The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHAQUILL BATTLE,
Plaintiff, 9:25-CV-1534
(BKS/PJE)
v.
NURSE BIOREFRENCE, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
SHAQUILL BATTLE
Plaintiff, pro se
15-B-2077
Gouverneur Correctional Facility
Scotch Settlement Road
P.O. Box 480
Gouverneur, NY 13642
BRENDA K. SANNES
Chief United States District Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint filed by pro se plaintiff Shaquill
Battle ("plaintiff") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") asserting claims arising out
of his confinement in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision ("DOOCS"). Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."). Plaintiff, who is presently
confined at Gouverneur Correctional Facility ("Gouverneur C.F."), has not paid the statutory
filing fee and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. No. 6 ("IFP Application").
II. IFP APPLICATION
"28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court
without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged." Cash v. Bernstein, No.
09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010).1 "Although an indigent,
incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must
subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from
his inmate accounts." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and Harris v. City of New York, 607
F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Upon review of plaintiff's IFP Application, the Court finds that plaintiff has
demonstrated sufficient economic need and filed the inmate authorization form required in the
Northern District of New York. Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 6) is granted.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Governing Legal Standard
Having found that plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action IFP,
and because plaintiff seeks relief from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the
Court must consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs
that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that – . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
1 Section 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding IFP where, absent a showing of "imminent danger of
serious physical injury," a prisoner has filed three or more actions that were subsequently dismissed as
frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The
Court has reviewed plaintiff's litigation history on the Federal Judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic
Records ("PACER") Service. See http://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov. It does not appear from that review that
plaintiff had accumulated three strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) as of the date this action was
commenced.
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any "complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity" and must "identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Additionally, when reviewing a complaint, the Court may also look to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading
which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose
of Rule 8 "is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party
the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine
whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable." Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 Civ. 4768, 1998
WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, No. 95-
CV-0063 (TJM), 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 1995) (other citations omitted)).
A court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the court should construe the
factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rule 8
"demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id.
Thus, a pleading that contains only allegations which "are so vague as to fail to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them" is subject to dismissal. Sheehy v.
Brown, 335 Fed. App'x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Court will construe the allegations in the complaint with the utmost leniency. See,
e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is
to be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.").
B. Summary of the Complaint
The complaint alleges wrongdoing that occurred at Clinton Correctional Facility
("Clinton C.F.") and Gouverneur C.F. See generally Compl. The following facts are set forth
as alleged by plaintiff in his complaint.
1. Clinton C.F.
On or about December 30, 2024, plaintiff was called to the medical department for a
"TB test." Compl. at 6, 10. Plaintiff objected and "unequivocally relayed" that he took a test
in November 2024. Id. at 6. Defendant Nurse Biorefrence ("Biorefrence") injected "hot fluid"
into plaintiff's arm that "made [him] jump." Id. at 6, 10. Due to the injection, plaintiff suffered
from headaches, sleep loss, a "permanent twitch," and loss of range of motion. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with defendant Deputy Superintendent of Health Harrigan
("Harrigan") and "corresponded at least 9 letters." Id. at 7.
While confined at Clinton C.F., plaintiff was treated by defendants Nurse Kim ("Kim")
and Doctor May ("May"). See generally Compl. Kim provided cough syrup and medication
for chest pain. Id. at 7. When plaintiff complained about a migraine, Kim "laughed." Id.
During a visit with May, the doctor conducted a "breathing test" using a stethoscope and
noticed a mass on plaintiff's "lat [sic] or arm area." Id. At the time, plaintiff was "covered in
puss-filled bumps" due to the "poison" administered by Biorefrence. Compl. at 10. May told
him that the bumps may be an allergy. Id. at 7. However, when plaintiff asked May if he
could show her the rest of his body, she refused. Id. During a second visit with May, on April
12, 2025, plaintiff was "spitting green phlegm" and presented with high blood pressure and
more "bumps." Id. May said she would "write a script" but plaintiff did not receive any
medication, including Tylenol. Compl. at 7.
From February 2025 until March 2025, plaintiff was denied recreation. Compl. at 11,
15. From February 2025 until April 2025, due to an "illegal lockdown," plaintiff's meals were
served on dirty trays without a dessert, drink, or vegetables. Id. Inmates received moldy
meat, wet bread, spoiled fruit and milk, and hard rice that was cold and "broke [plaintiff's]
teeth." Id. Plaintiff's trays were served through the "feed up slot" in his cell, which was
covered with mucus and feces. Compl. at 13. Plaintiff refused "over 9 meals" and "nobody
logged it" or provided plaintiff with Ensure. Id. at 12. Plaintiff suffered from diarrhea, stomach
pain, headaches, and dry mouth. Id. Plaintiff was "starving" until he was able to receive
commissary. Id. However, plaintiff's commissary credits were "robbed." Compl. at 12.
On March 12, 2025, plaintiff received a misbehavior report and was transferred to the
Special Housing Unit for 158 days. Compl. at 10. Defendant Superintendent M.J. King
("King") and the Deputy Superintendent for Security ("DSS") were present in the SHU when
plaintiff arrived and "heard his clear objections" to being housed in the unit. Id. When he
arrived, plaintiff was strip searched by Sergeant Martin2 and forced to face a wall, naked, for
twenty minutes. Id. at 10. The windows were open and, as a result, his hands froze. Id.
While in the SHU, plaintiff did not receive the "minimum standards" which included
"three sets of everything." Compl. at 9-10. Plaintiff was "stocked" with only the clothes on his
body and did not have a pillow, headphones, books, a sweater, or footwear. Id. Plaintiff
stood in his socks in piles of dirt, garbage, and feces. Id. at 10-11. The cell was covered in
dirt and "snot and mucus." Id. Plaintiff complained to Minkler, who responded, "you ain't
getting [expletive]." Id. at 10.
On March 15, 2025, defendant Correctional Officer Minkler ("Minkler") brought plaintiff
a tray marked "hospital." Compl. at 11. Plaintiff refused the meal and Minkler laughed. Id. at
12.
On March 18, 2025, defendant Correctional Officer Friend ("Friend") escorted plaintiff
to recreation. Compl. at 8. Plaintiff was directed to put his personal property into a bin. Id.
At approximately 9:30 a.m., plaintiff spoke with an area sergeant and asked about retrieving
his legal property "that was stored." Id. Defendant Officer Hitts ("Hitts") gave plaintiff
"several envelopes that were torn or damaged." Id. at 9. Plaintiff's storage bags were "cut at
the bottom" which resulted in items falling out. Id. Hitts destroyed his personal property and,
as a result, plaintiff had to "forfeit a claim" in "the state." Compl. at 9.
Plaintiff "grieved" his issues involving medical treatment and his conditions of
confinement, to defendants King and the DSS. Compl. at 7-8. Plaintiff sent mail and made
telephone calls. Id. at 7-8. King referred his mail to "another person." Id. at 8. Plaintiff also
2 Martin is not identified as a defendant in the caption or list of parties.
contacted defendant Commissioner Daniel Martuscello, III ("Martuscello") by mail and
telephone, but he did not respond. Id. at 7, 19. Instead, Martuscello asked defendant Carol
D. Moores ("Moores") to respond. Compl. at 7. Moores told plaintiff to "relay this to [his] care
provider." Id. Plaintiff also contacted the Office of Special Investigations ("OSI"). Id.
Defendant OSI Investigator "came to see" plaintiff and told him he "would get me to medical."
Compl. at 8.
2. Gouverneur C.F.
On April 22, 2025, plaintiff was transferred to Gouverneur C.F. Compl. at 15. When
plaintiff received his property from Clinton C.F., he noticed that paper, food, clothing, hygiene
items, electronics, and photographs were missing. Id. at 16. Friend and Hitts failed to store
plaintiff's property or intentionally sole items. Id.
From April 25, 2025 until October 2025, defendants Correction Officers Constigan
("Constigan"), Glandeur ("Glandeur"), Carr ("Carr"), Showers ("Showers"), Milsap ("Milsap")
and McDonald ("McDonald") served plaintiff with trays that were "marked with tape" and
contained food and drink that was tampered, contaminated, or spoiled. Compl. at 16-25.
Some of the trays contained blood, dead bugs or maggots. Id. When they served the trays,
defendants used racial slurs and verbally harassed plaintiff. Id. As a result, plaintiff refused
food. Id. Plaintiff vomited, "broke out" with bumps on his arms, suffered from chest pains,
itching on his head and neck and shoulders, and "had to use the bathroom 3 times in 1 hour."
Compl. at 16-25. On April 30, 2025, defendant Correction Officer McDonald ("McDonald")
served a meal that was tampered with and said, "they say your [sic] an [expletive] in your last
jail." Id.
On April 30, 2025, plaintiff complained about the food to defendant Sergeant Hull
("Hull"). Compl. at 20. Hull stated that he would supervise the meals, but he never followed
through. Id. Defendants' "conduct" caused plaintiff to file a complaint in the wrong
jurisdiction and interfered with plaintiff's complaint in the Western District of New York. Id. at
17.
On May 21, 2025, defendants Correctional Officer Lynch ("Lynch"), Milsap, Constigan,
and Glandeur "ransacked" plaintiff's cell. Compl. at 18.
On September 3, 2025, the "executive team," including defendant Superintendent
Rockwood ("Rockwood"), "walked around." Compl. at 23. Plaintiff yelled to Rockwood who
responded that he "did not know anything." Id. Plaintiff wrote to Rockwood "over 10 times."
Id. Plaintiff wrote to defendant Supervisor McCormick ("McCormick"), four times, and did not
receive a response. Id. Plaintiff attempted to file grievances with defendant Ms. Hutchins
("Hutchins"), but she refused to accept the grievances. Compl. at 22-24. Hull made rounds
every day from June through August and "never did anything to assist [plaintiff] in filing
complaints." Id.
While confined at Gouverneur C.F., plaintiff submitted sick call requests complaining of
chest and side pain, a "mass growing on his left side, black and red "itchy" bumps, and
"green phlegm" and was treated by defendants Nurse Woods ("Woods"), Nurse Coffey #1
("Coffey #1"), and Nurse Coffey #2 ("Coffey #2"). See generally Compl. and Dkt. No. 4.
When plaintiff saw Woods, she ordered blood drawn for allergy testing. Compl. at 18.
However, Woods refused to test for "infection or cancer" and said, "it is not serious." Id.
Woods told plaintiff he had, "nothing to complain about" and refused to treat him for his
chest/side pain, phlegm and rash that resulted from food issues. Id. at 20-21. Plaintiff told
Coffey #1 that Tylenol did not alleviate his pain and she said, "if it doesn't work, it doesn't
work" and walked away. Compl. at 21. Woods, Coffey #1, and defendant Nurse Coffey #2
("Coffey #2") repeatedly ignored plaintiff's sick call requests related to pain, vomiting, and
other medical issues associated with ingesting contaminated food and his refusal to eat.
Compl. at 22-24. On one occasion, Coffey #2 came to plaintiff's cell, took his temperature,
laughed, and did nothing else. Id.
While confined at Gouverneur C.F., plaintiff was not permitted to possess religious
study materials or magazines and was not permitted to "receive Jehovah witness." Compl. at
25-26.
Construed liberally3, the complaint contains the following: (1) claims related to
plaintiff's First Amendment right to religious freedom; (2) Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement; (3) Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims; (4) Fourth
Amendment claims related to illegal searches; (5) First Amendment access-to-court claims;
(6) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims related to an unwanted injection and
property; (7) constitutional claims related to the grievance process; and (8) state law claims.
See Compl. at 27-31. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 27.
For a complete statement of plaintiff's claims and the facts he relies on in support of those
claims, reference is made to the complaint.
3 The Court is mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a pleading by a pro se litigant must be construed
liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed
Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) ("On occasions too numerous to count, we have reminded district
courts" that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be construed liberally); Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d
Cir. 2005) ("We leave it for the district court to determine what other claims, if any, [plaintiff] has raised. In so
doing, the court's imagination should be limited only by [plaintiff's] factual allegations, not by the legal claims set
out in his pleadings."); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[W]e read [a pro se litigant's]
supporting papers liberally, and will interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.").
C. Analysis
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Section 1983, which establishes a cause of
action for " 'the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws' of the United States." German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885 F.Supp. 537,
573 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983)) (footnote omitted). "Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights, [but]
. . . only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes
v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 816 (1985)).
"Personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983." Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496,
501 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991);
McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)). As the Supreme Court has noted,
a defendant may only be held accountable for his actions under Section 1983. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 683 ("[P]etitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account
of a constitutionally protected characteristic.").
In order to prevail on a Section 1983 cause of action against an individual, a plaintiff
must show "a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered."
Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). This is true even for supervisory officials.
See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) ("There is no special rule for
supervisor liability."). "[A] plaintiff must plead and prove 'that each Government-official
defendant, [including supervisors,] through the official's own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.' " Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).
1. Rule 10
The complaint contains allegations related to individuals who are not identified in the
caption, or list of parties, as defendants. See Compl. 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24. Rule
10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "the title of the complaint must
name all the parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). A party not named in the caption of the complaint
is not a party to the action. Abbas v. U.S., No. 10-CV-0141, 2014 WL 3858398, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2014) (holding that the failure to name the individual defendants against
whom the plaintiff intends to assert claims makes it "infeasible for the Court to determine
which of the individual officers mentioned in the body of the complaint should be deemed to
be defendants to which claims").
Accordingly, plaintiff's allegations against any individual who is not named or identified
in the amended complaint or caption, as John Doe or otherwise, are dismissed for failure to
state a claim. See Whitley v. Krinser, No. 06-CV-0575, 2007 WL 2375814, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2007); Robles v. Armstrong, No. 3:03-CV-1634, 2006 WL 752857, at *1 n.1 (D.
Conn. Mar. 17, 2006) ("Because the John and Jane Does are not listed in the caption of the
Complaint, they are not defendants and the court does not consider claims against them.").
2. Defendant C.O. Gallagher ("Gallagher")
Plaintiff identifies Gallagher as a defendant in the caption. However, this defendant is
not referenced anywhere in the body of the complaint and the pleading lacks factual
allegations sufficient to plausibly suggest that the defendant was personally involved in
conduct that violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. Thus, the complaint fails to state a
cognizable claim against this defendant. See Cipriani v. Buffardi, No. 06–CV–0889
(GTS/DRH), 2007 WL 607341, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (“Dismissal is appropriate where
a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate what the
defendant did to the plaintiff.”) (citation omitted); see also Casino v. Rohl, No. 14-CV-2175,
2014 WL 5425501, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (dismissing complaint since the plaintiff
had not adequately pled the defendant's personal involvement in any of the constitutional
deprivations alleged in the amended complaint).
3. First Amendment – Religious Freedom
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to free
exercise of religion. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719
(2005). As is true with regard to the First Amendment generally, the free exercise clause
applies to prison inmates, subject to appropriate limiting factors. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352
F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that "[p]risoners have long been understood to retain
some measure of the constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause" (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
"In the prison context, however, 'the right to free exercise of religion' is balanced
against 'the interests of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from
administration of the penal system.' " Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 127-28
(2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Thus, "an infringement of the free exercise of religion [may be] permissible . . . if it is
'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' " Id. (quoting Benjamin, 905 F.2d at
574). "[T]o assess a free exercise claim, a court must determine (1) whether the practice
asserted is religious in the person's scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely
held; (2) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials infringes upon the religious
belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers legitimate
penological objectives." Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 128 (alterations adopted) (quoting Farid v. Smith,
850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff claims that he was not allowed to possess religious study materials or
magazines and was not permitted to "receive Jehovah witness." Compl. at 25-26. Initially,
the Court notes that plaintiff has not identified his religious beliefs and the complaint lacks
facts suggesting that his religious beliefs were "sincerely held." Moreover, plaintiff has not
plead when, how, or for how long his right to practice his religion was infringed. Further, even
assuming plaintiff identified his religious beliefs and plead facts suggesting that his right to
practice was infringed, the complaint fails to suggest that any named defendant was
personally involved in the constitutional violations. Thus, plaintiff's First Amendment religious
claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
4. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from "cruel and unusual punishment" at the
hands of prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). This includes punishments that "involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
a. Conditions of Confinement
While the United States Constitution " 'does not mandate comfortable prisons,' . . .
neither does it permit inhumane" treatment of those in confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). "To
demonstrate that the conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the
plaintiff must satisfy both an objective test and a subjective test." Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d
468,480 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). To satisfy the objective element, "the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement result 'in unquestioned and serious
deprivations of basic human needs.' " Jolly, 76 F.3d at 480 (citation omitted). "[T]he inmate
must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his health." Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted). The Constitution requires "that prisoners be served 'nutritionally adequate food that
is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the
health and well-being of the inmates who consume it' [and] under certain circumstances a
substantial deprivation of food may well be recognized as being of constitutional dimension."
Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983).
With respect to the subjective element, plaintiff must "demonstrate that the defendants
imposed those conditions with 'deliberate indifference.' " Jolly, 76 F.3d at 480 (citation
omitted). To constitute deliberate indifference, "[t]he prison official must know of, and
disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Walker, 717 F.3d at 125.
i. Clinton C.F.
Plaintiff claims his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because (1) he was denied
recreation; (2) he endured unconstitutional conditions of confinement in his cells; and (3) he
was served spoiled and contaminated food. See Compl. at 11-12, 15.
With respect to the claims related to recreation, plaintiff has failed to plead facts
related to who denied plaintiff recreation and how often he was denied recreation and
whether. Indeed, the complaint lacks any connection between any named defendant and
plaintiff's ability to participate in recreation.
With respect to plaintiff's food, the complaint lacks facts related to who provided
contaminated or tampered meals from February 2025 until April 2025. While plaintiff claims
that Minkler brought him a tray "marked hospital" on one occasion, the complaint lacks facts
suggesting that the food on the tray was contaminated, spoiled, or otherwise caused plaintiff
to suffer from any injury.
With respect to plaintiff's SHU confinement, the complaint lacks facts suggesting that
any named defendant was responsible for the conditions in the SHU. While plaintiff claims
that "Minkler said you ain't getting [expletive]," in reference to the conditions of his cell, the
complaint does not indicate when this exchange occurred, in what context, how often and
when plaintiff complained to Minkler or any other information that would allow the Court to
conclude that Minkler was responsible for plaintiff's conditions on any date.
For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement claims related to Clinton C.F. are dismissed without prejudice.
ii. Gouverneur C.F.
At this juncture, the Court directs Constigan, Glandeur, Carr, Showers, Milsap,
McDonald, Hull, Rockwood, and McCormick to respond to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
condition-of-confinement claims. This is not a ruling on the merits and the Court expresses
no opinion whether these claims can survive a properly filed motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment.
b. Deliberate Medical Indifference
The Eighth Amendment mandates that prison officials provide adequate medical care
to inmates. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). "An Eighth Amendment
claim arising out of inadequate medical care requires a demonstration of deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A
deliberate medical indifference claim has objective and subjective components. Id.
"Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition
of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists." Hathaway v.
Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to the
subjective element, an official acts with deliberate indifference when he knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Hill, 657 F.3d at 122 (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
i. Clinton C.F.
Plaintiff alleges that May, Kim, King, DSS, Martuscello, Moores, and OSI were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Compl. at 7-8. However, the allegations in
the complaint belie the claim. To wit, plaintiff admits that he received medical care and
attention from May and Kim and that he was prescribed cough syrup, medication, and
underwent "breathing testing." As presently constituted, plaintiff's allegations amount to
nothing more disagreement with defendants' course of treatment, which is insufficient to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Washington v. Westchester Cty. Dep't of
Corr., No. 13-CV-5322, 2014 WL 1778410, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2014) ("[I]t is well-settled
that the ultimate decision of whether or not to administer a treatment or medication is a
medical judgment that, without more, does not amount to deliberate indifference."); Sonds v.
St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Servs., 151 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("[D]isagreements over medications, diagnostic techniques (e.g., the need for X-rays), forms
of treatment, or the need for specialists or the timing of their intervention, are not adequate
grounds for a [§] 1983 claim. These issues implicate medical judgments and, at worst,
negligence amounting to medical malpractice, but not the Eighth Amendment.").
Accordingly, plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims
related to his medical treatment at Clinton C.F. are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
ii. Gouverneur C.F.
In light of the Court’s obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings,
defendants Woods, Coffey #1, and Coffey #2 will be required to respond to plaintiff’s medical
indifference claims related to his treatment at Gouverneur C.F. This is not a ruling on the
merits and the Court expresses no opinion whether these claims can survive a properly filed
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
5. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable
searches. All searches conducted within a prison must be reasonable. See Hodges v.
Stanley, 712 F.2d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Courts within the Circuit have
upheld routine random strip searches, including body-cavity inspections, performed on prison
inmates. See Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 76-80 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Hurley v. Ward,
584 F.2d 609, 612 (2d Cir. 1978) (reversing portion of injunction prohibiting strip searches of
prison inmates); Castro-Sanchez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 10-CV-8314, 2011
WL 6057837, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2011) ("Routine random strip searches of inmates,
including body cavity inspections, do not violate the Fourth Amendment."). Assessing the
reasonableness of a strip search "requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
An inmate bears the burden of showing that a search was unreasonable, see Shabazz
v. Pico, 994 F.Supp. 460, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), so, at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must
"plead facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible inference" that the search he challenges was
unreasonable under the aforementioned standards, Simmons v. Cripps, No. 12-CV-1061,
2013 WL 1290268, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by
2013 WL 1285417 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013).
As the Court reads the complaint, plaintiff claims that he was stripped searched by
Martin when he arrived in the SHU and that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Compl. at 10. As discussed supra, the Court will not engage in an analysis of any claims
against individuals who are not identified as defendants in the list of parties or caption. For
that reason, the Fourth Amendment claim related to the strip search is dismissed without
prejudice.
Plaintiff also makes a summary statement regarding his cell being "ransacked" by
Lynch, Milsap, Constigan, and Glandeur. See Compl. at 18. The Fourth Amendment is
inapplicable to the unwarranted search of an inmate’s prison cell, as inmates have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in such a place. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526
(1984) ("hold[ing] that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective
expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell ..." and thus the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to cell searches); Demaio v. Mann, 877 F.Supp. 89, 95 (N.D.N.Y.
1995) ("Searches of prison cells, even arbitrary searches, implicate no protected
constitutional rights.") (citations omitted).
Accordingly, plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims are dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to o 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.4
5. First Amendment – Access to Court
In Bounds v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that access to the courts is a
fundamental right that requires prison authorities to "assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must assert
non-conclusory allegations demonstrating that (1) the defendant acted deliberately, and (2)
the plaintiff suffered an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996);
Konigsberg v. Lefevre, 267 F.Supp.2d 255, 261 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Prison officials may only
be held liable for such injury if they frustrated or impeded a prisoner's efforts to pursue a non-
frivolous legal claim.").
However, "[a] hypothetical injury is not sufficient to state a claim for violation of the
right of access to the courts." Amaker v. Haponik, No. 98-CV-2663, 1999 WL 76798, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999). Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate "actual injury" by establishing
that the denial "hindered his efforts" to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at
349, 351-53 (noting that "an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by
establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some
4 To the extent that plaintiff intended to assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim related to property being
confiscated or discarded during the search, those claims are dismissed for the reasons set forth, infra.
theoretical sense"). "Mere 'delay in being able to work on one's legal action or communicate
with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.' " Davis, 320 F.3d at 352
(citing Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F.Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has stated that, in order to allege a denial of access to the courts
claim, "the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be
described in the complaint." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The
Supreme Court instructed that the underlying claim "must be described well enough to apply
the 'nonfrivolous' test and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more
than hope." Id. at 415-16.
"Finally, . . . the injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal
claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Rather, the injury must be to an inmate's ability "to attack
[his] sentence[ ], directly or collaterally, [or] . . . to challenge the conditions of [his]
confinement." Id. at 355. "Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the
incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." Id.
Here, plaintiff claims that Hitts destroyed his personal property and, as a result, plaintiff
had to "forfeit a claim" in "the state." Compl. at 9. Plaintiff also claims that issues with his
food caused plaintiff to file a complaint in the wrong jurisdiction and interfered with plaintiff's
complaint in the Western District of New York. Id. at 17. These vague allegations do not
support the conclusion that plaintiff suffered an "actual injury" as a result of defendants'
actions. The complaint lacks facts suggesting that plaintiff was unable to comply with court
orders or that he suffered any "actual injury" in any criminal or civil actions. Indeed, the
complaint does not contain any facts or information related to the procedural posture of any
pending actions. See Taylor v. John Doe Auburn Med. ADM & Health Care Provider, No.
9:23-CV-0017 (TJM/ATB), 2023 WL 2806119, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2023), on
reconsideration in part sub nom., 2023 WL 3275781 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 2023).
Because the complaint lacks any suggestion that plaintiff suffered an injury to a non-
frivolous legal claim concerning his criminal conviction, habeas corpus petition, or conditions
of confinement, plaintiff's First Amendment claims are dismissed without prejudice. See
Lafferty v. Virts, No. 23-CV-358, 2024 WL 4134254, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2024); see
also, e.g., Chalif v. Spitzer, No. 05-CV-1355, 2008 WL 1848650, at *11 (Apr. 23, 2008)
("Since plaintiff's complaint fails to allege any prejudice in the form of interference with his
pursuit of a non-frivolous legal claim, this provides an independent basis for dismissal[.]");
Joseph v. State, Dep't of Corrs., No. 92-CV-1566, 1994 WL 688303, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24,
1994) (dismissing the plaintiff's access to courts claim because the complaint "failed to allege
any adverse effect caused by the alleged denial of his legal mail").
6. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
i. Unwanted Injection
The Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of a competent person to refuse
unwanted medical treatment. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(recognizing "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"). The Second Circuit has held, "[i]t is a
firmly established principle of the common law of New York that every individual of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body and to
control the course of his medical treatment." Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 74 (2d
Cir.1996) (quoting Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 492 (1986)). Such a right may be set aside
only in narrow circumstances, including those where the patient "presents a danger to himself
or other members of society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct with
the institution." Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
At this juncture, the Court finds that the complaint contains allegations sufficient to
state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Biorefrence. See Muhammad v. Rabinowitz,
No. 11 Civ. 2428, 2012 WL 1155098, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012) (the plaintiff alleged
sufficient facts including the facility where he was located, the individuals involved, and the
time period to support a claim of involuntary administration of medication under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion
as to whether this claim can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment.
ii. Property
The Supreme Court has held that the negligent or intentional deprivation of prisoner's
property may not be the basis for constitutional claims if sufficient post deprivation remedies
are available to address the claim. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984) (citing
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)); Davis v. New York, 311 Fed. App'x 397, 400 (2d
Cir. 2009) (An alleged loss of property, "whether intentional or negligent - will not support a
due process claim redressable under § 1983 if 'adequate state post-deprivation remedies are
available.' ") (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. 533). "New York in fact affords an adequate post-
deprivation remedy in the form of, inter alia, a Court of Claims action." Jackson v. Burke, 256
F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2001). Because plaintiff has access to adequate state law remedies, he
has not been deprived of property without due process of law and therefore cannot state a
claim for relief pursuant to Section 1983. See Love v. Coughlin, 714 F.2d 207, 208-09 (2d
Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see also Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F.Supp. 460, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the defendants destroyed his property in violation of his
due process rights).
For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's claims related to property loss are dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 1983.
7. First Amendment Claims Related to the Grievance Process
Inmates do not have a constitutional right to state grievance programs. See Shell v.
Brzeniak, 365 F.Supp.2d 362, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[I]nmate grievance programs created
by state law are not required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison
officials violated those procedures does [sic] not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim.").
Moreover, inmates do not have a due process right to an investigation requested
through a grievance. See DeShaney v. Winnebego Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(The Due Process Clause "generally confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even
where that aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual."); Pine v. Seally, No. 9:09-CV-1198
(DNH/ATB), 2011 WL 856426, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011) ("To the extent that plaintiffs
attempt to assert a separate constitutional claim of 'failure to investigate,' the law is . . . clear
that inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to an investigation of any kind by government
officials.") (citing Bernstein v. New York, 591 F.Supp.2d 448, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting
cases)); Torres v. Mazzurca, 246 F.Supp.2d 334, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Inmates do not
have a due process right to a thorough investigation of grievances).
Accordingly, plaintiff's claims related to the processing and investigation into his
grievances and complaints, are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
8. State Law Claim
Plaintiff mentions in wholly conclusory fashion that he asserts a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. This "claim" is totally devoid of corresponding factual
information, and plaintiff does not indicate how these claims arose, or what defendant, if any,
might be personally involved in these alleged violations. "[T]he tenet that a court must accept
as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by merely conclusory
statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Similarly, a pleading that only "tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Id. (internal
quotations and alterations omitted). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id.
Because of the complete lack of factual allegations pertaining to the state law claim,
the claim is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To the extent plaintiff seeks to advance a criminal murder charge against defendants,
see Compl. at 28, such claims should be dismissed with prejudice because "[a]n individual
plaintiff has no private right of action to enforce state criminal statutes." Berger v. NYS Office
for People with Developmental Disabilities, 2016 WL 11265988, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 8,
2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 696686 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2017)
(citations omitted); Harper v. New York Child Welfare Comm'rs, No. 3:12-CV-0646
(NAM/DEP), 2012 WL 3115975, at *4, n.7 (N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012) (citing Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). Only government prosecutors have the authority to
bring criminal charges against someone. If plaintiff believes he has been the victim of a
crime, he should contact the appropriate law enforcement official.5 Accordingly, plaintiff lacks
standing to request this relief. See id.; see also Ross v. Reed, No. 1:13-CV-143, 2013 WL
1326947, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff is not "permitted to utilize
this civil lawsuit as a vehicle to initiate any federal or ... state criminal charges.") (citing, inter
alia, Leek v. Thomas, No. 09–3036, 2009 WL 1298499, at *3 (D.Kan. May 8, 2009) (and
cases cited therein) (dismissing on screening the portion of a civil rights complaint requesting
the initiation of a criminal prosecution and for disciplinary action against defendants because
those matters were "beyond the authority of this court and therefore are not proper requests
for relief") report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1314735 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28,
2013). Therefore, this claim is dismissed with prejudice.
IV. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff moves for an order directing Showers, McDonald, Lynch, Milsap, Constigan,
Glandeur, and Carr to cease "poisoning [him]." Dkt. No. 4 at 1, 5. Plaintiff also seeks an
order directing Woods, Coffey #1, and Coffey #2 to provide medical treatment "or investigate
[the] cause for complaints," and prevent defendants from asking questions only [without]
investigation" or directing defendants to "test [for] infection." Id. Plaintiff also seeks an order
directing Hutchins to "stop depriving [him] of his right to complain or petition[.]" Id. at 5.
Plaintiff also moves for an order directing Rockwood to release plaintiff from custody. Id.
5 If plaintiff believes the crime is a violation of federal law, he should contact the United States Attorney's Office
for the district in which the crime is alleged to have occurred. If plaintiff believes the crime is a violation of state
law, he should contact the police or the District Attorney's Office for the county in which the crime is alleged to
have occurred.
Preliminary injunctive relief "is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should
not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). "[T]his circuit has required a party seeking
a preliminary injunction to show: (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief." Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v.
VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, when the moving party seeks a “mandatory injunction
that alters the status quo by commanding a positive act,” the burden is even higher. N.Y.
Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2011). Thus, a
mandatory preliminary injunction "should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving
party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result
from a denial of preliminary relief." Citigroup Global Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4 (internal
quotation marks omitted). "The district court has wide discretion in determining whether to
grant a preliminary injunction." Moore, 409 F.3d at 511.
"To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must establish
a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion and the conduct giving rise to the
complaint." Levesque v. Clinton County, No. 10-CV-787 (DNH/DEP), 2012 WL 6948779, at
*11 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2012) (citing inter alia Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World
Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997)) (holding that a preliminary injunction may not be
issued to prevent an injury or harm which was not caused by the wrong claimed in the
underlying action); see also Allen v. Brown, No. 96-CV-1599 (RSP/GJD), 1998 WL 214418,
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998) (denying request for injunctive relief where allegations in
application were unrelated to claims asserted in the complaint and, thus, plaintiff "failed to
establish either a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his underlying claim, or sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits of such claim and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly toward" him).
As plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction, he must meet the higher standard and
establish a clear or substantial likelihood of success of show that extreme or very serious
damage would result in the absence of the requested relief. See Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc.
v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff's motion is denied for the
following reasons.
A. Relief Related to "Poisoning"
The relief that plaintiff seeks, directing an official to stop poisoning him, is, in essence,
a request that this official obey the law. "Obey the law" injunctions are vague, do not require
a defendant to do anything more than that already imposed by law, subject the defendant to
contempt rather than statutorily prescribed sanctions, and are not readily capable of
enforcement. As such, these injunctions are not favored. N.L.R.B. v. Express Pub. Co., 312
U.S. 426, 435-36 (1941); see also Rowe v. New York State Division of Budget, No. 1:11-CV-
1150 (LEK/DRH), 2012 WL 4092856, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012); New York v.
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 560 F.Supp.2d 186, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). According to the
Second Circuit, " '[u]nder Rule 65(d), an injunction must be more specific than a simple
command that the defendant obey the law.' " S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241
F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 51 (2d
Cir. 1996)).
B. Relief Related to Medical Care
"[R]equest[s] for injunctive relief must be supported by evidence, as opposed to mere
allegations, showing that the alleged irreparable harm is imminent." Hall v. Annucci, No. 19-
CV-5521, 2021 WL 4392526, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2021) (citing inter alia Perkins v.
Rock, No. 12-CV-1269, 2013 WL 4781762, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013) (noting that a
plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief was appropriately denied where the plaintiff's
allegations of harm were "purely speculative" and unsupported "by any evidence, such as
exhibits, medical reports, affidavits from other inmates, or any other proof").
While plaintiff seeks an order directing defendants to provide medical attention, see
Dkt. No. 1, at 1, the motion lacks any specific facts demonstrating the likelihood of future
harm. Plaintiff has not provided any documentation, exhibits, or any other evidence to
support his Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims. Plaintiff's concerns
are "unsubstantiated" and "speculative" and cannot form the basis for injunctive relief. Louis
v. Morley, No. 22-CV-10094., 2024 WL 4573677, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2024) "[The court
cannot simply order adequate medical care or constitutional conditions of confinement,
because '[u]nder Rule 65(d), an injunction must be more specific than a simple command that
the defendant obey the law.' " Smith v. Halstead, No. 7:24-CV-6855, 2024 WL 4389284, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2024) (citation omitted). Moreover, plaintiff's allegations related to
defendants' refusal to "test for cancer" amount to nothing more than a disagreement over the
course of treatment, and cannot form the basis for a colorable § 1983 claim. See Tolbert v.
Koenigsmann, No. 9:13-CV-1577 (LEK/DEP), 2016 WL 3349317, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 15,
2016) (denying request for preliminary injunctive relief based upon the plaintiff's "issues" with
the defendants' medical judgment).
On this ground, plaintiff's request is denied, without prejudice. See Hall, 2021 WL
4392526, at *14 (noting that if the plaintiff wishes to renew his request for injunctive relief, he
should provide the Court with medical records, affidavits, or other documentary evidence in
support of his theory that the defendants' actions presented a risk of irreparable harm).
C. Relief Against Hutchins
First, as noted supra, the remaining defendants are Constigan, Glandeur, Carr,
Showers, Milsap, McDonald, Hull, Rockwood, and McCormick; and (2) Eighth Amendment
deliberate medical indifference claims against Woods, Coffey #1, and Coffey #2. To the
extent that plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Hutchins, or any party not named as a
defendant, that request is denied. A request for injunctive relief against non-parties is
available only under very limited circumstances, none of which are clearly present here. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Reinert & Duree, P.C., 191 F.3d 297,
302-03 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In
re Rationis Enterprises, Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A court may not
grant a final, or even an interlocutory, injunction over a party over whom it does not have
personal jurisdiction.").
Second, with regard to plaintiff's request for an order affording him the "right to
complain or petition," see Dkt. No. 4 at 5, these events bear no relationship to the underlying
claims that remain in this action. See Candelaria v. Baker, No. 00-CV-0912, 2006 WL
618576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2006) ("To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive
relief, the moving party must establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion
and the conduct giving rise to the complaint.") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Scarborough v. Evans, No. 9:09-CV-0850 (NAM/DEP), 2010 WL 1608950,
at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010) (motion for preliminary injunction alleging use of excessive
force and denial of medical care by non-parties denied where complaint alleged denial of
mental health care and proper conditions of confinement); Lewis v. Johnston, No. 9:08-CV-
0482 (TJM/ATB), 2010 WL 1268024, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2010) (denying motion for
injunctive relief based upon actions taken by staff at Great Meadow Correctional Facility in
2010, where the complaint alleged wrongdoing that occurred at Franklin and Upstate
Correctional Facilities in 2006 and 2007); Mitchell v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs.,
No. 06-CV-6278, 2011 WL 5326054, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2011) (denying plaintiff's
request for preliminary injunctive relief because "the facts underlying the request for injunctive
relief [were] essentially unrelated to the underlying facts of the claims in this action, except for
the fact that they arise in the prison context"); McClenton v. Menifee, No. 05-CV-2844, 2006
WL 2474872, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006) (denying motion for preliminary injunction
where the underlying claim "[was] not included in the complaint and there [was] no showing
that the plaintiff [had] exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to [that] claim").
D. Release from Custody
"Release from custody only may be obtained by a writ of habeas corpus." Anderson v.
Connecticut Superior Ct., No. 3:01 CV 2214, 2003 WL 203152, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 26,
2003) (holding that "[a] state prisoner may not bring a civil rights action in federal court under
[section] 1983 to challenge either the validity of his conviction or the fact or duration of his
confinement."). Accordingly, this portion of plaintiff's motion is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 6) is GRANTED.6 The Clerk shall
provide the superintendent of the prison facility in which plaintiff is currently confined with a
copy of plaintiff's inmate authorization form (Dkt. No. 3) and notify the official that this action
has been filed and that plaintiff is required to pay the entire statutory filing fee $350.00
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915;7 and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall provide a copy of plaintiff's inmate authorization form to
the Financial Deputy of the Clerk's Office; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's claims the following claims are DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted: (1) claims against Gallagher; (2) First
Amendment claims related to religious freedom; (2) Eighth Amendment claims related to
plaintiff's conditions of confinement at Clinton C.F.; (3) Eighth Amendment deliberate medical
indifference claims related to plaintiff's treatment at Clinton C.F.; (4) Fourth Amendment
claims; (5) Fourteenth Amendment property claims; (6) First Amendment access-to-court
claims; (7) claims related to the grievance process; and (8) state law claims 8; and it is further
6 Plaintiff should note that, although his IFP application has been granted, he will still be required to pay fees
that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
7 While Section 1915 permits indigent litigants to commence a civil action in federal court without prepayment of
the filing fee, those litigants "must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent [they are] able to do so, through
periodic withdrawals from [their] inmate accounts." Cash, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b);
Harris, 607 F.3d at 21).
8 Should plaintiff seek to pursue a claim dismissed without prejudice by the Court herein, he must file an
amended complaint. Any amended complaint, which shall supersede and replace the original complaint in its
entirety, must allege claims of misconduct or wrongdoing against each named defendant which plaintiff has a
legal right to pursue, and over which this Court may properly exercise jurisdiction. Any amended complaint filed
by plaintiff must also comply with the pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil
ORDERED that the following claims survive review and require a response: (1) Eighth
Amendment condition-of-confinement claims against Constigan, Glandeur, Carr, Showers,
Milsap, McDonald, Hull, Rockwood, and McCormick; (2) Eighth Amendment deliberate
medical indifference claims against Woods, Coffey #1, and Coffey #2; and (3) Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Biorefrence and Harrigan; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall terminate the following defendants from
the Docket Report: Kim, King, Security Superintendent Deputy, Moores, Martuscello, Friend,
Hitts, May, OSI, Minkler, Lynch, Hutchins, and Gallagher; and it is further
ORDERED that, upon receipt of the documents for service, the Clerk shall issue
summonses and forward them, along with a copy of the complaint, to the United States
Marshal for service upon the defendants. The Clerk shall forward a copy of the summons
and complaint to the Office of the Attorney General, together with a copy of this Decision and
Order; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants or counsel, shall file a response to the complaint as
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further
ORDERED that all pleadings, motions, and other documents relating to this action
must bear the case number assigned to this action and be filed with the Clerk of the United
States District Court, Northern District of New York, 7th Floor, Federal Building, 100 S.
Clinton St., Syracuse, New York 13261-7367. Any paper sent by a party to the Court or
the Clerk must be accompanied by a certificate showing that a true and correct copy of
same was served on all opposing parties or their counsel. Any document received by
Procedure. Plaintiff's deadline to amend his pleading as a matter of course is set forth in Rule 15(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
the Clerk or the Court which does not include a proper certificate of service will be
stricken from the docket. Plaintiff must comply with any requests by the Clerk’s Office for
any documents that are necessary to maintain this action. All parties must comply with Local
Rule 7.1 of the Northern District of New York in filing motions. Plaintiff is also required to
promptly notify the Clerk’s Office and all parties or their counsel, in writing, of any
change in his address; the failure to do so will result in the dismissal of his action; and
it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED
without prejudice to renew; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide plaintiff with copies of the unpublished decisions
cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d
76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order on
plaintiff in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated: January 21, 2026
Brenda K. Sannes
Chief U.S. District Judge
33