Brady

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

ALEXANDER BRADY, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-1330

)

JEFFREY LOWER et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Motion for

Counsel (Doc. 4), and Motions for Status (Doc. 8) and Status Hearing (Doc. 10) filed by

Plaintiff Alexander Brady, a detainee at the Tazewell County Jail (“Jail”).

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon

review of the complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate and

construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th

Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must

Page 1 of 9

be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United

States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Facts Alleged

Plaintiff identifies the following Tazewell County Officials as Defendants: Sheriff

Jeffrey Lower, Captain Ryan Tarby, Jail Superintendent Mike Harper, Deputy Jail

Superintendent Dave Harper, Jail Operations Supervisor Aaron Hoffman, and Deputy

Sheriffs Brodie Oberle and Brandon Reese.

On March 8, 2025, Plaintiff was arrested and transported by Defendants Oberle

and Reese to a hospital for a mental health evaluation. At that time, Plaintiff was told that

his cell phone had been seized and would be searched after a warrant was issued. After

arriving at the hospital, Oberle and Reese conducted a warrantless search of Plaintiff’s

phone, claiming that Plaintiff had consented. Plaintiff states he has no memory of

consenting, given his mental state. (Pl. Compl., Doc 1 at 6-7.) During a “strip search” of

Plaintiff’s person by a female hospital staff member, Plaintiff informed Oberle and Reese

that he wanted to file a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint against them.

(Id. at 7.) Oberle and Reese left after Plaintiff “was released to the hospital for an

involuntary committal.” (Pl. Exh., Doc. 1-1 at 9.)

On April 1, 2025, Defendant Reese arrested Plaintiff at the Tazewell County

Courthouse and transported him to the Jail. Plaintiff claims that Reese failed to restrain

Plaintiff using seat belts and refused to allow Plaintiff to file a complaint against Reese.

(Pl. Compl., Doc 1 at 8.) At the Jail, a corrections officer informed Defendant Hoffman

Page 2 of 9

that Plaintiff wanted to file a PREA complaint. In preparation for Plaintiff’s PREA

interview, Hoffman restrained Plaintiff using a waist chain and ankle shackles over

Plaintiff’s objections “due to [Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)]

accommodations” (Id.)

Upon arriving at the interview room, Defendant Hoffman refused Plaintiff’s

request for a witness to be present and terminated the interview. Plaintiff notes Hoffman

spoke with Defendant D. Harper about Plaintiff’s PREA interview, and D. Harper then

spoke to Defendant M. Harper, who stated he would notify Defendant Tarby. Plaintiff

acknowledges that on June 17, 2025, Harper interviewed Plaintiff about his PREA

concerns, and on July 8, 2025, Tarby determined Plaintiff’s PREA complaint was

unfounded. (Id., Pl. Exh., Doc. 1-1 at 8-9.)

C. Analysis

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held as follows:

[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (footnote omitted).

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Thus, under Heck, a § 1983 damages claim does not accrue if

a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on that claim “would necessarily imply the invalidity of

[the plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487.

Page 3 of 9

However, “any § 1983 claim for damages resulting from a false arrest is not barred

by Heck and accrues immediately after the arrest, because such alleged violations of the

Fourth Amendment would not necessarily impugn the validity of a conviction.”

Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enf’t Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh

Circuit has “applied this principle categorically to all § 1983 claims for false arrest, ruling

that ‘Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful searches or arrests do not necessarily imply

a conviction is invalid, so in all cases these claims can go forward.’” Id. (quoting Copus v.

City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 1998)).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim

against Defendants Oberle and Reese. However, Plaintiff’s account is insufficient to state

a claim against the remaining Defendants.

Plaintiff asserts Defendant Reese failed to restrain Plaintiff with seat belts, but this

assertion does not state a constitutional violation. Neither the Supreme Court nor the

Seventh Circuit has held that transporting an inmate without a seat belt creates an

intolerable risk of harm. See Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming

the district court conclusion on summary judgment for the defendant with respect to the

claim that the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s safety by

failing to confine him more securely in the police car); see also Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d

54, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2012) (“hold[ing] that the failure of prison officials to provide inmates

with seatbelts does not, without more, violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments”).

Page 4 of 9

“The primary mandate of Title II [of the ADA] is that ‘no qualified individual with

a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.’” Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847, 852

(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151,

157 (2006) (“[T]he phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ in § 12132 includes

recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison programs.”)

A Rehabilitation Act claim is functionally identical to an ADA claim. See Amundson

v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 721 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the

Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are substantively identical and that, because the

Rehabilitation Act affords plaintiffs any relief to which they may be entitled, claims under

the ADA become academic).

“[T]he analysis governing each statute is the same except that the Rehabilitation

Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept

for their prisons.” Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012). “As a practical

matter, then, [courts] may dispense with the ADA and the thorny question of sovereign

immunity, since [a plaintiff] can have but one recovery.” Id. at 672. “Illinois has waived

its immunity from suits for damages under the Rehabilitation Act as a condition of its

receipt of federal funds.” Id. 672 n.5.

However, “the Illinois Department of Corrections [or other relevant state agency]

is the proper defendant for this claim because there is no individual liability under the

Page 5 of 9

Rehabilitation Act.” Wilson v. Sood, 727 F. App’x 220, 223 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Stanek v.

St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also Silk v.

City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding no individual liability under

the ADA and explaining the Rehabilitation Act is nearly identical).

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant Hoffman violated the ADA by restraining him

with a waist chain and ankle shackles over Plaintiff’s objections is insufficient to state a

claim. Plaintiff also does not state a claim against Defendants under the PREA because

the Act does not create a private cause of action. See Ross v. Gossett, 2016 WL 335991, at *4

(S.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2016) (The PREA “does not create a private cause of action” but instead

“establishes finding of facts, sets forth statistics, recites research, adopts standards, and

provides for grant money”) (collecting cases); Krieg v. Steele, 599 F. App’x. 231 (5th Cir.

2015) (PREA does not create a private cause of action).

II. Remaining Motions

Plaintiff also moves to recruit counsel. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to

counsel, and the Court cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in

civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County

of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that although indigent civil litigants

have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request

counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances). In considering

Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent

plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from

Page 6 of 9

doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent

to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is denied because he has not satisfied his

threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically

requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 8) and Motion for Status Hearing (Doc. 10) are

moot with the entry of the Court’s Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Doc. 8) and Motion for Status Hearing (Doc. 10)

are MOOT.

3) According to the Court’s Merit Review of Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to proceed with a Fourth Amendment

unlawful search claim against Defendants Oberle and Reese. Plaintiff’s claim

against Defendants proceeds in their individual capacity only. Additional claims

shall not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a

party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to terminate Jeffrey Lower, Ryan

Tarby, Mike Harper, Dave Harper, and Aaron Hoffman as Defendants.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait

until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise

directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a

waiver of service. Defendants have sixty days from service to file an Answer. If

Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety

days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status

Page 7 of 9

of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order

setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall

submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, said

Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained

only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed

by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends

the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent

pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an

answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits

of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no

response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents

that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does

not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses

are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests

and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses

sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the

subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’

counsel files an appearance and the Court enters a scheduling order, which will

explain the discovery process in more detail.

10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of

a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this

lawsuit with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

Page 8 of 9

formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will

require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED January 22, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 9 of 9