explaining that § 7609(b)(2) constitutes the government’s consent to waive sovereign immunity and that limitations on that consent “must be strictly observed” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that § 7609(b)(2) constitutes the government’s consent to waive sovereign immunity and that limitations on that consent “must be strictly observed” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- setting forth requirements for establishing a prima facie case for enforcement and explaining that a taxpayer has a heavy burden to show an abuse of process or 2 24-7086 lack of good faith once the IRS makes a prima facie showing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 23 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEAN ALLEN STEEVES, No. 24-7086
D.C. No. 3:24-cv-01300-DMS-AHG
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 22, 2026**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Dean Allen Steeves appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
denying his motion to quash a summons from the Internal Revenue Service and
granting the IRS’s motion to enforce the same summons. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Viewtech, Inc. v.
United States, 653 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other
grounds by Polselli v. IRS, 598 U.S. 432 (2023), and for clear error a district
court’s summons-enforcement decision, United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 563
(9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly denied Steeves’s motion to quash for lack of
jurisdiction because Steeves was not entitled to notice of the summons and thus
could not seek to quash it. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7609(b)(2)(A) (allowing any person
entitled to notice of a third-party summons to bring a proceeding to quash the
summons), 7609(c)(2)(A) (stating that § 7609 does not apply to a summons
“served on the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued, or any
officer or employee of such person”); Mollison v. United States, 568 F.3d 1073,
1075 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that § 7609(b)(2) constitutes the government’s
consent to waive sovereign immunity and that limitations on that consent “must be
strictly observed” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not clearly err by granting the motion to enforce
because the IRS met its burden of establishing its prima facie case for enforcement
of the summons, and Steeves failed to rebut that showing. See Richey, 632 F.3d at
564 (setting forth requirements for establishing a prima facie case for enforcement
and explaining that a taxpayer has a heavy burden to show an abuse of process or
2 24-7086
lack of good faith once the IRS makes a prima facie showing).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 24-7086