Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NEW BEGINNING SANCTUARY, )

A MISSOURI NOT- )

FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION, )

JAAM PROPERTIES LLC, )

A MISSOURI LIMITED LIABILITY )

COMPANY, and )

ALON FISCH, AN INDIVIDUAL, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 6:23-cv-03336-MDH

)

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI, )

A MISSOURI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude or Limit the Testimony of Defendant’s

expert witnesses Stephen D. Villavaso, Andreas Stevens, and Dr. John Majer. (Doc. 56). The

motion is ripe for review.

BACKGROUND

This case involves the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”). Defendant, the City of Springfield, prohibited Plaintiffs from operating a home for

residents in recovery from drug or alcohol addiction. Defendants claimed its zoning ordinance

prohibited the home from operating in an R-SF Zone because it is a "group home" under the City's

zoning code and there is another “group home” located within ¼ mile. The City classified the

home as a group home because the residents who occupy the home are in recovery from drug and

alcohol abuse. The City denied Plaintiffs' request for a reasonable accommodation under the FHA

and ADA.

To establish discrimination under either the FHA or the ADA, plaintiffs may proceed under

any or all of three theories: intentional discrimination (disparate treatment), disparate impact, and

failure to make a reasonable accommodation. One Love Hous., LLC v. City of Anoka, Minnesota,

93 F.4th 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 573

(2d Cir. 2003)). See also Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010). Due to the

similarities between the FHA and the ADA, the Court will interpret them as one. Id.

Plaintiff brings four claims under the ADA and the FHA; Count I: FHA – Failure to

Accommodate, Count II: FHA – Disparate Treatment, Count III: FHA – Disparate Impact, and

Count IV: ADA. Thus, the claims considered in this case will be Failure to Accommodate,

Disparate Treatment, and Disparate Impact.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard to admit expert testimony is stated in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as

amended in 2000 to conform with Daubert v. Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 479

(1993). The Rule states:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the

case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. “The proponent of the expert testimony must prove its admissibility by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Lauzon v. Senco Products, Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir.

2001).

DISCUSSION

Daubert and F.R.E. 702

Defendant argues that the experts’ opinions are not based on reliable methodology, are not

supported by sufficient facts or data, and are based upon theories that have not been tested.

Defendant challenges several opinions provided by the experts based on these arguments.

Plaintiffs have responded stating all are qualified experts and Defendant’s arguments challenge

the weight and credibility of their opinions, but do not warrant exclusion under Daubert.

Stephen D. Villavaso is an expert in professional and urban planning, who offers opinions

on municipal zoning practices, the City’s application of its ordinances, and the compatibility of

the spacing requirements with accepted planning principles and DOJ/HUD guidance. (Doc. 56-1,

Villavaso’s Report). Andrea Stevens is a licensed real estate professional, who analyzes residential

housing market conditions in Springfield, including the availability of suitable properties during

the relevant timeframe. (Doc. 56-2, Stevens’s Report). Dr. John Majer is an expert in the operation

of residential recovery housing, who provides insight into the therapeutic and operational

requirements of recovery homes, as well as the practical implications of spacing requirements on

their viability. (See Doc. 56-3, Majer’s Report).

This Court agrees that the arguments raised by Defendant’s motion go to credibility and

the weight of the testimony which are subjects that may be raised during cross-examination. The

parties will have the opportunity to present evidence of their positions based on the evidence,

testimony, and cross-examination of witnesses during trial. The Court will make any further

rulings regarding specific objections to testimony as the evidence is presented at trial. However,

the Court finds Plaintiffs’ experts may be relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and finds no basis to

exclude them under Daubert.

One Love Housing, LLC v. City of Anoka, Minnesota

Defendant further argues that One Love Housing v. City of Anoka, Minnesota, 93 F.4th

424, 431-32 (2024) provides for the exclusion of the expert reports.

In considering reasonable accommodation claims, federal courts should limit their review

to the materials that were presented to the local land use board, except in circumstances where the

board prevents applicants from presenting sufficient information. One Love Housing v. City of

Anoka, Minnesota, 93 F.4th 424, 431-32 (2024). This general rule however, does not apply to

disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimination claims. One Love Hous., 93 F.4th 424, 431

n.4 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 467

n.10 (3d Cir. 2002). The court in Lapid-Laurel reasoned that:

We hold that reviewing courts should limit their review to the administrative

record only on reasonable accommodations claims. It was proper for the

District Court to allow the plaintiffs to rely on materials from outside the

administrative record to support their disparate impact claims. It makes sense

that a plaintiff would need broader discovery and more latitude on the

evidence that he or she is allowed to present in a disparate impact claim than

in a failure to make reasonable accommodations claim. The first involves

demonstrating a discriminatory pattern resulting from the impact of the

municipality's decisions, whereas the latter turns only on information

regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the proposed accommodation,

all of which can be presented to a local land use board in the first instance.

Furthermore, this distinction is consistent with the approach of other courts

that have addressed the proper scope of materials reviewed under FHAA

reasonable accommodations and disparate impact claims.

Lapid-Laurel at 467 n.10 (citing United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1233 n. 3 (7th

Cir.1994)).

Defendant argues the proffered expert testimony should also be excluded because it was

not presented to the City as part of Plaintiffs’ request for accommodation under One Love Housing.

Plaintiffs argue the One Love Housing exclusion does not apply because the City did not provide

Plaintiffs with a meaningful opportunity to present their evidence.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs were not prevented from providing the information they now

seek to present. Plaintiffs were invited to resubmit their request to the proper individual, and asked

to address several issues, which they chose to ignore when making their resubmission. Therefore,

the One Love exclusion does apply in this case.

However, as the 8th Circuit noted in One Love, the exclusion applies only to reasonable

accommodation claims, not disparate impact or disparate treatment claims. Thus, the expert reports

will be considered in the disparate impact and disparate treatment claims. The expert reports will

be excluded in the failure to accommodate claim.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ experts may be relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and at this time, there is no

basis to exclude them under Daubert. However, Plaintiffs’ expert testimony should be excluded in

the failure to accommodate claim under One Love Housing because it was not presented to the

City as part of Plaintiffs’ request for accommodation. Wherefore, for the reasons stated herein,

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2026

/s/ Douglas Harpool_______________

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE