Boyd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TAMESHA N. BOYD,

Plaintiff,

-against- 1:25-CV-169 (LEK/MJK)

THE CORPORATION of the

STATE of NEW YORK et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 6, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Tamesha Boyd (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action

against Defendants the State of New York,1 Governor Kathy Hochul, the New York Department

of Motor Vehicles, Division of Field Investigations (“DMV”), the DMV Commissioner, Katrina

Turner, and Doe Union and/or Insurance Company Defendants, alleging, inter alia, violations of

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”).

On June 30, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint. Dkt. No. 28

(“Motion”). Plaintiff filed a response, Dkt. No. 31 (“Response”), and Defendants filed a reply,

Dkt. No. 32.

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part, and denied

in part.

1 The Complaint’s caption identifies “The Corporation of the STATE of NEW YORK” as a

Defendant in this action. Compl. at 1I. In an effort to grant Plaintiff the special solicitude owed

pro se litigants the Court will assume Plaintiff intended to sue the State of New York. The Clerk

is directed to update the case caption to reflect as such.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are set forth as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, her Response, and

the exhibits attached to it.

Plaintiff is an African-American woman with a disability, who, “at all relevant times, was

employed by the [DMV].” See Compl. at 2, 12. She alleges “a pattern of racial and disability

discrimination, retaliation, defamation, and violation of [her] constitutional rights . . . .

perpetrated by the [DMV], various [DMV] employees . . . , and governmental institutions tasked

with providing access to justice.” Id. at 4.

Outside of work, Plaintiff writes under the pseudonym, Zalaina Carpenter, “to safeguard

[her] privacy, freedom of expression, and mental health.” Id. She alleges her supervisor, Katrina

Turner, and “others in [her] workplace, misuse[d] and misinterpret[ed]. . . [her] personal writings

under the pseudonym.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff says, “that in the work place it seemed [she] was

‘defamed’” because of the personal views she expressed on “issues of racial discrimination,

identity, and self-expression.” Id. Turner “retaliated against [her]” by spreading defamatory

statements about Plaintiff amongst colleagues, excluding her from career opportunities, creating

a hostile work environment where Plaintiff felt unwanted and “discriminated against due to

racial biases,” and telling her to “utilize the team email set up to communicate with [her] co

workers and to share work related ‘content’ to complete[] work task[s]!” Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff

believes this was done in “bad faith” and that Turner’s statements subjected her to the “false

beliefs that [she], as a Black woman, was somehow unprofessional or unworthy of the

opportunities others were afforded.” Id. at 6–7.

Later, after recovering from an illness, Plaintiff was further subjected to “retaliation and a

hostile work environment.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff overheard her colleagues “suggesting [she] was a

racist” and mention she “would be fired soon.” Id. at 10. Moreover, on several occasions

Plaintiff was “subjected to verbal abuse” by Turner and explains that she felt Turner “deflected”

Plaintiff’s concerns. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges “the DMV and its employees have deprived [her] of [her] 14th

Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 9. She explains that the DMV maintains

a practice of “including racial profiling, discriminatory treatment, and defamation” that has

“hindered [her] ability to perform [her] job.” Id. Plaintiff attempted to “facilitate a complaint

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other governmental

institutions” but they failed to “investigate or adequately address [her] complaints of

discrimination and retaliation.” Id. at 10–11.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges Turner denied her reasonable accommodations under the ADA.

Id. at 9, 12, 14–15. Plaintiff is the “mother of a disabled child, [who] requested reasonable

accommodations to attend necessary meetings regarding [her] child’s education.” Id. at 14–15.

Turner’s denial of Plaintiff’s accommodations caused her “additional stress and harm.” Id. at 15.

Plaintiff requests $100,000,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive

relief in the form of, inter alia, requiring the EEOC and other government agencies to “reform

their processes [in order to] ensure adequate protection for individuals who experience

discrimination and retaliation.” Id. at 23. She also requests the Court engage in ‘Systemic

Reforms,’ including a Court ordered “implementation of anti-retaliation policies for employees

with disabilities.’ Id.

Courts in the Second Circuit are required to show special solicitude to pro se litigants,

especially those raising civil rights claims, as Plaintiff does here. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d

90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir.2003)). As best the

Court can understand, Plaintiff brings the following claims for relief: 1) employment

discrimination claims against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), 2)

employment discrimination and hostile work environment claims against all Defendants pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), 3) ADA failure to accommodate, employment

discrimination, and retaliations claims against all Defendants, 4) Title VII claims for racial

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment against all Defendants, 5) state law

Defamation claims against all Defendants, 6) NYSHRL claims against all Defendants for

discriminatory practices, 7) Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress against all Defendants, and

8) a state law Negligence claim against Katrina Turner. See Compl. at 7, 9–16.2

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations

contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of a plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v.

Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a

2 However, Plaintiff’s vague allegations regarding violations of the “United Nations Convention

on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, among

others, stand on different footing. See Compl. 18, 21. As to these claims, the Court is unable to

discern any factual basis for them in the Complaint, and therefore the Court will not consider

them. Buxbaum v. Zillow Grp. Inc., No. 25-CV-2766, 2025 WL 1549017, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May

30, 2025) (“The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, ‘[n]otwithstanding any filing fee . . .

that may have been paid.’”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at

556.

The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court

has stated that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the pleader has not

demonstrated that she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. Id. at 679.

Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must “construe the complaint

broadly, and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests.” Weixel v. Bd. of Educ.

of City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, “dismissal of a pro

se complaint is…appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet the minimum pleading

requirements.” Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Rodriguez v.

Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997)). The Court’s “duty to liberally construe a plaintiff’s

complaint is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F.

Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (cleaned up).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a district court must confine its consideration to

facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated

in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F.

v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).

However, for pro se plaintiffs, the Court may consider “materials outside the complaint to the

extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” Alsaifullah v. Furco, No.

12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (internal quotations

omitted), including, “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers,” Agu v.

Rhea, No. 09-CV-4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010), “factual

allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion,” Walker v. Schult, 717

F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013), and “documents that the plaintiff[ ] either possessed or knew

about and upon which [he or she] relied in bringing the suit,” Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81,

88 (2d Cir. 2000). Finally, “the sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the court is

capable of determining based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law.”

McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Law Claims

Plaintiff’s federal claims for relief suffer from several pleading deficiencies. The Court

addresses each in turn.

1. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants aver that Plaintiff’s claims against the State of New York, the DMV, and the

individual Defendants in their official capacity should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment

grounds. Mot. at 8–11. The Court agrees.

The Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing a suit against her own state in

federal court. See U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment also immunizes States

against suits for damages against state officials acting in their official capacities. Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); see also Keles v. Davalos, 642 F. Supp. 3d 339, 359

(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (explaining that Section 1983 official capacity suits are considered “de facto

monetary suits against the state and are barred by sovereign immunity.”) (internal quotations

omitted). “This immunity extends to ‘. . . state instrumentalities.’” Clark v. Schroeder, 847 F.

App’x 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429–30

(1997)). The DMV, of course, is a state instrumentality. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138,

149 (2d Cir. 2004).

Eleventh Amendment immunity is lost only if Congress unequivocally abrogates states’

immunity or a state expressly consents to suit. See Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365–66 (2d

Cir. 2009). It is well-settled that Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity through

Section 1983. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (“There can be no doubt,

however, that [a Section 1983] suit against the State . . . is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.”). Moreover, New York has not waived its immunity from suit on the claims for

monetary damages asserted in the Complaint. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n,

557 F.2d 35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 1977).

Therefore, as an initial matter, all of Plaintiff’s claims against New York State, the DMV,

and the individual Defendants in their official capacities, are clearly barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and are dismissed with prejudice.3

Plaintiff “invoke[s] Ex Parte Young” in her Complaint as a means of “addressing

violations committed by state officials, including the Governor and other related parties, in their

3 This necessarily means that any of Plaintiff’s claims brought under Section 1981 and 1983 as

against the Governor, DMV Commissioner, and Ms. Turner in their official capacities, see

Compl. at 11–12; Resp. at 7, 9, 11, as the Court describes infra, must also fail. See Duplan v.

City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 620-21 (2d Cir. 2018) (explaining that Section 1981 “does not

provide a separate private right of action against state actors.”); Stephens v. New York State

D.O.C.C.S., No. 25-CV-0473, 2025 WL 2377136, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May 29, 2025) (“To the

extent that plaintiff seeks monetary damages for his § 1983 claims against [State

instrumentalities] or defendants in their official capacity, those claims are dismissed.”) (citing

Richardson v. Nassau Cty., 277 F. Supp. 2d 196, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).

official capacity.” Compl. at 15. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), is indeed a “‘well-known

exception’ to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Clark, 847 F. App’x at 94. The exception allows

for “prospective injunctive relief against state officers sued in their official capacity.” Id. (citing

Vega v. Semple, 963 F.3d 259, 281 (2d Cir. 2020)).

However, Plaintiff’s invocation of Ex Parte Young is patently erroneous. Ex Parte Young

only allows for prospective relief against state officials, not state agencies. See Silva v. Farrish,

47 F.4th 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2022). Therefore, the limited exception the Supreme Court recognized in

Ex Parte Young is inapplicable as against both the DMV and New York State. See Clark, 847 F.

App’x at 93–94. And to the extent Plaintiff identifies “prospective injunctive relief” 4 against the

DMV’s Commissioner, Governor Hochul, or Ms. Turner, any argument for future relief would

fail because Plaintiff lacks the standing to do so. See Cozayatl Sampedro v. Schriro, 377 F. Supp.

3d 133, 145 (D. Conn. 2019) (“To have standing to seek an injunction, Mr. Sampedro ‘must

assert a likelihood that [he] will be subjected to a similar [constitutional] violation in the

future.’”) (citations omitted). Plaintiff is neither employed by the DMV, nor does she seek

reinstatement, and thus lacks standing to seek such relief. Compare Compl. at 11, 13 with

Cassells v. Univ. Hosp. at Stony Brook, No. 86-CV-698, 1987 WL 3717, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.

12, 1987) (“[P]laintiff, as a former employee, can no longer benefit from any prospective

injunctive relief the court might grant, and thus she does not have standing.”) (citing Simon v.

4 The Complaint seeks, inter alia, “[a]n order requiring the EEOC and other relevant

governmental entities to reform their processes to ensure adequate protection for individuals who

experience discrimination and retaliation.” Compl. at 23. The EEOC is not a Defendant in this

case and it is unclear who the other “relevant governmental entities” are that Plaintiff is referring

to. See id. The Court lacks the power to compel a nonparty to a suit to take action. Moody v. U.S.

Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, No. 24-CV-3320, 2025 WL 2549074, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,

2025) see also United States v. Paccione, 964 F.2d 1269, 1275 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] court

generally may not issue an order against a nonparty.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).

Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976)). Accordingly, because

Plaintiff lacks standing, any claims she has for prospective injunctive relief are also dismissed

with prejudice.

In sum, Plaintiff’s claims for damages and any claims for prospective injunctive relief

against New York State, the DMV, and the individual Defendants in their official capacity, are

barred on sovereign immunity grounds and dismissed with prejudice.

2. Personal Involvement

Further, Defendants argue that any Section 1981 or 1983 claims must be dismissed

against Governor Hochul and the DMV Commissioner for lack of personal involvement. See

Mot. at 28.

“An individual may be held liable under §§ 1981 and 1983 only if that individual is

‘personally involved in the alleged deprivation.’” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297,

314 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107,

127 (2d Cir. 2004) (for Section 1983 claims)); Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229

(2d Cir.2004) (for Section 1981 claims). A plaintiff can establish personal involvement by

demonstrating either that:

(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being

informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a

policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy

or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful

acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference . . . by failing to act on information indicating that

unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 314 (citing Back, 365 F.3d at 127).

The Court notes that it is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to sue the individual Defendants

in their individual capacity or their official capacity. In the Complaint, Plaintiff appears to sue

the Governor and DMV Commissioner in their official capacities only, while she sues Ms.

Turner in both her individual and official capacity. See Compl. at 2–3. In her Response however,

Plaintiff seems to amend her allegations to include a suit against the Governor and the DMV

Commissioner in their individual capacities as well. See Resp. at 1, 6, 9, 13; Dkt. No. 31-1 at 2.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s pro se status, and the special solicitude owed to pro se litigants in this

Circuit and because “individual-and official-capacity claims are not mutually exclusive,”

Rodriguez v. City of Rochester, 624 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2015), the Court will assume

Plaintiff intended to sue the Governor and the DMV commissioner in their individual capacities

as well.5

Plaintiff fails to allege any plausible theory that either the Governor or the DMV

Commissioner were personally involved in the actions alleged in the Complaint. See generally

Compl. Instead, the Complaint merely cites the state officials in the case caption, and as parties

to the Complaint, but is otherwise bereft of the “tangible connection” the law requires to

establish liability for even supervisory officials. See Burrell v. DOCCS, 655 F. Supp. 3d 112, 124

(N.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986); Tangreti v.

Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020)). “[A] plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each

Government-official defendant, [including supervisors,] through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.’” Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

676).

5 While the Court gives Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt regarding the status of her suit against

the individual Defendants in their official and individual capacities, the Court will not entertain

the wholly new motions for inquest, or new allegations regarding, inter alia,

“Cyberstalking/Surveillance/[and] Data trafficking.” See, e.g. Resp. at 9–11; Reply at 8–9. “[A]

plaintiff[, even appearing pro se,] may not allege new facts and legal claims in opposition to a

motion to dismiss.” Helwing v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-3764, 2021 WL 781794, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021), aff'd sub nom. Helwing v. Pszeniczny, No. 21-843, 2022 WL 610341

(2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2022) (citing Wright v. Ernst Young LLP, 152 F. 3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Governor and the DMV Commissioner are

dismissed for lack of personal involvement. See Cipriani v. Buffardi, No. 06-CV-889, 2007 WL

607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (“Dismissal is appropriate where a defendant is listed in

the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate what the defendant did to the

plaintiff.”).6

3. Title VII

Plaintiff brings Title VII retaliation, hostile work environment, and discrimination claims

against New York State, the DMV, and the individual Defendants in their official and personal

capacities. Compl. at 9, 12. Defendants aver, inter alia, that this Court has cannot hear Plaintiff’s

Title VII claims because she has not received a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC and therefore

her claims should be dismissed. See Mot. at 11–13. Defendants further aver that by Plaintiff’s

failing to rebut these arguments, they are entitled to dismissal of her original claims. Reply at 3–

4 (citing Lopez v. Wright, 2007 WL 388919 *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)).

After carefully considering the matter, the Court agrees with Defendants on this latter

point. “Plaintiff had due notice of [her] duty to oppose such legal arguments if [s]he wished them

to be considered by the Court as challenged.” Johnson v. Lew, No. 13-CV-1072, 2015 WL

4496363, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015); see also Dkt. No. 3; NDNY L.R. 7.1(b)(3). “In this

District, when a non-movant willfully fails to oppose a legal argument asserted by a movant, the

movant’s burden with regard to that argument is lightened, such that, in order to succeed on that

argument, the movant need only show that the argument possess facial merit.” Id. This burden is

a “modest” one. Id. “Here, the Court finds that Defendants have, at the very least, met this

6 The Court notes this also applies to Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe Union and/or Insurance

company Defendants. The Complaint is devoid of any facts as to these Defendants and thus they

are subject to dismissal.

lightened burden with regard to these arguments.” Id. However, the Court will make three

observations:

a. Failure to Exhaust

The Court agrees with Defendants that this Court cannot hear Plaintiff’s Title VII claims

without a “Right to Sue” letter from the EEOC. 42 USC § 2000e-5. “There are two prerequisites

for filing a Title VII action in federal court; plaintiff must (1) file a timely charge of employment

discrimination with the EEOC and (2) receive a notice of the right-to-sue letter.” Coleman v.

Board of Educ., No. 96-CV-4293, 2002 WL 63555, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2002). Plaintiff has

not alleged that she has fulfilled either requirement here, and therefore these claims are subject to

dismissal for failure to exhaust pursuant to 42 USC § 2000e—5.

b. Liability under Title VII

Moreover, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims as against the individual Defendants and New York

State cannot survive. As to the former, Title VII does not provide for individual liability, and

therefore any of Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants cannot survive. Smith v.

New York City Hous. Auth., No. 25-CV-283, 2025 WL 1031063, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2025)

(“Title VII does not provide for individual liability; rather, only the employer may be named.”)

(citing Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004). As to the latter, Plaintiff

has not alleged that New York State is her employer in any meaningful sense, and so “Plaintiff’s

Title VII claim must be dismissed against the State of New York.” Trostle v. State of New York,

No. 13-CV-0709, 2016 WL 1175215, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2016) (collecting cases); La

Martina v. Fischer, No. 12-CV-308, 2013 WL 1682603, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 12-CV-308, 2013 WL 1681492 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013)

(“[C]ases decided within the Second Circuit have held that the State is not a proper defendant in

Title VII actions brought by employees of various other state agencies.”).

c. Failure to State a Claim Against the DMV

Had Plaintiff properly exhausted her claims, her Complaint as it stands still fails to

plausibly allege a theory of retaliation, hostile work environment, or discrimination under Title

VII against the DMV. Plaintiff alleges she was retaliated against for expressing her “personal

experiences in writing, dealing with issues of racial discrimination, identity, and self-

expression,” Compl. at 5, but does not explain the nature of the protected nature of these

writings, or any cognizable adverse employment action taken because of that activity. Terry v.

Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (detailing cognizable adverse employment actions,

including “termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary,

[or] a less distinguished title . . . .” ). Marshall v. Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers Br. 36, No. 00-

CIV-3167, 2003 WL 223563, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (dismissing a complaint because it

“fail[ed] to connect the alleged retaliation to any activity directed at the enforcement of rights

protected by Title VII.”).

Further, Plaintiff alleges that she felt “discriminated against due to racial biases,” targeted

for her expression, heard someone say she “would be fired soon,” that her colleagues suggested

she “was a racist without justification,” and that she was subject to verbal abuse by her

supervisor. Compl. at 6, 9–10. But again, states no facts to support a claim against the DMV for

a hostile work environment leaving the claim subject to dismissal. Boza-Meade v. Rochester

Hous. Auth., 170 F. Supp. 3d 535, 547 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing a hostile work environment

claim where plaintiff made “vague allegations that co-workers made fun of her . . ., with no

additional supporting factual information as to the context and frequency of this conduct.”);

Nugent v. St. Lukes-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 303 F. App’x 943, 945 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing a

hostile work environment claim because “derogatory language,” “dismissive comments by

management,” and “intense scrutiny” of an employee are “insufficiently severe and pervasive” to

state a claim for relief); see also Alvarado v. Mount Pleasant Cottage Sch. Dist., 404 F. Supp. 3d

763, 781–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining that Title VII “does ‘not prohibit employers from

maintaining nasty, unpleasant workplaces, or even ones that are unpleasant for reasons that are

due to the protected characteristic.’”) (quoting Carrington v. Mota, 16-CV-8061, 2017 WL

3835883, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017)).

Finally, any racial discrimination claims under Title VII that Plaintiff may be alleging,

Compl. at 5–7. 9–10, must fail because she provides no facts to infer discriminatory intent on

behalf of her employer. Oliver Cyrus v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 22-CV-4115, 2025 WL

964016, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025), reconsideration denied sub nom. Cyrus v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., No. 22-CV-4115, 2025 WL 1638056 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2025) (dismissing a racial

discrimination claim under Title VII because “[t]he plaintiff does not allege that any defendant

referred to her race, criticized her work ‘in ethnically degrading terms,’ or made ‘invidious

comments about others in the employee’s protected group.’”) (citing Tieu v. New York City

Econ. Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 3d 305, 321–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)).

4. ADA

Plaintiff brings discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims under the

ADA against all Defendants for the actions alleged in the Complaint. Compl. at 9–15. To the

extent she alleges ADA discrimination and retaliation claims, they rely on largely the same

theory as her Title VII claims against the DMV. Id. at 6–7, 9–15. As to her failure to

accommodate claims, she brings these on behalf of herself and her disabled son. Id. at 12, 14–15.

But, as Defendants correctly note, Plaintiff’s employment discrimination and retaliation ADA

claims cannot proceed against New York State, the DMV, or any of the individual Defendants.

See Mot. at 29–30; Yerdon v. Poitras, 120 F.4th 1150, 1153–55 (2d Cir. 2024) (explaining that

ADA claims brought under either Title I or Title V are barred against the DMV and state

officials acting in their official capacity); id. at 1155–57 (explaining that “neither Title I nor Title

V of the ADA permits claims against individual[s]”). Thus, the only remaining claim would be

Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. But this too must fail because Plaintiff has simply

alleged no facts to support it.

a. Failure to Accommodate Plaintiff’s Disability

Defendants aver that Plaintiff cannot establish she was disabled as defined by the ADA.

See Mot. at 31.

“To establish a prima facie [failure to accommodate] case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that: (1) [her] employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [s]he was disabled within

the meaning of the ADA; (3) [s]he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with

or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) . . . [her] employer refused to make a reasonable

accommodation.”

Tudor v. Whitehall Cent. Sch. Dist., 132 F.4th 242, 246 (2d Cir. 2025) (emphasis omitted) (quoting

Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam)).

After carefully reviewing the Complaint, the Court agrees with Defendants that it is

“devoid of any allegation that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Mot. at 31.

Plaintiff does not explain her specific disability, how it qualifies as a disability within the ADA.

or describe the “reasonable accommodations” she sought for herself. See generally Compl.

Rather, Plaintiff merely describes herself as a “disabled individual.” See, e.g., id. at 16; Resp. at

11 (“I am not just any citizen: I am a disabled professional leader.”) (emphasis in original).

These statements are conclusory and thus do not state a claim for relief, let alone a plausible one.

Tillman v. New York City Dep’t of Hum. Res. Admin., No. 22-872-CV, 2023 WL 2770218, at *2

(2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2023).

b. Plaintiff’s Associational Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff also alleges the Defendants failed to accommodate her “reasonable

accommodations to attend necessary meetings regarding [her] child’s education.” Compl. at 14–

15. Defendants aver this fails to state a disability discrimination claim under the ADA. See Mot.

at 31. The Court agrees.

To state a claim for associational discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege:

“1) that she was qualified for the job at the time of an adverse employment action; 2) that she was subjected

to adverse employment action; 3) that she was known at the time to have a relative or associate with a

disability; and 4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable

inference that the disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the employer’s

decision.”

Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any elements of an associational discrimination

claim. Specifically, as described supra Part IV (A)(3)(c), Plaintiff does not describe any adverse

employment action taken against her, or moreover, that anyone’s disability was the reason for

that action, see generally Compl. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed.

5. Section 1981

Plaintiff brings a Section 1981 damages claim against all Defendants for “subjecting

Plaintiff to discriminatory actions and harassment based on race and disability.” Compl. at 11–

12. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims should be dismissed because, inter

alia, Section 1983 provides the constitutional remedy she seeks. Mot. at 22–26. The Court

agrees.

In Duplan, the Second Circuit held that Section 1981 claims against state actors are

barred because “[Section] 1983 already provides a remedy against state actors.” Duplan, 888

F.3d 612, 620–21 (2d Cir. 2018). Thus, a Section 1981 claim against New York State, the DMV,

and the individual Defendants (in either their individual or official capacities) “would not be the

appropriate vehicle for suit, and such claims must be dismissed.” Perry v. Clement, No. 23-CV-

1573, 2025 WL 2592189, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2025); see also Jett v. Dallas Independent

School District, 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989) (explaining that “the express cause of action for

damages created by [Section] 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the

rights guaranteed in [Section] 1981 by state governmental units.”); Gonzalez v. City of New York,

377 F. Supp. 3d 273, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The Supreme Court’s holding in Jett has been

interpreted to encompass not only governmental entities, but also individuals sued in their

individual capacities who are also state actors.”).7

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims as

Section 1983 claims against all Defendants. In re New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 15-CV-

7150, 2019 WL 1433163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (“Following the Second Circuit’s

approach in Duplan, the Court will construe the [Section] 1981 claims as causes of action

brought under [Section] 1983.”) (collecting cases).

6. Section 1983

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims because they are either

barred by sovereign immunity or otherwise fail to state a claim. Mot. at 26–29.

7 Plaintiff’s claim against the DMV here specifically fails because the Defendant is a state

agency. Feingold, 366 F.3d at 149.

The Court observes it might be helpful to identify which of the Defendants is subject to

liability under Section 1983 given the procedural bars to Plaintiff’s claims. First, any Section

1983 claims against New York State, the DMV, or any of the Defendants in their official

capacity must fail because they are clearly barred by sovereign immunity. See supra Part

IV(A)(1). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot seek prospective injunctive relief because she no longer

works at the DMV, nor does she seek reinstatement. Id. Finally, based on the analysis supra Part

IV(A)(2), Plaintiff’s Complaint is currently devoid of any facts which allege that either the

Governor or the DMV Commissioner were personally involved in her alleged constitutional

violation. Thus, the only viable Defendant to whom a Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims might

apply is Ms. Turner. But those too must fail.

a. First Amendment Claim

Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations raise a First Amendment retaliation claim

against Ms. Turner. Compl. at 8.

“The speech of a public employee is protected by the First Amendment when the

employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, rather than pursuant to his

employment responsibilities.” Specht v. City of New York, 15 F.4th 594, 600 (2d Cir. 2021)

(citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006)). To state a claim for relief, a Plaintiff

must allege that they have (1) “engaged in protected First Amendment activity; (2) . . . suffered

an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action.” Smith v. County of Suffolk, 776 F.3d 114, 118 (2d

Cir. 2015). “Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as

relating to matters of political, social, or general interest to the community or value and concern

to the public.” Specht v. City of New York, 15 F.4th 594, 600 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Snyder v.

Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011)). Courts “consider the motive of the speaker, cognizant that

‘speech on a purely private matter does not pertain to a matter of public concern’ and,

conversely, that an individual motivated by a personal grievance can simultaneously speak on a

matter affecting the public at large.” Golodner v. Berliner, 770 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2014)

(cleaned up).

Defendants aver Plaintiff’s claim fails because she has not alleged that her speech was a

matter of public concern or that an adverse employment action was taken against Plaintiff by Ms.

Turner. Mot. at 32–34. Defendants further aver that by failing to rebut these arguments, Plaintiff

waives her original claims. Reply at 7 (citing Lopez, 2007 WL 388919 *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)).

After carefully considering the matter, the Court agrees with Defendants on this point,

and for the same reasons set out supra Part IV (A)(3), the Court finds that Defendants have met

their burden with regard to these arguments. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is

dismissed.

b. Equal Protection Claims

Plaintiff also alleges Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims against Ms. Turner

for, inter alia, “racial discrimination or creating a hostile work environment based on race,

ethnicity, or other protected characteristics.” Compl. at 9. Defendants, in turn, argue that

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims against Ms. Turner (the facts of which are nearly identical to

her Title VII claims) must fail because, among other things, they are premised on the same

actions underlying her Title VII claims. See Mot. at 28–29 (citing McBeth v. City of New York,

No. 23-CV-10389, 2025 WL 951439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025)); supra Part IV (A)(3).

Moreover, in their Reply, they aver that Plaintiff has not “address[ed] the validity of this claim”

in her Response. Reply at 6.

Upon reviewing Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion, and carefully considering the matter,

the Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to oppose Defendants’ argument for dismissal on her

Equal Protection claims. See generally Resp.; Dkt. No 31-4. Although the Court did not reach

the merits of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims due to a jurisdictional defect, the Court explained supra

Part IV (A)(3)(c) that those claims would fail in any event because the Complaint alleges only

conclusory allegations. Here, Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claims rely on the same facts and suffer

the same pleading deficiencies. The Response does nothing to dispute Defendants’ arguments

that the Complaint fails to plausibly allege facts that show “discrimination, hostile work

environment [or] retaliation” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Mot. at 15–22, 28–29;

Reply at 6. Instead, Plaintiff’s Response merely restates the same conclusory allegations against

Ms. Turner that Plaintiff made in her Complaint – i.e., that Ms. Turner’s “conduct contributed

to a hostile work environment and violated Plaintiff's rights under the ADA” and that her

“allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal at the pleading stage.” Compare Dkt. No. 31-4 at

3 (emphasis in original and citations omitted) with Compl. at 5–10.

Given the overlap in Defendants’ arguments against Plaintiff’s Title VII and Equal

Protection claims, the fact that they remain unrebutted in Plaintiff’s Response, and that they are

indeed meritorious, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim for the same reasons

laid out above. Supra Part IV (A)(3)(c); Johnson, 2015 WL 4496363, at *5.

B. State Law Claims

Given that the bases for this Court’s federal question jurisdiction have been disposed of,

the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over [pendent state law claims] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction”); McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 158 n.6

(2d Cir. 2017) (“[A] district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state

and local law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).

Accordingly, any state law claims Plaintiff wishes to bring against Defendants are

dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.8 However, because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and the Court cannot say at this

time that amendment would be futile as to certain claims, limited leave to amend is appropriate,

so long as it is consistent with the case law outlined in this Memorandum-Decision and Order.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No, 28, is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice, as

to: 1) any claims for damages against New York State, Governor Hochul, in her official capacity,

Katrina Turner, in her official capacity, and the DMV Commissioner, in their official capacity;

2) any Title VII claims against New York State or the individual Defendants; 3) any ADA

discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims against New York State and the

individual Defendants; 5) any claims brought under Section 1981; and 6) any Section 1983

8 The Court acknowledges that Defendants’ Motion sought dismissal against Governor Hochul,

and Ms. Turner for insufficient service of process. Given the Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s

claims on other grounds, the Court need not consider this argument. Moreover, because the

Complaint is dismissed, the Court will not entertain Plaintiff’s request to change venue.

claims brought against New York State or any of the individual Defendants in their official

capacities; and it is further

ORDERED, that the remaining balance of Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without

prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process as to

Governor Hochul and Katrina Turner, Dkt. No, 28, is DENIED as moot; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend within forty-five (45) days of the

filing date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order, solely to attempt to cure the deficiencies

identified herein with respect to: 1) her Title VII claim against the DMV, provided she can allege

exhaustion of administrative remedies and sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for

relief; 2) her ADA reasonable-accommodation claims on behalf of her and her son, provided she

can allege facts showing that: a) she is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning

of the ADA and that she sought and was denied a reasonable accommodation; and/or b) that she

sought a reasonable accommodation on behalf of her disabled son and was denied; 3) her Section

1983 claims against Ms. Turner in her individual capacity, provided she can allege specific facts

showing that Ms. Turner personally participated in conduct violating a clearly established

constitutional right; and 4) her state law claims, assuming Plaintiff adequately pleads the

aforementioned federal claims; and it is further

ORDERED, that if Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within forty-five (45)

days of the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Clerk shall enter judgment

dismissing this action with prejudice without further order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all

parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2026

Albany, New York

AWRENCE E. KAHN

United States District Judge

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