Gourely

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ABRAHAM SIGURD LEE, No. 1:25-CV-01839

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

MICHAEL GOURLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANUARY 21, 2026

Plaintiff Abraham Sigurd Lee filed the instant pro se Section 19831 lawsuit,

alleging constitutional violations by officials at the State Correctional Institution in

Camp Hill, Pennsylvania (SCI Camp Hill). Because Lee fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, the Court will dismiss his complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) but will grant him leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

During the events that underlie the instant lawsuit, Lee was incarcerated at

SCI Camp Hill. It appears that shortly after filing his complaint, he was released

from prison and now resides in Minneapolis, Minnesota.2

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).

The gist of Lee’s lawsuit is that SCI Camp Hill officials improperly treated

him as a felony sex offender when his underlying criminal convictions did not

warrant such treatment. Lee’s pro se complaint is disjointed and difficult to

follow, but he appears to allege that prison officials requested that he undergo a

“sex offender evaluation” and DNA collection despite these procedures not being

required by any court, his sentencing judgments, or Pennsylvania law.3 It is

unclear from Lee’s complaint whether he was forced to undergo the sex offender

evaluation or the DNA collection prior to his release from custody.

From the publicly available criminal docket, it appears that in 2016, Lee was

charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania,

with simple assault, terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, unlawful

dissemination of an intimate image, and false imprisonment—all first- or second-

degree misdemeanor offenses.4 In March 2017, he pled guilty to these offenses

and was sentenced to 18 to 36 months’ incarceration and four years’ probation.5

Lee moved for parole approximately six months later, which motion was

granted.6 However, at some subsequent point, he violated his probation

(apparently by making terroristic threats again), and was reincarcerated with a

controlling minimum date of May 16, 2024, and a controlling maximum date of

3 See Doc. 1 at 1, 2, 3.

4 See Commonwealth v. Lee, No. CP-46-CR-0007653-2016 (Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery Cnty.).

5 See id.; see also Doc. 1 at 14.

6 See Lee, No. CP-46-CR-0007653-2016 (Ct. Com. Pl. Montgomery Cnty.).

November 16, 2025.7 It appears that Lee was released from SCI Camp Hill and the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s custody after reaching his controlling maximum

date, after which he returned to Minnesota.8

Lee lodged the instant Section 1983 complaint in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in September 2025, approximately

two months before his release.9 The Eastern District then transferred the case to

this Court via 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).10 Lee eventually paid the statutorily required

initial partial filing fee in December 2025, rendering his case ripe for screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Lee sues four defendants: SCI Camp Hill Superintendent Michael Gourley,

Classification Officer A. Herchelroath, Counselor Mr. Bingham, and Cumberland

County, Pennsylvania.11 As best as the Court can discern, he appears to be

asserting Section 1983 claims invoking the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments.12 It is unclear which Defendant or Defendants are targeted by each

constitutional tort claim. Lee seeks money damages from all Defendants.13

7 Doc. 1 at 14.

8 See id.; Doc. 25.

9 See generally Doc. 1.

10 See Doc. 5.

11 See Doc. 1 at 1-2; Doc. 11. In his initial complaint, Lee named “Columbia County,

Pennsylvania,” as a defendant, but then moved to amend this defendant to “Cumberland

County, Pennsylvania,” when he realized that he had identified the wrong county. See Doc.

11. The Court will grant this motion to amend.

12 See Doc. 1 at 3-4.

13 Id. at 12. Lee also filed a separate motion seeking injunctive relief, (Doc. 7), but that motion

was withdrawn by operation of Local Rule of Court 7.5 when Lee did not timely file a

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.14 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”15 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).16

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”17 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.18 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

supporting brief. See Doc. 27. This motion also appears to be moot, as Lee is no longer in the

Commonwealth’s custody. See id. at 2 n.4.

14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

15 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

16 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

17 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

18 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.19

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.20 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”21 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.22 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”23

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”24

Because Lee proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed and

his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”25

19 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

20 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

21 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

22 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

23 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

25 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Lee appears to assert a Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim, an Eighth

Amendment failure-to-protect claim, a Fourteenth Amendment double jeopardy

claim, and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.26 After careful

review, the Court finds that he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. The Court will address Lee’s various pleading deficiencies in turn.

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”27 Rather, a Section

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”28 Personal involvement can include direct

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;

however, such averments must be made with particularity.29 Furthermore, it is

26 Lee references innumerable other constitutional amendments and laws, including but not

limited to the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as Articles

“1, 2, 3, 4, 14, [and] 16” of the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and the “Kyoto Protocol.”

See Doc. 1 at 3, 4, 9. The Court will summarily dismiss these claims because they are

completely undeveloped and represent only conclusions of law. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at

787.

27 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).

28 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

29 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does

not give rise to Section 1983 liability.30

Lee asserts some or all Section 1983 claims against Superintendent Gourley.

He does not, however, plausibly allege how Superintendent Gourley was

personally involved in the alleged violation of his federal rights. Lee contends that

Superintendent Gourley is the head supervisor at SCI Camp Hill and is thus

“accountable for the actions of the SCI Camp Hill employees.”31 This assertion is

a quintessential example of respondeat superior (that is, vicarious liability for

Superintendent Gourley based on the conduct of others), which does not apply to

Section 1983 claims.

Additionally, Lee fails to allege personal involvement for Counselor

Bingham. It appears that on September 9, 2025, Lee wrote a “request to staff

member” (form DC-135A) to Counselor Bingham, complaining that Officer

Herchelroath “falsely requested” a sex offender evaluation.32 Counselor Bingham

responded to Lee, providing his best statutory explanation as to why a sex offender

30 See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal involvement

when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”);

Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v.

Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144

F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims against

certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against them “merely

assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”).

31 Doc. 1 at 2.

32 Id. at 6.

evaluation and DNA sample were being requested.33 This simple correspondence

does not implicate personal involvement in a constitutional violation, as Lee does

not allege that Counselor Bingham took any action that would have potentially

violated Lee’s federal rights.

To plausibly plead a Section 1983 claim, Lee must specify each Defendant’s

personal involvement in the alleged constitutional misconduct in order to state a

claim against them. He does not do so for Superintendent Gourley or Counselor

Bingham. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the Section 1983 claim(s) against

these Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal involvement.

B. Claim(s) Against Cumberland County

As noted above, Lee names Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, as a

defendant in this action. He does not, however, explain how Cumberland County

is or could be involved in this lawsuit. Although situated in Cumberland County,

SCI Camp Hill is a state correctional institution controlled and operated by a state

agency, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.

It is possible that Lee may be attempting to assert a Section 1983 claim

against Cumberland County for an unconstitutional policy or practice.34 If so, he

faces two significant problems. First, Lee has not plausibly alleged how

Cumberland County has anything to do with the management, operation, or

33 See id.

34 See Doc. 1 at 2; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

policies of SCI Camp Hill, a state correctional institution. Second, he has not

identified a prison policy that is violative of the constitution. Lee does not, for

example, allege that SCI Camp Hill has a policy of forcing inmates to undergo

unwarranted sex offender evaluations and DNA collection. In fact, he does not

plead any SCI Camp Hill policy or practice in his complaint—he merely alleges

what happened to him. Accordingly, the Section 1983 claim or claims against

Cumberland County will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

C. Official Capacity Claims

Lee sues the SCI Camp Hill officers in their individual and official

capacities.35 However, any official capacity claim seeking monetary damages from

state officials is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal

courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign

states—brought against a state.36 This immunity from private suit extends to state

agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because such

lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”37 States may waive

this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its

35 See Doc. 1 at 11, 12.

36 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

37 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.38 There are two

exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting

states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue

state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”39

In his complaint, Lee seeks only money damages. To the extent those

damages are sought against Defendants in their official capacities, such claims are

barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and will be dismissed as

legally frivolous. Additionally, although Lee separately moved for injunctive

relief, that motion was withdrawn by operation of the Local Rules of Court. Even

if it had not been withdrawn, Lee’s request for prospective injunctive relief is moot

in light of his release from the Commonwealth’s custody.40

D. Fourth Amendment Claim

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in pertinent part,

protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”41 However, in the prison

context, it is well settled that “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy

. . . and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches [and

38 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)).

39 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)

(emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

40 See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding moot inmate’s claim for

injunctive relief regarding legal access in prison’s maximum security unit, as inmate had been

released from that unit well before district court ruled on the claim).

41 U.S. CONST. amend IV.

seizures] does not apply in prison cells[.]”42 Rather, the Fourth Amendment’s

application to prison settings has been narrowly constrained to issues regarding

bodily integrity.43

Lee alleges that the forced collection of a DNA sample without a proper

legal basis is a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. It is doubtful that a

DNA sample (normally obtained through a cheek swab) would transgress beyond

the “reasonable intrusions necessitated in the prison setting” that the Third Circuit

has noted are constitutionally permissible.44

Assuming for the sake of argument that the intrusion is unreasonable, Lee’s

claim falls short because he does not allege in his complaint that he was forced to

provide a DNA sample, only that Officer Herchelroath was requesting one. And to

the extent that Lee is seeking preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin future DNA

collection, that claim is moot because he has been released from SCI Camp Hill

and the Commonwealth’s custody. Accordingly, Lee’s Fourth Amendment claim

will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

42 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001)

(“The Hudson court confirmed that a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures is inconsistent with incarceration.”); see also Humphrey v. Sec’y Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 712 F. App’x 122, 125 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (holding that seizure

of legal materials did not state a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim) (citing Hudson, 468

U.S. at 536).

43 See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Hudson’s holding

from Fourth Amendment claims regarding invasive searches of prisoners’ bodies).

44 See id. at 325.

E. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim

Lee asserts that prison officials inappropriately labeling him a “sex

offender” by forcing him to obtain an unwarranted sex offender evaluation could

create a significant risk of bodily harm from other prisoners.45 Such a risk has long

been acknowledged by courts within and outside this circuit.46

“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”47 Prison officials,

therefore, have “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners.”48 However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of

another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for

the victim’s safety.”49

To plead an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a prison

official, the inmate must plausibly allege that “(1) he was incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was

deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to [the prisoner’s] health and safety,

and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused [the prisoner] harm.”50 In this

45 See Doc. 1 at 7, 12.

46 See Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2022); Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d

315, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).

47 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Mack

v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

48 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).

49 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

50 Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367.

context, deliberate indifference is a subjective standard; that is, “the prison official-

defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate

safety.”51 Actual knowledge or awareness of a substantial risk to an inmate’s

safety can be proven “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial

evidence.”52

Lee’s Eighth Amendment claim falls short for reasons similar to his Fourth

Amendment claim. That is, he does not allege that he was harmed by being

inappropriately mislabeled as a sex offender while incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill.

Of course, prisoners do not need to wait until harm has come to them to file a

Section 1983 failure-to-protect claim; rather, they may seek prospective injunctive

relief to avoid the harm that could occur from the substantial risk of injury they are

facing.53 The problem for Lee, once again, is that he has been released from SCI

Camp Hill and from the state’s custody. Thus, any claim for prospective injunctive

relief seeking protection from potential harm caused by being mislabeled as a sex

offender is moot. Accordingly, Lee’s complaint, as it currently stands, does not

plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. This claim, too,

will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Section 1915A(b)(1).

51 Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)).

52 Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

53 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“It would be odd to deny an injunction to

inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground

that nothing yet had happened to them. The Courts of Appeals have plainly recognized that a

remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.”); Dongarra, 27 F.4th at 180.

F. Fourteenth Amendment Double Jeopardy Claim

Lee contends that SCI Camp Hill officials violated the constitutional

protection against double jeopardy54 by “imposing another form of punishment to

an expired sentence” for his conviction for unlawful dissemination of an intimate

image. Lee’s double jeopardy claim is fatally flawed because the alleged

“punishment” he identifies—being required to undergo a sex offender evaluation

and DNA collection—does not qualify as punishment for double jeopardy

purposes. The two requirements alleged by Lee do not have a punitive or

retributive purpose and do not have an effect or “sting” so harsh as to constitute

punishment.55 As such, Lee’s allegations do not plausibly state a double jeopardy

claim.56

G. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that

“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws.”57 To state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, a

54 The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy is applicable to the states through

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,

787 (1969).

55 See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1093 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining factors considered when

determining whether a measure is “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes).

56 Additionally, Lee has not alleged that he underwent a sex offender evaluation or DNA

collection, thus providing another reason why his double jeopardy claim is deficiently pled.

Like his Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims, although he could seek prospective injunctive

relief if he were still incarcerated and had yet to be evaluated or swabbed, Lee has been released

from prison and therefore his equitable claims are moot.

57 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

prisoner must allege “that he was treated differently than other similarly situated

inmates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional

discrimination based on his membership in a protected class[.]”58 An equal

protection claim can also be asserted under a “class of one” theory, whereby a

plaintiff alleges that a state actor intentionally treated him differently than others

who are similarly situated “and there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment.”59

Lee’s complaint fails to plausibly plead an equal protection violation. He

does not allege that his membership in a protected class was the basis for the

alleged discrimination. Rather, he states that “[t]he discrimination at issue might

be due to ‘suspect classifications,’” like “ethnicity” or an unspecified “immutable

trait.”60 This type of vague and equivocal pleading does not plausibly allege

discrimination based on membership in a protected class.

To the extent that Lee may be attempting to assert a “class of one” equal

protection claim, he has not done that either. Lee has failed to identify others who

are similarly situated to him and who received intentionally different treatment by

SCI Camp Hill officials, and thus he has failed to plausibly plead a class-of-one

58 Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016).

59 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 243 (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).

60 See Doc. 1 at 5 (emphasis added).

equal protection claim against any Defendant.61 So Lee’s Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim must be dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1) as well.

H. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”62 Lee will be granted limited leave to

amend in the event that he can plead facts that would plausibly state a Section 1983

claim.

However, Lee’s Fourteenth Amendment double jeopardy claim will be

dismissed with prejudice, as granting leave to amend this claim would be futile.

The allegedly punitive actions (being required to undergo a sex offender evaluation

and DNA collection) do not constitute “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes.

Additionally, all official capacity claims will be dismissed with prejudice under

Section 1915A(b)(1) as legally frivolous. That is because any official capacity

claim for money damages is barred by sovereign immunity and any official

capacity claim seeking prospective injunctive relief is moot.

61 See Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App’x 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (finding that

prisoner failed to state an equal protection claim because he did not “allege facts showing that

he was similarly situated to the inmates who received [better medical treatment], or that there

was no rational basis for his different treatment.”).

62 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.

If Lee chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without

reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth his

Section 1983 claim or claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in

sequentially numbered paragraphs. Lee must leave one-inch margins on all four

sides of his pleading.63 Any exhibits or documents he wishes to present should be

attached to his amended complaint. Lee may not include claims that have been

dismissed with prejudice, and he must address the deficiencies set forth in this

Memorandum. He must name proper defendants and specify the offending actions

taken by a particular defendant. He must also sign the amended complaint and

indicate the nature of the relief sought.

If Lee does not timely file an amended complaint, dismissal of any Section

1983 claims without prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with

prejudice and the Court will close this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Lee’s complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

63 See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 5.1.

granted. Lee may file an amended complaint in accordance with this

Memorandum. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge