and “hit his head ‘very hard’

on the floor[,]” all while swearing and screaming at him. Id.

at 620. The same goes for Sallenger, in which we denied qual-

ified immunity to defendants who arrested a plaintiff and

then senselessly beat him into the ground even after he was

secured and stopped moving. 473 F.3d at 740.

The only authority that Johnson offers addressing police

transport claims directly is out-of-circuit, though this alone is

not dispositive. In assessing whether a right is clearly estab-

lished, we first look to “controlling Supreme Court precedent

and our own circuit decisions on the issue[.]” Gray, 75 F.4th at

717 (citation omitted). After doing so, we may then look to

“all relevant caselaw” and ask “whether there was such a

No. 24-1503 15

clear trend in the caselaw that we can say with fair assurance

that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent

was merely a question of time.” Id. (citation omitted).

But we cannot say the out-of-circuit cases Johnson cites

meet this standard. Only one case addresses a Fourth Amend-

ment claim involving post-arrest transport by police, and its

facts are worse. See McCowan v. Morales, 945 F.3d 1276, 1280

(10th Cir. 2019) (denying qualified immunity to a defendant

who engaged in “fast, jerky driving” that “repeatedly

slammed” a plaintiff “throughout the backseat ‘like a ping

pong ball,’” and laughed while the plaintiff begged him to

slow down). The other arose under the Eighth Amendment in

the prison context.1 See Thompson, 878 F.3d at 102. Though this

case offers some support for the viability of Fourth Amend-

ment “rough ride” claims, it is not enough to show a “clear

trend” that would have fairly put officer Hecker on notice his

conduct was unlawful.

In sum, many of the cases Johnson cites do not address al-

leged rough rides. And those out-of-circuit cases that do are

distinct because officers’ conduct in those cases was far worse

than officer Hecker’s. Thus, officer Hecker is entitled to qual-

ified immunity against Johnson’s excessive-force claim.

1 Johnson also cites Scott v. Becher, 736 F. App’x 130 (6th Cir. 2018)

(reversing dismissal for qualified immunity where defendant’s driving of

a prison van “catapulted” a plaintiff out of his seat and “slammed [him]

down onto his head, neck, and back”). Scott not only arose in the Eighth

Amendment context, but is an unpublished, nonprecedential opinion

from a sister circuit, so we do not consider it further.

16 No. 24-1503

E. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care

In Count IV (Johnson’s final federal claim), Johnson al-

leges officers Edwards and Hecker, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, failed to provide him adequate medical care af-

ter he hit his head. Though defendants called paramedics af-

ter they arrived at the station and realized Johnson was hurt—

just a few minutes after he hit his head—Johnson says defend-

ants should have done more. Because Johnson cannot over-

come qualified immunity here, either, we affirm.

Johnson’s claim arose from facts that occurred before a

probable-cause hearing, so it is governed by the Fourth

Amendment. Village of Palatine, 56 F.4th at 551. We thus ask,

weighing factors such as “the seriousness of the medical

need” and “the scope of the requested treatment,” whether

officers Edwards and Hecker acted in an objectively reasona-

ble way. Id. (cleaned up). Johnson must also show the delay

caused him “some degree of harm” using “verifying medical

evidence[.]” Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, 74 F.4th

496, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2023).

In support of his argument that he had a clearly estab-

lished right to better treatment from defendants, Johnson

cites, though he does not discuss, two district court cases that

post-date the facts here: Kudla v. City of Hammond, 2022 WL

2171229, at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 16, 2022), and Snukis v. Taylor,

2022 WL 2305697, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 27, 2022). But a handful

of district court cases does not clearly establish a constitu-

tional right. See Lojuk v. Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 631 (7th Cir.

1985) (stating that one analogous circuit court case, one anal-

ogous district court case, and several other distantly related

cases were not enough to clearly establish a constitutional

right). Johnson also distinguishes Pulera v. Sarzant, on which

No. 24-1503 17

the district court below relied, where we found officers acted

reasonably in rendering emergency aid. 966 F.3d 540, 556 (7th

Cir. 2020). But concluding that certain conduct is constitution-

ally reasonable, without more, generally does not establish

that different conduct is constitutionally unreasonable for the

purposes of qualified immunity.

With no precedent showing defendants clearly violated

the Constitution in merely calling for paramedics when they

arrived at the police station, we hold that qualified immunity

bars Johnson’s claim.

F. Malicious Prosecution

In Count V (Johnson’s sole state-law claim), Johnson al-

leges all defendants violated Illinois law by prosecuting him

maliciously. We agree with the district court that this claim

necessarily fails because Johnson cannot show defendants

acted with malice.

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must meet five elements to

prove malicious prosecution. Moran v. Calumet City, 54 F.4th

483, 499 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d

504, 512 (1996)). Failing to prove any element forecloses a

plaintiff’s claim. Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 2021 IL 125617, ¶ 74.

“Malice[,]” the element that matters here, is “the initiation of

a prosecution for an improper motive,” meaning “any reason

other than to bring the responsible party to justice.” Id. at

¶ 141. “The element of malice may be inferred from a lack of

probable cause when the circumstances are inconsistent with

good faith by the prosecutorial team and lack of probable

cause has been clearly proved.” Id.

In opposing summary judgment below, Johnson argued

only that “lack of probable cause” to arrest him “raises an

18 No. 24-1503

inference of malice[.]” Yet on appeal Johnson now argues a

jury could infer malice based on his apparently litigious his-

tory “with the Chicago Police Department and the Defendant

officers more specifically[.]” Johnson forfeited this specific ar-

gument by not making it below, so we do not consider it. See

Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

As for Johnson’s argument about lack of probable cause

showing malice, we have already concluded that officers had

at least arguable probable cause to arrest Johnson for disor-

derly conduct. Supra, at 10; see Mwangangi, 48 F.4th at 825. We

thus affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim for lack

of malice.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.