Beckman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JOHN BECKMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:24-cv-585-JES-DNF

THE COLLIER COUNTY BOARD OF

COUNTY COMMISIONERS,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of the Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. #27) filed by Defendant Collier County

Board of County Commissioners (the “County” or Defendant) on

September 25, 2025. Plaintiff John Beckman (“Beckman” or

Plaintiff) filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #28)

on September 26, 2025. Both parties filed Responses to the

respective motions on October 31, 2025. (Docs. ##31, 32.) On

November 14, 2025, both parties filed Replies to the Responses.

(Docs. ##33, 34.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s

motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when a movant shows that

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence

is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322,

1329 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). A fact is “material” if

it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In

ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court views all evidence

and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving

party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Tana v.

Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).

II.

Beckman began his employment with the County in 2006 as an

Emergency Medical Technician. Beckman enjoyed a successful career

with the County, and by 2016 had been promoted to Battalion Chief.

At all relevant times Beckman had been able to perform the

essential functions of his employment position with an

accommodation for a gastrointestinal condition that substantially

limits his major life activities. After multiple medications

proved unsuccessful in managing the condition, on September 12,

2020, Beckman obtained a certification for medical marijuana use

from the State of Florida.

The County has implemented a Drug Free Workplace policy

pursuant to the Drug-Free Workplace Act, Fla. Stat. § 112.0455.

See also Fla. Stat. § 440.102. The County maintains a County

Manager Administrative Procedure (“CMA”) mandating a work

environment free from the unlawful use of controlled substances

(including marijuana).

In October 2020 Beckman notified both Deputy Chief Tony Camps

(“Deputy Chief Camps”) and Chief Tabatha Butcher (“Chief Butcher”)

about his medical marijuana use certification. The details of the

conversations are somewhat disputed, but the disputes are not

material to any issue in the case. Beckman would periodically

request and receive paid time off because of his medical condition.

There were no issues about Beckman’s work performance, and Beckman

continued to use the medical marijuana on and off as needed.

Beckman was only tested at work because of the random drug testing

protocol, and until September 1, 2023, he had never tested positive

for the presence of marijuana in his system.

On September 1, 2023, Beckman was selected for random drug

testing as part of the County’s testing protocol. The test came

back positive for the presence of marijuana in Beckman’s system,

and he was immediately placed on unpaid administrative leave until

completing counseling with a substance abuse professional and

returning a negative drug screening.

Beckman was cleared to return to work after testing negative

for illegal substances on October 17, 2023. By October 24, 2023,

Beckman received and signed a Behavioral Action Plan (“BAP”) which

included: (1) a thirty-day suspension credited as time served,

(2) demotion from Battalion Chief II to Paramedic II with an

approximate 24.5% pay cut, (3) a six-month driving prohibition,

(4) a six-month probationary period, and (5) ineligibility for

promotional opportunities for up to twenty-four months. Beckman

did not appeal this discipline, but was unwilling to accept the

demotion in rank. Beckman submitted a letter of resignation on

October 26, 2023, and terminated his employment with the County on

November 9, 2023. Beckman characterizes this as a constructive

discharge by the County.

After filing a formal Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC,

Beckman received his Notice of Right to Sue on April 26, 2024. He

filed the underlying Complaint (Doc. #1) on June 24, 2024, bringing

claims under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) for disability

discrimination and retaliation (Counts I and III) and under the

Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) for disability discrimination and

retaliation (Counts II and IV).

III.

The County seeks summary judgment on all four of Beckman’s

claims. Beckman seeks partial summary judgment on his two FCRA

claims. All four claims implicate the interplay between federal

and Florida law regarding the medical use of marijuana. The Court

therefore begins with a discussion of those respective laws.

A. Federal Marijuana Use Laws

Federal law makes the medical use of marijuana unlawful. The

context, however, is more complicated than the rule.

Under federal law it is a criminal offense to possess even a

small amount of marijuana. 18 U.S.C. § 844(a). Possession of

small amounts of marijuana for personal use is subject to a civil

penalty, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), but a civil penalty may not be imposed

on more than two separate occasions, 21 U.S.C. § 844(d), before

criminal penalties are applicable.

Marijuana is currently categorized as a Schedule I drug under

the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23).

A Schedule I drug “(1) has a high potential for abuse; (2) has no

currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States;

and (3) lacks accepted safety use under medical supervision.”

Florida Comm'r of Agric. v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 148

F.4th 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)).

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recently proposed a new

rule to reclassify Marijuana as a Schedule III drug, which would

allow use of marijuana for medical treatment. See 21 U.S.C. §

812(b)(3). The proposed new rule, however, is still working its

way through the administrative process. See In the Matter of

Schedules of Controlled Substances: Proposed Rescheduling of

Marijuana, DEA Docket No. 1362 (January 13, 2025). Recently,

President Donald J. Trump has issued an Executive Order to speed

up consideration of the reclassification of marijuana. Increasing

Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research, 90 FR 60541.

As a Florida appellate court has summarized:

[F]ederal law provides that marijuana is not safe

and has no use in medical treatment. The Controlled

Substances Act (“CSA”) classifies marijuana as a

Schedule I substance. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Sched.

I(c)(10). The CSA defines a Schedule I substance as one

that has “a high potential for abuse,” “has no currently

accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,”

and lacks safe use even under medical supervision. 21

U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). Indeed, mere possession of marijuana

is a federal crime everywhere in the United States. See

21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (providing criminal penalties for

“simple possession” of marijuana); cf. 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(B)(vii), (D), (E)(4) (providing criminal

penalties for distribution and possession with intent to

distribute marijuana). Although the CSA requires

periodic updates of the schedules of controlled

substances, marijuana has remained a Schedule I drug

since the CSA's enactment in 1970. See 21 U.S.C. §

812(a); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 n.23, 125 S.Ct.

2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).

Jones v. Grace Healthcare, 320 So. 3d 191, 193–94 (Fla. 1st DCA

2021). More recently, that court stated:

Marijuana is a schedule I drug under the Controlled

Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10). Under the Act,

Schedule I drugs are deemed to have “no medicinal purpose

for treatment in the United States, have a high potential

for abuse, and lack acceptable safety measures even when

used under proper medical supervision.” 21 U.S.C. §

812(b)(1). Therefore, under the Act, there are no valid

prescriptions for marijuana. Because marijuana may not

be validly prescribed under federal law, mere possession

of marijuana is a felony under federal law. Gonzales v.

Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1

(2005).

Velez Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 368 So. 3d 33, 34–35 (Fla. 1st DCA

2023). In other words, “the use of marijuana for medical purposes,

even where sanctioned by state law, remains a violation of federal

law . . ..” United States v. Cannon, 36 F.4th 496, 500 (3d Cir.

2022).

Nevertheless, while the possession and use of even small

amounts of marijuana remains unlawful, Congress has virtually

guaranteed that no person will be charged with possessing or using

marijuana when participating in a state medical marijuana program.

When Congress exercises its power to appropriate government funds

1

each year pursuant to its Article I powers, such appropriation

acts are often accompanied by “riders” that limit how the money

may (or may not) be spent. See SEAN M. STIFF, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,

R46417, CONGRESS’S POWER OVER APPROPRIATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS (2020). Every year since 2015 Congress has

included a budget rider amendment (commonly referred to as the

1

Article I of the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part,

that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in

Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §

9, cl. 7.

“Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment”) providing that “[n]one of the funds

made available under this Act to the Department of Justice may be

used” to prevent any state which has legalized medical marijuana

“from implementing their own laws that authorize the use,

distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”

See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub.

L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014); Florida Comm'r

of Agric., 148 F.4th at 1312. Federal courts have interpreted

this rider to prohibit prosecution of individuals “who fully

complied,” United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th

Cir. 2016), or “substantially complied”, United States v.

Bilodeau, 24 F.4th 705, 715 (1st Cir. 2022), or “comply”, United

States v. Stacy, 156 F.4th 994, 1012 (10th Cir. 2025), with their

respective State laws regulating medical marijuana use.

As a result, “. . . Congress has precluded the Department of

Justice (for now) from prosecuting crimes that Congress (for now)

chooses to maintain on the books.” Fried v. Garland, 640 F. Supp.

3d 1252, 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2022), vacated and remanded sub nom.

Florida Comm'r of Agric., 148 F.4th 1307 (11th Cir. 2025). This

type of inconsistency had led Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas

to observe that while “[o]nce comprehensive, the Federal

Government’s current approach is a half-in, half-out regime that

simultaneously tolerates and forbids local use of marijuana. This

contradictory and unstable state of affairs strains basic

principles of federalism and conceals traps for the unwary.”

Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2236, 2236-37

(2021) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

Nonetheless, the Court ends where it began: Federal law makes the

medical use of marijuana unlawful.

The existence of the Florida medical marijuana law, discussed

below, does not change Federal law. The Florida constitutional

amendment does not attempt to do so, providing only that medical

use of marijuana “is not subject to criminal or civil liability or

sanctions under Florida law.” Art. X, § 29(3), Fla. Const.

(emphasis added.) Nor could it, since Federal law prevails in

this area.

Even though some states—including Florida—permit

the purchase, possession, and use of marijuana for

medical purposes, federal law must prevail in

circumstances such as this. We are bound by the United

States Constitution to apply the CSA over a provision in

the Florida Constitution to the contrary. As the federal

constitution commands, the “Laws of the United States

... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges

in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding.” Art. VI, U.S. Const. (emphasis

supplied). We cannot reverse—as Jones would have us do—

the JCC's order in reliance on an undisputed

characterization of medical necessity that directly

conflicts with clear federal law. Cf. Ledoux-Nottingham

v. Downs, 210 So. 3d 1217, 1221 (Fla. 2017) (observing

that when federal law conflicts with Florida law,

federal law controls under the Supremacy Clause).

Jones, 320 So. 3d at 194.

B. Florida Marijuana Use Laws

Under Florida law, it is illegal to sell, manufacture, or

deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver,

a controlled substance. Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) (2008-present).

Cannabis, the technical name for marijuana, is classified as a

Schedule I controlled substance in Florida. Fla. Stat. §

893.03(1)(c)(7). Simple possession of marijuana remains a crime

in Florida, constituting either a felony or misdemeanor depending

on whether the amount is more or less than 20 grams. Fla. Stat. §

893.13(6)(b). See generally Wright-Johnson v. State, 405 So. 3d

501, 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025); Campbell v. State, 407 So. 3d 558,

561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025).

A limited exception exists for the medical use of marijuana

as the result of a 2016 voter-approved amendment to the Florida

Constitution. This constitutional amendment mandated “the

development of a carefully regulated system for providing access

to marijuana for certain patients suffering from debilitating

medical conditions.” Florida Dep't of Health v. Florigrown, LLC,

317 So. 3d 1101, 1106 (Fla. 2021). Article X, § 29 of the Florida

Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he medical use

of marijuana by a qualifying patient or caregiver in compliance

with this section is not subject to criminal or civil liability or

sanctions under Florida law.” Art. X, § 29(3), Fla. Const. The

Amendment contemplates that the Florida Legislature may enact laws

consistent with its provisions, Id. § 29(e) (“Nothing in this

section shall limit the legislature from enacting laws consistent

with this section”) and that the Florida Department of Health

“issue reasonable regulations necessary for the implementation and

enforcement of” its provisions for the purpose of “ensur[ing] the

availability and safe use of medical marijuana by qualifying

patients.” Id. § 29(d). See Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d at 1106.

In 2017 the Florida legislature enacted Fla. Stat. § 381.986

(Medical use of marijuana) as the legislative framework to

implement and regulate the constitutional amendment. Sanctuary

Cannabis v. Florida Dep't of Health, 406 So. 3d 390, 392 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2025). The Legislature amended the definition of “cannabis”

to exclude medical marijuana. Id.; Williams v. State, 421 So. 3d

809, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025). The statute imposed various

limitations, including the requirements that the marijuana:

consist of no more than certain, limited amounts; be “acquired

from a medical marijuana treatment center”; be obtained pursuant

to a “medical marijuana use registry identification card” issued

by a “qualified physician”; and be administered in a location other

than “in plain view of or in a place open to the general public;

in a school bus, a vehicle, an aircraft, or a boat; or on the

grounds of a school.” See generally Fla. Stat. § 381.986; Wright-

Johnson, 405 So. 3d at 506.

Additionally, the Florida medical use of marijuana statute

provides certain protections for employers. Section 381.986(15)

protects an employer's right to maintain and enforce a drug-free

workplace. See Fla. Stat. § 381.986(15)(a) (“This section does

not limit the ability of an employer to establish, continue, or

enforce a drug-free workplace program or policy.”). Additionally,

§ 381.986(15)(c) clarifies that “[t]his section does not create a

cause of action against an employer for wrongful discharge or

discrimination.” Fla. Stat. § 381.986(15)(c).

IV.

The Court first discusses Beckman’s two ADA claims. Beckman

asserts that he was subjected to unlawful disability

discrimination when his employer failed to accommodate his

gastrointestinal condition by permitting him to use medical

marijuana outside of work hours. Beckman also alleges that the

County retaliated against him by subjecting him to discipline

following protected disability disclosures.

The County argues that Beckman must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), and that Beckman has not done so. (Doc. #27, pp. 22-

23.) Additionally, the County argues that even if Beckman had

established a prima facie case for either ADA claim, he has not

established that the stated reason for the employment action was

a pretext for disability discrimination or retaliation. (Id., p.

27.) The County argues that it is therefore entitled to summary

judgment as to both the ADA discrimination claim and the ADA

retaliation claim.

A. Summary Judgment Procedure

First, a word about summary judgment procedure. The County

seems to suggest that failure to satisfy McDonnell Douglas ends

the inquiry with summary judgment in its favor. (Doc. #27, pp.

22-24.) This would be incorrect.

An employee may establish his claims using direct or

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. Jefferson v.

Sewon Am. Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 921 (11th Cir. 2018). When utilizing

circumstantial evidence, an employee may rely on the burden-

shifting McDonnell Douglas framework, Akridge v. Alfa Ins.

Companies, 93 F.4th 1181, 1191 (11th Cir. 2024), or if that fails,

may establish a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that

would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the

decisionmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321,

1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(footnote omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has recently summarized

the McDonnell Douglas framework in employment discrimination and

retaliation cases as follows:

There, the [Supreme] Court introduced a three-part

evidentiary burden shifting framework:

1. First, the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie

case, which may be done by showing: (i) the plaintiff is

in a protected group; (ii) the plaintiff was well

qualified; (iii) the plaintiff suffered an adverse

employment action; and (iv) the plaintiff was treated

less favorably than similarly situated employees outside

of the plaintiff's protected group.

2. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the adverse action.

3. Third, if the employer provides an adequate

reason, the plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate

that the employer's proffered rationale is pretextual.

Retaliation claims (as opposed to direct discrimination

claims) follow the same framework, but the prima facie

case is modified. There, a plaintiff must show: (i) that

she engaged in a protected activity, like filing a

complaint for discrimination; (ii) that she suffered a

material adverse action; and (iii) that there was a

causal connection between the protected activity and the

adverse action.

Ismael, 161 F. 4th at 759 (internal citations omitted.)

If plaintiffs cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test, “the

inquiry does not end. Rather, a district court must turn to

evaluate the evidence before it, applying the duly promulgated

Rule 56 summary judgment standard.” Id. at 764. “[A] plaintiff

who cannot establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is

entitled to a full review under the convincing mosaic standard.”

Id. at 761. Under this standard,

[a]s in other contexts, a plaintiff may avoid

summary judgment by presenting a wide range of

circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may include “(1)

suspicious timing, ambiguous statements ..., and other

bits and pieces from which an inference of

discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systematically

better treatment of similarly situated employees, and

(3) that the employer's justification is pretextual.”

Id. at 760 (citations omitted.)

B. ADA Discrimination

The ADA prohibits covered employers from “discriminat[ing]

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he (1)

had a disability, (2) was a qualified individual, and (3) was

subjected to unlawful discrimination “on the basis of disability.”

Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023).

The County does not contest that Beckman had a disability but

argues that he has not established the remaining two elements of

a prima facie discrimination claim.

(1) Qualified Individual

The County asserts that “no accommodation was due because

Beckman was not a qualified individual with a disability under the

ADA.” (Doc. #27, p. 22.) The County argues that Beckman is not

a qualified individual within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)

because he was an employee “who is currently engaging in the

illegal use of drugs,” and the County imposed the discipline on

the basis of such drug use. (Id., p. 23.)

The ADA defines a qualified individual as one “who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

Beckman must prove he was a qualified individual “at the time of

the County’s alleged disability-based discrimination.” Stanley v.

City of Sanford, 606 U.S. ––––, 145 S. Ct. 2058, 2071 (2025).

A person illegally using drugs is excluded from the definition

of a “qualified individual.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (“[A]

qualified individual with a disability shall not include any

employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use

of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such drug

use.”) It is not disputed that Beckman was using marijuana

pursuant to his Florida certification. This constituted illegal

use of drugs under federal law. Beckman was disciplined because

he tested positive for marijuana use. Unless there is an

applicable exception, this would exclude Beckman from being a

qualified individual.

There is an exception to this definitional exclusion: The

“illegal use of drugs . . . does not include the use of a drug

taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or

other uses authorized by the Controlled Substance Act.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12110(d)(1). Beckman’s use was clearly not an “other use[]”

authorized by the Controlled Substance Act. Additionally,

persuasive federal case law holds that the use of medical marijuana

pursuant to a state-authorized program is not drug usage “taken

under supervision by a licensed health care professional.” James

v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 F.3d 394, 403 (9th Cir. 2012) (“doctor-

supervised marijuana use is an illegal use of drugs not covered by

the ADA's supervised use exception.”); Anderson v. Diamondback

Investment Group, 117 F.4th 165, 177-80 (4th Cir. 2024) (employer

not liable for failure to accommodate under the ADA where employee

was terminated based on a positive drug test for marijuana);

Eccleston v. City of Waterbury, No. 3:19-cv-1614, 2021 WL 1090754,

at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021) (“I agree with the courts that have

reasoned that even physician-supervised medical marijuana use does

not fit within the supervised-use exception identified in the ADA.

To read otherwise would place it in direct tension with the clear

provisions of the CSA[.]”); Steele v. Stallion Rockies, Ltd., 106

F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1212 (D. Colo. 2015) (collecting cases). See

also Velez Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 368 So. 3d 33, 35 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2023) (there are no valid prescriptions for marijuana under

Controlled Substance Act.)

Beckman argues that he was unquestionably a qualified

individual under Florida law because “[w]hen conduct is

constitutionally protected under state law, federal classification

cannot eliminate state civil rights protections.” (Doc. #31, p.

14.) Beckman’s argument is wrong. See Jones, 320 So. 3d at 194.

The undisputed facts demonstrate that Beckman received an

adverse employment action after testing positive for the presence

of marijuana during a random drug screening as part of the County’s

testing protocol. Beckman’s use of marijuana, even pursuant to

his Florida certificate, was illegal under federal law, and the

statutory exclusion is not satisfied by the Florida medical

marijuana program. Accordingly, Beckman was not a qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA.

(2) Causation

The County also challenges Beckman’s showing of the third

prima facia element – causation between his disability and the

employment action. (Doc. #27, pp. 25-27.) Beckman asserts that

his disabilities were “gastro-intestinal impairments that affect

the major life activities of digestion and working.” (Doc. #1, ¶

9.) Beckman further asserts that his disabilities “are the basis

for [the County’s] discriminatory employment practices toward him”

(id., ¶ 14) and that the County discriminated against him “because

of his disabilities.” (Id., ¶ 22.)

The ADA imposes a “but-for” causation standard — that is, an

adverse employment action would not have occurred but for the

plaintiff's disability. Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Companies, 93 F.4th

1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 2024). As the County correctly argues, there

is no evidence that Beckman was disciplined because of his medical

condition. None of Beckman’s asserted causation evidence (Doc.

#31, pp. 15-17) goes to his gastrointestinal disability, but rather

goes to his use of marijuana. Beckman was disciplined for using

marijuana as his remedy-of-choice in violation of the County’s

Drug Free Work policy and federal law. See Stewart v. Happy

Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.

1997) (holding that an employer need only provide a reasonable

accommodation to its disabled employee, not the employee’s

accommodation of choice). Accordingly, Beckman has failed to

establish the causation element.

(3) Legitimate, Non-Pretextual Reason for Action

The County argues that even if Beckman could establish all

the prima facie case elements, he has not proven that the reason

for its employment action was unlawful disability discrimination

(or retaliation). (Doc. #27, pp. 27-30.) The County asserts it

imposed discipline on Beckman because he failed a drug test in

violation of the County’s established policy and there is no

evidence that this reason was a pretext for disability

discrimination.

Beckman responds that the proffered reasons for the BAP

discipline were “pure pretext” because (1) Chief Butcher testified

his discipline was more severe than it should have been; (2) the

County treated him differently than another employee; and (3) the

County’s policy provided for discretion, yet the County failed to

exercise it for Beckman. (Doc. #31, pp. 15-18.) None of these

factors would allow a reasonable jury to find pretext.

An employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad

reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at

all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.”

Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc'ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.

1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis, 918 F.3d 1213.

“Federal courts ‘do not sit as a super-personnel department that

reexamines an entity's business decisions. No matter how medieval

a firm's practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional

process, no matter how mistaken the firm's managers, the ADEA does

not interfere. Rather our inquiry is limited to whether the

employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.’” Chapman v.

AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted.)

The Chief’s personal view of the severity of punishment also

does not tend to establish that the reason for termination was

plaintiff’s disability, rather than his marijuana use. Indeed,

the record establishes that plaintiff’s discipline was more

lenient than typical, since the employment of 22 of 24 persons who

had tested positive for drugs while employed by the County was

terminated. Assuming the County had discretion, the failure to

exercise that discretion in favor of plaintiff is not an indication

that plaintiff’s physical ailment was the real reason. The Court

concludes that even if plaintiff had established (1) that he was

a qualified individual and (2) the causation element, he has made

no showing from which a reasonable jury could find pretext.

(4) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

The Complaint alleges that with a reasonable accommodation

Beckman could have performed the essential functions of his job.

(Doc. #1, ¶ 19.) Beckman testified that the accommodation he was

referring to was continued use of medical marijuana. (Doc. #24-

1, pp. 67-68.) The County argues that to the extent Beckman is

pursuing the aspect of his discrimination claim involving failure

to accommodate, it too is subject to summary judgment. (Doc. #27,

pp. 31-32.)

An employer's failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled

individual is itself disability discrimination. Holly v. Clairson

Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). An employee is

subjected to unlawful disability discrimination when the employer

fails to provide “reasonable accommodations” for the disability

unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Beasley, 69 F.4th at 754. If the

plaintiff establishes that he was denied reasonable accommodation,

the burden shifts to the “employer . . . to show undue hardship.”

Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000). An

employer need not “accommodate an employee in any manner in which

that employee desires.” Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117

F.3d at 1285 (citation omitted). Rather, an employer meets its

obligations under the ADA if it provides some reasonable

accommodation, regardless of whether it is “the accommodation of

[the employee's] choice.” Id. at 1286 (citation omitted).

An employer's duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is

not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation has

been made. Id. To “trigger an employer's accommodation duties, a

disabled employee need only identify a statutory disability and

explain generally how a particular accommodation would assist

[him].” Owens v. Governor's Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th

1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2022). The employee has the burden of

identifying an accommodation and demonstrating that it is

reasonable. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir.

2016).

The County argues that Beckman never requested use of

medical marijuana as an accommodation, and in any event, it would

have been illegal and therefore not reasonable. (Doc. #27, pp.

31-32.) Beckman testified in deposition that he requested, and

was allowed to take, time off to attend to his medical condition.

He further testified that he never asked the County for any other

accommodation. However, Beckman has also identified conduct from

which it is reasonable to infer he was requesting to use marijuana

to obtain relief from his disability. (Doc. #31, pp. 18-19.)

Beckman states that he made the following disclosures with regard

to his medical marijuana usage: In October 2020, Beckman

"[n]otified Chief Camps of [his] medical issue getting worse and

having to use Medical Marijuana as treatment after multiple other

medications were not working." In April of 2021, he “[a]sked Chief

Camps if [he] could turn in [his medical marijuana certification]

to be upfront of the situation.” Finally, in September 2022 he “.

. . called Chief Butcher and let her know of [his medical marijuana

certification]. [He] explained that [he] had a [medical marijuana]

card and prescription for the medication as well." (Doc. #31, p.

18.)

There is no “precise form” that a request for accommodation

must take. Instead, the “circumstances must at least be sufficient

to cause a reasonable [defendant] to make appropriate inquiries

about the possible need for an accommodation.” Hunt v. Aimco

Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1226 (11th Cir. 2016). Given the

summary judgment standard, this is sufficient to show Beckman did

make a request for accommodation.

But even construing this conduct as being a requested

accommodation to allow the use of marijuana, it was not reasonable

under the ADA because medical marijuana use was and still is

illegal under federal law. Accordingly, any failure to accommodate

claim based on the underlying facts fails as a matter of law.

(5) Individual Assessment Under the ADA

Beckman asserts that the County discriminated against him by

failing to individually assess whether he could presently perform

the essential aspects of his job while using state-authorized

medical marijuana. (Doc. #31, pp. 20-22.) But no individualized

assessment is required to determine if an employee is able to

safely function while being afforded an unreasonable

accommodation.

Beckman relies on a non-binding decision which allowed

employment discrimination claims where the employee was discharged

based on possible side effects of certain anxiety medications

without making individualized assessments of whether the

individual was able to perform his or her job. See Haynes v. City

of Montgomery, No. 2:06CV1093WKW, 2008 WL 4495711, at *3 (M.D.

Ala. Oct. 6, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Haynes v. City of Montgomery,

Ala., 344 F. App’x 519 (11th Cir. 2009). However, the facts in

this case differ substantially from those in Haynes. The

medications used by the employee in Haynes were not Schedule I

substances under the CSA; marijuana, even under the supervision of

a clinical physician, is a Schedule I substance and its use is

illegal under federal law. No individualized assessment was

authorized or required when the requested accommodation was to use

an illegal substance even if the person can function without side

effects.

(6) Interactive Process Under ADA

Beckman asserts that even if there are no protections for

medical marijuana users under the ADA, the County was nevertheless

required to engage in a good faith interactive process with regard

to his disability disclosures. (Doc # 31, p. 23.) While for

summary judgment purposes Beckman is deemed to have made the

accommodation request, the requested accommodation was still

illegal under federal law. Accordingly, there was nothing to

interact about. The employer was simply unable to change federal

law and allow an employee to use a substance which federal law

forbade. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the County

on Beckman’s claim for disability discrimination under the ADA.

(7) Convincing Mosaic Alternative

While the record establishes Beckman has failed to establish

two of the three prima facie elements, the Court must consider if

there was other evidence which would satisfy Beckman’s burden and

avoid summary judgment. A review of the record establishes that

there is not a convincing mosaic of evidence which would allow a

reasonable jury to find either disability discrimination or

disability retaliation.

C. ADA Retaliation Claim

Beckman asserts a claim for retaliation because of protected

activity, which he identifies as his “request for reasonable

accommodation.” (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 46, 47, 55, 56.) The County seeks

summary judgment on this ADA retaliation claim.

The ADA prohibits covered employers from retaliating against

an employee who “has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by

this Act or because such individual made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this Act.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).

Claims for retaliation are evaluated under McDonnel Douglas

framework. Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d

1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). To establish a prima facie claim for

retaliation, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he engaged in a

statutorily protected activity or expression, (2) that he suffered

an adverse employment action, and (3) that there exists a causal

connection between the protected acts and the adverse employment

action. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir.

2018).

A plaintiff engages in a statutorily protected activity by

making requests for accommodation under the ADA when he has a good

faith reasonable belief that he is entitled to those

accommodations. Monroe v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 793 F. App'x 924,

928 (11th Cir. 2019). To prove a causal connection for a

retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only demonstrate “that the

protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly

unrelated.” Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161,

1180 n.30 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

One way of doing this is by showing a close temporal proximity

between the employer's discovery of the protected activity and the

adverse action. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir.

2004). Temporal proximity must be “very close,” id. (quotation

marks omitted); a three-to-four-month delay is too long, Thomas v.

Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007), while

a one-month gap may satisfy the test, Donnellon v. Fruehauf Corp.,

794 F.2d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 1986).

The County argues that Beckman cannot establish a retaliation

claim because he did not engage in protected activity, the use of

marijuana remained illegal, and the reason for the discipline was

not false or pretextual. Beckman responds that he made requests

for over three years, and points to the timing and severity of the

discipline after testing to support his retaliation claim.

Despite Beckman’s testimony that he did not request any

accommodation other than occasional time off, which was granted,

the Court has found that for summary judgment purposes his conduct

constitutes an implicit request for the use of medical marijuana.

The record shows that Beckman’s disability disclosures occurred in

October 2020, April 2021, and September 2022. Those implicit

requests were denied.

There is no evidence supporting Beckman’s theory that he was

retaliated against for making the request for the accommodation.

Indeed, under his theory Beckman’s employment continued for years

after he made the implicit requests. However, Beckman did not

receive and sign the BAP until October 24, 2023. The elapsed time

between the protected activity and the adverse action is, on its

own, far too remote to support an inference that the County’s

decision was motivated by Beckman’s protected activity. See

Gallimore v. City of Opa-Locka, Florida, No. 23-12241, 2025 WL

2237313, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (“While ‘an employee's

termination within days -- or at the most within two weeks -- of

[her] protected activity can be circumstantial evidence of a causal

connection between the two,’ a gap of multiple months, in the

absence of some other evidence of retaliation, is too large a

temporal gap.” (citing Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911,

926 (11th Cir. 2018)). While Beckman counts from the drug test,

this was not a protected disclosure.

It was not the requests for an accommodation which led to his

discipline, but Beckman’s continued use of an illegal drug. There

is no evidence that the implicit requests for accommodation were

in any way related to the suspension, demotion, and other

disciplinary actions outlined in the BAP. “To establish a causal

connection, a plaintiff must show that the relevant decisionmaker

was aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity

and adverse actions were not wholly unrelated.” Kidd v. Mando Am.

Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation and

quotations omitted). “The burden of causation can be met by showing

close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected

activity and the adverse employment action.” Thomas v. Cooper

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). However,

“in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, if

there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and

the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter

of law.” Id.

The evidence before the Court indicates that the County never

subjected Beckman to any “reasonable suspicion” drug screenings

(as it was permitted to do by its Drug Free Workplace policy).

Instead, as Beckman conceded in his deposition, he was only

subjected to random drug screenings during his tenure with the

County. (Doc. #24-1, pp. 28-34.) The Court finds the temporal

gap between Beckman’s disclosures and the adverse employment

action fatal to the element of causation. Accordingly, the Court

grants the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Beckman’s

ADA claim for retaliation.

V.

The FCRA forbids employers from “discriminat[ing] against any

individual . . . because of such individual's . . . handicap.”

Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). “Florida courts construe the Florida

Civil Rights Act in conformity with the federal Americans with

Disabilities Act [(“ADA”)].” Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc.,

4 F.4th 1149, 1155 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and brackets

omitted). See Abadi v. Walt Disney World Parks & Resorts, 338 So.

3d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). This includes situations where

the language is similar but not identical. Ring, 4 F.4th at 1156.

The FCRA is also analyzed under the same framework as the ADA.

Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir.

2007); Samson v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 746 F.3d 1196, 1200 n. 2 (11th

Cir. 2014). Similarly, retaliation claims brought under the FCRA

are analyzed pursuant to federal case law. Carter v. Health Mgmt.

Associates, 989 So. 2d 1258, 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Because the Florida Civil Rights Act does not define the term

“handicap,” Florida courts look to the ADA’s definition of a

“disability.” Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc., 948 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.

DCA 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting

“handicap” in the FCRA in the light of the definition of

“disability” in the ADA); Ring, 4 F.4th at 1155–56. The question

becomes whether the Florida medical marijuana constitutional

amendment and statute change the ADA analysis when addressing

marijuana under the FCRA.

Beckman argues that he is unquestionably a qualified

individual under Florida law because the Florida Constitution

explicitly protects the medical use of marijuana by a qualifying

patient or caregiver. (Doc. #31, p. 2.) Beckman relies heavily

on the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County’s decision in Giambrone

v. Hillsborough County, No. 20-CA-4719 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Dec.

10, 2024), which found that medical marijuana use was protected

under the FCRA in light of Article X, § 29 of the Florida

Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 381.986. That decision is currently

on appeal, and in any event, state trial court decisions do not

bind federal courts as a final expression of state law. See North

Shore Med. Center, Inc. v. Cigna Health and Life Ins. Co., 68 F.4th

1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2023).

The Court is not persuaded by Giambrone. Florida law is clear

that the FCRA follows federal law as set forth in the ADA, and

that law still classifies marijuana as an unlawful drug.

Additionally, Florida’s medical marijuana statutes specifically

protect an employer's right to maintain and enforce a drug-free

workplace. See Fla. Stat. § 381.986(15)(a) (“This section does

not limit the ability of an employer to establish, continue, or

enforce a drug-free workplace program or policy.”); Fla. Stat. §

381.986(15)(c) (“[t]his section does not create a cause of action

against an employer for wrongful discharge or discrimination.”)

The County’s motion for summary judgment as to the two FCRA claims

is granted.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Collier County’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. #27) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff John Beckman’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

DENIED.

Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant

Collier County Board of County Commissioners as to each

count and against Plaintiff John Beckman, who shall take

nothing. The Clerk is further directed to terminate all

deadlines and to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 13th day of

January 2026.

/ — OL

JGHE E. STEELE

SHEIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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