McCann-McCalpine

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

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LYDON MCCANN-MCCALPINE, et al., *

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Plaintiffs *

* Civ. No. MJM-24-2181

v. *

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AMPED UP! FAMILY *

AMPHITHEATRE, LLC, et al., *

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Defendants. *

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MEMORANDUM ORDER

Self-represented plaintiff Lydon McCann-McCalpine (“Plaintiff”) and his minor children,

N.J. and I.J., filed this civil action against Amped Up! Family Amphitheatre, LLC; Briana Shirey

and Jane Does 1, 2, and 3 of Baltimore County Family Support Services; and several other

defendants. ECF No. 1 (Complaint). On March 20, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum and

Order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, dismissing the Complaint without prejudice,

and setting a deadline for the filing of any amended complaint. ECF Nos. 24 & 25. Plaintiff filed

a First Amended Complaint1 on or about April 17, 2025, containing certain allegations against

Briana Shirey and Jane Does 1, 2, and 3 (“Defendants”), and asserting claims for compensatory

and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. ECF No. 26.2 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on May

1 The document is styled as “Motion to leave and amend complaint,” but it appears to be a

pleading in its entirety rather than a motion. ECF No. 26.

2 The Amended Complaint does not include any allegations nor specify any claims for relief

against any of the other defendants named in the original Complaint.

2, 2025. ECF No. 27. The Court issued a notice to Plaintiff advising him that the motion to dismiss

had been filed, that he could file a response within 28 days, and that the Court may dismiss the

case without further notice if Plaintiff failed to file a timely response. ECF No. 29. Plaintiff did

not file a timely response. The Amended Complaint may be dismissed for this reason alone.

The Amended Complaint also fails on the merits. Defendants are alleged to be employees

of Baltimore County Family Support Services, a division of Baltimore County Department of

Social Services, which is an agency of the State of Maryland. See Md. Code Ann., Hum. Servs. §

2-201 (establishing the Department of Human Services as a “principal department of the State”);

id. § 3-201 (creating local departments referred to as “the department of social services preceded

by the name of the county”); COMAR 07.02.01.04 (Baltimore County Family Support Services

as a division of the Baltimore County Department of Social Services); Keller v. Prince George’s

Cnty., 923 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding local departments of social services are agencies

of the State of Maryland.). It is unclear from the face of the Amended Complaint whether Plaintiff

is suing Defendants in their official capacities or in their individual capacities. In either case, the

Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal.

Insofar as Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, his claims are barred by

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Suits against state officials in their official capacities are, in

essence, suits against the state itself. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989)) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”). Under the Eleventh Amendment, “an

unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as

by citizens of another State.” Amison v. George Mason Univ., No. 23-1042, 2023 WL 8946774, at

*2 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 2023) (per curiam) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,

Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)). “While the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity

for certain types of cases brought in State courts, see Md. Code, Ann., State Gov’t, § 12-101, et

seq[.], it has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court.”

Dixon v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 345 F. Supp. 2d 512, 513 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 88 F. App’x

610 (4th Cir. 2004).

Insofar as Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual capacities, his claims are barred by

qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity “bars § 1983 actions against government

officials in their individual capacities ‘unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional

right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’” Barrett v.

Pae Gov’t Servs., Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 428 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,

62–63 (2018)). Only one of these questions must be resolved in favor of the official for qualified

immunity to apply. So, “even if a court finds or assumes that a government official violated an

individual’s constitutional rights, the official is entitled to immunity so long as the official did not

violate clearly established law.” Id. at 429. The Supreme Court has “emphasized that

qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). To determine whether an official is alleged to have violated “clearly established” law,

courts in the Fourth Circuit “first look to cases from the Supreme Court, [the Fourth Circuit] Court

of Appeals, or the highest court of the state in which the action arose.” Thompson v.

Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 98 (4th Cir. 2017). Here, Defendants are alleged to have

violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by enforcing certain rules that restricted his ability to

express himself during visitation with his two minor children at the Visitation Center of Baltimore

County. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants prohibited him from “mak[ing] promises”

to his children. Defendants asserted qualified immunity in their motion. Plaintiff failed to respond

to that argument and thus failed to identify any binding authority that “clearly established” rights

he claims Defendants violated.

For the foregoing reasons, it is by the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF

No. 27) is GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26) is DISMISSED without

prejudice. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.

It is so ORDERED this _23rd__ day of January, 2026.

/s/

Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge