holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts; a suit brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction, such as the existence of diversity or the presentation of a federal question”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts; a suit brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction, such as the existence of diversity or the presentation of a federal question”
- affirming dismissal of complaint because the Supremacy Clause does not confer subject matter jurisdiction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
P. BROWN BEY, )
Heir-in-law of Elsey and Henly )
Brown, In Propria Persona, Sui )
Juris, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00870-RAH
)
STEVE MARSHALL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff—a self-described “Moorish American by nationality,” a “lawful and
faithful member of the Moorish Science Temple of America” who “adhere[s]to the
ancient customs, sacred laws, and land inheritance rites of the Moabites, the ancient
mothers and fathers of civilization, as recognized under the Holy Koran Circle Seven
divinely prepared by THE NOBLE DREW ALI”—seeks to “affirm the lawful and
supreme title held by the lawful heirs of Elsey Brown and Henly Brown, through
original federal land patents recorded with the United States Bureau of Land
Management.” (Doc. 1.) According to Plaintiff, he seeks no monetary damages but
instead asserts, under claims of quiet title and declaratory judgment, that Defendants
Steve Marshall (Attorney General of the State of Alabama), Kathy Evans (Revenue
Commissioner of Autauga County), Jay Thompson (Chair of the Autauga County
Commission), and Kim Kervan (Administrative Tax Assessor for Autauga County),
have clouded title, imposed unlawful taxes, issued unauthorized assessments, and
threatened unlawful takings of federally patented land. The Complaint also alleges
that jurisdiction exists “under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this action arises under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including the federal land patent statutes,
the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201.” (Doc. 1 at 1.)
The Defendants, except for Defendant Steve Marshall, have moved to dismiss,
stating there is no subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants also argue the
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may challenge the
subject matter jurisdiction of a particular case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden
of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.
Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does
in fact exist.
When a party files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion along with other Rule 12 motions,
the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing
any attack on the merits. Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2020).
This requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing
a case with prejudice. The court's dismissal of a plaintiff's case because the complaint
lacks subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does not
prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper
jurisdiction. Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024).
A district court must have one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain an action: (1) jurisdiction pursuant to a statutory grant, (2) federal question
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir.
1997). If a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it is
powerless to continue and must dismiss the complaint. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff, an Alabama resident, brings claims against state
government officials for quiet title and declaratory judgment, and states that “[t]his
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as this action arises under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including the federal land patent statutes,
the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201.” (Doc. 1 at 1.) But these claims, nor their broad references to federal
statutes and the Constitution, do not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. See Yocum
v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 23-10714, 2024 WL 490113 (11th Cir. Feb.
8, 2024) (citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661,
676–77 (1974), and Burat’s Heirs v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 496 F.2d 1336
(5th Cir. 1974),1 and affirming dismissal of quiet title complaint that invoked federal
land patents because federal question jurisdiction is not raised merely because title
to land devolves from a federal land patent); Nalls v. Countrywide Home Services,
LLC, 279 F. App’x 824 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of complaint because
the Supremacy Clause does not confer subject matter jurisdiction); Borden v.
Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 1989)(holding that the Declaratory
Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts; a suit
brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction, such as
the existence of diversity or the presentation of a federal question”). Having failed
to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, the Complaint is due to be dismissed.2
1 In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
2 The Court would be remiss if it failed to note that Plaintiff appears to be asserting “sovereign
citizen” claims since Plaintiff is challenging the taxing and assessment authority of local
government officials and uses words and phrases such as “lawful divine inheritance,” “supreme
beneficial interest in the patented land,” “propria persona,” “divine honor,” and “ancestral land
patents.”
Accordingly, for good cause, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant Steve Marshall’s Motion to Dismiss’ (doc. 9) is DENIED as
moot;
2. The Motion to Dismiss (doc. 11) of Defendants Kathy Evans, Jay
Thompson, and Kim Kervin is GRANTED;
3. This lawsuit is DISMISSED without prejudice as this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction; and,
4. A separate Final Judgment will issue.
DONE, on this the 26th day of January 2026.
R. CP JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 Marshall did not make a subject matter jurisdiction argument in his motion. Nevertheless, even
if not made, the Court is obligated to consider the issue, and having determined that jurisdiction
does not exist, the claims against Marshall are due to be dismissed also.