Gottfried

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

JUSTIN A. GOTTFRIED Case No. 6:26-cv-00071-MC

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

BAY AREA RESOURCE CENTER,

JENNIFER RAMSEY, and TRAVIS

RAMSEY,

Defendants.

MCSHANE, Judge:

Plaintiff Justin Gottfried seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action against

Defendants Bay Area Resource Center, Jennifer Ramsey, and Travis Ramsey.1 Pl.’s IFP Appl.,

ECF No 2; Compl., ECF No. 1.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. But

because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, his Complaint, ECF No.

1, is DISMISSED with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is a citizen of Oregon. Compl. 2. Defendant Bay Area Resource Center (“BARC”),

Plaintiff’s former employer, has its principal place of business in Oregon. Id. 2–3. Defendants

1 Plaintiff brings claims of unlawful wage withholding, retaliation, conversion, intentional interference with economic

advantage, misappropriation of trade secrets, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under

both federal and state law. Compl. 12–13.

Jennifer Ramsey and Travis Ramsey, both domiciled in Oregon, acted as controlling officers of

Defendant BARC. Id. 3.

Plaintiff states that he relocated to California in August of 2023 for employment with

Defendant BARC, an entity that performs housing and victim services work. Compl. 3. Plaintiff

describes his employment agreement as including wages, a housing stipend, daily per diem, and

the use of a “live-work office apartment” in San Francisco. Id. 3–4. During his continuous

employment between August 2023 and April 2024, Plaintiff purportedly developed various

processes, programs, internal workflows, and operational content for BARC. Id. 4.

In April 2024, Plaintiff traveled from San Francisco to Oregon temporarily for “family-

related reasons.” Compl. 4. Plaintiff alleges that immediately following his travel to Oregon,

Defendant Travis Ramsey stopped paying Plaintiff his regular wages and barred him from the

“live-work office apartment” in San Francisco. Id. Plaintiff contends that he never received his

final wages, nor did he receive notice of termination from BARC. Id. After he was terminated,

Defendants allegedly continued to use Plaintiff’s “proprietary business materials” in BARC’s

operations. Id. 5.

Plaintiff avers that Defendants Jennifer Ramsey and Travis Ramsey reported him to

Oregon child welfare authorities for “false” and “retaliatory purposes.” Compl. 4. Plaintiff’s

children then entered state custody. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants “caused” his

personal vehicle “to be seized” without his consent or legal process. Id. Because of Defendants’

alleged actions, Plaintiff has suffered “unpaid wages, loss of housing, loss of transportation, loss

of business and intellectual property, relocation expenses exceeding $15,000, and severe emotional

distress.” Id. 5.

/ / / /

LEGAL STANDARD

Courts have broad discretion whether to grant an in forma pauperis application.

O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). To qualify for in forma pauperis status, a

civil litigant must demonstrate that he is unable to pay court fees and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1);

Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1987). Courts must also screen

an applicant’s complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

When screening a complaint for failure to state a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

the court applies the same standard as that of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include a short, plain statement of the

claim and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads enough

factual content that allows the court to reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court is not required to “accept as

true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation

omitted).

Unless it is “absolutely clear” that leave to amend is futile, a self-represented litigant must

receive notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and be given an opportunity to cure before dismissal.

Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).

/ / / /

DISCUSSION

The Court is satisfied with Plaintiff’s showing of indigency. The Court proceeds to screen

Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. This Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims

Plaintiff asserts that this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Compl.

2. District courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in which the matter in controversy

exceeds $75,000 and the parties are citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). For

diversity purposes, a party is a “citizen” of the state in which they are domiciled. E.g., Kantor v.

Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). Since all parties are domiciled in

Oregon, there is not complete diversity between them and the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s claims. Compl. 2; see also Chan Healthcare Grp., PS v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,

844 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that traditional diversity cases require complete

diversity).

Nevertheless, this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal law claims that survive

screening. Compl. 5–6, 9. Accordingly, the Court would have supplemental jurisdiction over his

state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Accordingly, if Plaintiff’s federal law claims fail at this

stage, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear his state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

II. Counts I and II: Fair Labor Standards Act claims

Plaintiff brings claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206,

215, based on Defendants’ alleged unlawful withholding of wages, purported retaliation against

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s constructive discharge. Compl. 5–6. Even liberally construing the

Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that relate to 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 215. But Plaintiff’s

allegations appear minimally sufficient to survive screening for claims under ORS § 652.140.

Counts I and II as they relate to the FLSA are subject to dismissal with leave to amend.

III. Count V: Defend Trade Secrets Act claims

Plaintiff asserts a claim of misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets

Act (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1836. Compl. 9. To succeed on a claim for misappropriation of trade

secrets under the DTSA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he possessed a trade secret; (2) the

defendant misappropriated that trade secret; and (3) the misappropriation caused or threatened

damage to the plaintiff. InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 657–58 (9th

Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a trade secret exists. Id. at 658. A plaintiff

should describe the trade secret “‘with sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general

knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons . . . skilled in the trade.’” Id.

(quoting Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of a trade secret,

Count V is subject to dismissal with leave to amend.

IV. Counts III, IV, VI, and VII: State law claims

The Court construes the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims as arising under Oregon law.

Plaintiff asserts claims of conversion (Count III), intentional interference with economic advantage

(Count IV), unjust enrichment (Count VI), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count

VII). Compl. 7–10. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal law claims, as it

stands, his state law claims cannot survive. But assuming arguendo that there is supplemental

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s state law claims, the Court screens them according to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Oregon law defines conversion as “an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a

chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly

be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” In re conduct of Martin, 970 P.2d 638,

642 (Or. 1998) (citation omitted). Plaintiff contends that “Defendants wrongfully exercised control

over” his personal vehicle and his interest in the work apartment. Compl. 7. Without more, this

bare conclusion cannot establish a conversion claim. Count III is subject to dismissal with leave

to amend.

To state a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) the existence of a professional or business relationship; (2) intentional interference with that

relationship; (3) by a third party; (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper

purpose; (5) causation between the interference and damage to the economic relationship; and (6)

damages. McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 844 (Or. 1995) (en banc). Plaintiff does not

offer any facts to establish the third-party element of intentional interference with economic

relations. Count IV is subject to dismissal with leave to amend.

For a plaintiff to prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, he must allege that: (1) property

rightfully belonging to him was taken by someone else under wrongful or inequitable

circumstances; (2) the person who now possesses the property is not a bona fide purchaser for

value and without notice; and (3) the property in that person’s hands is the very property that

rightfully belongs to the plaintiff. Tupper v. Roan, 243 P.3d 50, 58 (Or. 2010) (en banc). Plaintiff

avers that Defendants retained the “benefits” of his employment, but offers no factual allegations

to plausibly suggest a claim for unjust enrichment. Compl. 9. Count VI is subject to dismissal with

leave to amend.

Finally, a plaintiff stating claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress must plead

that: (1) the defendant intended to inflict such distress on him; (2) the defendant’s conduct caused

the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s acts “constituted an extraordinary

transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct.” Babick v. Or. Arena Corp., 40 P.3d

1059, 1063 (Or. 2002) (citation omitted). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ conduct was “done with

knowledge that it would likely cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiff.” Compl. 10. This

amounts to a legal conclusion styled as a factual allegation, which falls short of federal pleading

standards. Count VII is subject to dismissal with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED. Upon

screening his Complaint, ECF No. 1, it appears subject to dismissal. Because Plaintiff is self-

represented and this Court has not previously dismissed pleadings in this case, Plaintiff has leave

to amend his Complaint. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to file an

amended pleading to cure the deficiencies identified here.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 26th day of January 2026.

________/s_/_M_i_c_h_a_e_l _M_c_S_h_a_n_e_____

Michael McShane

United States District Judge