Nicholas Zemlick v. Brad Burkhart

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-2799

NICHOLAS ZEMLICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRAD BURKHART, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:22-cv-02319 — Matthew P. Brookman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 9, 2025 — DECIDED JANUARY 22, 2026

____________________

Before ST. EVE, LEE, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.

KOLAR, Circuit Judge. Nicholas Zemlick had an elective off-

site abdominal surgery while he was detained at the Hancock

County Jail in Indiana. While Zemlick recovered at the jail, he

developed an infection and became miserably ill. Jail officials

took Zemlick to the hospital for emergency surgery to treat

the infection. He made a full recovery. Zemlick sued the Han-

cock County Sheriff (who runs the jail) and two Sheriff’s office

personnel (who staff the jail) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

2 No. 24-2799

claimed the Sheriff’s officers were deliberately indifferent to

his medical needs in violation of his due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment. He also brought a Monell claim,

alleging that the Sheriff failed to ensure adequate resources at

the jail. The district court granted summary judgment to the

defendants, and Zemlick now appeals. Because his claims fail

on the merits, are waived, or are barred by qualified immun-

ity, we affirm.

I. Background

In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment to the officers, we construe all facts and draw all justifi-

able inferences in the light most favorable to Zemlick. Ander-

son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

In August 2020, Nicholas Zemlick was arrested and de-

tained at the Hancock County Jail. At that time, Zemlick had

a colostomy stoma, 1 put in place months earlier after a Janu-

ary 2020 motor vehicle accident. Shortly after his arrival, Zem-

lick and jail medical staff arranged for him to have an elective

colostomy reversal surgery at an off-site location, paid for by

the county. Defendant Sheriff Brian Burkhart—the elected

county official responsible for operating the jail—approved

that plan but had no further involvement in Zemlick’s medi-

cal care. Before the procedure, an outside specialist informed

Zemlick of the risks, which included post-operative ab-

dominal infection. Zemlick went forward with the surgery on

December 8, 2020, and he returned to the jail on December 13.

1 Colostomy, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-proce-

dures/colostomy/about/pac-20583139 [https://perma.cc/93CQ-XD8R] (last

visited Jan. 21, 2026) (describing the procedure).

No. 24-2799 3

Upon his return, the jail’s medical staff took over Zem-

lick’s post-operative care. Zemlick was housed in a single cell

in the receiving area near the jail’s medical staff. Zemlick’s

care plan included daily wound checks and the administra-

tion of several medications. Jail medical staff treated Zemlick

on December 13, 14, and 15. After one of these visits, the on-

call physician prescribed oxycodone for pain management.

Jail records do not reflect any medical evaluation of Zemlick

between December 15 and 21, but Zemlick testified that Nurse

Brigett Holmes changed his wound dressing whenever she

worked. Holmes worked nearly 90 hours between December

13 and 26, and she testified that she treated Zemlick each day

she worked during that period. Jail records also show that

Zemlick received wound care on December 14, 21, 25, and 26.

On December 21, Holmes reported to the on-call physician

that Zemlick was experiencing dizzy spells and body aches.

She observed that Zemlick’s blood pressure had been ele-

vated for a few days, there was drainage on his wound dress-

ing, and his wound looked infected, but his temperature was

not elevated. Zemlick recalled feeling so badly by this point

that he “couldn’t get out of bed.” Zemlick was prescribed an-

tibiotics and referred to his outside surgeon for a follow-up.

The record does not show that Zemlick saw his surgeon based

on that referral.

On December 25, Nurse Megan Ward examined Zemlick

and grew concerned about the wound’s appearance, noting

redness and a “bubble” forming near the incision. Zemlick re-

ported dizziness, chills, and “not feeling right,” though his

temperature still was not elevated. The on-call physician pre-

scribed a different antibiotic and directed that medical staff

take a culture of Zemlick’s wound.

4 No. 24-2799

Meanwhile, Zemlick had been complaining to defendant

Sheriff’s Lieutenant Matthew Boots about the quality of the

medical care he was receiving. Boots served as the assistant

jail commander, and his office was near Zemlick’s cell. Zem-

lick testified he “talked to Mr. Boots about everything that

happened as it happened,” and that he saw Boots every day

Boots was working: December 14 through 18, 22, and 23.

Boots does not recall these discussions but testified that he

likely told Zemlick to address his complaints to the medical

staff. Boots was not particularly alarmed by Zemlick’s com-

plaints, as he testified: “Every [detainee] I ever ran across was

complaining to me about something due to my position in the

jail.” Boots also testified that “if medical is doing what they’re

supposed to do, I probably told him something along the line

of, yeah, medical is doing the best they can, we’re doing the

best we can.”

On December 26, Zemlick was experiencing intense pain

and heavy drainage from his abdomen. To address the exces-

sive drainage, Holmes changed Zemlick’s dressing several

times that day. Either that day or early on December 27, Zem-

lick heard Holmes tell defendant Sheriff’s Corporal Luke

Schmidt, who was the overnight shift commander: “you have

to get him out of here, he’s going to die.” Before the end of

their shifts at 6 a.m. on December 27, Holmes also told

Schmidt that Zemlick needed to go to the hospital, but that he

did not need to go by ambulance. Holmes did not assess Zem-

lick’s condition to be imminently life-threatening, and she did

not believe he needed to be transported to the hospital imme-

diately by ambulance. When a jail detainee does not require

an ambulance, an officer transports him to the hospital in a

county vehicle. Schmidt wanted to wait until the 6 a.m. shift

No. 24-2799 5

change for another officer to transport Zemlick, delaying

Zemlick’s transport by about two hours.

On December 27 at 6:01 a.m., Zemlick departed the jail by

officer transport. He arrived at the hospital at 6:30 and was

first evaluated in the emergency room shortly after 7 a.m.

Zemlick then had emergency surgery to drain his abdominal

infection, and he returned to the jail on December 29.

After returning to the jail, Zemlick’s bandages were sup-

posed to be changed twice daily. But Zemlick contends that

medical staff did not adhere to that regimen, and he submit-

ted grievances about this issue and complained directly to

Boots. During that time, Zemlick’s medical records show that

his wound was healing as expected. There is no evidence that

Zemlick had any complications or infections after the Decem-

ber 27 surgery.

Zemlick sued the three Sheriff’s office defendants, the

third-party entity that employs medical personnel at the jail,

and 16 doctors and nurses comprising the jail’s medical staff.

He alleged that all were negligent and deliberately indifferent

to his medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment,

among other claims. The district court granted summary

judgment to all defendants on Zemlick’s federal claims and

relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

claims. Zemlick appealed. He then settled with the medical

staff defendants, leaving only his claims against Burkhart,

Boots, and Schmidt.

II. Discussion

We review the district court’s order granting summary

judgment de novo. James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir.

2020). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no

6 No. 24-2799

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en-

titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

We construe the facts and draw all justifiable inferences in the

nonmovant’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. We do not

weigh evidence or make credibility determinations—those

tasks are entrusted to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761

F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014).

We set forth the governing legal standards and review

each of Zemlick’s individual-capacity claims against each de-

fendant before assessing his Monell claim against the Sheriff.

A. Zemlick’s Claim for Deliberate Indifference to

Medical Needs

Zemlick contends that Burkhart, Boots, and Schmidt were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. We discuss

the governing legal framework applicable to such claims be-

fore applying it to each defendant.

We assess pre-trial conditions of confinement under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Miranda v.

County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018). To prevail on

his claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs, Zemlick

must establish, in addition to causation and harm, that:

the defendants did not take reasonable available

measures to abate the risk of serious harm to

[Zemlick], even though reasonable officers under

the circumstances would have understood the high

degree of risk involved, making the consequences

of the defendants’ conduct obvious.

Pittman v. Madison County, 108 F.4th 561, 572 (7th Cir. 2024)

(“Pittman IV”). We analyze such claims objectively—a

No. 24-2799 7

plaintiff “d[oes] not need to prove subjective awareness of the

risk of harm.” Id. at 564. Instead, we ask “whether a reasona-

ble officer in the defendant’s shoes would have recognized

that the plaintiff was seriously ill or injured and thus needed

medical care.” Id. at 570.

Further, to subject defendants to liability, Zemlick must

also overcome qualified immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who know-

ingly violate the law.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

(internal quotation marks omitted). That means “government

officials performing discretionary functions”—like jail offi-

cials managing pre-trial detainees—are immune from civil li-

ability if their “conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982).

Such officials receive qualified immunity unless: “(1) they

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the

unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the

time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In this context, to defeat

qualified immunity Zemlick must show that “every reasona-

ble officer must have understood that deferring to the judg-

ment of medical staff in these circumstances was unlawful.”

McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 572 (7th Cir. 2022).

With these standards in mind, we assess whether sum-

mary judgment was appropriate, based on either the merits

or qualified immunity, on Zemlick’s deliberate indifference

claims against each of the three defendants in this appeal—

Burkhart, Boots, and Schmidt. We consider each defendant’s

8 No. 24-2799

liability under section 1983 independently. Whitfield v. Spiller,

76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023).

1. Sheriff Brian Burkhart

Zemlick contends that Burkhart “abdicated his … role to

ensure” that the jail provided adequate medical services and

that “Burkhart’s failure to ensure that his jail staff were

properly trained to ensure access to adequate medical care led

to the violation of Mr. Zemlick’s due process rights.” To face

section 1983 liability, a defendant must be personally (not vi-

cariously) responsible for the deprivation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional right. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th

Cir. 1995). Accordingly, to the extent he maintains this claim

on appeal, Zemlick’s individual-capacity claim against

Burkhart requires evidence Burkhart personally violated

Zemlick’s federal rights. Id. But the record contains no such

evidence with respect to Burkhart. Indeed, Burkhart played

no direct role in Zemlick’s ordeal other than approving Han-

cock County’s payment for Zemlick’s initial colostomy

takedown procedure.

The personal-involvement requirement may be fulfilled

for supervisory officers like Burkhart through indirect con-

duct. See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.

1988). But “supervisors who are merely negligent in failing to

detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not” directly

liable because mere negligence is not enough. Id. Rather, the

“supervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it,

approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they

might see.” Id. And our precedent also makes clear that

Burkhart—a nonmedical jail officer—is generally entitled to

defer to medical providers absent evidence of deficient care.

Miranda, 900 F.3d at 343. Zemlick offers nothing to undermine

No. 24-2799 9

Burkhart’s reliance on the jail’s medical staff. Put differently,

Zemlick offers no evidence that Burkhart relied on medical

staff negligently—let alone unreasonably—in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. We therefore

agree with the district court that Burkhart is entitled to sum-

mary judgment.

2. Sheriff’s Lieutenant Matthew Boots

Zemlick argues that Boots was deliberately indifferent to

his medical needs in ignoring Zemlick’s complaints in blind

reliance on the jail’s medical staff. But Zemlick may succeed

on this claim only if Boots is not entitled to qualified immun-

ity. The Supreme Court has instructed “that lower courts

‘should think hard, and then think hard again,’ before ad-

dressing both qualified immunity and the merits of an under-

lying constitutional claim.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62 n.7 (quoting

Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011)).

With that admonition, we begin with step two of the qual-

ified-immunity analysis: whether Boots’s conduct was clearly

established to be unlawful at the time Zemlick complained to

Boots about his medical care. We assess whether, “at the time

of the challenged conduct,” precedent “placed the statutory

or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). For Zemlick to overcome this consid-

erable hurdle, every reasonable jail officer must have under-

stood that Boots was violating Zemlick’s rights by declining

to take any action and deferring to the jail medical staff in re-

sponse to Zemlick’s complaints about his ongoing care. Id.

Here, the case law existing as of December 2020 shows that

Boots’s conduct did not violate clearly established law. On the

contrary, Boots’s conduct is consistent with conduct we have

10 No. 24-2799

held is not unlawful in similar contexts. No clearly established

law compelled Boots to follow up on Zemlick’s complaints

about his care when Zemlick was already being closely mon-

itored by the medical staff.

To start, nonmedical jail staff are permitted to rely on the

professional judgment of medical staff. For example, in John-

son v. Doughty, we held that “non-medical prison official[s]…

cannot be held deliberately indifferent simply because [they]

failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a pris-

oner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.” 433

F.3d 1001, 1012 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). 2

Boots was entitled to defer to the judgment of medical per-

sonnel “without fear of liability for doing so.” Berry v. Peter-

man, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010). That is because correc-

tional facilities “engage in the division of labor” between

medical professionals and other administrative and security

officers. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 343. We thus do not hold jail of-

ficers liable for reasonably relying on and “generally

trust[ing] the professionals to provide appropriate medical at-

tention.” Id. “[A] non-medical prison official will generally be

justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands”

when treated by jail medical staff. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d

2 Post-conviction deliberate indifference claims are governed by the

Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). After Johnson,

we clarified that while Eighth Amendment claims require inquiry into the

officer’s subjective state of mind, due process claims like Zemlick’s turn

only on the objective reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. Pittman IV,

108 F.4th at 570. But that later clarification did not disturb Johnson’s hold-

ing that deference to medical staff does not amount to deliberate indiffer-

ence.

No. 24-2799 11

645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,

236 (3d Cir. 2004)).

That deference is not limitless: “nonmedical officers may

be found deliberately indifferent if they have a reason to be-

lieve (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assis-

tants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” King v. Kra-

mer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted). But because correctional staff “must discrim-

inate between serious risks of harm and feigned or imagined

ones, which is not an easy task,” we do not require them to be

“credulous” in response to detainees’ complaints or to assess

risks “flawlessly.” Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525 (7th

Cir. 2004).

Our 2022 decision in McGee post-dates Zemlick’s ordeal,

but summarized this principle from King:

[C]orrections officers are not constitutionally

obligated to override the judgment of medical

professionals unless they have reason to know

that an inmate is receiving inadequate treat-

ment. This remains true even when an inmate is

in obvious distress and even when the medical

staff has misdiagnosed an inmate[.]

55 F.4th at 573. Indeed, because King was decided at the qual-

ified-immunity inquiry’s first step, it “affirmatively estab-

lished that a corrections officer may trust jail medical profes-

sionals to provide inmates with appropriate medical care.” Id.

We have cited this principle to affirm summary judgment in

favor of nonmedical jail officer cases that pre-date Zemlick’s

ordeal, too. E.g., Miranda, 900 F.3d at 343 (affirming summary

judgment because, just before a detainee on a hunger strike

12 No. 24-2799

died of starvation, medical staff told jail officials that the de-

tainee “was stable and promised to send her to the hospital if

necessary”); Estate of Perry v. Wentzel, 872 F.3d 439, 458–59 (7th

Cir. 2017) (holding nonmedical jail staff were entitled to rely

on nurse’s judgment even though they saw the inmate bleed-

ing from his mouth and soiling himself before he died).

Johnson, King, Rausch, Miranda, Greeno, and Perry all sug-

gest that Boots was entitled to defer to medical staff. Boots has

no medical training that positioned him to independently as-

sess Zemlick. Boots’s conduct under the circumstances is con-

sistent with our precedent upholding (and encouraging) jail

officers’ deference to medical staff.

Moreover, Boots had no reason to believe (or actual

knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants were mis-

treating (or not treating) Zemlick. Zemlick’s complaints to

Boots were too general to place Boots on notice of Zemlick’s

concern that the medical care he was receiving was constitu-

tionally deficient. Boots knew that Zemlick was housed in the

jail’s medical area and receiving daily care during his recov-

ery. And the record shows Zemlick received consistent treat-

ment. “This is not a case where [Zemlick] was being com-

pletely ignored by medical staff.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d

742, 756 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of a complaint al-

leging deliberate indifference against a nonmedical officer

who deferred to medical staff on treatment of prisoner’s rheu-

matoid arthritis). That remained true while Zemlick’s condi-

tion worsened, and he was prescribed different courses of an-

tibiotics. In these circumstances, it was not clearly established

that Boots would be violating Zemlick’s rights by deferring to

the medical personnel.

No. 24-2799 13

That said, we acknowledge the record permits the infer-

ence (which we must draw in Zemlick’s favor) that Boots may

have failed to relay any of Zemlick’s complaints. That could

amount to negligence. But negligence cannot support a due

process violation, which demands a showing of deliberate in-

difference. Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012).

Johnson illustrates the point: an inmate (Johnson) with a her-

nia complained to a nonmedical jail official (Jones) about his

care by a prison doctor. 433 F.3d at 1011. Jones told Johnson

he would follow up on his informal complaint but never did.

Id. at 1012. We affirmed the grant of summary judgment to

Jones, observing that “Jones’s apparent failure to get back

with Johnson about his informal complaint evinces a negli-

gent handling of the complaint and not deliberate indiffer-

ence.” Id. We have explicitly held that “negligent conduct

does not offend the Due Process Clause” in a case involving a

detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs.

Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327, 330–31 (1986)). Proving deliberate indifference requires a

plaintiff to clear a “high bar,” and “even gross negligence” is

insufficient. First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978,

987 (7th Cir. 2021).

In any event, Zemlick’s case does not present a situation

where every reasonable officer would know that Boots’s con-

duct amounted to a violation of Zemlick’s rights. For that rea-

son, Zemlick cannot overcome Boots’s qualified immunity.

Our analysis thus ends where it began, at step two of the

qualified-immunity inquiry. McGee, 55 F.4th at 572. Because

Boots’s conduct was not clearly established as unlawful, he is

entitled to qualified immunity, and we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to Boots.

14 No. 24-2799

3. Sheriff’s Corporal Luke Schmidt

Zemlick posits that Schmidt was deliberately indifferent

to Zemlick’s medical needs in delaying his transport to the

hospital to await a shift change. As above, we assess Zem-

lick’s claim against Schmidt at the second step of the quali-

fied-immunity analysis, and conclude Schmidt is entitled to

qualified immunity.

For Schmidt to face liability, every reasonable jail officer

must have understood that Schmidt was violating Zemlick’s

rights by failing to call an ambulance and awaiting a shift

change, delaying Zemlick’s transport to the hospital by two

hours. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

We have observed that correctional facilities “have limited

resources, and that fact makes some delay inevitable.” Mitch-

ell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 500 (7th Cir. 2018). But we have also

held that “[a] delay in the provision of medical treatment for

painful conditions—even non-life-threatening conditions—

can support a deliberate-indifference claim.” Grieveson v. An-

derson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008). For example, in

Grieveson, we reversed the grant of summary judgment to

nonmedical jail officers where the officers knew that a de-

tainee had suffered a broken nose and was in intense pain but

waited nearly two days to secure any medical treatment for

him. Id. at 779–80.

That said, we have also held that short delays between in-

jury and treatment do not support deliberate indifference. In

Knight v. Wiseman, an inmate injured his shoulder while doing

off-site roadside maintenance and had to wait for a ride back

to the facility from an officer, who took the inmate to the med-

ical unit after stopping along the way to drop off items

No. 24-2799 15

elsewhere. 590 F.3d 458, 461–62 (7th Cir. 2009). About two and

a half hours elapsed between the inmate’s injury and treat-

ment. Id. at 466. We nonetheless affirmed summary judgment

for the officers and observed that “[a]n unincarcerated indi-

vidual may well consider oneself fortunate if he receives med-

ical attention at a standard emergency room within that short

of a period of time.” Id.

Of course, even short delays may be actionable where, for

example, an officer “encountered an inmate in severe distress,

sobbing in pain and complaining that he was unable to move,

and did, literally, nothing.” Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556,

564–65 (7th Cir. 2017) (reversing grant of summary judgment

to an officer whose inaction contributed to an hour-and-a-half

delay in treating the inmate’s debilitating muscle spasm). But

we held as much when the plaintiff was not already being

cared for by the medical staff; instead, he was wholly reliant

on the nonmedical officers to relay his emergency to medical

personnel. Id. at 564.

None of these cases place the lawfulness of Schmidt’s con-

duct “beyond debate” such that it was clearly established that

delaying Zemlick’s transport by two hours would violate his

constitutional rights. Unlike the officers in Grieveson and

Lewis, Schmidt knew that Zemlick was already in the care of

the jail’s medical staff who were fully informed of Zemlick’s

condition. This was not a situation where only Schmidt knew

of Zemlick’s plight and did nothing or failed to secure medi-

cal assistance. Like Boots, in these circumstances, Schmidt

was entitled to defer to the judgment of medical staff. See Mi-

randa, 900 F.3d at 343.

Recall that Nurse Holmes advised Schmidt that Zemlick

did not require an ambulance and could wait until the shift

16 No. 24-2799

change to go to the hospital by officer transport. Though Zem-

lick points to her earlier statement that he would die if not

transported, Holmes also later said that an ambulance was

not necessary. Thus, in context, Holmes’s first statement did

not convey that she believed Zemlick would die imminently,

just that he needed to go to the hospital. After all, Zemlick’s

condition was serious: he was on the verge of sepsis and re-

quired immediate surgery on his arrival at the hospital.

Schmidt could have exercised his discretion to call an ambu-

lance over Holmes’s determination that Zemlick’s situation

was not emergent, but we cannot say that Zemlick had a

clearly established right compelling Schmidt to do so.

In essence, Zemlick—in arguing to the contrary—advo-

cates for a due process right to have a nonmedical jail officer

veto the medical staff’s judgment about a detainee’s medical

condition and to immediately take a detainee to the hospital

at the detainee’s request. But we are aware of no authority es-

tablishing such a right. Rather, in most situations, “the law

encourages non-medical security and administrative personnel

at jails and prisons to defer to the professional medical judg-

ments of the physicians and nurses treating the prisoners in

their care without fear of liability for doing so.” Berry, 604 F.3d

at 440 (emphasis added).

For these reasons, Schmidt is entitled to qualified immun-

ity, and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment to Schmidt.

B. Zemlick’s Monell Claim

In addition to his individual-capacity claims, Zemlick

brought an official-capacity claim against Sheriff Burkhart.

Section 1983 does not allow vicarious-liability theories against

No. 24-2799 17

municipalities and higher-level decisionmakers like Burkhart.

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2009). Instead,

such parties may be held accountable for constitutional viola-

tions they cause through their subordinate officers by official

policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

694 (1978).

Zemlick alleged that Burkhart failed to ensure the Han-

cock County Jail had “appropriate resources, including staff-

ing,” to provide Zemlick medical care, because Burkhart

made the “decision to prioritize money over the health of the

prisoners in his charge[.]” Later in the proceedings, Zemlick’s

theory changed: Burkhart “fail[ed] to ensure that his jail staff

were properly trained to ensure access to adequate medical

care[.]” Regardless of the formulation, these two Monell theo-

ries fail both for procedural reasons and on the merits.

The district court granted summary judgment to Burkhart

on Zemlick’s Monell claim because Zemlick changed his Mo-

nell theory in his response brief opposing defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. Zemlick’s statement of claims—re-

quired by the district court’s case management order—does

not contain his present Monell theory: that Burkhart “fail[ed]

to ensure that his jail staff were properly trained to ensure ac-

cess to adequate medical care[.]” That differs from the earlier

theory (the county prioritized saving money over detainees’

health) that Zemlick included in his pleadings and main-

tained throughout discovery. Given this difference, the dis-

trict court found Zemlick’s present Monell theory waived in

enforcing its case management order that instructed: “the

party with the burden of proof shall file a statement of the

claims or defenses it intends to prove at trial, stating

18 No. 24-2799

specifically the legal theories upon which the claims or defenses

are based.” 3

The Southern District of Indiana routinely holds that legal

claims not specifically raised in a plaintiff’s statement of

claims are abandoned, forfeited, or waived. Dysland v. Shelter

Moving & Storage, Inc., 2022 WL 18540516, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept.

7, 2022) (collecting cases). Indeed, the district court’s case

management order warned that failure to include a claim or

defense in the statement of claims “may result in the waiver

of the omitted claim or defense.” We have previously held

that the district court does not abuse its discretion in enforc-

ing that requirement. Jackson v. Regions Bank, 838 F. App’x 195,

198 (7th Cir. 2021); see also Frakes v. Peoria School District No.

150, 872 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2017) (observing that pursuant

to Rule 83, “a district court may adopt and amend local rules

so long as they are consistent with, but not duplicative of, the

Federal Rules”).

Here, because “district courts may require strict compli-

ance with their local rules[,]” it was not an abuse of discretion

to reject Zemlick’s new Monell theory under the district

court’s established procedures. Hinterberger v. City of Indian-

apolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020).

Further, Zemlick does not argue that the district court’s

statement-of-claims rule is inconsistent with the federal rules

3 Zemlick did not need to specify a legal theory supporting his Monell

claim in his complaint, as “we have stated repeatedly (and frequently) that

a complaint need not plead legal theories, which can be learned during

discovery.” Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011). Ra-

ther, the district court required Zemlick to articulate his legal theory in his

statement of claims, which is within its discretion. See Elizarri v. Sheriff of

Cook County, 901 F.3d 787, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2018).

No. 24-2799 19

or otherwise improper under Rule 83. And of course, since he

replaced his original theory with the new one at summary

judgment, Zemlick also failed to develop arguments support-

ing the original theory, resulting in waiver. Keck Garrett & As-

socs. v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 517 F.3d 476, 487 (7th Cir. 2008)

(holding that a nonmovant’s failure to defend a claim in its

opposition to the motion for summary judgment resulted in

waiver).

Even were we to set these waivers aside, the claim remains

a nonstarter. Zemlick developed no evidence at summary

judgment to show the county had any policy, widespread

practice, or custom that resulted in deficient training of jail

officers or understaffing at the jail that led to his abdominal

infection. See Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir.

2008) (“A governmental unit is not liable under § 1983 unless

the deprivation of constitutional rights is caused by its own

policy or custom.”). Instead, the record reflects that jail offic-

ers were trained to notify medical staff if a detainee needs

care, and to elevate repeated concerns to a supervisor. Jail of-

ficers likewise were trained to make hourly rounds, permit-

ting them to observe detainees’ physical condition. And the

county affords detainees round-the-clock access to medical

staff. The record lacks any evidence of budget cuts, under-

staffing, or shortfalls in the jail’s training program constitut-

ing “deliberate conduct” that was the “moving force” behind

a violation of Zemlick’s federal rights. Board of County

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (explaining plaintiff

must show “the municipal action was taken with the requisite

degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal

link between the municipal action and the deprivation of fed-

eral rights”). Zemlick cannot overcome that considerable

20 No. 24-2799

hurdle, so either of his Monell claim formulations would also

fail on the merits.

Therefore, Zemlick’s Monell theory fails, and the district

court properly granted summary judgment to Burkhart on

Zemlick’s official-capacity claim.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment.