Irion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

VAN IRION, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00001

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

TRAVIS MCDONOUGH, LEANN )

WILSON, DOE 1, and )

TENNESSEE BOARD OF )

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

In his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), the operative pleading, plaintiff Van Irion

seeks “declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages” against

defendants Travis McDonough, Chief Judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Tennessee (“EDTN”), LeAnna Wilson (named in the SAC as “Leann”), Clerk of Court

of the EDTN, “Doe 1,” and the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility (“TBPR”). Now

before the court are two separate Motions to Dismiss filed respectively by the TBPR (Doc. No.

47) and by McDonough and Wilson (Doc. No. 57). For the reasons set forth herein, both motions

will be granted, and the remaining claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The original Complaint and First Amended Complaint named as defendants the EDTN and

the TBPR. (Doc. Nos. 1, 22.) Following dismissal of the EDTN on the grounds of sovereign

immunity (Doc. Nos. 38, 39), Irion sought and was granted leave to amend his pleading again

(Doc. Nos. 44, 45). The SAC, now the operative pleading, removed the EDTN as a defendant,

maintained the claim against the TBPR, and added a claim against McDonough, Wilson, and “Doe

1,” the latter of whom has never been identified or served.

According to the SAC, Irion is an attorney licensed in Tennessee who resides in Knox

County, in the federal Eastern District of Tennessee. (SAC ¶ 1.) He has been admitted to practice

law before the EDTN and this court, among others. (Id. ¶¶ 3–5.)

The putative basis for this lawsuit is an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) issued by Judge

McDonough on August 8, 2024, initiating disciplinary proceedings against Irion in the EDTN.

Show Cause Order, In re: Irion, No 1:24-dm-00007-TRM-CHS (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2024), ECF

No. 1. (See SAC ¶ 15; see also Doc. No. 64-2.) Irion “believes that said disciplinary matter was

filed by Judge McDonough in retaliation against Irion.” (SAC ¶ 15.) In support of this “belief,”

the plaintiff alleges that McDonough, assisted by Wilson and Doe 1, illegally altered the court’s

record. He knows an alteration occurred because Document No. 1 of the disciplinary matter in the

EDTN, Case No. 1:24-dm-007, as shown by the footer automatically applied by the court’s

electronic filing system, begins on “PageID#9,” meaning that “Page ID#s 1–8 are completely

missing.” (SAC ¶ 80.) Irion complains that neither he nor his attorney has ever seen the “first

version of the OSC that initiated his disciplinary proceeding,” “can never know what that initial

disciplinary document said,” and “will never know why TNED was desperate not to allow Irion to

see that first version of the initiating OSC document.” (Id. ¶ 82.) His belief that the document was

substituted is substantiated by a notation on the docket stating, “Initial document replaced on

8/8/2024.” (Id. ¶ 84.)

The plaintiff speculates that the docket was manipulated by McDonough in order to

“misrepresent the date and time upon which the initiating document was first filed.” (Id. ¶ 86.) The

plaintiff believes that the substitution was in retaliation for his having filed a complaint with the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, allegedly also on August 8, 2024, accusing McDonough of

unlawful and unethical conduct. (Id.) Alternatively, the plaintiff speculates that the original OSC

was altered to “eliminate information . . . that would reflect poorly upon McDonough, and/or

exculpate the plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 87; see also id. ¶ 96.) Irion claims to have evidence that the third

version of the OSC, the one that actually appears on the docket, was filed “weeks” after August 8,

2024 rather than on August 8, 2024.

Irion apparently filed another complaint against McDonough with the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals based on the substitution of the OSC on the docket. This complaint was dismissed in

an opinion authored by Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jeffrey Sutton. Irion quotes

Judge Sutton’s opinion at length, which explains his factual findings after investigating Irion’s

allegations about the substitution of the OSC:

On the morning of August 8, 2024, the Court’s administrative lawyer entered the

show-cause order. When confirming that the document was successfully uploaded,

the administrative lawyer noticed that the case number on the order was incorrect.

She quickly replaced the first show-cause order with a second document containing

the correct case number. When the subject judge viewed the document a few hours

later, he observed that the replaced document contained metadata visible to those

with access to the docket. The subject judge alerted a different staff member, who

scrubbed the metadata from the document and again replaced the show-cause order

with a metadata-free copy. The docket shows that the original document was

replaced on August 8. Because the document was twice replaced, the operative

show-cause order begins at PageID#9, and not PageID#1.

(Id. ¶ 97; see also Doc. No. 63-1 at .)

While appearing to adopt Judge Sutton’s findings, insofar as they (according to Irion)

constitute “an admission of unlawful alteration and deletion of Federal Court Records,” Irion also

claims that a version of the OSC that begins on PageID#5 was served upon him at his residence

via certified mail and that he and “other witnesses accessed the PageID#5 version of the OSC on

TNED’s ECF system after August 25, 2024,” meaning that it could not have been filed on August

8, as McDonough claims. (SAC ¶¶ 103, 105.)1

Based on these allegations, the plaintiff continues to maintain that McDonough caused the

first eight pages of the docket to be deleted to “hide his retaliation” against Irion and that

McDonough unlawfully directed Wilson “and/or Doe 1” to “permanently alter and destroy

documents of Record” filed through the court’s electronic filing system. (Id. ¶¶ 125–26.) He asserts

that Wilson “violated Federal law by permanently altering and destroying documents of Record”

filed on the court’s electronic docket. (Id. ¶ 127.)

The SAC’s First, Second, Third, and Fourth “Causes of Action” seek judicial declarations

that TNED Local Rules 3.2 and 83.6, and 83.7 are unconstitutional facially and/or as applied. (SAC

1 On February 20, 2025, Judge Sutton dismissed Irion’s complaint that was based on the

allegedly improper replacement of the OSC on the docket, finding generally that the plaintiff’s

allegations “cannot survive the Rule 11 inquiry.” (Doc. No. 63-1 at 6.) More specifically, Judge

Sutton found that Irion was

simply wrong to suggest that the subject judge initiated these [disciplinary] proceedings

only after [Irion] complained about the subject judge’s conduct in his en banc petition with

the Sixth Circuit. All the available evidence shows just the opposite: that the court docketed

the show-cause order on August 8, a day before the complainant filed his petition. Indeed,

the U.S. Postal Service records show that the clerk’s office sent the complainant the show-

cause order by certified mail on August 8. The complainant’s contrary theory—that the

subject judge issued the show-cause order to cover up his retaliation . . . —is contradicted

by objective evidence. . . .

. . . .

The complainant’s one claim specific to the subject judge—that he improperly replaced a

document on the docket of the disciplinary proceeding—similarly fails. . . . Even if such

decisions could be the basis for misconduct, the decision to remove the document’s

metadata (while adding a docket notation that the document had been replaced) does not

constitute misconduct. As the subject judge notes in his response, this alteration to the

document’s metadata had no effect on the paper copy that the court mailed to the

complainant. This allegation warrants dismissal as attacking the merits of the subject

judge’s decisions and lacking sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has

occurred.

(Id. at 5–6.)

at 34–39.)2 The Fifth Cause of Action seeks a declaration that the TNED deleted or altered court

records in the disciplinary action and that such deletions and alterations violated federal law and

violated Irion’s due process rights. (Id. at 39–41.) All of these “causes of action” were also set

forth in the First Amended Complaint, which did not name McDonough and Wilson as defendants.

(Doc. No. 22 at 30–37, 39–40.) Insofar as these claims were aimed at the EDTN, then named as a

defendant, they were dismissed on the grounds of the EDTN’s sovereign immunity. (See Doc. No.

39.) Their continued inclusion in the SAC, however, did not serve to reinstate the claims, which

remain dismissed.

The sole cause of action in the SAC asserted against McDonough and Wilson is tacked

onto the end of the pleading, as the Eighth Cause of Action, characterized as a “Bivens Claim for

Denial of Due Process.” (SAC at 43.) The plaintiff asserts that McDonough and Wilson, “acting

under color of Federal law, intentionally deprived the plaintiff of his right to unbiased due process

under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by unlawfully deleting pageID#s1–4 in case

number 1:24-dm-007; and by, several weeks later, unlawfully deleting pageID#s5–8 in said case.”

2 EDTN Local Rule 3.2(c) provides for the random assignment of judges to new cases, and

Rule 3.2(d) provides exceptions to such randomized assignment. (See SAC ¶¶ 76–77.)

Rule 83.6, as amended in 2025 and as applied by Judge McDonough in the underlying

disciplinary proceeding, reads:

The minimum standards of professional conduct before this Court include the Rules of

Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee insofar as they relate to

matters within the jurisdiction of this Court. Such rules are not exhaustive of the ethical

standards the Court expects attorneys to meet. The Court has the obligation and

responsibility to interpret and apply the RPC and other rules and standards of conduct

without being bound by the decisions of Tennessee courts, other courts, or agencies.

EDTN L.R. 83.6 (Revised April 23, 2025). See also Memorandum Opinion and Order 3–4, In re:

Irion, No. 1:24-dm-7 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2025), ECF No. 114.

Rule 83.7 pertains to the procedures for imposing attorney discipline and specifically

authorizes the district’s chief judge to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings by “issuance of an

order to show case signed by the Chief Judge.” EDTN L.R. 83.7(b).

(Id. ¶ 222.) The plaintiff seeks “injunctive and declaratory relief [and] damages, including nominal

and/or punitive damages.” (Id.)

The SAC does not state any substantive factual allegations regarding the TBPR, but it

asserts that the TBPR is a “necessary party” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. The sole

cause of action asserted against it, the SAC’s Sixth Cause of Action, asks the court to find, as a

factual matter, that “TNED’s actions in prosecuting the disciplinary action 1:24-dm-007 against

attorney Irion included unconstitutional actions that deprived attorney Irion of his due process

rights.” (SAC ¶ 215.) Irion asks the court to issue a declaration, based on that putative finding, that

the TBPR’s “application of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 §§ 25.4(a) and 25.5 in any

disciplinary matter against attorney Irion . . . would violate attorney Irion’s right to due process as

protected by the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶ 216.)

The two Motions to Dismiss were filed in response to the SAC. The court takes judicial

notice that, on the day after the judicial defendants filed their present motion, Judge McDonough

issued an eighty-page ruling in the underlying disciplinary action against Irion, finding by clear

and convincing evidence that Irion had violated Rules 3.3(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) of the Tennessee

Rules of Professional Conduct and ordering disciplinary action. Memorandum Opinion and Order,

In re: Irion, No. 1:24-dm-00007-TRM-CHS (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2025), ECF No. 114. Following

the denial of his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Irion appealed the ruling to the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals on September 30, 2025, where his appeal is docketed as Case No. 25-5874.

II. THE JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

In support of their Motion to Dismiss, McDonough and Wilson (collectively referred to in

this section of the Memorandum as “defendants” or “judicial defendants”) argue that (1)

McDonough has absolute judicial immunity and Wilson has absolute quasi-judicial immunity from

suit based on the claim asserted in this case; (2) in the alternative, they are entitled to qualified

immunity; (3) the Supreme Court has never authorized expanding Bivens to imply a cause of action

by a disgruntled litigant against judicial officers for alleged due process violations, and this court

should decline to extend Bivens this far; (4) insofar as the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, Bivens

does not provide a remedy. (See generally Doc. No. 58.) The plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc.

No. 63), and the defendants filed a Reply in further support thereof (Doc. No. 64).

Regarding the damages claim against the defendants, the court finds it unnecessary to wade

far into the Bivens quagmire, because it is clear that the defendants have absolute immunity from

the damages claim asserted against them in this case. The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed

that federal judges are absolutely immune from lawsuits grounded in the performance of official

judicial acts. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

355–57 (1978); see also Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[J]udges generally

have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions,” which “even

allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome.”). Such immunity extends to court officers,

such as Clerks of Court, who enjoy “absolute immunity from suit on claims arising out of the

performance of . . . quasi-judicial functions.” Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988)

(citing Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973) (municipal court clerk)).

Judicial immunity will not apply in only two circumstances: (1) where the challenged

actions are “nonjudicial,” that is, they were not taken in the judge’s “judicial capacity,” and (2)

where the judge acted “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

11–12, (1991) (citations omitted).

While the plaintiff asserts that the acts at issue—removing and replacing a docketed order

first to correct the docket number and then to remove metadata from the order—constitute non-

judicial, administrative tasks for which the defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity, his

argument fails because the correction and replacement of the OSC are inextricably intertwined

with the judicial act of entering the OSC and thus initiating disciplinary proceedings against Irion.

Even if the court focuses on the ministerial tasks of checking and then correcting the OSC after it

had been docketed, these tasks pertained to the management of the case against Irion, making them

judicial in nature. Accord Dekom v. Fannie Mae, 846 F. App’x 14, 18 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Insofar as

Dekom asserts that he sues some of these judges and their staffs for non-judicial, administrative

tasks, his argument fails because the actions all pertained to the management of his foreclosure

case and appeal, thus making them judicial in nature.”); see also Kipen v. Lawson, 57 F. App’x

691 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Control of the docket is a function for which judges are entitled to absolute

immunity.” (collecting cases)); Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210 (“[A]cts arising out of, or related to,

individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.”); Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116

F.3d 62, 66–67 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A court’s inherent power to control its docket is part of its function

of resolving disputes between parties. This is a function for which judges and their supporting staff

are afforded absolute immunity.”); Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460–61 (D.C. Cir. 1993):

(“[C]lerks, like judges, are immune from damage suits for performance of tasks that are an integral

part of the judicial process.” (collecting cases)). The entry of a particular order on the docket, as

well as ensuring the correct docketing of a particular order, in a case over which McDonough

himself presided was intimately connected with a particular case and was necessarily judicial in

character. The making of substantive changes to the OSC would obviously have been an official

judicial act; that the changes were minor and non-substantive does not make the nature of the act

somehow non-judicial.

Further, the court takes notice that district courts are frequently called upon to correct

docketed filings by substituting corrected documents. This is not an unusual occurrence or one that

is outside the scope of a court’s ordinary judicial functions. Rather, it is a necessary part of

managing the docket and the orderly administration of a case. This is nothing like, for instance,

truly administrative acts for which absolute immunity is not afforded, such as hiring, firing, and

demoting court employees, see, e.g., Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229–30, “compiling general jury lists

to affect all future trials”—rather than a particular case—or “promulgating a code of conduct for

attorneys” (for which the defendants instead had legislative immunity). Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210

(citing Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of

United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731, 734 (1980)).

Moreover, even if the actions at issue were considered administrative rather than judicial

in nature, a judge performing a discretionary, administrative function is entitled to qualified

immunity from suit for civil damages unless his or her actions violate “clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1993); Jones v. Muskegon

Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010). In this case, the plaintiff cannot articulate a constitutional

right associated with accessing court documents with incorrect docket numbers or metadata that is

not meant to be available to the public, much less a right so clearly established that its “contours

. . . were sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he was

doing violated that right.” Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft

v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

“Absolute immunity in Bivens actions against federal judges has also been extended to

requests for injunctive relief.” Kipen, 57 F. App’x at 691 (citing Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,

1240-42 (11th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases)). In addition, an injunction against a federal judge

requiring action directly related to a judicial proceeding before that judge would necessarily

require official government action on the part of the judge, not some action taken in his individual

capacity. Consequently, “Bivens is both inappropriate and unnecessary for claims seeking . . .

equitable relief against actions by the federal government. By definition, Bivens suits are individual

capacity suits and thus cannot enjoin official government action.” Solida v. McKelvey, 820 F.3d

1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). Moreover, here as in Kipen, the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief

is moot, because Judge McDonough has already issued a ruling in the underlying disciplinary

proceeding. See Kipen, 57 F. App’x at 691.

As for the plaintiff’s request for a judicial declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act,

whether to grant declaratory relief is entirely discretionary with the court, “even when the suit

otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S.

277, 282 (1995). The Declaratory Judgment Act is “an enabling Act, which confers a discretion

on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.” Id. at 287 (citation omitted).

Declaratory relief “is meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in anticipation

of some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a past act.” Lawrence v. Kuenhold,

271 F. App’x 763, 766 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). The plaintiff seeks a declaration

pertaining to Judge McDonough’s past actions in initiating the disciplinary action against him, but,

as set forth above, Judge McDonough no longer presides over the action because he issued

judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In this situation,

declaratory relief would not define any relationship or rights between the plaintiff and the

defendants. Declaratory relief, therefore, is not warranted.

Finally, irrespective of the other grounds for dismissal, it is abundantly clear from the face

of the SAC that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding what he believes the uncorrected documents

showed and why they were substituted are based on nothing but speculation and conjecture. The

claim against the defendants, including the claim for a declaration, based on the substitution of

documents on the docket in order to correct them is utterly frivolous and would be subject to

dismissal on this ground as well.

The judicial defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

III. THE TBPR’S MOTION

The TBPR argues that the claim against it should be dismissed, presumably under Rule

12(b)(1), on ripeness grounds. (See Doc. No. 47-1 at 6 (“Plaintiff presupposes two future events.

First, that TNED will impose discipline upon him. Secondly, if TNED disciplines him that,

TNBPR will impose reciprocal discipline. Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments are based on mere

speculation about future events and are not yet ripe.”).)

Irion filed a Response, arguing generally that ripeness in the context of a request for a

declaratory judgment does not require “imminent and certain” harm and that the entire “point of

the declaratory judgment statute is to grant Federal courts discretion to resolve pure questions of

law prior to harm occurring to one party or another.” (Doc. No. 53 at 4–5.) He insists that (1) it is

practically certain that TNED will discipline Irion within the next week or two” and that, (2) under

its “published rules,” the TBPR is “certain to deny Irion any hope of avoiding reciprocal discipline

by the [TBPR].” (Id. at 5.) He further argues that dismissing the claim against the TBPR under the

circumstances presented here would impose a significant hardship upon him and that the court

should, in the exercise of its discretion, resolve the case. (Id. at 8–9.)

As an initial matter, the court notes that the TBPR, a state agency, is absolutely immune

from suit. Accord Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 63 F.4th 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2023) (recognizing that

the TBPR “cannot be sued for injunctive relief here because it is an arm of the state and the state

has not waived the Board’s sovereign immunity, nor has Congress removed it”). The plaintiff

could avoid the application of sovereign immunity if he proceeded under the exception provided

by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), but, for Ex parte Young to apply, “the claimant must

explicitly allege that a state official acted in her official capacity.” Id. (citing Long v. Tennessee,

744 F. App’x 945, 946 (6th Cir. 2018), as holding that the plaintiff’s “failure to allege an official-

capacity claim against a state official prevents him from availing himself of the Ex parte Young

exception”). The plaintiff has not identified or named as defendants any members of the TBPR in

their official capacity, as a result of which Ex parte Young does not apply, and sovereign immunity

bars the suit against the TBPR.

Perhaps recognizing that it would be relatively simple for the plaintiff to amend his

pleading (yet again) to name an appropriate official, the TBPR invokes ripeness instead of

sovereign immunity. “The related doctrines of Article III standing and ripeness are both limits on

a federal court’s ability to hear a case.” Carman v. Yellen, 112 F.4th 386, 401 (6th Cir. 2024); see

also Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 78 F.4th 929, 941 (6th Cir. 2023) “[T]here is unquestionably some

overlap between ripeness and standing.” (citation omitted)). “The constitutional elements of

ripeness encompass traditional parts of the standing inquiry: namely, whether a plaintiff ‘is

threatened with ‘imminent’ injury in fact.’” Carman, 112 F.4th at 400 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007)). “If a case is ‘dependent on

contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,’ it is not

constitutionally ripe.” Id. (quoting Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131 (2020) (per curiam))

(some internal quotation marks omitted).

Only one aspect of this case has proceeded beyond the speculative: Judge McDonough did

in fact find that Irion had violated various ethical rules governing Tennessee attorneys’ conduct

and he did in fact impose discipline. However, that ruling has not been finalized, because Irion’s

appeal remains pending before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, it is still unclear

whether the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals will affirm or reverse the finding that Irion violated the

Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Irion’s claim against the TBPR remains contingent upon

the Sixth Circuit’s upholding Judge McDonough’s ruling. As such, it is “dependent on [a]

contingent future event[] that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Id.

Consequently, Irion’s request for a declaration that the TBPR’s imposition of Tennessee Supreme

Court Rule 9 §§ 24.4(a) and 25.5 would violate his right to due process is not ripe.

The court further notes that, as articulated in the FAC, the plaintiff’s claim against the

TBPR is also contingent on a finding by this court that the “TNED’s actions in prosecuting the

disciplinary action 1:24-dm-007 against attorney Iron included unconstitutional actions that

deprived attorney Irion of his due process rights.” (FAC ¶ 215(a).) Aside from the problem

presented by Iron’s asking this court to conduct what amounts to an appellate review of a decision

by a sister court, Irion has in fact appealed that finding, and his appellate brief in the Sixth Circuit

argues pervasively that his due process rights were violated by the proceedings before

McDonough. See generally Brief of the Appellant/Respondent, In re Irion, No. 25-5874 (6th Cir.

Jan. 5, 2026), Doc. No. 19 (in which the term “due process” appears more than twenty times). It

remains to be seen whether the Sixth Circuit will be persuaded by Irion’s due process arguments.

If that court reverses Irion’s disciplinary conviction, then his claim against the TBPR will be

rendered moot—which is precisely why his claim against the TBPR is not yet ripe. Regardless,

the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is the body with jurisdiction to determine whether Irion’s

disciplinary proceedings violated his right to due process, making his claim not fit for review in

this court at this juncture.

In sum, this claim, too, will be dismissed without prejudice.

14

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, both Motions to Dismiss will be granted, and the claims

against the remaining defendants will be dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate Order is

filed herewith.

ALETA A. TRAUGER

United States District Judge