Terrell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MAURICE TERRELL,

Plaintiff,

No. 25 CV 6641

v.

Judge Georgia N. Alexakis

COOK COUNTY; THOMAS DART, Cook

County Sheriff, in his official capacity;

AND CLEVELAND BANKS, Correctional

Officer, Star No. 15527,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Maurice Terrell says he was being held as a pre-trial detainee in Cook

County Jail when he was physically and sexually assaulted by five fellow detainees.

They forced him to call his wife to tell her to send them $1,000 via Cash App and then

continued to abuse him for two and a half hours. Meanwhile, Terrell’s wife called the

jail to report her concerns. But when correctional officer Cleveland Banks was asked

to check on Terrell, he did nothing. Terrell now sues Banks, Sheriff Thomas Dart,

and Cook County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move to dismiss his complaint

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons,

the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants’ motion.

I. Legal Standards

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement” showing that the

plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). To survive a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to state a facially

plausible claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is

facially plausible if the complaint’s “factual content allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

At this stage (and as it does in the Background section that follows), the Court

assumes that the facts alleged in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable

inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d

634, 645 (7th Cir. 2018). However, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or

‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft, 556

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Similarly, a complaint that

“tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not survive

a motion to dismiss. Id. Nevertheless, “[i]t is the defendant’s burden to establish the

complaint’s insufficiency.” Gunn v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020).

II. Background

In July 2023, when Terrell was a pre-trial detainee at the Cook County Jail in

Chicago, Illinois, he was transferred to a new facility within the jail. [1] ¶¶ 4, 8.

Shortly after his arrival, he entered the washroom. Id. ¶ 11. Five other detainees soon

followed. Id. ¶ 13. They attacked him, grabbing his limbs, putting him in a headlock,

and punching him in the face. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17. They then bound him with zip ties and

sexually assaulted him with a plastic spoon. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.

One assailant told Terrell that they would release him if he called someone and

got them to send $1,000 using Cash App. Id. ¶ 22. Someone gave him a tablet to make

the call, and Terrell reached his wife and told her to immediately send money. Id.

¶¶ 23, 25. Although he did not explain that he was being coerced—he was being

watched closely—his wife could tell he was in distress. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27.

After sending the money as instructed, Terrell’s wife called the jail and

“reported her concerns” to an Officer Clarke at the facility’s security desk. Id. ¶¶ 26–

28. Clarke “notified [] Banks of the call and asked him to check on [Terrell].” Id. ¶ 29.

Banks conducted a visual check of Terrell’s tier and told Clarke that no detainees on

the tier had approached him or mentioned any problems. Id. ¶¶ 29, 42–43. He also

falsely told Clarke that he had checked the bathroom and washroom. Id. ¶ 30. Relying

on Banks’s statement, Clarke told Terrell’s wife that nothing was wrong. Id. ¶¶ 30–

31. When Terrell’s mother also called, Clarke told her the same thing. Id. ¶ 32.

Terrell’s wife called Clarke a second time and requested a wellbeing check. Id.

¶ 33. Clarke left her desk and went to Terrell’s tier, where she told Banks to check on

Terrell. Id. ¶ 34. Banks finally checked the washroom. Id. ¶ 35. He found the

assailants trying to wipe up blood and flush evidence down the toilet. Id. ¶ 36. By

that time, Terrell had been held hostage and tormented in the washroom for

approximately two and a half hours. Id. ¶ 37.

Following this ordeal, Terrell spent six days in the hospital being treated for

lacerations and bruising to his face and neck, facial swelling, tenderness in his

abdomen and neck, puncture wounds, loss of consciousness, and dizziness. Id. ¶ 38.

He then spent time recovering in the jail’s Rehabilitation and Treatment Unit and

was confined to a wheelchair before being able to use a walker, then a cane. Id. ¶ 39.

The Office of Professional Review eventually recommended that Banks be

suspended for 120 days for failure to perform duties, failure to follow policy, failure

to properly supervise detainees, and unsatisfactory work performance. Id. ¶ 44.

Throughout his shift, Banks had failed to conduct regular security checks of living

areas and inmates, which jail policy requires at least every 30 minutes. Id. ¶¶ 45–47.

Terrell now brings this action under § 1983. [1] ¶ 1. His complaint includes (1)

a failure-to-protect claim against Banks, (2) a Monell claim against Dart, and (3) a

request that the Court order Cook County and Dart to indemnify Banks for any

judgment against him. Id. at 6–7, 9. Defendants have moved to dismiss Terrell’s

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. [9]. They challenge Terrell’s failure-to-protect and Monell claims but not his

indemnification claim, although that claim depends on the first. In response, Terrell

withdrew his Monell claim but seeks to preserve his failure-to-protect claim. [15] at

2.

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that Terrell’s failure-to-protect claim should be dismissed

because it fails on the merits and because Banks is entitled to qualified immunity.

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Merits of the Failure-to-Protect Claim

Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides redress for violations of

constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment gives pre-trial detainees the “right to be free from physical harm

inflicted by others in the institution.” Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 841 (7th Cir.

2022). To state a viable failure-to-protect claim, a pre-trial detainee must allege: (1)

the defendant made an intentional decision regarding the conditions of plaintiff’s

confinement; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering

serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate

the risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have

appreciated the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the

defendant’s inaction obvious; and (4) the defendant, by not taking such measures,

caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. (citing Kemp v. Fulton Cnty., 27 F.4th 491, 494 (7th

Cir. 2022)).

Defendants focus their challenge on the third element. See [9] at 4–6. To satisfy

that element, Terrell must plausibly allege that “a specific defendant was ‘on notice

of a serious risk of harm’ to the detainee.” Thomas, 39 F.4th at 841 (quoting Kemp,

27 F.4th at 497). A defendant was “on notice” if “a reasonable officer in [his]

circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk the detainee was

facing,” id., based on “what the officer knew at the time,” id. at 842 (quoting Kingsley

v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)). The analysis “begins with the defendant’s

knowledge of the factual context and then asks whether a reasonable officer with that

knowledge would appreciate the risk of harm and still engage in the same conduct.”

Davis v. Rook, 107 F.4th 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2024).

Defendants say Terrell hasn’t plausibly alleged that Banks was on notice that

Terrell was in danger. [9] at 5. Terrell alleges that Terrell’s wife “reported her

concerns” to Clarke, and Clarke “notified … Banks of the call [from Terrell’s wife] and

asked him to check on [Terrell].” [1] ¶¶ 27, 29. But those allegations, according to

defendants, are “insufficient[ly] detail[ed] regarding what was relayed to Officer

Banks.” [9] at 5.

The Court disagrees. Certainty of harm is not required. An allegation that a

similarly situated and reasonable officer would have appreciated the “high degree of

risk” is sufficient. Thomas, 39 F.4th at 841. For example, in Starks v. Dart, No. 24 C

9509, 2025 WL 2838956 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2025), the plaintiff filed a grievance about

his cellmate’s drug use, after which the cellmate began threatening the plaintiff. Id.

at *1. When the plaintiff told several corrections officers about the threats, the officers

separated the plaintiff and his now-ex cellmate. Id. The threats continued, so plaintiff

asked for further separation, including being placed on different decks of the jail. Id.

The officers nevertheless kept them on the same deck. Id. The court held the officer-

defendants were on notice of a substantial risk of harm because the plaintiff had

informed them of his ex-cellmate’s threats. Id. at *4.

On the other end of the spectrum is Kemp, 27 F.4th 491. There, the plaintiff

had an argument with another detainee who lived on his cell block, leading a second

detainee to threaten to “get” the plaintiff. Id. at 493. The plaintiff did not tell any of

the guards about the argument or the threat and instead confronted the two

detainees, who responded by beating him. Id. When a third detainee joined in the

beating, the plaintiff yelled for help, but no one responded. Id. The plaintiff sued an

officer who had been patrolling the cell block; the officer had some hearing loss and

was not using his hearing aid at the time of the beating. Id. The court affirmed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the officer defendant, id. at

499, holding that there was no evidence that the officer was on notice of a serious risk

of harm to the plaintiff: No one had reported the argument or threats, and the

plaintiff had lived peaceably with the other detainees for several months. Id. at 497.

Plus, the officer had worked without his hearing aid for six months, and there was no

evidence of deficient performance during that time. Id.

This case is more like Starks than Kemp. Terrell’s wife was asked to send

$1,000 to a mysterious address and could tell that Terrell was in distress. [1] ¶¶ 25,

27. The Court reasonably infers that Terrell’s wife conveyed those facts when she

“reported her concerns” to Clarke. Id. ¶ 27. It likewise reasonably infers that Clarke

conveyed that information to Banks when she notified him “of the call and asked him

to check on [Terrell].” Id. ¶ 29. Because Terrell’s circumstances were especially

troubling, and because Clarke responded to the call from Terrell’s wife by asking

Banks to take a specific security measure, it stands to reason that Terrell’s wife did

not simply convey a vague sense of unease to Clarke and that Clarke did not do the

same when she spoke to Banks.

Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in Terrell’s favor, as it must at this

stage, Tobey, 890 F.3d at 645, the Court concludes that Banks was aware of multiple

red flags indicating that Terrell was at a significant risk of harm. The facts here are

unlike those in Kemp, where there were no earlier reports of imminent harm and the

officer literally did not hear the actual call for help. And although the signs here may

be less explicit than the threat in Starks, they are at least as alarming and suggest

an even more immediate risk of harm. A “reasonable officer with that knowledge

would appreciate the risk of harm” facing Terrell, Davis, 107 F.4th at 781, and would

have performed a wellness check as requested by Clarke and required by jail policy,

[1] ¶¶ 29, 46–47. But Bates did not. Id. ¶¶ 30, 45. Terrell has therefore adequately

pleaded the third element. See Davis, 107 F.4th at 781.

Terrell has also adequately pleaded the other elements. As to the first, he

alleges that Bates chose not to check the washroom and bathroom when Clarke first

asked him to perform a wellness check, id. ¶¶ 29–30, 42–43, and he revealed his

intentionality by lying about the choice, id. ¶ 30. See Starks, 2025 WL 2838956, at *3

(citing Clark v. Cook Cnty. Sherriff’s Off., No. 19 C 7131, 2023 WL 4134808, at *3

(N.D. Ill. June 20, 2023)) (holding that defendant officer’s failure to separate plaintiff

from a threatening fellow inmate constituted an intentional decision). As to the

second and fourth elements, Terrell adequately alleges that Bates’s inaction put him

at a substantial risk of serious harm and caused his injuries. See id. (quoting Brown

v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005)) (“[A] beating suffered at the hands of a

fellow detainee … clearly constitutes serious harm.”).

Terrell’s failure-to-protect claim against Bates may therefore proceed.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that Banks is entitled to qualified immunity because

Terrell does not adequately allege a constitutional violation or a clearly established

constitutional right. The Court disagrees on both points.

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Starks, 2025 WL 2838956, at *5 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580

U.S. 73, 78–79 (2017)). Defendants typically present qualified immunity as a defense

at the summary judgment stage, but they can also present it in a motion to dismiss.

Id. (citing Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 706 (7th Cir. 1997)). At this stage, to

overcome an assertion of qualified immunity, Terrell must allege a violation of a

statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the

violation so that a reasonable officer would have known of the unlawfulness of his

conduct. Id. (citing Hanson v. LeVan, 967 F.3d 584, 592 (7th Cir. 2020)).

As discussed above, Terrell has plausibly alleged that Banks failed to protect

him from his fellow detainees’ assault. As for the second prong, the Seventh Circuit

had clearly established a duty to protect pretrial detainees from serious harm by

others in custody well before the alleged assault occurred in July 2023. See, e.g.,

Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment ... places a duty upon jail officials to protect pre-trial

detainees from violence.”); Brown, 398 F.3d at 910–11 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that

pretrial detainee’s failure to protect claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause); Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).

Accordingly, Banks is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. See also

Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that courts hesitate to

dismiss complaints on qualified immunity grounds “[b]ecause an immunity defense

usually depends on the facts of the case” beyond the allegations of the complaint).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss [9] is granted in part

and denied in part. Count IJ, having been withdrawn by Terrell, is dismissed without

prejudice. Counts I and III may proceed.

ENTER: yy

Georgia N. Alexakis

United States District Judge

Date: 1/20/2026

10