The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
NEKEYIA WILLIAMS, January 15, 2026
10:24 AM
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 371788
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 20-001601-NI
CHRISTINE ANTOINETTE KELLY and CITY OF
DETROIT,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY, MICHIGAN
ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, also known as
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
PLACEMENT FACILITY, and JOHN DOE
INSURER,
Defendants.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and GARRETT and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this negligence action, plaintiff, Nekeyia Williams, appeals by delayed leave granted1
the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants,2 the city of Detroit (the
1
Williams v Kelly, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 26, 2024 (Docket
No. 371788).
2
Our reference to “defendants” refers to Kelly and the City only because the remaining defendants
are not parties to this appeal.
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City) and Christine Antoinette Kelly, under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity granted by law) and
(C)(8) (failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted). We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As stated in this Court’s previous opinion in this case, Williams was injured when Kelly,
who was driving the City’s bus in the course of her employment, sideswiped a parked car in which
Williams was a passenger. Williams v Kelly, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued October 13, 2022 (Docket No. 357934), p 1, vacated in part 511 Mich 909 (2023).
Williams filed this action against defendants, alleging that they were liable for her injuries.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), arguing
that governmental immunity precluded their liability. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning
that Williams could not establish that Kelly was grossly negligent, and, as such, Williams could
not establish the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity. Id. at 2.
Williams appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. Although we concluded that the
trial court erred by applying the gross-negligence standard when considering the City’s liability,
we affirmed the court’s decision granting summary disposition for the City on the basis that
Williams failed to allege a claim against the City that fit within an exception to governmental
immunity. We recognized that Williams’s claims alleging owner’s liability, respondeat superior,
and negligent hiring and retention were not statutory exceptions to governmental immunity and
that Williams failed to allege that the City was exempt from governmental immunity under the
motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, or any other exception to governmental immunity. Id.
at 3. Regarding Kelly, we noted that MCL 691.1407(2) grants immunity to governmental
employees but that MCL 691.1407(2)(c) provides an exception to that immunity if the employee
acts with gross negligence. Because the record contains no evidence suggesting that Kelly acted
with gross negligence, we affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary disposition in
Kelly’s favor under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Id. at 4.
Williams appealed to our Supreme Court, which vacated the portion of our opinion
pertaining to the City. The Court stated, in relevant part:
Although the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Wayne Circuit Court erred
by applying the gross negligence standard, we REMAND this case to the Wayne
Circuit Court to determine whether the plaintiff should be permitted to amend her
complaint to more clearly plead that defendant City of Detroit is exempt from
governmental immunity under the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, or any
other exception. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are
not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this
Court. [Williams v Kelly, 511 Mich 909 (2023) (emphasis added).]
On remand, the trial court allowed Williams to amend her complaint to plead that the City was
exempt from governmental immunity under MCL 691.1405. Williams filed a second amended
complaint alleging negligence (count I) and gross negligence (count II) against Kelly. Against the
City, Williams alleged owner’s liability (count III), negligent hiring and retention (count IV), and
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respondeat superior (count V). Notably, Williams’s second amended complaint alleged the same
counts against defendants, with the addition of three references to MCL 691.1405.
Defendants again moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8),
arguing that counts I and II should be dismissed under the law-of-the-case doctrine because this
Court affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary disposition for Kelly on the basis that
she was not grossly negligent. Defendants further argued that the City was entitled to summary
disposition under the law-of-the-case doctrine because Williams’s second amended complaint
restated the same theories of liability against the City—owner’s liability, negligent hiring and
retention, and respondeat superior—which were not statutory exceptions to governmental
immunity as stated in our prior opinion.
In response to defendants’ motion, Williams asserted that she pleaded in avoidance of
governmental immunity under MCL 691.1405 by including references to MCL 691.1405 in her
second amended complaint. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, stating as follows:
Indeed, Plaintiff’s response ignores the law of the case doctrine when it
outlines or when it re-files the same or similar claims . . . that were dismissed by
this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Inserting random
references to the Motor Vehicle Exception Statute does not transform inapplicable
claims into valid motor vehicle exception claims. You have to have more than
that . . . . [T]he Court finds that the City of Detroit and Christine Kelly were
entitled to summary disposition under (C)(7) and (C)(8) for Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint based upon the law of the case doctrine
and Plaintiff’s failure to plead an exception to governmental immunity.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo motions for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7).” Regan v Washtenaw Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 249 Mich App 153, 157; 641 NW2d
285 (2002). “De novo review means that we review the legal issue independently and without
deference to the trial court.” Wilcox v Wheatley, 342 Mich App 551, 556; 995 NW2d 594 (2022).
“Summary disposition is proper when a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law.”
Regan, 249 Mich App at 157. “To survive a motion for summary disposition based on
governmental immunity, the plaintiff must allege facts giving rise to an exception to governmental
immunity.” Id. “This Court considers all documentary evidence submitted by the parties,
accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents
specifically contradict them.” Id.
In addition, “[a] motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based
on the factual allegations in the complaint.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152,
159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (emphasis omitted). “When considering such a motion, a trial court
must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” Id. at 160.
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“A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable
that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id.
B. MCL 691.1405
The trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8) because Williams’s second amended complaint, when read as a whole, was
sufficient to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity under MCL 691.1405.
The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., grants governmental
agencies broad immunity from tort liability when engaged in a governmental function. Mack v
Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 196; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). Specifically, MCL 691.1407(1) provides,
“Except as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if
the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” To
overcome governmental immunity and impose tort liability on a government agency, “[a] plaintiff
must plead their case in avoidance of immunity.” Mount Clemens Recreational Bowl, Inc v Dir of
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 344 Mich App 227, 245; 998 NW2d 917 (2022). “A plaintiff
pleads in avoidance of governmental immunity by stating a claim that fits within a statutory
exception or by pleading facts that demonstrate that the alleged tort occurred during the exercise
or discharge of a nongovernmental or proprietary function.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
MCL 691.1405 is an exception to the general rule that a government agency is immune
from tort liability under MCL 691.1407(1). Id. MCL 691.1405 states:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property
damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee
of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency
is owner . . . .
Because a government agency has broad immunity from tort liability under the GTLA, its
exceptions must be narrowly construed. Regan, 249 Mich App at 158.
Williams argues that her second amended complaint, read as a whole, pleaded an exception
to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1405. We agree. When reviewing a plaintiff’s
complaint, “we disregard the labels given to the claims and instead read the complaint as a whole,
seeking the gravamen of the claims.” Trowell v Providence Hosp & Med Ctrs, Inc, 502 Mich 509,
519; 918 NW2d 645 (2018). When read in its entirety, Williams’s second amended complaint
alleged facts sufficient to impose tort liability on the City under MCL 691.1405. Williams alleged
that the City is a government agency, Kelly was an agent of the City, and Kelly was operating a
motor vehicle (the City bus) when the collision occurred. Further, Williams pleaded facts that, if
proven, would establish that Kelly was negligent, as required to impose tort liability on the City
under MCL 691.1405. Thus, Williams’s second amended complaint, when read as a whole,
pleaded an exception to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1405.
A negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish the following elements: “(1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the legal duty, (3) the plaintiff
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suffered damages, and (4) the defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
damages.” Anderson v Transdev Servs, Inc, 341 Mich App 501, 508; 991 NW2d 230 (2022)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In count I (negligence as to Kelly), Williams alleged that
Kelly owed and breached various legal duties to Williams. Specifically, ¶ 12 reads:
12. Defendant, CHRISTINE ANTOINETTE KELLY, owed Plaintiff
certain duties which Defendant violated, and the violation of these obligations
consisted of the following acts of negligence and breaches of duties owed to
Plaintiff:
a. Violation of MCL 257.627 which provides that: a person operating a
motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not
greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic,
surface, and width of the highway, and of any other conditions then existing; and,
no person shall operate a motor vehicle on a highway at a greater speed than that
which will permit a stop within the assured clear distance ahead;
b. Violation of the duty to exercise reasonable care and caution, and to
observe other vehicles lawfully upon the roadway, particularly the vehicle of
Plaintiff;
c. Violation of the duty to operate a motor vehicle so as to avoid collision
with other vehicles, particularly the vehicle of Plaintiff;
d. Violation of the duty to operate a motor vehicle in such a manner as to
maintain the same under control, taking into account the grade of highway and
general conditions then existing, and to maintain said vehicle so that it could be
safely halted;
e. Violation of the duty to keep a motor vehicle under control at all times;
f. Violation of MCL 257.705, which provides that a person driving a
vehicle on a highway shall equip his or her vehicle with brakes adequate to control
the movement of, and to stop and hold said vehicle[;]
g. Violation of the duty to keep a proper lookout for traffic conditions then
and there existing, or while keeping said lookout, failing to heed such conditions;
h. Violation of other duties not heretofore mentioned.
Moreover, in ¶ 13 Williams alleged that Kelly did “negligently, carelessly and without due regard
for the rights of Plaintiff, fail and neglect to control, maintain and operate the above listed motor
vehicle, as required, and as specifically set forth in the preceding paragraph of this Complaint.”
Therefore, ¶¶ 12 and 13 of Williams’s second amended complaint adequately pleaded the first
two elements of a negligence claim against Kelly, which are required to impose tort liability on
the City under MCL 691.1405. Further, Williams’s second amended complaint alleges that her
“serious and lasting injuries” were the result of Kelly’s negligence, thereby satisfying the
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remaining elements of a negligence claim, which require that Williams’s damages be caused by
Kelly’s negligence.
Accordingly, reading Williams’s allegations in her second amended complaint as a whole,
Williams pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity under MCL 691.1405. The trial court
erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition because it failed to read Williams’s
second amended complaint in its entirety when determining if Williams adequately pleaded in
avoidance of governmental immunity under MCL 691.1405.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
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