Derrick S. Walker v. E. Walters et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

DERRICK S. WALKER, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-1168

)

E. WALTERS et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed by Plaintiff Derrick Stephen Walker,

an inmate at Federal Correctional Institution Pekin (“FCI Pekin”). Plaintiff has also filed

Motions for Counsel (Doc. 5), Regarding Mail (Doc. 6), and for Status (Docs. 7, 8, 10).

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

Plaintiff’s Complaint is before the Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

which requires the Court to “screen” the pleading and identify and dismiss any legally

insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes them liberally in his

favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements

and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that

is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff names the following officials as Defendants: Wardens E. Walters and K.

Bennett; Assistant Warden N. McDowell; Physicians Lisa Dodds and Moats; Physician

Assistant Johnson, Psychologists Bruessel, Chakos, and Gomory; and Health Service

Administrators Brown and T. Steketee.

On October 24, 2023, Defendant Chakos diagnosed Plaintiff with an opioid use

disorder and “mandated” that Plaintiff participate in the Medication Assisted Treatment

(“MAT”) Program to treat his disorder. (Pl. Compl., Doc, 1 at 5.) On January 21, 2025,

Defendant Dodd, who Plaintiff describes as an employee at the North Central Regional

Office, which is located in Kansas City, Kansas, prescribed Suboxone and “listed Plaintiff

as priority for participation and treatment in the MAT program.” (Id. at 5.) On February

5, 2025, Defendant Steketee screened Plaintiff for the MAT program by ordering an

electrocardiogram, labs, and X-rays. Plaintiff notes that, at the time Steketee examined

him, he had been waiting over 15 months to start the MAT program. Plaintiff alleges

constitutional violations based on this delay. (Id. at 4.)

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint proceeds under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,

which holds that a victim can seek damages in federal court for constitutional violations

committed by federal officers. 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971); see also Hernandez v. Mesa, 582 U.S.

548, 553 (2017) (“Bivens … recognized for the first time an implied right of action for

damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional

rights.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court explained that it applied Bivens in only three

constitutional contexts: (1) Fourth Amendment unreasonable searches and seizures, (2)

Fifth Amendment Due Process claim for gender discrimination, and (3) Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs. 582 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2017) (citing

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14

(1980)). The Supreme Court has since “made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is

now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity[,]” which the Supreme Court has refused to extend

for decades. Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 135 (collecting cases where the Supreme Court has declined

to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of federal defendants).

Specifically, the Supreme Court held that because Bivens created a judicial remedy

for damages against federal employees rather than a legislatively created remedy such as

42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal court should not expand Bivens unless special circumstances

exist. Id. at 137.

Plaintiff’s overarching claim alleges Eighth Amendment violations based on his

delay in receiving MAT treatment. (Pl. Compl., Doc. 1 at 5.); see also McGowan v. Hulick,

612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A delay in treatment may constitute deliberate

indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s

pain.”). In support of his claim, Plaintiff cites an exhibit appended to his pleading, which

spans twenty-five pages, claiming that the enclosed email correspondences demonstrate

that Defendants Bennett, Brown, Bruessel, Chakos, Dodds, Gomory, Johnson, McDowell,

Moats, Steketee, and Walters “have long ignored and neglected treatment of his

substance abuse ….” (Id. at 6.)

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an

objective and subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under

the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical condition is

sufficiently serious. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective

component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. In the medical care context, a “deliberate indifference” standard is used. Estelle,

429 U.S. at 104. A plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference by showing that a

defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”

Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). A defendant “must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

In other words, Plaintiff’s complaint must contain more than “highly generalized

factual allegations. Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2013). Instead, a pleading

must contain “enough specific factual allegations to state a plausible claim” against the

identified individual, who allegedly committed the unconstitutional conduct. Id. In other

words, there must not be any “genuine uncertainty regarding who is responsible for

what.” Id. at 710; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating that the pleading

standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation”).

A review of Plaintiff’s exhibits does not provide facts that show or permit the

inference that Defendants engaged in deliberate indifference by delaying Plaintiff’s

admission to the MAT treatment program. For example, Plaintiff’s exhibit contains

sixteen pages of emails he sent through the “Trulincs” system addressed to Brown,

Bruessel, Gomory, McDowell, Moats, Phychology, Skeketee, and “Warden,” which

Plaintiff has annotated as receiving no response or contain responses acknowledging

Plaintiff’s requests but explaining the long approval process, which was complicated by

physician personnel shortages.

Plaintiff’s correspondences are not addressed to Defendants Bennett, Chakos,

Dodds, Johnson, or Walters. Even if they were, it would be insufficient to state a claim

for deliberate indifference without additional facts that show they were in a position to

correct the delay, which they consciously ignored, intending to inflict cruel and unusual

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592,

595 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding that liability does not extend to “everyone who knows

about a prisoner’s problems”).

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s account shows that in October 2023, Defendant Chakos

diagnosed Plaintiff with an opioid use disorder and ordered Plaintiff’s participation in

the MAT Program. In January 2025, Defendant Dodd listed Plaintiff as a priority

admission for MAT treatment, and, in February 2025, Defendant Steketee screened

Plaintiff for the MAT program by ordering appropriate diagnostic medical testing. These

facts are insufficient to show that Chakos, Dodd, or Steketee was deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s medical condition.

Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed because it fails to state a plausible claim

for relief. However, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. If

Plaintiff elects to file an amendment, that filing must contain a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court does

not accept piecemeal amendments. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must stand

independently without reference to his initial filing and contain all claims against all

defendants. In other words, Plaintiff’s amended pleading must specify the constitutional

violation, when it occurred, and the Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See

Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983,

a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation

of a constitutional right.”).

II. Mail, Counsel, and Status

Plaintiff filed a Motion (Doc. 6) explaining that FCI Pekin mail room staff are

“opening, screening, copying, and delivering” his legal mail, which is being delivered

five to forty-five days late. “An inmate’s legal mail … is entitled to greater protections

because of the potential for interference with his right of access to the courts.” Kaufman v.

McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2005). “Thus, when a prison receives a letter

for an inmate … marked with an attorney’s name and a warning that the letter is legal

mail, officials potentially violate the inmate’s rights if they open the letter outside of the

inmate’s presence.” Id. at 686. However, isolated incidents of opening a prisoner’s legal

mail outside of his presence generally do not violate the Constitution, absent a

detrimental effect on the prisoner’s “access to justice.” Guajardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622

F.3d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 2010). Prison officials, however, may open mail outside the

prisoner’s presence when the letters “either are public or if private still are not of a nature

that would give the reader insights into the prisoner’s legal strategy.” Guajardo-Palma,

622 F.3d at 806.

Plaintiff requests an annotation on all future correspondence sent from the Clerk

of the Court to Plaintiff, indicating legal mail to be opened in Plaintiff’s presence, which

the Court declines to direct. If Plaintiff believes FCI Pekin’s actions violate his

constitutional rights regarding his legal mail, he may file a new pleading alleging that

deprivation.

With the entry of the Court’s Order, Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Doc. 7, 8, 10)

are moot. Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) remains pending until further order of

the Court.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 6) is DENIED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 7, 8, 10) are MOOT given the Court’s Order.

3) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc 1) is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for

failure to state a federal claim on which relief may be granted.

4) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within thirty

days of the entry of this order and in compliance with the Court’s guidance. If

Plaintiff does not file an amendment on or before the deadline established or fails

to comply with the provided instructions, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s case

without prejudice.

ENTERED January 26, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

_________________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE