Owings

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-20117-RAR

ASHLEY OWINGS, et al.,

on behalf of themselves and

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MEDUSIND, INC.,

Defendant.

_________________________/

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR

FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND

APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Final

Approval of Class Action Settlement and Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Motion for

Final Approval”), [ECF No. 56],1 filed on November 26, 2025, requesting entry of an order: (1)

granting Final Approval of the Settlement; (2) certifying the Settlement Class and California

Settlement Subclass for settlement purposes, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3); (3)

affirming the appointments of the Plaintiffs as Class Representatives, Class Counsel, and the

Settlement Administrator; (4) awarding attorneys’ fees and costs; (5) approving payment of the

Settlement Administration Costs; (6) overruling timely objections, if any; and (7) entering final

judgment dismissing the Action with prejudice as to the Defendant and reserving jurisdiction over

Settlement implementation. The Court held a hearing on the Motion for Final Approval on January

26, 2026. [ECF No. 61].

1 All capitalized terms used herein have the same meanings as those defined in Section II of the Settlement

Agreement attached to the Motion for Final Approval as Exhibit A. See [ECF No. 56-1].

Having already analyzed the Settlement in entering the Preliminary Approval Order, [ECF

No. 52], and having again carefully reviewed the Motion for Final Approval, the proposed

Settlement and its exhibits, all relevant filings, the record, and argument from the Parties’ counsel,

the Court finds the Settlement Class and California Settlement Subclass should be finally certified,

the Settlement satisfies the Final Approval criteria, and the Application for Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs should be granted. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for Final Approval, [ECF No. 56], is

GRANTED as set forth herein.

BACKGROUND

The relevant procedural and factual background of this Action is detailed in the Motion for

Final Approval. Below is a summary of facts pertinent to the findings and rulings in this Final

Approval Order.

Defendant is a medical and dental billing and software company that provides services to

providers throughout the country. See generally Complaint, [ECF No. 1]. Defendant’s healthcare

customers entrusted Defendant with the Private Information of their patients, including their

names, mailing addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, health insurance and billing

information (insurance policy numbers or claims/benefits information), payment information

debit/credit card numbers or bank account information), health information (medical history,

medical record numbers, or prescription information), and government identification (Social

Security numbers, taxpayer ID numbers, driver’s licenses numbers, or passport numbers). Id.

On December 29, 2023, Defendant detected suspicious activity on its computer systems

and later confirmed that cybercriminals accessed certain information stored on those systems. Id.

On or about January 7, 2025, Defendant began sending notice letters to over 700,000 individuals

advising them that their Private Information may have been impacted in the Data Incident. Id. On

January 9, 2025, Plaintiff Owens filed an action against Defendant before this Court related to the

Data Incident. Id. Thereafter, a number of similar lawsuits with overlapping claims and classes

were filed against Defendant regarding the Data Incident. Following a Motion for Consolidation

and Appointment of Leadership, the Court consolidated all related cases into this action and

appointed Jeff Ostrow and Mariya Weekes as Interim Class Counsel. [ECF Nos. 4, 6]. Plaintiffs

filed their Consolidated Class Action Complaint on February 18, 2025, to which Defendant filed

a Motion to Dismiss on April 11, 2025. [ECF Nos. 21, 35]. Plaintiffs filed their Response in

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on May 15, 2025, to which Defendant filed its Reply on June

10, 2025. [ECF Nos. 40, 46].

This Settlement was reached before the Court considered the Motion to Dismiss. Prior to

participating in mediation, the Parties engaged in meaningful discovery. Plaintiffs consulted with

liability and damages experts and requested pre-mediation informal discovery from Defendant. In

response, Defendant produced extensive material, including but not limited to, the number of

individuals and categories of Private Information impacted by the Data Incident. The Parties also

exchanged detailed mediation statements outlining their positions with respect to liability,

damages, and settlement.

On June 10, 2025, the Parties participated in a full-day private mediation session in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, before experienced class action mediator and retired federal

Magistrate Judge Diane Welsh. The mediation concluded with the Parties agreeing to all material

terms of the Settlement. The terms of the settlement reached are memorialized in the Agreement,

which was negotiated at arm’s length, in good faith, and without collusion by capable and

experienced counsel with full knowledge of the facts, the law, and the inherent risks in the Action,

and with the active involvement of Plaintiffs and Defendant.

The Parties filed a Notice of Settlement with the Court on June 12, 2025. [ECF No. 47].

Over the next five weeks, the Parties worked diligently to finalize the terms of the Agreement and

ancillary documents. They signed the agreement on July 11, 2025. The Parties did not discuss

attorneys’ fees and costs until after they reached agreement on all material Settlement terms.

Specifically, the Settlement provides monetary relief that includes a non-reversionary all-

cash Settlement Fund of $5,000,000. The Settlement Fund was fully funded after Preliminary

Approval. The Settlement Fund will pay: (i) all Settlement Class Member Benefits; (ii) any

attorneys’ fees and costs awarded by the Court to Class Counsel; and (iii) all Settlement

Administration Costs. The Settlement also provides that Defendant will provide Class Counsel

with an attestation as to the security measures it has implemented and plans to implement following

the Data Incident. The costs of any such security measures shall be fully borne by Defendant, and

under no circumstances will such costs be deducted from the Settlement Fund.

Plaintiffs sought Preliminary Approval of the Settlement on behalf of the proposed

Settlement Class and California Settlement Subclass. See [ECF No. 51]. The Court entered the

Preliminary Approval Order, [ECF No. 52], granting the Motion for Preliminary Approval,

conditionally certifying the Settlement Class and California Settlement Subclass, and finding it

was likely to grant Final Approval, and approving a comprehensive Notice Program and Claim

Process. Following entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Parties and the Settlement

Administrator implemented and completed the Notice Program. Mot. for Final Approval at 7–9.

The Claim Form Deadline was December 29, 2025. Id.

Having completed the Notice Program, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel filed the Motion for

Final Approval and Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. [ECF No. 56]. Only five

Settlement Class Members have opted out of the Settlement. Those individuals are identified in

the attached Exhibit A. Those Settlement Class Members will not be bound by the Settlement or

Releases contained therein. Zero objections were submitted by Settlement Class Members.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR CLASS SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

It is well established that “[a] class may be certified solely for purposes of settlement [if] a

settlement is reached before a litigated determination of the class certification issue.” Borcea v.

Carnival Corp., 238 F.R.D. 664, 671 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (internal citations omitted). “There is a

strong judicial policy in favor of settlement, in order to conserve scarce resources that would

otherwise be devoted to protracted litigation.” Id. (citing Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982,

986 (11th Cir. 1984)). In deciding whether to provisionally certify a settlement class, a court must

consider the same factors that it would consider in connection with a proposed litigation class—

i.e., all Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) factors and at least one subsection of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23(b) must be satisfied—except that the Court need not consider the

manageability of a potential trial, since the settlement, if approved, would obviate the need for a

trial. See id. at 672.; see also Diakos v. HSS Sys., LLC, 137 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1306 (S.D. Fla.

2015) (explaining a court evaluates whether certification of a settlement class is appropriate under

Rule 23(a) and (b)); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).

Rule 23(a) requires: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of

representation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Rule 23(b)(3) requires that (1) “the questions of

law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual

members” and (2) “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The Eleventh Circuit also requires that

the class representatives have standing to sue and that the proposed class is adequately defined and

clearly ascertainable. See Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012).

Before addressing any Rule 23 factor, however, the Court must ensure that standing under

Article III is met. See Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[A]ny analysis

of class certification must begin with the issue of standing . . . .”). To satisfy Article III standing,

a plaintiff must “(1) suffer[] an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct

of defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc.

v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citations omitted).

If certification of a settlement class is appropriate, a court then determines if the proposal

is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). To do so, the Court considers whether

the following factors are met:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the

class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief provided for

the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and

appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the

class, including the method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of

any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any

agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats

class members equitably relative to each other.

Id. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit “instruct[s] district courts to consider several additional

factors called the Bennett factors.” In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d

1247, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986). These additional factors are:

[(a)] “there was no fraud or collusion in arriving at the settlement,” and [(b)] the

settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable, considering (1) the likelihood of

success at trial; (2) the range of possible recovery; (3) the point on or below the

range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable;

(4) the complexity, expense and duration of litigation; (5) the substance and amount

of opposition to the settlement; and (6) the stage of proceedings at which the

settlement was achieved.

Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986 (citations omitted) (“Bennett factors”).

Courts have substantial discretion in approving a settlement agreement, id. at 986, and

settlement negotiations that involve arm’s-length, informed bargaining with the aid of experienced

counsel support a preliminary finding of fairness. See Manual for Compl. Lit., Third, § 30.42

(West 1995) (“A presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may attach to a class

settlement reached in arm’s-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after

meaningful discovery.”) (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

The Court finds, for settlement purposes only that it should finally certify the proposed

Settlement Class and California Settlement Subclass and enter this Final Approval Order because

the Settlement Class, California Settlement Subclass, and proposed Settlement satisfy the Rule

23(a), 23(b)(3), and 23(e) requirements and the Bennett factors. Nothing has changed since the

Court granted Preliminary Approval. Additionally, the response from the Settlement Class

Members has been overwhelmingly favorable.

A. Final Certification Is Appropriate.

As the Court found in the Preliminary Approval Order, when it concluded it was likely to

certify the Settlement Class and California Settlement Subclass, the Court now finds, for settlement

purposes only, that the Rule 23 factors are satisfied, and certification of the proposed Settlement

Class and California Settlement Subclass is appropriate under Rule 23. The Court further finds

that the Article III standing requirement is met here.

The Court therefore finally certifies the following Settlement Class:

Settlement Class: All living individuals residing in the United States who were

sent a notice of the Data Incident indicating their Private Information may have

been impacted in the Data Incident.

A subset of the Settlement Class is the California Settlement Class of “Settlement Class Members

residing in California as of December 29, 2023.”2

2 Excluded from the Settlement Class are (a) all persons who are directors and officers of Defendant, and

their respective subsidiaries and affiliated companies; (b) governmental entities; (c) the Judge assigned to

The Court will address each Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) factor in turn.

1. The Rule 23(a) Factors Are Satisfied.

(i) Rule 23(a)(1) – Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires the “class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The numerosity requirement is “generally a low hurdle”

and, as a baseline, “less than twenty-one is inadequate . . . [and] more than forty is adequate[.]”

Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). Here, the

numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied because the Settlement Class includes 702,115

individuals. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986) (numerosity

generally satisfied where there are more than 40 class members); In re Fortra File Transfer

Software Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 24-MD-03090, 2025 WL 2675178, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept.

17, 2025); In re Fortra File Transfer Software Data Security Breach Litig., No. 24-MD-03090-

RAR, 2025 WL 457896, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2025); In re Mednax Serv., Customer Data Sec.

Breach Litig., No. 21-MD-02994-RAR, 2024 WL 1554329, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2024). The

joinder of approximately 700,000 Settlement Class Members would certainly be impracticable,

and thus numerosity is satisfied.

(ii) Rule 23(a)(2) – Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P.

23(a)(2). “[C]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have

suffered the same injury,” and the plaintiff’s common contention “must be of such a nature that it

is capable of class wide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will

the Action, that Judge’s immediate family, and Court staff; and (d) all Settlement Class Members who

submit a valid opt-out request by the Opt-Out Deadline.

resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011) (citation modified).

The commonality requirement is a “low hurdle.” See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568

F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009). Courts in this Circuit have previously addressed this requirement

in the context of data breach class actions and found it satisfied. See, e.g., Fortra, 2025 WL

2675178, at *5-6; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *4; Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *4

(commonality satisfied because claims turn on adequacy of defendants’ data security to protect PII

and PHI); Desue v. 20/20 Eye Care Network, Inc., No. 21-cv-61275, 2022 WL 17477004, at *4

(S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2022); see also Equifax, 999 F.3d at 1274-75, 1277 (affirming district court’s

certification of class, including finding of commonality).

Here, Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members all had their Private Information impacted

by the Data Incident. Plaintiffs’ claims turn on whether Defendant’s data security environment,

or their practices or procedures related to the collection of sensitive data or selection of third parties

who are given access to that data, was adequate to protect Plaintiffs’ and the Settlement Class

Members’ Private Information. These issues are common to the Settlement Class (including the

California Settlement Subclass), are alleged to have injured all Settlement Class Members in the

same way and would generate common answers central to the viability of all claims were this case

to proceed to trial. In other words, evidence to resolve said claims does not vary among Settlement

Class Members and can therefore be fairly resolved, for purposes of settlement, for all Settlement

Class Members at once. Thus, commonality is satisfied.

(iii) Rule 23(a)(3) – Typicality

Under Rule 23(a)(3), a class representative’s claims must also be typical of the putative

class they seek to represent. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Typicality “measures whether a

significant nexus exists between the claims of the named representative and those of the class at

large.” Hines v. Widnall, 334 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Kornberg v. Carnival

Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1984) (typicality satisfied where claims “arise

from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory”). “Neither the

typicality nor the commonality requirement mandates that all putative class members share

identical claims, and [] factual differences among the claims of the putative members do not defeat

certification.” Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 714 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation modified); see also

Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). When the same course of

conduct is directed at the named plaintiff and the members of the proposed class, typicality is

satisfied. See Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 717 (11th Cir. 1983).

Here, Plaintiffs’ interests are aligned with the Settlement Class Members in that they all

were sent a notice letter indicating their Private Information may have been impacted in the Data

Incident and were therefore all affected by the same purportedly inadequate security that allegedly

harmed Settlement Class Members. Their claims are based on the same legal theories and

underlying event. Thus, the typicality requirement is satisfied. See Hines, 334 F.3d at 1256;

Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *6; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *5; Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329,

at *4.

(iv) Rule 23(a)(4) – Adequacy

Adequacy under Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties . . . fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Adequacy relates to (i)

whether the proposed class representative has interests antagonistic to the class, and (ii) whether

the proposed class counsel has the competence to undertake this litigation. See Fabricant v. Sears

Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 314-15 (S.D. Fla. 2001). The determinative factor “is the forthrightness

and vigor with which the representative party can be expected to assert and defend the interests of

the members of the class.” Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried Emp’s Ret. Plan, 221 F.3d

1235, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation modified); Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *6; Fortra, 2025

WL 457896, at *5; Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *5.

Here, like all Settlement Class Members, Plaintiffs have claims against Defendant arising

from the Data Incident that allegedly impacted their Private Information and were similarly injured

by Defendant’s allegedly wrongful acts. Proof of Plaintiffs’ claims would necessarily involve

adjudicating the same issues of law and fact as the claims of the Settlement Class as a whole. Thus,

Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members have the same interests in recovering damages and

other relief. Further, Plaintiffs have also diligently and adequately prosecuted this action through

Class Counsel by, among other things, reviewing filings, promptly providing documents and

information to Class Counsel, acting in the best interest of the Settlement Class Members, and

accepting the classwide Settlement. Plaintiffs are committed to continuing to assist Class Counsel

through Final Approval.

Class Counsel “are highly qualified and have a great deal of experience litigating consumer

class actions, including in the data privacy context, demonstrating their adequacy.” Fortra, 2025

WL 2675178, at *7 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *5, and Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at

*5). Class Counsel have litigated this Action by evaluating the claims, preparing comprehensive

pleadings, serving informal discovery, consulting with data security experts, responding to

Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF Nos. 35, 40, 46], complying with Court orders and

requirements, and participating in a mediation that ultimately resulted in this Settlement. See

Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *7; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *5.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no conflicts with the Settlement Class Members and have

demonstrated their adequacy as Class Representatives by “(i) having a genuine personal interest

in the outcome of the case; (ii) selecting well-qualified counsel; (iii) producing information and

documents to counsel to permit investigation and development of the complaints; (iv) being

available as needed throughout the litigation; and (v) monitoring the Litigation.” Fortra, 2025

WL 2675178, at *7 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *5 (quoting Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329,

at *5)). The adequacy requirement is therefore met, and the Court confirms its appointments of

Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives and Class Counsel. See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *7

(appointing Class Counsel and plaintiffs as class representatives); Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *6

(same).

2. The Rule 23(b)(3) Factors Are Satisfied.

Having found all Rule 23(a) factors are satisfied, the Court proceeds to address at least one

Rule 23(b) subsection—namely, Rule 23(b)(3)—to ascertain whether “questions of law or fact

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,”

and to ensure “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For predominance and superiority, the

court may consider the class will be certified for settlement purposes only, and that a showing of

manageability at trial is not required. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (“Confronted with a request

for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried,

would present intractable management problems, . . . for the proposal is that there be no trial.”).

(i) Predominance

The predominance inquiry looks at “the legal or factual questions that qualify each class

member’s case as a genuine controversy, questions that preexist any settlement.” Id. at 623.

“[C]ommon issues of fact and law predominate if they have a direct impact on every class

member’s effort to establish liability and on every class member’s entitlement to injunctive and

monetary relief.” Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 985 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation

omitted). Further, “[i]t is not necessary that all questions of law or fact be common, but only that

some questions are common and that they predominate over individual questions.” In re Takata

Airbag Prod. Liability Litig., 677 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (citation modified). The

focus on a defendant’s security measures in a data breach class action “is the precise type of

predominant question that makes class-wide adjudication worthwhile.” In re Anthem, Inc. Data

Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299, 312 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

Here, as in other data breach cases, common questions predominate because all claims arise

out of a common course of conduct by Defendant. Id. at 312; Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *8;

Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *6; Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *5. All Settlement Class Members

had their Private Information compromised in the Data Incident and the security practices at issue

did not vary from person to person. “Thus, because these common questions represent a significant

aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication,

there is a clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual

basis.” Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *7 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *6 (quoting Mednax,

2024 WL 1554329, at *5)). The predominance requirement is therefore satisfied.

(ii) Superiority

To satisfy the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), a movant must show that “a class

action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). “The focus of the superiority analysis is on the relative

advantages of a class action suit over whatever other forms of litigation might be realistically

available to plaintiffs.” Mohamed v. American Motor Co., LLC, 320 F.R.D. 301, 316 (S.D. Fla.

2017) (quotation omitted); Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *8 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at

*6, and Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *5). Here, adjudicating individual actions would be

impractical. The amount in dispute for individual class members is too small, the technical issues

involved too complex, and the expert testimony and document review too costly. Further,

individual claim prosecution would be prohibitively expensive, needlessly delay resolution, and

may lead to inconsistent rulings. Accordingly, certification of this suit as a class action is superior

to other methods to fairly, adequately, and efficiently resolve the claims asserted. See Fortra,

2025 WL 2675178, at *8; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *6.

3. The Article III Standing Requirement Is Met.

To demonstrate Article III standing Plaintiffs must establish that they each “(1) suffered an

injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is

likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. Further, “[t]o

have standing to represent a class, a party must not only satisfy the individual standing

prerequisites, but must also ‘be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same

injury as the class members.’” Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Prado-Steinman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000)). There is

no requirement that Article III standing be proved with evidentiary support at the settlement

approval stage. See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *8 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *7, and

Equifax, 999 F.3d at 1261 n.8).

“Standing exists when a plaintiff’s sensitive personal information is allegedly accessed and

exfiltrated in a data breach.” Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *8 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896,

at *6, and Desue v. 20/20 Eye Care Network, Inc., No. 21-cv-61275, 2022 WL 796367, at *4 (S.D.

Fla. Mar. 15, 2022)); see also Desue, 2022 WL 17477004, at *5. In a similar data breach class

action, this Court extensively addressed standing in data breach class actions and subsequently

relied on that analysis when preliminarily approving a class settlement in that case. See In re

Mednax Servs., Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 603 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1200-08 (S.D. Fla.

2022) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing, including in the context of TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 2190 (2021)); Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *4 n.2 (citing Green-

Cooper v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 73 F.4th 883 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing standing analysis from motion

to dismiss opinion and preliminarily approving class settlement)).

To establish an imminent threat of identity theft based on a data breach, plaintiffs must

show that “some misuse of class members’ data” has already occurred. Green-Cooper, 73 F. 4th

at 889 (citing Tsao v. Captiva MVP Rest. Partners, LLC, 986 F.3d 1332, 1343 (11th Cir. 2021)

(emphasis in original)). Plaintiffs’ allegations that a criminal ransomware group accessed their

Private Information and published it to its data leak site, and that two Plaintiffs’ Private

Information is now on the dark web, supports that misuse. See Green-Cooper, 73 F. 4th at 890

(posting of Private Information on the dark web “establishes both a present injury . . . and a

substantial risk of future injury”). Therefore, the actual misuse of and actual access to the

Settlement Class Members’ data are injuries-in-fact that plausibly give rise to a substantial risk of

future harm from identity theft; emotional injury; the diminution in the value of Plaintiffs’ and

Settlement Class Members’ Private Information; and the loss of privacy. See In re Fortra File

Transfer Software Data Security Breach Litig., No. 24-MD-03090-RAR, 2024 WL 4547212, at

*3-7 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2025) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing); Mednax, 603 F.

Supp. 3d at 1202-05.

Traceability—the causal connection between the Data Incident and the Settlement Class

Members’ injuries—also exists for Article III standing. Plaintiffs’ and Settlement Class Members’

injuries must be “fairly traceable” to Defendant’s actions, but that does not mean they are required

to show proximate cause, as harms flowing indirectly from the Data Incident are sufficient for

standing. See Fortra, 2024 WL 4547212, at *6-7; Mednax, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1205. Defendant’s

alleged failure to protect the Private Information, resulting in the Data Incident whereby

unauthorized access was gained, preceded Plaintiffs’ documented incidents of identity theft,

economic losses, lost time, and emotional distress, and put them at a substantial risk of future

incidents of identity theft too. See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *9; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at

*7; Mednax, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1206. The Data Incident need not have provided all information

necessary to inflict those harms; it is enough the Data Incident could assist give identity thieves in

perpetrating them. See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *9; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *7; Mednax,

603 F. Supp. 3d at 1206.

Thus, like in Fortra, Mednax, and Desue, “because all Plaintiffs and Settlement Class

members had their Private Information impacted in the Data Incident, they have all suffered

injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the Data Incident and would likely be redressed by a

favorable judgment if this case was litigated through trial, demonstrating Article III standing. The

Court therefore finally certifies the Settlement Class.” See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *9;

Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *8.

B. Final Approval of the Settlement Is Warranted.

The Court already determined it was likely to grant Final Approval of the Settlement in the

Preliminary Approval Order. Now, the Court must finally determine whether the Settlement is

fair, adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e)(2) while also considering the Bennett factors, with

the Settlement Class Members having now been given Notice of the Settlement and the opportunity

to opt-out of or object to it. The Court finds the Settlement satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(e)

as well as the Bennett factors. The Court will address each factor in turn.

1. Rule 23(e)(2)(A) – Adequacy of Representation

For the same reasons that led the Court to find Class Counsel adequate to certify the

Settlement Class and California Settlement Subclass, Class Counsel have adequately represented

the Settlement Class Members’ interests for purposes of Final Approval. Additionally, as the

Court has found for purposes of preliminary certification, Plaintiffs’ respective interests are

coextensive and do not conflict with the interests of the Settlement Class Members, demonstrating

their adequacy. Plaintiffs have the same interest in the Settlement relief as do Settlement Class

Members, and the absent Settlement Class Members have no diverging interests. Accordingly, the

first Rule 23(e)(2) factor weighs heavily in favor of granting Preliminary Approval because both

Class Counsel and the Class Representatives have adequately represented the Settlement Class

(including the California Settlement Subclass). See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *9; Fortra, 2025

WL 457896, at *8; Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *6.

2. Rule 23(e)(2)(B) and Bennett Factors 5-6 – Arm’s Length Negotiations

The Court finds the Settlement was reached in the absence of collusion and is the result of

good faith, informed, and arm’s-length negotiations between experienced attorneys who are

familiar with class action litigation and with the legal and factual issues at stake. See Fortra, 2025

WL 2675178, at *10; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *8; Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *6. Before

discussing a potential resolution, the Parties conducted a thorough factual and legal investigation

including significant pre-mediation discovery, allowing them to fully understand the claims,

defenses, and risks of continued litigation. Mot. for Final Approval at 3-4. The Settlement was

reached after extensive legal and factual investigation by the Parties, a full-day mediation assisted

by a well-respected and experienced mediator, and weeks of additional negotiations to finalize the

terms of the Agreement and ancillary documents. Id. The Parties did not discuss attorneys’ fees

and costs until after they had agreed on all material Settlement terms. Id.

For these reasons and those discussed related to attorneys’ fees below, there was no fraud

or collusion in arriving at the Settlement. See Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986. Accordingly, “[t]he fact

that the Settlement was achieved through well-informed, arm’s-length, and neutrally supervised

negotiations weighs in favor of granting preliminary approval under Rule 23(e)(2)(B).” Fortra,

2025 WL 2675178, at *10 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *8 (quoting Mednax, 2024 WL

1554329, at *6)).

3. Rule 23(e)(2)(C) and Bennett Factors 1-4 – Adequacy of Settlement

Relief

The Court finds, considering the likelihood of success at trial, the complexity, expense, and

duration of the litigation, the relief provided is reasonable. While Plaintiffs believe the claims

asserted in the Action are meritorious and the Plaintiffs would ultimately prevail at trial, continued

litigation against Defendant poses significant risks that make any recovery for the Settlement Class

Members uncertain. “[D]ata breach class actions are risky cases.” Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at

*10 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *9 (quoting Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *7) (citation

omitted); see also Fox v. Iowa Health Sys., No. 3:18-cv00327, 2021 WL 826741, at *5 (W.D. Wis.

Mar. 4, 2021) (“Data breach litigation is evolving; there is no guarantee of the ultimate result . . .

[they] are particularly risky, expensive, and complex.”); Fulton-Green v. Accolade, Inc., No. 18-

274, 2019 WL 4677954, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2019) (explaining data breach class actions are

“a risky field of litigation because [they] are uncertain and class certification is rare.”). And given

the complexity of the claims and arguments here, a lengthy trial would likely be required before

Settlement Class Members could recover. Maintaining class certification through trial “is another

over-arching risk” as well. Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *10 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896,

at *9 (quoting Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *7)). “Thus, through the Settlement, Plaintiffs and

Settlement Class Members gain significant benefits without having to face further risk of not

receiving any relief at all,” weighing heavily in favor of preliminary approval. Id.

Despite the risks involved with further litigation, the Settlement provides outstanding

benefits, including Cash Payments, Credit Monitoring, and injunctive relief for all Settlement

Class Members. See [ECF No. 56-1] at ¶¶ 80–81, 108; see also Equifax, 999 F.3d at 1273

(“Settlements also save the bench and bar time, money, and headaches”) (citation omitted)). All

Settlement Class Members are given an equal opportunity to claim Settlement Class Member

Benefits. Specifically, each Settlement Class Member has the option to be reimbursed for

documented losses up to $5,000.00, or they may elect to receive a flat cash payment of an estimated

$100.00. See [ECF No. 56-1] at ¶ 81.a.-b. Additionally, California Settlement Subclass Members

may elect to receive the California Statutory Award in the estimated amount of $100.00. Id. ¶

81.c. In addition, all Settlement Class Members may elect Credit Monitoring. Id. ¶ 81.e.

Based upon the number of Claims submitted to the Settlement Administrator, the Court

observes the Settlement Class Members have reacted favorably by submitting Claims. See Mot.

for Final Approval at 9. The Court further finds the Claim Form submission process and

distribution of Settlement Class Member Benefits to be fair, convenient, and effective. Settlement

Class Members will promptly receive Cash Payments by electronic means or paper check issued

by the Settlement Administrator and Credit Monitoring, if elected. Id. The Settlement

Administrator is highly qualified to manage the entire process. Thus, “[t]he method of distributing

the settlement benefits will be equitable and effective.” Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *11 (citing

Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *9 (quoting Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *7)).

Furthermore, the attorneys’ fees do not impact the other Settlement terms. The request for

one-third of the Settlement Fund in attorneys’ fees, plus reimbursement of costs, to be paid from

the Settlement Fund, is subject to this Court’s approval. Class Counsel and Defendant negotiated

and reached agreement regarding attorneys’ fees and costs only after reaching agreement on all

other material Settlement terms. The Settlement, including disbursement of the Settlement Class

Member Benefits, is not contingent on approval of the attorneys’ fee or costs award. Finally, the

agreements between the Plaintiffs and Defendant are all in the Agreement. The Court therefore

finds Rule 23(e)(2)(C)’s requirements and the first four Bennett factors are met.

4. Rule 23(e)(2)(D) – Equitable Treatment of Settlement Class Members

As this Court found in Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *11; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *9,

and Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *7, all Settlement Class Members are given an equal

opportunity to claim Settlement Class Member Benefits. Thus, “[t]he method of distributing the

settlement benefits will be equitable and effective.” Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *11 (citing

Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *9 (quoting Mednax, 2024 WL 1554329, at *7)). Further, the

attorneys’ fees do not impact the other Settlement terms, as Class Counsel and Defendant

negotiated and reached agreement regarding attorneys’ fees and costs only after agreeing on all

other material Settlement terms. The Settlement, including disbursement of the Settlement Class

Member Benefits, is not contingent on approval of the attorneys’ fee or costs award. [ECF No.

56-1] at ¶ 114. Finally, the agreements between the Plaintiffs and Defendant are all in the

Agreement. Mot. for Final Approval at 15.

C. Appointment of Class Representatives and Class Counsel Is Appropriate.

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have adequately

represented the Settlement Class Members throughout this Action. The Court therefore designates

and appoints the Plaintiffs as Class Representatives.

Rule 23(g)(1)(A)’s four factors for appointing class counsel for a certified class are:

(1) “the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action;”

(2) “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of

claims asserted in the action;” (3) “counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law;” and (4) “the

resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The

Court may also “consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately

represent the interests of the class.” Id.

The Court finds Class Counsel have expended a reasonable amount of time, effort, and

expense investigating the Data Incident and in litigating this Action. Further, it is clear from their

track record of success, as outlined in their resumes, that Class Counsel are highly skilled and

knowledgeable concerning class action practice. Therefore, for purposes of the Settlement only,

and pursuant to Rule 23(g)(1), the Court appoints Class Counsel to act on behalf of the Settlement

Class (including the California Settlement Subclass) with respect to the Settlement. They are

experienced and competent counsel and will adequately protect the interests of the Settlement

Class Members. See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *12; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *10.

D. The Notice Program Was Properly Administered.

Notice of a proposed settlement must be the “best notice practicable.” FED. R. CIV. P.

23(c)(2)(B). The best notice practicable is that which “is reasonably calculated, under all of the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an

opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,

314 (1950).

Having consider the results of the Notice Program implementation, the Court now finds

the form, content, and method of giving notice to the Settlement Class Members as described in

the Notice Program, including the forms of Postcard Notice and Long Form Notice, Settlement

Website, Settlement telephone line for frequently asked questions, and Claim Form was (a) the

best practicable notice to the Settlement Class Members; (b) reasonably calculated, under the

circumstances, to apprise Settlement Class Members of the pendency of the Action, the terms of

the Settlement, the effect of the proposed Settlement (including the Releases contained therein),

and their rights under the proposed Settlement, including the right to opt-out of or to object to the

proposed Settlement and appear at the Final Approval Hearing; (c) reasonable and constituted due,

adequate, and sufficient notice to those persons entitled to receive notice; and (d) written in plain

language, using simple terminology, and designed to be readily understandable by Settlement

Class Members. Accordingly, the Notice Program satisfied the Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and due process

requirements. See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *12; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *10.

Rule 23(h)(1) further requires that “[n]otice of the motion [for attorneys’ fees] must be

served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable

manner.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (h)(1). The Notice Program satisfied that requirement, as it notified

the Settlement Class Members that Class Counsel will apply to the Court for an award of attorneys’

fees of up to one-third of the Settlement Fund, plus reimbursement of costs. See Fortra, 2025 WL

2675178, at *12; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *11.

****

Upon final review, the Court finds the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and

adequate; the Settlement Class and California Settlement Subclass are certified for Settlement

purposes; and the Notice Program satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 and due process.

Accordingly, Final Approval is granted.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS AWARD

Pursuant to the Settlement and the Notices, and consistent with recognized class action

practice and procedure, the Court hereby awards $1,666,666.66 for attorneys’ fees, which is equal

to 33.33% of the $5,000,000.00 Settlement Fund, and $32,384.30 for reasonable litigation costs.

Class Counsel shall determine the allocation of attorneys’ fees to all Plaintiffs’ counsel.

The requested attorneys’ fee award is within the range of reason under the factors listed in

Camden I Condo. Ass’n. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991);3 see also Fortra, 2025 WL

2675178, at *13; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *11. It is well established that when a representative

party has conferred a substantial benefit upon a class, counsel is entitled to attorneys’ fees based

3 The factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the relevant questions;

(3) the skill required to properly carry out the legal services; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the

attorney as a result of his acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or

contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the clients or the circumstances; (8) the results obtained,

including the amount recovered for the clients; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;

(10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and the length of the professional relationship with the

clients; and (12) fee awards in similar cases. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 772 n.3.

upon the benefit obtained. Camden I, 946 F.2d at 771; Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,

478 (1980); Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *13; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *11. The common

benefit doctrine is an exception to the general rule that each party must bear its own litigation

costs. “The doctrine serves the ‘twin goals of removing a potential financial obstacle to a

plaintiff’s pursuit of a claim on behalf of a class and of equitably distributing the fees and costs of

successful litigation among all who gained from the named plaintiff’s efforts.’” Gevaerts v. TD

Bank, N.A., No. 11:14-cv-20744, 2015 WL 6751061, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2015) (citation

omitted). “The common benefit doctrine stems from the premise that those who receive the benefit

of a lawsuit without contributing to its costs are ‘unjustly enriched’ at the expense of the successful

litigant.” Id. (citing Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478).

“As a result, the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and courts in this District [ ] have

all recognized that ‘[a] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons

other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as whole.’”

See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *13 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *12 (quoting Gevaerts,

2015 WL 6751061, at *10) (citations omitted)); see also Camden I, 946 F.2d at 771 (“Attorneys

in a class action in which a common fund is created are entitled to compensation for their services

from the common fund, but the amount is subject to court approval.”). Courts have also recognized

that appropriate fee awards in cases such as this encourage redress for wrongs caused to entire

classes of persons and deter future misconduct of a similar nature. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank

v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980). Further, “[a]dequate compensation promotes the

availability of counsel for aggrieved persons.” Millstein v. Holtz, No. 21-CV-61179, 2022 WL

18024840, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2022) (citation omitted); Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *13;

Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *12.

In the Eleventh Circuit, class counsel are awarded a percentage of the funds obtained

through a settlement. In Camden I—the controlling authority regarding attorneys’ fees in

common-fund class actions—the Eleventh Circuit held that “the percentage of the fund approach

[as opposed to the lodestar approach] is the better reasoned in a common fund case. Henceforth

in this circuit, attorneys’ fees awarded from a common fund shall be based upon a reasonable

percentage of the fund established for the benefit of the class.” Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774; Fortra,

2025 WL 2675178, at *14; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *12.

The Court has discretion in determining the appropriate fee percentage. “There is no hard

and fast rule mandating a certain percentage of a common fund which may be awarded as a fee

because the amount of any fee must be determined upon the facts of each case.” In re Sunbeam

Sec. Litigation, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (quoting Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774).

Here, the attorneys’ fee request falls within this accepted range. See Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178,

at *14 (citing Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *12, and In re Mednax Servs., Inc., Customer Data Sec.

Breach Litig., No. 21-MD-02994-RAR, 2024 WL 4415214 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2024) (noting district

courts in the Eleventh Circuit routinely approve fee awards of one-third of the common fund

settlement)). See also, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 1:09-MD-02036-JLK,

2020 WL 4586398, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2020) (awarding a 35% fee); Morgan v. Public

Storage, 301 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1257-58 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (awarding 33.33%); Wolff v. Cash 4

Titles, No. 03-22778-CIV, 2012 WL 5290155, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2012) (“The average

percentage award in the Eleventh Circuit mirrors that of awards nationwide—roughly one-third.”)

(citing Circuit case law and listing Southern and Middle District of Florida attorneys’ fees awards);

Waters v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530

U.S. 1289 (2000) (affirming fee award of 33.33 % of settlement).

The litigation costs, comprised of actual out-of-pocket costs Plaintiffs’ Counsel reasonably

and necessarily incurred and paid in connection with the prosecution of the Action and the

Settlement, are reasonable. “Upon submission of adequate documentation, plaintiffs’ attorneys

are entitled to reimbursement of those reasonable and necessary out-of-pocket expenses incurred

in the course of activities that benefitted the class.” Morgan, 301 F.Supp.3d at 1258; see also

Fortra, 2025 WL 2675178, at *14; Fortra, 2025 WL 457896, at *12. Further, pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(h), a trial court may award nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or the parties’

agreement. See also Behrens v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 549 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8,

1988) (noting plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to reimbursement from the class fund for reasonable

expenses).

RELEASES, ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT, AND RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

With the exception of those listed on Exhibit A, the Court adjudges that the Class

Representatives and all Settlement Class Members are bound by this Final Approval Order.

Because the Court approves the Settlement set forth in the Agreement as fair, reasonable,

and adequate, the Court authorizes and directs implementation of all terms and provisions of the

Agreement, including the payment of Valid Claims, attorneys’ fees and costs, and the Settlement

Administration Costs.

Judgment shall be, and hereby is, entered dismissing the Action with prejudice, on the

merits, and without taxation of costs in favor of or against any Party.

As of the Effective Date, the Releasing Parties hereby fully and irrevocably release and

forever discharge the Released Parties of and from the Released Claims. Notwithstanding, the

Releases shall not interfere with a Settlement Class Member’s right to communicate with a

government or law enforcement agency regarding any inquiries involving the Data Incident.

Upon the entry of this Final Approval Order, with the exception of Class Counsel,

Defendant’s Counsel, Defendant, and the Class Representatives’ implementation of the Settlement

and the approval process in this Action, all Settlement Class Members shall be enjoined and barred

from asserting any claims or continuing any litigation against Defendant and the Released Parties

arising out of, relating to, or in connection with the Released Claims.

Any residual funds remaining in the Settlement Fund 240 days following the date

Settlement Class members are sent an email to select their form of payment shall be distributed to

the National Cybersecurity Alliance (https://www.staysafeonline.org/) as the cy pres recipient.

The Court finds that its mission matches the goals of this Action to redress and protect the privacy

rights for consumers.

The Court hereby decrees that neither the Agreement, nor this Final Approval Order, nor

the fact of the Settlement, is an admission or concession by Defendant or the Released Parties of

any fault, wrongdoing or liability whatsoever, or as an admission of the appropriateness of class

certification for trial or dispositive motion practice. This Final Approval Order is not a finding of

the validity or invalidity of any of the claims asserted or defenses raised in the Action. Nothing

relating to the Settlement shall be offered or received in evidence as an admission, concession,

presumption, or inference against Defendant or the other Released Parties in any proceeding, other

than such proceedings as may be necessary to consummate or enforce the Settlement Agreement

or to support a defense based on principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release, good faith

settlement, judgment bar or reduction, or any other theory of claim preclusion or issue preclusion

or similar defense.

The Court hereby retains and reserves jurisdiction over: (a) implementation of this

Settlement and any distributions from the Settlement Fund; (b) the Action, until the Effective Date,

and until each and every act agreed to be performed by the Parties shall have been performed

pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, including the exhibits appended

thereto; and (c) all Parties, for the purpose of enforcing and administering the Settlement.

In the event the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement does not occur, the Settlement

shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided by and in accordance with the Settlement

Agreement, and this Order shall be vacated. In such event, all orders entered and releases delivered

in connection with the Settlement shall be null and void and the Action shall return to its status

immediately prior to execution of the Settlement Agreement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, itis ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Final Approval, [ECF No. 56], is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice with

respect to the Defendant herein, and no costs shall be awarded other than specified in this Order

or provided by the Settlement Agreement. There being no reason for delay, the Clerk of Court is

hereby directed to enter final judgment forthwith pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida this 26th day of January, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

27

EXHIBIT A – OPT-OUT LIST

1. Victoria Figueiredo

2. Anna Figueiredo

3. Nini Kisiskhelashvili

4. Donna Burroughs

5. Janet Rullo