Opinion

Bey

Court
District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed
Jan 26, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.3%

holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts; a suit brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction, such as the existence of diversity or the presentation of a federal question”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts; a suit brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction, such as the existence of diversity or the presentation of a federal question”
  • affirming dismissal of complaint because the Supremacy Clause does not confer subject matter jurisdiction

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

P. BROWN BEY, )

Heir-in-law of Elsey and Henly )

Brown, In Propria Persona, Sui )

Juris, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00870-RAH

)

STEVE MARSHALL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff—a self-described “Moorish American by nationality,” a “lawful and

faithful member of the Moorish Science Temple of America” who “adhere[s]to the

ancient customs, sacred laws, and land inheritance rites of the Moabites, the ancient

mothers and fathers of civilization, as recognized under the Holy Koran Circle Seven

divinely prepared by THE NOBLE DREW ALI”—seeks to “affirm the lawful and

supreme title held by the lawful heirs of Elsey Brown and Henly Brown, through

original federal land patents recorded with the United States Bureau of Land

Management.” (Doc. 1.) According to Plaintiff, he seeks no monetary damages but

instead asserts, under claims of quiet title and declaratory judgment, that Defendants

Steve Marshall (Attorney General of the State of Alabama), Kathy Evans (Revenue

Commissioner of Autauga County), Jay Thompson (Chair of the Autauga County

Commission), and Kim Kervan (Administrative Tax Assessor for Autauga County),

have clouded title, imposed unlawful taxes, issued unauthorized assessments, and

threatened unlawful takings of federally patented land. The Complaint also alleges

that jurisdiction exists “under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this action arises under the

Constitution and laws of the United States, including the federal land patent statutes,

the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2201.” (Doc. 1 at 1.)

The Defendants, except for Defendant Steve Marshall, have moved to dismiss,

stating there is no subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants also argue the

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may challenge the

subject matter jurisdiction of a particular case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden

of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.

Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016).

Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does

in fact exist.

When a party files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion along with other Rule 12 motions,

the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing

any attack on the merits. Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2020).

This requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing

a case with prejudice. The court's dismissal of a plaintiff's case because the complaint

lacks subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does not

prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper

jurisdiction. Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024).

A district court must have one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction to

entertain an action: (1) jurisdiction pursuant to a statutory grant, (2) federal question

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a). Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir.

1997). If a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it is

powerless to continue and must dismiss the complaint. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff, an Alabama resident, brings claims against state

government officials for quiet title and declaratory judgment, and states that “[t]his

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this action arises under the

Constitution and laws of the United States, including the federal land patent statutes,

the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2201.” (Doc. 1 at 1.) But these claims, nor their broad references to federal

statutes and the Constitution, do not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. See Yocum

v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 23-10714, 2024 WL 490113 (11th Cir. Feb.

8, 2024) (citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661,

676–77 (1974), and Burat’s Heirs v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 496 F.2d 1336

(5th Cir. 1974),1 and affirming dismissal of quiet title complaint that invoked federal

land patents because federal question jurisdiction is not raised merely because title

to land devolves from a federal land patent); Nalls v. Countrywide Home Services,

LLC, 279 F. App’x 824 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of complaint because

the Supremacy Clause does not confer subject matter jurisdiction); Borden v.

Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 1989)(holding that the Declaratory

Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts; a suit

brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction, such as

the existence of diversity or the presentation of a federal question”). Having failed

to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, the Complaint is due to be dismissed.2

1 In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

2 The Court would be remiss if it failed to note that Plaintiff appears to be asserting “sovereign

citizen” claims since Plaintiff is challenging the taxing and assessment authority of local

government officials and uses words and phrases such as “lawful divine inheritance,” “supreme

beneficial interest in the patented land,” “propria persona,” “divine honor,” and “ancestral land

patents.”

Accordingly, for good cause, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendant Steve Marshall’s Motion to Dismiss’ (doc. 9) is DENIED as

moot;

2. The Motion to Dismiss (doc. 11) of Defendants Kathy Evans, Jay

Thompson, and Kim Kervin is GRANTED;

3. This lawsuit is DISMISSED without prejudice as this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction; and,

4. A separate Final Judgment will issue.

DONE, on this the 26th day of January 2026.

R. CP JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 Marshall did not make a subject matter jurisdiction argument in his motion. Nevertheless, even

if not made, the Court is obligated to consider the issue, and having determined that jurisdiction

does not exist, the claims against Marshall are due to be dismissed also.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.