BROWN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEPHEN BROWN, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : 25-CV-6381

:

DELAWARE COUNTY :

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

BARTLE, J. JANUARY 15, 2026

Stephen Brown asserts civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an

alleged illegal arrest, detention, and assault. For the following reasons, the Court will grant

Brown leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his Amended Complaint with prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Brown asserts constitutional claims against the Delaware County Sheriff’s Department

and unidentified “sheriff deputies, correctional facility officials, and supervisory officials.”

(ECF No. 16 at 2-3.) His facts are brief. He alleges that he was “seized without lawful probable

cause” on January 21, 2022 and subsequently “placed on court-ordered house arrest from

February 2022 through July 2022.” (Id. at 3.) Later, in November of 2022, Brown was allegedly

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Brown’s Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 16.) His Amended Complaint, which was permitted by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), superseded his initial Complaint and became the operative pleading

subject to the Court’s screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Garrett v. Wexford

Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that “an amended pleading supersedes the

original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity” and that “the most recently filed

amended complaint becomes the operative pleading”). The Court adopts the sequential

pagination assigned to the Amended Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

“assaulted” by “sheriff deputies,” who used a taser on Brown and ultimately transported him to a

hospital. (Id.) Brown was detained for approximately one and a half weeks instead of being

“presented before a judge within forty-eight hours” and allegedly endured “unsanitary jail

conditions, inadequate food, [and] degrading treatment” during his time in detention. (Id.)

Based on these allegations, Brown asserts Fourth Amendment claims based on his arrests and the

assault, Fourteenth Amendment claims based on his “delayed judicial presentment and prolonged

supervision,” constitutional claims based on the conditions of his confinement, and a municipal

liability claim. (Id. at 3.) He seeks money damages. (Id. at 4.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Brown appears to be unable to pay the filing fee in this matter, the Court will

grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether an

amended complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the amended complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged

in the pro se amended complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,

and ask only whether the amended complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.

See Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds

recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do

not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, a court may dismiss an amended complaint

based on an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations when the “defense is apparent

on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). As

Brown is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th

182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.

2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

Brown asserts constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which federal

constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. Based on the

allegations in the Amended Complaint, Brown’s § 1983 claims are time barred. See Whitenight

v. Cmwlth. of Pa. State Police, 674 F. App’x 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“When

screening a complaint under § 1915, a district court may sua sponte dismiss the complaint as

untimely under the statute of limitations where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no

development of the factual record is required.” (citations omitted)). Section 1983 claims, such as

those brought by Brown, are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Pennsylvania, that limitations period is two

years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. Monell claims are also subject to a two-year statute of

limitations. Buelna v. City of Philadelphia, No. 01-5114, 2002 WL 531538, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr.

8, 2002); see also Bullock v. Borough of Roselle, No. 17-13208, 2018 WL 4179481, at *8

(D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2018) (noting that Monell claims are “subject to the same two-year statute of

limitations as the underlying § 1983 tort”). A claim accrues “when a plaintiff has a complete and

present cause of action, that is, when [he] can file suit and obtain relief.” Dique v. N.J. State

Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). In general, this means that the

statute of limitations will start running at the time the plaintiff “knew or should have known of

the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d

582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).

Brown’s Fourth Amendment claims accrued when he was arrested, detained, and

subjected to excessive force. See Lloyd v. Ocean Twp. Counsel, 857 F. App’x 61, 64 (3d Cir.

2021) (per curiam) (noting that false arrest and imprisonment claims begin to run at the time the

plaintiff was “detained pursuant to legal process”); see also LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’x

140, 142 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“Claims for false arrest and assault (which would include

LeBlanc’s excessive force claim) typically accrue on the date of the arrest or the assault,

because, at that point, the plaintiff has reason to know of the injury.”). Brown’s Fourteenth

Amendment due process claims accrued, at the latest, when he was detained and not presented to

a judge for over a week in November 2022. See Smith v. Delaware Cty. Court, 260 F. App’x

454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (applying Pennsylvania’s two-year statutory period to

plaintiff’s claim that he was denied due process after his arrest and noting that the statute of

limitations begins to run from the time when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the

injury forming the basis for the federal civil rights action). Finally, Brown’s conditions-of-

confinement claims accrued when he was detained for a week and a half in November 2022. See

Davis v. City of Phila., No. 23-4841, 2024 WL 2817556, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2024) (holding

that claim based on unconstitutional conditions of confinement accrued at the time of

confinement because the plaintiff “knew or should have known of any possible constitutional

injury” at that time), aff’d, No. 24-2028, 2024 WL 4164270 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2024).

Brown states that he was arrested in January 2022 and November 2022 and assaulted and

detained without due process in November 2022. Thus, he was required to bring his claims by

November 2024, at the latest. Since Brown did not file this lawsuit until November 6, 2025,

nearly a year after the statute of limitations expired, it is apparent from the face of his Amended

Complaint that his claims must be dismissed as time barred.2

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint as time barred.

Since Brown cannot cure the fact that his case is untimely, he will not be given leave to amend.

A final order follows.

2 Moreover, there are no allegations in the Amended Complaint that would support a

basis for equitable tolling of the claims. See Lloyd, 857 F. App’x at 64 (stating that equitable

tolling is generally appropriate where: (1) a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff regarding a

cause of action; (2) a plaintiff has been prevented from asserting a claim as a result of other

extraordinary circumstances; or (3) a plaintiff has timely asserted his claims, but in the wrong

forum).