The opinion
Filed 1/21/26
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
S275272
Second Appellate District, Division Seven
B306321
Los Angeles County Superior Court
BC6768283
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
THE COURT:
The majority opinion in this matter, filed on November 10,
2025, and appearing at 18 Cal.5th 970, is modified as follows:
1. The second to last sentence of the first full paragraph
on page 985, which begins, “In the wake of those decisions . . . ,”
is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
Prior to the issuance of those decisions, the City of Los
Angeles (the City) had entered into a consent decree with the
1
federal government that effectively barred it from requiring
complainants to sign the type of advisory described in section
148.6(a)(2).
2. The first sentence of the second full paragraph on page
991, which begins, “Following those federal decisions . . . ,” is
deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
Before those cases were decided, the City had entered into
a consent decree with the federal government that prevented the
City from enforcing the advisory requirement set forth in section
148.6(a)(2).
This modification does not affect the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
S275272
Second Appellate District, Division Seven
B306321
Los Angeles County Superior Court
BC676283
November 10, 2025
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, Chief
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Evans, and
Jenkins* concurred.
Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion.
*
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
S275272
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
California requires law enforcement agencies to
investigate complaints against peace officers. (See Pen. Code,
§ 832.5, subd. (a)(1).) Penal Code section 148.6, subdivision (a)
(section 148.6(a))1 makes it a crime to file a knowingly false
allegation of misconduct against a peace officer. (See § 148.6,
subd. (a)(1) [section 148.6(a)(1) or subdivision (a)(1)].) The
statute also mandates that before accepting a complaint, law
enforcement agencies must require the complainant to read and
sign an advisory informing the complainant that filing a
knowingly false complaint of police misconduct is a crime.
(§ 148.6, subd. (a)(2) [section 148.6(a)(2) or subdivision (a)(2)].)
The issue presented in this case is whether section 148.6(a)’s
provisions violate constitutional free speech rights. We conclude
that they do.
This is not the first time we have considered this issue. In
People v. Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497 (Stanistreet), the
defendants argued that section 148.6(a) violated the rule set
forth in R. A. V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377 (R. A. V.), which
generally requires that courts apply heightened scrutiny to
regulations that discriminate on the basis of content within a
1
Except where noted, all further statutory citations are to
the Penal Code.
1
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
proscribable category of speech. (See Stanistreet, at p. 507.)
More specifically, the defendants argued that heightened
scrutiny was warranted under R. A. V. because section 148.6(a)
“appl[ied] one defamation rule to citizen complaints against
peace officers, and a different rule to those made against other
public officials.” (Stanistreet, at p. 507.) We agreed that section
148.6(a) constituted a content-based regulation within a
proscribable category of speech, which we described as
“knowingly false statements of fact.” (Stanistreet, at p. 508.) We
concluded, however, that the statute fell within various
categories of content discrimination within a proscribable class
that R. A. V. had recognized as generally permissible.
After Stanistreet was decided, multiple federal decisions
rejected its analysis and held that section 148.6(a) violated the
First Amendment. (See Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005)
428 F.3d 1215 (Chaker); Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino
(C.D.Cal. 2004) 325 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1091 (Hamilton II);2 accord
Eakins v. Nevada (D.Nev. 2002) 219 F.Supp.2d 1113 (Eakins)
[adopting Hamilton I’s reasoning in striking down Nevada
statute making it a misdemeanor to file knowingly false
allegations of misconduct against a peace officer].) In the wake
of those decisions, the City of Los Angeles (the City) entered into
a consent decree barring it from requiring complainants to sign
2
The district court issued two published opinions in the
Hamilton matter, both of which are cited in this opinion. The
first opinion denied the City of San Bernardino’s motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to section
148.6(a) (see Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino (C.D.Cal. 2000)
107 F.Supp.2d 1239 (Hamilton I), while the second granted the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on that claim (see
Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d 1087).
2
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
the advisory described in section 148.6(a)(2). The consent decree
expired in 2013, but the City still does not require a signed
advisory from complainants.
In 2017, the Los Angeles Police Protective League
(LAPPL) filed the current action seeking an injunction that
would require the City to comply with section 148.6(a)(2)’s
advisory requirement. Relying on the reasoning of the federal
authorities cited above, the City argued that section 148.6(a)
was an unconstitutional regulation of speech. The trial court
concluded it was bound by Stanistreet and enjoined the City
from accepting any complaint alleging misconduct by a peace
officer unless the complainant had signed the advisory required
by section 148.6(a)(2). The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding
(as the trial court had) that it was bound by Stanistreet. (See
Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1088.) As a result of the ruling, the City
was ordered to advise complainants that it was a crime to file a
knowingly false claim of misconduct against a peace officer
despite the fact that multiple federal decisions had found that
criminal provision to be unconstitutional. The City petitioned
for review, arguing that Chaker and other intervening federal
decisions cast doubt on Stanistreet’s reasoning. We granted
review.
In the intervening years since Stanistreet was decided, the
United States Supreme Court has issued additional guidance on
First Amendment issues that relate both to R. A. V. and, more
generally, prohibitions on knowing falsehoods. This new
guidance compels us to reconsider our decision in Stanistreet. In
Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n (2007) 551 U.S. 177
(Davenport), the court discussed when speech restrictions that
3
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
fall outside “ ‘the general prohibition’ ” (id. at p. 188) on content-
based regulations may nonetheless warrant heightened
constitutional scrutiny. The court’s analysis indicates that
when content-based regulation occurs within a proscribable
class, the key inquiry is whether the statute risks
“impermissibly distort[ing] the marketplace of ideas” (id. at
p. 189) by “ ‘ “driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints” ’ ” from the
public sphere (id. at p. 188; accord R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at
pp. 387–388). And in United States. v. Alvarez (2012) 567 U.S.
709 (Alvarez), the court announced for the first time that even
well-intentioned prohibitions on knowing falsehoods can trigger
heightened constitutional scrutiny if they go too far in chilling
protected speech. (See id. at pp. 709, 723, plur. opn. of Kennedy,
J. [criminal statute that targets “falsity and nothing more”
would risk “cast[ing] a chill [on speech that] the First
Amendment cannot permit”]; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer,
J. [statute criminalizing any knowingly false claim of receiving
military award raised sufficient “risk of chilling” to warrant
heightened scrutiny].) Most recently, in Free Speech Coalition,
Inc. v. Paxton (2025) 606 U.S. 461 (Free Speech Coalition), the
court held that content-based restrictions that regulate
unprotected speech are subject to heightened constitutional
scrutiny if they have an “incidental burden” on protected speech.
(Id. at p. 495; see id. at pp. 482–483.)3
3
The United States Supreme Court decided Free Speech
Coalition shortly after we held oral argument in this matter. We
vacated submission and directed the parties to submit
supplemental briefing addressing the effect, if any, of Free
Speech Coalition on the issues here.
4
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
The fundamental principle we derive from these
subsequent cases, read in conjunction with R. A. V., is that when
assessing a statute like section 148.6(a) — which discriminates
on the basis of content within a proscribable class of falsity
(defamation) — courts must evaluate whether the risk of
“ ‘driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints’ ” (R. A. V., supra,
505 U.S. at p. 387) from the public sphere is so “inconsequential”
(Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188) that no further
constitutional scrutiny is warranted. Stated differently, courts
should ask whether the content-based regulation of proscribable
speech is structured in such a manner that it either disfavors
certain subjects or viewpoints (as in R. A. V.) or burdens
protected forms of speech (as in Alvarez and Free Speech
Coalition).4
4
As discussed in more detail below, R. A. V. concluded that
the statute at issue in that case risked driving out certain
viewpoints by criminalizing hate speech made in connection
with certain topics (race, religion and gender), while leaving
unregulated hate speech pertaining to any other topics (such as
political affiliation or sexual orientation). Although the statute
did not burden any form of protected speech (as all forms of hate
speech are unprotected), the court reasoned that heightened
scrutiny was warranted because it imposed “special prohibitions
on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.”
(R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 391.) In this case, however, we
focus not on whether section 148.6(a) impermissibly targets
defamatory speech on disfavored topics, but rather whether the
statute risks driving out certain viewpoints or ideas by
regulating a subset of defamation in a manner that sufficiently
burdens protected speech so as to warrant heightened scrutiny.
(See Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at pp. 482–483;
Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 709, 723, plur. opn. of Kennedy,
J.; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.)
5
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Applying those principles here, we conclude that section
148.6(a)’s criminal provision (§ 148.6(a)(1)) and its
accompanying admonition requirement (§ 148.6(a)(2)) exhibit
numerous characteristics that, considered together, sufficiently
burden a protected form of speech — namely, truthful (or at
least well-intentioned) complaints of police misconduct — so as
to warrant heightened constitutional scrutiny. Those features
include: (1) singling out for criminal treatment knowingly false
allegations of misconduct that are filed against a category of
government official whose job duties are of particular concern to
the public; (2) asymmetrically criminalizing knowingly false
allegations that are filed against law enforcement, while leaving
unregulated false statements that witnesses might make in
support of law enforcement during the course of the ensuing
investigation that is required under section 832.5; (3) barring
law enforcement from accepting a formal complaint of police
misconduct unless complainants agree to read and sign an
admonition warning that they can be criminally prosecuted if
their claims are disbelieved; (4) providing complainants ill-
defined and inconsistent descriptions of what specific types of
false statements might trigger criminal liability; and (5) failing
to require that the statements actually be material to an
actionable type of misconduct or that they cause any harm to
the falsely accused. (See post, at pp. 38–48.) While we express
no view whether any of these elements might unduly burden
speech when considered in isolation, we think it clear that,
considered together, they “threaten censorship of ideas”
(R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) by deterring citizens from
filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaints of
police misconduct.
6
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
There is still a question under United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence as to whether strict or intermediate
scrutiny should apply to a content-based regulation like section
148.6(a), which discriminates within a proscribable class of
knowing falsehoods (defamation) in a manner that incidentally
burdens protected speech. (Compare R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at
p. 395 [applying strict scrutiny to a viewpoint-based regulation
that discriminated within a proscribable class of speech] with
Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at pp. 482–483 [content-
based restrictions that regulate unprotected speech but
incidentally burden protected speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny]; compare Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 724, plur. opn.
of Kennedy, J. [certain forms of regulations on false statements
of fact should be subject to strict scrutiny] with id. at pp. 730–
731, conc. opn. of Breyer, J. [restrictions on false statements of
fact should generally be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny].)
For the purposes of this case, however, we need not resolve that
question because we conclude that section 148.6(a) cannot
survive even the less exacting standard of intermediate
scrutiny, which requires that “a law must be ‘narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest.’ ” (Packingham v.
North Carolina (2017) 582 U.S. 98, 105–106 (Packingham).)
Applying that test here, we conclude that while the
Legislature had a legitimate and significant interest in
remedying the harmful effects of abusive false claims of police
misconduct, section 148.6(a) is not narrowly tailored to meet
those objectives. Instead, the statute establishes an ill-defined,
asymmetrical criminal provision (see § 148.6(a)(1)) that is
accompanied by an unusual admonition requirement.
Considered together, those elements “create[] a potent
7
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
disincentive for citizens to file” even well-intentioned complaints
of police misconduct. (Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at
p. 1094.) Thus, while we reaffirm Stanistreet’s conclusion that
the Legislature is authorized to take steps to protect the
integrity of the peace officer complaint process (see Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 510), we part ways with Stanistreet by
now concluding that, as presently drafted, section 148.6(a)
“ ‘burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government’s legitimate interests.’ ” (Packingham,
supra, 582 U.S. at p. 105 [describing intermediate scrutiny
standard].)
I. BACKGROUND
A. Regulation of Complaints Against Peace
Officers
Section 832.5 requires “[e]ach department . . . that
employs peace officers” to “establish a procedure to investigate
complaints by members of the public against the personnel of
these departments . . . , and . . . [to] make a written description
of the procedure available to the public.” (§ 832.5, subd. (a)(1).)
The statute further requires that “[c]omplaints and any reports
or findings relating to these complaints . . . shall be retained for
a period of no less than 5 years.” (Id., subd. (b).) Complaints
“that are determined . . . to be frivolous, . . . or unfounded or
exonerated” are not to be retained in the officer’s general
personnel file (id., subd. (c)) and “shall not [be] use[d] . . . for
punitive or promotional purposes” (id., subd. (c)(2)).
The Penal Code provision at issue in this case, section
148.6(a), makes it a misdemeanor for any person to “file[] any
allegation of misconduct against any peace officer . . . knowing
the allegation to be false.” (§ 148.6(a)(1).) The statute
8
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
separately provides that any law enforcement agency accepting
an allegation of misconduct against a peace officer “shall require
the complainant to read and sign” an advisory explaining that
California provides citizens “the right to make a complaint
against a police officer for any improper police conduct” and
requires law enforcement agencies to investigate such
complaints. (§ 148.6(a)(2), all caps and boldface omitted.) The
admonition goes on to warn the complainant that “it is against
the law to make a complaint that you know to be false. If you
make a complaint against an officer knowing that it is false, you
can be prosecuted . . . .” (Ibid., all caps and boldface omitted.)
The statute further mandates that the advisory shall be written
in all capital letters and boldface. (Ibid.)5
5
Section 148.6(a)(2) requires that the admonition include
the following language:
“YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A COMPLAINT
AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER FOR ANY IMPROPER
POLICE CONDUCT. CALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES
THIS AGENCY TO HAVE A PROCEDURE TO
INVESTIGATE CIVILIAN’ COMPLAINTS. YOU HAVE A
RIGHT TO A WRITTEN DESCRIPTION OF THIS
PROCEDURE. THIS AGENCY MAY FIND AFTER
INVESTIGATION THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH
EVIDENCE TO WARRANT ACTION ON YOUR
COMPLAINT; EVEN IF THAT IS THE CASE, YOU HAVE
THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE COMPLAINT AND HAVE IT
INVESTIGATED IF YOU BELIEVE AN OFFICER
BEHAVED IMPROPERLY. CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS
AND ANY REPORTS OR FINDINGS RELATED TO
COMPLAINTS MUST BE RETAINED BY THIS AGENCY
FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS. [¶] IT IS AGAINST THE
9
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Prior to section 148.6(a)’s enactment, a different statute
“made (and still makes) it a misdemeanor to report a felony or
misdemeanor knowing the report to be false. (§ 148.5.)
However, . . . courts had interpreted section 148.5 as not
applying to complaints of police misconduct from members of the
public. [Citations.] The Legislature enacted section 148.6 to fill
this gap.” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 502.) Section
148.6(a), however, “does not merely extend section 148.5’s
protection to peace officers. Section 148.5 applies only to
knowingly false reports ‘that a felony or misdemeanor has been
committed,’ i.e., to reports of a criminal offense. By contrast,
section 148.6 applies to all ‘citizens’ complaints of police
misconduct during the performance of an officer’s duties that
may or may not rise to the level of a criminal offense.’ ”
(Stanistreet, at p. 503.)
The legislative materials accompanying the assembly bill
that added section 148.6(a) explained that “[s]ince the Rodney
King incident in March 1991, law enforcement agencies
throughout the state have revised their citizen complaint
procedures to promote greater accountability on the part of their
line officers. [¶] . . . [One] glaringly negative side-effect which
has resulted has been the willingness on the part of many of our
less ethical citizens to maliciously file false allegations of
misconduct against officers in an effort to punish them for
simply doing their jobs. [¶] Unfortunately for the officers, these
complainants usually become a permanent part of their
LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE
FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN
OFFICER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE
PROSECUTED ON A MISDEMEANOR CHARGE.”
10
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
personnel jackets. . . . [M]ost of the officers find they have very
little recourse against the complaints.”6 (Assem. Com. on Public
Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1732 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.)
April 18, 1995, at p. 1 (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis);
see Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 502–503.)
The arguments in favor of the bill similarly explained that
section 148.6(a) would “finally address[] the issue of knowingly
making false allegations of misconduct against any peace officer.
These false accusations can adversely affect the officer’s position
within the Department, and this legislation will discourage such
false reports. [¶] . . . [¶] Yearly hundreds of unfounded and false
complaints are filed against Peace Officers. In the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department alone, over 500 complaints were
received of which approximately 60 to 70% were unfounded. [¶]
This bill will help prevent frivolous complaints which can affect
the individual officer’s future. For example, a Deputy Sheriff on
a list for promotion to Sergeant receives a false report of
misconduct, after which his promotion is deferred until the
matter is resolved. After which, the complaint being found
unfounded, the Deputy has no recourse for any financial loss due
6
The legislative history of section 148.6(a) does not explain
how law enforcement agencies had “revised their citizen
complaint procedures to promote greater accountability on the
part of their line officers.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety
Analysis, supra, at p. 1.) Whatever the nature of the revisions,
it appears that such changes were not compelled by section
832.5. That statute was originally passed in 1974 and remained
in its original form when section 148.6(a) was enacted.
11
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
to the delay.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety Analysis, supra, at
p. 2.)
Although not mentioned in the reports before the
Legislature, several enrolled bill reports stated that section
148.6(a) would also save “department resources and time by not
having to investigate unfounded complaints.” (Dep. of Forestry
and Fire Protection, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1732
(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 8, 1995, p. 1; see Dep. Parks and
Recreation, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1732 (1995–
1996 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 8, 1995, p. 1; Governor’s Office of
Planning and Research, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No.
1732 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 8, 1995, p. 2.)
B. Procedural History
As discussed in more detail below, in Stanistreet, supra,
29 Cal.4th 497, we ruled that section 148.6(a) did not violate the
First Amendment because it fell within each of the categories
that R. A. V. had identified as permissible forms of content-
based regulation within a proscribable category of speech. Two
years after we decided Stanistreet, a federal district court
expressly rejected our analysis and held that section 148.6(a)
“does not come within the . . . R. A. V. categories of permissible
content-based subclass regulation” and was thus
“unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.”
(Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1091; accord Eakins,
supra, 219 F.Supp.2d 1113.) The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shortly followed suit, reasoning
that section 148.6(a)(1) unlawfully discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint by criminalizing knowingly false speech that is
critical of police officers while leaving unregulated knowingly
false speech that is supportive of police officers. (See Chaker,
12
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
supra, 428 F.3d at p. 1227 [“The imbalance generated by section
148.6 — i.e., only individuals critical of peace officers are subject
to liability and not those who are supportive — . . . turns the
First Amendment on its head”].)
Following those federal decisions, the City entered into a
consent decree with the federal government that prevented the
City from enforcing the advisory requirement set forth in section
148.6(a)(2). After the decree expired in 2013, the City —
presumably concerned about Chaker’s holding that section
148.6(a)(1)’s criminal provision was unconstitutional —
continued not to comply with the admonition requirement. In
2017, the LAPPL filed the current action against the City, which
seeks an injunction requiring it to comply with section
148.6(a)(2)’s advisory requirement. Concluding that it was
bound by Stanistreet, the trial court entered judgment in favor
of the LAPPL and enjoined the City from accepting any
complaint alleging misconduct by a peace officer unless the
complainant has signed the advisory described in section
148.6(a)(2). The Court of Appeal affirmed. We granted review.
II. DISCUSSION
The City argues that Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d 1215, and
other intervening federal authorities cast doubt on the
continuing validity of Stanistreet.7 As discussed below, while we
apply different reasoning than the Chaker court, we agree that
7
In challenging the constitutionality of section 148.6(a), the
City appears to rely solely on the free speech clause set forth in
the First Amendment of the federal Constitution; it has not raised
any argument that the California Constitution provides a separate
basis of relief.
13
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
subsequent developments in the law warrant a reconsideration
of our holding in Stanistreet.
A. Relevant Case Law
In order to understand the complex First Amendment
issues presented in this case, it is necessary to review the series
of cases that preceded the challenge before us.
1. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul
In R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, the Supreme Court
considered a constitutional challenge to a City of St. Paul
ordinance that made it a crime to display a symbol “ ‘which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender.’ ” (Id. at p. 380, italics added.) The Minnesota
Supreme Court had previously construed the ordinance as
reaching only “fighting words,” a well-established category of
unprotected speech.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court accepted the state
court’s conclusion that the statute only reached speech that
amounted to fighting words. The court explained, however, that
even those “limited” categories of speech that may be subjected
to regulation (fighting words, defamation, obscenity, fraud, etc.)
are not “entirely invisible to the Constitution.” (R. A. V., supra,
505 U.S. at p. 383.) R. A. V. established a general rule that
“while certain categories of speech . . . may be regulated, such
regulation may not discriminate within that category on the
basis of content.” (Stanistreet, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 507.)
Thus, for example, “the government may proscribe libel; but it
may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing
only libel critical of the government.” (R. A. V., at p. 384.)
14
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Critically, however, the court went on to explain that the
First Amendment’s general prohibition against content
discrimination “applies differently in the context of proscribable
speech than in the area of fully protected speech.” (R. A. V.,
supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387.) According to the court, while the
“rationale of the general prohibition . . . is that content
discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace,’ [citations] . . . content discrimination among
various instances of a class of proscribable speech often does not
pose this threat.” (Id. at pp. 387–388.)
The court next described some categories of content
discrimination within a proscribable class of speech that
generally do not threaten to drive viewpoints from the public
sphere. The first of those categories is “[w]hen the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.” (R. A. V., supra,
505 U.S. at p. 388.) Providing illustrations of regulations that
might fall within this category, the court explained that “[a]
State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the
most patently offensive in its prurience — i.e., that which
involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it
may not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which
includes offensive political messages. [Citation.] And the
Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of
violence that are directed against the President [citation] —
since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility
15
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when
applied to the person of the President.” (Ibid.)
Second, citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986)
475 U.S. 41, 48 (Renton), the court explained that content-based
regulations within a proscribable category of speech are
generally “valid” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390) when the
regulation is “aimed only at the ‘secondary effects’ of the speech”
(id. at p. 394). The court noted, for example, that a state could
“permit all obscene live performances except those involving
minors.” (Id. at p. 389.)
Finally, the court recognized a “more general exception for
content discrimination that does not threaten censorship of
ideas.” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393.) As explained by the
court, “Where totally proscribable speech is at issue,” there need
not be any specific “ ‘neutral’ basis [to justify the regulation] so
long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that
there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas
is afoot. (We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that
would stand in the way of a State’s prohibiting only those
obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses).” (Id. at
p. 390.)
Having laid out the general principles applicable to
content-based regulations within a proscribable category of
speech, the court concluded that the statute under review was
impermissible because it created a special prohibition on hate
speech that insults or provokes violence “ ‘on the basis of race,
color, [or] creed,’ ” while permitting symbols that are intended
to express hostility for other reasons, such as “political
affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality.” (R. A. V.,
supra, 505 U.S. at p. 391.) The court further concluded that the
16
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
prohibition went “even beyond mere content discrimination, to
actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays containing some
words — odious racial epithets, for example — would be
prohibited to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting words’ that
do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender
. . . would . . . be usable ad libitum.” (Ibid.)
The court next addressed why the statute did not fall
within any of the three categories of generally permissible
content-based regulations it had described earlier in the
opinion. Turning to the first category — “content discrimination
based on the very reasons why the particular class of speech at
issue . . . is proscribable” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) —
the court explained that fighting words are excluded from First
Amendment protection because their “content embodies a
particularly intolerable . . . mode of expressing whatever idea
the speaker wishes to convey” (ibid., italics omitted). The court
reasoned, however, that the ordinance at issue had “not singled
out an especially offensive mode of expression. . . . Rather, it
has proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that
communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious
intolerance.” (Id. at pp. 393–394.)
The court also concluded the ordinance did not fall within
the exception for content discrimination “aimed only at the
‘secondary effects’ of the speech.” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at
p. 394.) St. Paul had argued this exception was applicable
because the intent of the ordinance was not to limit the speech
rights of the accused, but rather to protect “ ‘particularly
vulnerable’ ” groups that had ‘ ‘historically . . . been
discriminated against.’ ” (Ibid.) The court disagreed, explaining
that “ ‘[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
17
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
“secondary effect.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The court likewise concluded that
the “general exception” (id. at p. 393) for restrictions that are
“beyond the suspicion of official suppression of ideas” (id. at
p. 395) was clearly inapplicable because St. Paul had expressly
argued that the intent of the statute was to suppress ideas
expressed against specific classes of persons.
Having found that the ordinance was an impermissible
content-based regulation on hate speech because its application
turned on the viewpoint of the speaker, the court went on to
apply strict scrutiny and found the statute unconstitutional.
2. People v. Stanistreet
In Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, the defendants
challenged their convictions under section 148.6(a)(1),
contending that the statute violated R. A. V.’s rule against
content-based regulations within proscribable categories of
speech. The defendants argued that while California was
permitted to ban all defamatory statements made against public
officials (or at least those that meet the heightened mens rea
requirement of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S.
254 (New York Times)), the state was not permitted to “apply
one defamation rule to citizen complaints against peace officers,
and a different rule to those made against other public officials.”
(Stanistreet, at p. 507.)
We agreed with the defendants that section 148.6(a)’s
distinct treatment of complaints against peace officers versus
complaints against other public officials qualified as a content-
based regulation within a proscribable category of speech, which
we described as “knowingly false statements of fact.”
(Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 508.) We further held,
18
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
however, that the statute fell within each of the three categories
of content-based regulations of proscribable speech that R. A. V.
identified as generally not posing any threat to the marketplace
of ideas.
Applying the first category — “ ‘[w]hen the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable’ ” (Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 508) — we reiterated that the relevant
“[proscribable] class of speech at issue” was “knowingly false
statements of fact.” (Ibid.) Relying on R. A. V.’s example that
“ ‘the reasons why threats of violence are [proscribable] . . . have
special force when applied to the President’ ” (ibid.), we
concluded that the reason false statements are generally
proscribable likewise “has ‘special force’ [citation] when applied
to false accusations against peace officers. When a person
makes a complaint against a peace officer of the type that
section 148.6 governs, the agency receiving the complaint is
legally obligated to investigate it and to retain the complaint
and resulting reports or findings for at least five years. (§ 832.5.)
Thus, the potential harm of a knowingly false statement is
greater here than in other situations.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
We also found section 148.6(a) valid under R. A. V.’s
second category of generally permissible forms of regulations,
reasoning that false accusations against peace officers have
“substantial secondary effects — they trigger mandatory
investigation and record retention requirements” that compel
law enforcement agencies to expend “[p]ublic resources . . . that
could otherwise be used for other matters.” (Stanistreet, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 509.) We further noted that once triggered,
those mandatory requirements could “adversely affect the
19
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
accused peace officer’s career, at least until the investigation is
complete.” (Ibid.)
Finally, we held that the statute was valid under R. A. V.’s
general “catchall exception,” concluding there was “no realistic
possibility” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509) that section
148.6(a)’s criminalization of knowingly false complaints against
police was meant to suppress any particular idea or viewpoint.
Rejecting the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the law might
operate “ ‘to suppress . . . citizen complaints of police
misconduct,’ ” we explained that “[t]he Legislature is not
suppressing all complaints of police misconduct, only knowingly
false ones.” (Stanistreet, at p. 509.) We further noted that
rather than disfavoring police complaints, the Legislature had
in many respects “favored” such speech by requiring their
investigation. (Id. at p. 510.) We explained that “[t]he
Legislature may elevate the status of a category of complaints”
by mandating that they be investigated and that the records of
the investigation be retained, “and at the same time penalize
those” who choose to file a knowingly false complaint after
having received an admonition explaining that their allegations
would trigger an investigation under California law. (Ibid.) “No
one has a constitutional right to make a complaint of misconduct
knowing both that the complaint must be investigated and that
it is false.” (Ibid.)
In a concurring opinion, Justice Werdegar (joined by
Justice Moreno) agreed that section 148.6(a) was constitutional
under R. A. V.’s secondary effects category of regulation but
disagreed that either of the other two categories applied. As to
the first R.AV. category, the concurrence defined the relevant
“class of speech at issue” as “defamation,” which is generally
20
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
subject to regulation because defamatory statements “may
injure personal reputations without making any positive
contribution to the democratic process.” (Stanistreet, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 513, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) The concurrence
reasoned that “section 148.6 does not target speech that is
especially worthless or especially injurious to reputation. . . .
[N]othing about false speech affecting peace officers . . .
distinguishes it from false speech affecting other governmental
officials with respect to the grounds on which defamation is
proscribable in the first place.” (Ibid.)
The concurrence also rejected the majority’s application of
the “catchall” exception, explaining that the Legislature had
created a special crime that applies only to allegations against
peace officers while simultaneously creating a “unique . . .
mandate” that “prospective complainants” be warned of the
“possibility of criminal sanctions.” (Stanistreet, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 513, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) Justice
Werdegar explained that, “[r]ealistically,” these features of the
law would cause “some complainants . . . to choose not to go
forward — even when they have legitimate complaints.” (Id. at
p. 514.)
3. Cases decided after Stanistreet
Since Stanistreet was decided, several federal decisions
have weighed in either specifically on the constitutionality of
section 148.6(a) or more generally on issues that relate to the
analysis in R. A. V. and Stanistreet.
21
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
a. Federal cases finding section 148.6(a)
unconstitutional
In Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d 1087, a plaintiff
brought a federal civil rights action against the City of San
Bernardino arising out of his interactions with law enforcement.
(See Hamilton I, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1240–1241.) The
plaintiff, a Black man, alleged that he had been unlawfully
stopped on his bicycle and was then handcuffed and beaten. He
was taken into custody and later released with a citation for not
having a bicycle license. The plaintiff later returned to the
police to lodge a citizen’s complaint. According to the complaint,
the watch commander questioned his story and orally advised
the plaintiff that he could be prosecuted for knowingly filing a
false complaint and provided a copy of the written admonition
required under section 148.6(a)(2). After receiving those
warnings, the plaintiff chose not to file a complaint. The
plaintiff subsequently filed a civil rights complaint against the
police department that included a claim alleging section
148.6(a) was unconstitutional.
The district court granted the plaintiff summary judgment
on his challenge to section 148.6(a), concluding that Stanistreet
had erred in finding that the statute fell within the categories of
generally permissible content-based regulations of proscribable
speech described in R. A. V. Regarding the first category, the
court rejected Stanistreet’s rationale that “the reasons for
proscribing defamation have special force when applied to law
enforcement officers” because false complaints trigger
investigation requirements that might result in “greater harm
to law enforcement officers than to other groups of persons.”
(Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1091.) Echoing Justice
22
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Werdegar’s concurrence in Stanistreet, the court found that the
state had failed to show there was anything “ ‘about the position
of a peace officer [that] is inherently tied to the policies
underlying the law of defamation, as compared to the position of
other government officers.’ ” (Hamilton I, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d
at p. 1246.) The court explained that, in fact, “[p]ublic officials
are generally entitled to less protection from defamatory
statements since they hold positions of prominence.” (Hamilton
II, at p. 1092, italics added.)
Regarding the “secondary effects” exception, the court
concluded that “even if [California] was partly motivated by the
desire to curb the harmful effects of wasted investigative
resources and damage to officers’ reputation, . . . these motives
focus on the direct impact of the speech, not its ‘secondary’
effects.” (Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1093.)
Because section 148.6(a) “is justified only by reference to the
content of the speech . . ., the ‘secondary effects’ doctrine” does
not apply. (Id. at p. 1093.)
Finally, the court rejected Stanistreet’s conclusion that
“ ‘the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is
no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot.’ ” (Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1090.)
According to the court, section 148.6(a)’s criminal provision,
combined with its “mandat[e] that an individual wishing to
register a complaint . . . first receive the sobering forewarning
that she or he can be criminally prosecuted for making a
knowingly false complaint against an officer” (id. at p. 1094),
were “high[ly] like[ly] [to] . . . cause individuals to refrain from
filing a complaint against law enforcement officers” (ibid.).
23
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Shortly after Hamilton II was decided, the Ninth Circuit
held that section 148.6(a)(1)’s criminal provision violated the
First Amendment. (See Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d 1215.) Unlike
Stanistreet, the court did not focus on the fact that section
148.6(a) treats misconduct claims made against peace officers
differently than complaints made against other types of public
officials. Instead, Chaker concluded that the statute
“discriminates on the basis of a speaker’s viewpoint” (Chaker, at
p. 1217) by “holding . . . citizen complainants accountable for
their knowing falsehoods, while leaving unregulated the
knowingly false speech of a peace officer or witness.” (Id. at
p. 1226.) The court observed that the state’s “asserted interest”
(ibid.) in passing section 148.6(a) — to save valuable public
resources and maintain integrity in the complaint process —
was undermined by “its choice to prohibit only the knowingly
false speech of those citizens who complain of peace officer
conduct.” (Chaker, at p. 1226.)
b. First Amendment decisions implicating issues
related to R. A. V. and Stanistreet
In Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. 177, a union filed a free
speech challenge to a state law that placed certain restrictions
on public employee unions’ ability to spend fees that they collect
from employees who are not union members but who are
represented by the union in collective bargaining. The law at
issue required the unions to obtain affirmative consent from
nonunion members before using their funds for election-related
expenditures but permitted the union to expend nonmember
fees for other purposes without obtaining such consent. The
union argued that by placing restrictions on expenditures
related to elections but not for other purposes, the statute
24
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
effectively imposed a content-based regulation that must be
evaluated under strict scrutiny.
The court agreed that the statute constituted a content-
based regulation and that such regulations are generally treated
as “presumptively invalid.” (Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at
p. 188.) Quoting R. A. V., the court explained that “ ‘[t]he
rationale of the general prohibition’ ” on content-based
discrimination is that such regulations “ ‘ “raise[] the specter
that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 188.) The court
further explained, however, that its prior cases had “identified
numerous situations in which that risk is inconsequential . . . so
that . . . strict scrutiny is unwarranted.” (Ibid.) As an example,
the court again cited R. A. V., explaining that “content
discrimination among various instances of a class of
proscribable speech does not pose a threat to the marketplace of
ideas when the selected subclass is chosen for the very reason
that the entire class can be proscribed.” (Ibid.) The court then
applied those general principles to the statute before it,
concluding that placing a “reasonable” and “viewpoint-neutral
limitation” on the manner in which nonunion members’ fees
could be expended did not “impermissibly distort[] the
marketplace of ideas.” (Id. at p. 189.) Notably, in discussing
R. A. V. and other First Amendment decisions addressing
situations where content-based regulations are generally
permissible, the court focused on the minimal risk that those
forms of regulations posed to suppressing certain ideas or
viewpoints, not on whether the government was in fact
attempting to suppress such speech.
25
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
In Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. 709, the Supreme Court
considered a First Amendment challenge to “The Stolen Valor
Act of 2005” (the Stolen Valor Act or the Act), a federal law that
made it a crime to falsely represent having been awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor. Although six justices found the
law to violate the First Amendment, no opinion secured a
majority.
The four-vote plurality opinion began its analysis by
rejecting the government’s contention that false statements of
fact constitute a general category of speech that lack First
Amendment protection. (See Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 722,
plur. opn. of Kennedy, J. [“The Government has not
demonstrated that false statements generally should constitute
a new category of unprotected speech”].) While acknowledging
that prior opinions contained language that could be read to
support that conclusion, the plurality clarified that those cases
involved false statements that were associated with a “legally
cognizable harm” such as defamation or fraud. (Id. at p. 719.)
In contrast, the plurality reasoned, the Act extended criminal
liability to false claims regarding military medals, no matter the
context in which they were made and regardless of whether they
had caused harm. (Id. at pp. 722–723.) Although the plurality
concluded that the Act furthered a legitimate state interest —
“protecting the integrity of the military honors system” (id. at
p. 725) — it explained that approving a criminal statute that
targeted “falsity and nothing more” (id. at p. 719) would risk
“cast[ing] a chill . . . [on speech that] the First Amendment
cannot permit” (id. at p. 723). According to the plurality,
because the Act “conflict[ed] with free speech principles” it was
subject to strict scrutiny and could not satisfy that “exacting”
26
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
level of review because there were less speech-deterring ways to
address the state’s interests. (Id. at p. 724.)
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer (joined by Justice
Kagan) likewise rejected the government’s theory that “false
factual statements” are entitled to “ ‘no [constitutional]
protection at all.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 732, conc. opn.
of Breyer, J., at pp. 732, 733.) Unlike the plurality, however, the
concurrence concluded that when evaluating a regulation of
“false statements about easily verifiable facts” (id. at p. 732),
courts should apply intermediate scrutiny, asking whether “the
statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to
its justifications” (id. at p. 730). In applying that test, the
concurrence noted that the Act lacked any of the “limiting
features” (id. at p. 736) that were evident in numerous other
prohibitions on falsity the court had previously endorsed. Those
limitations included, for example, “requiring proof of specific
harm to identifiable victims” or limiting the reach of the statute
to statements made in “contexts in which a tangible harm to
others is especially likely to occur.” (Id. at p. 734.) In contrast,
the Act’s broad prohibition on any knowing false claims about
being a medal recipient “create[d] a significant risk of First
Amendment harm” by (among other things) broadly applying to
contexts in which the falsity would be unlikely to cause harm,
inviting selective prosecutions on the part of the government
and “chilling . . . [speakers who] might still be worried about
being prosecuted for a careless false statement.” (Id. at p. 736,
italics omitted.) The concurrence ultimately concluded that
while the Act had laudable objectives, it could not pass
intermediate scrutiny because the government had failed to
27
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
show “why a more finely tailored statute would not” satisfy those
goals. (Id. at p. 739.)
Finally, in Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 409, the
court addressed the constitutionality of a state law requiring
“commercial websites that publish sexually explicit content to
verify the ages of their visitors.” (Id. at p. 462.) The state
argued that the law was only subject to “rational-basis review”
(id. at p. 477) because it regulated an unprotected form of
speech, namely “speech that is obscene to minors” (id. at p. 482).
While the court agreed that the statute did not “directly regulate
. . . protected speech” (ibid.), it concluded that heightened
scrutiny was nonetheless warranted because the age
verification statute had an “incidental burden” on protected
speech, namely “adult[s’] . . . right to access speech that is
obscene only to minors” (id. at p. 495, italics added).
The court went on to hold that intermediate scrutiny was
the appropriate standard of review for laws that “directly
regulate[] unprotected activity . . . while only incidentally
burdening protected activity.” (Free Speech Coalition, supra,
606 U.S at p. 492.) The more “unforgiving” strict scrutiny
standard, the court explained, is reserved for restrictions that
“direct[ly] target[] . . . fully protected speech.” (Id. at p. 484.)
According to the court, while not as exacting as strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny nonetheless “plays an important role in
ensuring” that statutes with an “ostensibly legitimate
purpose[]” are not structured in a manner that threatens to
“suppress fundamental rights.” (Id. at p. 495.) The court
explained for example, that while merely requiring an adult to
verify their age through a routine credit-card transaction was
28
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
permissible, the state could not “require as proof of age an
‘affidavit’ from the individual’s ‘biological parent.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Is There an Adequate Basis to Reconsider
Stanistreet?
Before addressing the merits of the parties’ arguments
regarding section 148.6(a), we first address whether there are
appropriate grounds to reconsider our holding in Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, given the doctrine of stare decisis.8 (See
Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 296 [stare decisis requires
that “prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even
though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently
by the current justices”].) For the reasons explained below, we
conclude that a re-examination is warranted.
While we do not “lightly” depart from past precedents,
stare decisis nonetheless remains a “ ‘a flexible [policy].’ ”
(People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 924.)
“[R]eexamination of precedent may become necessary when
subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was
unsound, or has become ripe for reconsideration.” (In re Jaime
P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 133.) “ ‘This is especially so when [the
issues under consideration] . . . relate[] to “matter[s] of
continuing concern” to the community at large.’ ” (Moradi-
Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 296.)
8
Although the LAPPL has not raised any arguments
directly predicated on the stare decisis effect of Stanistreet, we
nonetheless think it appropriate to address this “fundamental
jurisprudential policy.” (Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296 (Moradi-Shalal).)
29
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Those factors are clearly implicated here. We are
presented with a constitutional question regarding the validity
of a statute that implicates a subject — “ ‘[c]riticism of public
officials[ — that] lies at the very core of speech protected by the
First Amendment.’ ” (Green v. City of St. Louis (8th Cir. 2022)
52 F.4th 734, 739 (Green); accord Hernandez v. City of Phoenix
(9th Cir. 2022) 43 F.4th 966, 981.) What restrictions, and in
particular what criminal restrictions, our government may
place on speech related to the misconduct of police officers is
clearly a matter of continuing concern to the public at large.
Moreover, in the years since Stanistreet was decided,
multiple federal decisions have rejected its reasoning, creating
a split of authority that has resulted in a mandatory injunction
issued by a state superior court (and affirmed by the Court of
Appeal) directing that the City enforce section 148.6(a)(2)’s
admonishment requirement despite the fact that the Ninth
Circuit has held that the criminal provision that section
148.6(a)(2) references is unconstitutional. (See Swift & Co. v.
Wickham (1965) 382 U.S. 111, 116 [reevaluation of precedent
may be necessary where prior holding has created practical
complications or resulted in “mischievous consequences to
litigants and courts”].)9
9
The potential problems that split has caused are not just
theoretical. In Cuadra v. City of South San Francisco (N.D.Cal.,
Jan. 4, 2010, No. C 08-3439 TEH) 2010 WL 55875 (Cuadra), the
plaintiff brought a federal civil rights action against the City of
South San Francisco after being arrested for violating section
148.6(a)(1). The officers who prepared the police report that led
to the plaintiff’s arrest moved for summary judgment on the
30
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Most critically, as discussed in more detail below, since
Stanistreet was decided, the United States Supreme Court has
issued multiple rulings that provide further guidance regarding
how we should evaluate the constitutionality of a statute like
section 148.6(a), which discriminates based on content within a
proscribable class of knowing falsehoods (defamation). (See
Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188 [describing when
restrictions on speech that fall outside “ ‘the general
prohibition’ ” on content-based regulations warrant heightened
scrutiny]; Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 709 [false statements do
not qualify as a category of unprotected speech]; Free Speech
Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 495 [content-based restrictions
that regulate unprotected speech are subject to heightened
review if they incidentally burden protected speech].)
For all those reasons, we believe this is an appropriate
case in which to revisit our prior precedent in Stanistreet.
C. Is Section 148.6(a)(1) a Valid Restraint on
Speech?
1. Section 148.6(a) qualifies as a content-based
regulation within a proscribable category of speech
The question we must address in this case is whether
section 148.6(a) constitutes an impermissible content-based
restriction on speech. The parties do not dispute that the
statute, which makes it a crime to file a knowingly false
“allegation” of police misconduct and compels complainants to
basis of qualified immunity. The federal court denied the
motion, explaining that there “was no probable cause to arrest
[plaintiff] for breaking a law that had already been held
unconstitutional [by the Ninth Circuit], which means a
constitutional right was violated.” (Id. at pp. *28–29.)
31
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
read and sign an admonition acknowledging it is a crime to file
a knowingly false “complaint against an officer,” qualifies as a
content-based regulation of speech. (§ 148.6(a), capitalization
and boldface omitted; see generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert
(2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163 (Reed) [a law is content based if it
“applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or
the idea or message expressed”]; McCullen v. Coakley (2014)
573 U.S. 464, 479 [law is content based if it “require[s]
‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the content of the message
that is conveyed to determine whether’ a violation [of the law]
has occurred”].)
Content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional
and generally subject to strict scrutiny. (Reed, supra, 576 U.S.
at p. 163.) Notwithstanding that general rule, our high court
has identified limited situations in which strict scrutiny does not
automatically apply. It is well-established, for example, that
content-based restrictions are permissible on speech that falls
within certain “ ‘ “historic and traditional categories [of
expression] long familiar to the bar,” ’ ” including (among other
categories) defamation, fraud, fighting words and obscenity.
(Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 717, plur. opn of Kennedy, J.; see
R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388.) R. A. V., in turn, established
an alternate framework of analysis for “content discrimination
among various instances of a class of proscribable speech.”
(R. A. V., at p. 388; see Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d at p. 1224 [“The
leading case establishing the First Amendment’s application to
proscribable classes of speech is R. A. V.”].)
Accordingly, the first issue we must address is whether
section 148.6(a) qualifies as a content-based restriction within a
proscribable category of speech, thus triggering review under
32
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
the principles of R. A. V., or whether it implicates “fully
protected speech” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387), thus
automatically triggering strict scrutiny review. As explained
above, Stanistreet concluded that review under R. A. V. was
appropriate because “[s]ection 148.6 proscribes only
constitutionally unprotected speech — knowingly false
statements of fact.” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 501,
italics added; see id. at p. 508 [“the entire class of speech at
issue — knowingly false statements of fact — is proscribable”].)
Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. 709, however, has since suggested that
we were incorrect in concluding that knowingly false statements
of fact qualify as a category of proscribable speech. (See ante, at
pp. 26–28.)
While true that without the benefit of Alvarez, Stanistreet
broadly characterized the relevant category of proscribable
speech as “knowingly false statements of fact” (Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 508), our analysis in that case
nonetheless makes clear that we also viewed section 148.6(a) as
regulating a subclass of false statements that unquestionably
falls outside the protections of the First Amendment, namely
defamatory falsehoods. Our decision, for example,
characterized the defendants’ core constitutional argument to be
that section 148.6(a) impermissibly establishes different
“defamation rule[s]” for complaints against peace officers.
(Stanistreet, at p. 507.) Further, when summarizing the
applicable First Amendment principles at issue, we focused
almost exclusively on Supreme Court precedent addressing the
limitations on defamation actions against public officials. (See
id. at pp. 505–506 [discussing New York Times, supra, 376 U.S.
254 and Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64].) And when
33
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
addressing why we need not consider “the California
Constitution as a separate basis to invalidate section 148.6,” we
explained that “California law regarding defamation is
coterminous with that of the United States Constitution.”
(Stanistreet, at p. 504, fn. 3; see id. at p. 507, fn. 4 [noting that
R. A. V. “cited defamation as an example of the kind of
proscribable speech it was talking about”].)
We now confirm what we implied in Stanistreet: section
148.6(a) criminalizes allegations of police misconduct that are
defamatory in nature. Indeed, the legislative history makes
clear that one of the primary motivations in enacting section
148.6(a) was to protect law enforcement from the professional
and reputational harms that result from knowingly false
allegations of misconduct. (See ante, at pp. 10–12; Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 503 [§ 148.6(a) was intended to address
“frivolous complaints which can affect the individual officer’s
future” and have an “ ‘adverse impact’ ” on peace officers’
careers], italics added; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 569, com. e
[statements that “attribute . . . conduct or characteristics
incompatible with the proper conduct . . . or with the proper
discharge of . . . duties as a public officer” are generally deemed
to be defamatory].) Accordingly, we conclude that section
148.6(a) constitutes a content-based regulation within a
proscribable category of speech and is therefore subject to
review under the framework set forth in R. A. V.
2. Application of R. A. V.
a. General principles guiding the evaluation of
content-based regulations of defamation
R. A. V. makes clear that some forms of content-based
regulation within a proscribable class of speech warrant
34
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
heightened scrutiny while others do not. (See R. A. V., supra,
505 U.S. at p. 384.) The high court’s decision, however, leaves
some uncertainty as to how, exactly, courts should evaluate
whether a particular form of content-based regulation within a
proscribable class of speech warrants additional scrutiny.
Broadly speaking, the court explained that while content-based
regulations are generally prohibited because they “ ‘raise[] the
specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas
or viewpoints from the marketplace’ ” (id. at p. 388), many forms
of “content discrimination among various instances of a class of
proscribable speech . . . do[] not pose this threat” (id. at p. 388).
The court then described three categories of content
discrimination within a proscribable category of speech that
generally “do not threaten to drive ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace and hence are permissible.” (Stanistreet,
29 Cal.4th at p. 508, citing R. A. V., at pp. 388–390.)
While these three categories play an important role in
assessing whether a content-based regulation within a
proscribable category of speech warrants further scrutiny, we
believe they are best understood as proxies for the ultimate
question that courts must decide when evaluating such a
regulation: Does the form of regulation that the Legislature
adopted create a consequential risk of “ ‘driv[ing] certain ideas
or viewpoints’ ” from the public sphere? (R. A. V., supra,
505 U.S. at p. 387; see Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188
[characterizing the first R. A. V. “category” of permissible
regulation — “when the selected subclass is chosen for the very
reason that the entire class can be proscribed” — as one
situation where “the risk” that the regulation “will
35
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
impermissibly interfere with the marketplace of ideas” is so
“inconsequential” that further scrutiny “is unwarranted”].)
Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S 709, applied similar principles in
the context of regulations that prohibit knowing falsehoods. A
majority of the court there concluded that some forms of
prohibitions on knowingly false statements, even well-
intentioned ones, can trigger constitutional scrutiny if the
prohibition is written in such a manner that it unduly burdens
protected speech. (See id. at p. 723, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.
[permitting the government to criminalize any knowingly false
statement regarding the receipt of a military medal, regardless
of context, would “cast[] a chill . . . the First Amendment cannot
permit”]; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J. [while limiting the
Act to “knowing and intentional acts of deception . . . reduc[es]
the risk that valuable speech is chilled,” the “breadth” of the
statute nonetheless “creates a significant risk of First
Amendment harm”; “a speaker might still be worried about
being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even if he does
not have the intent required to render him liable”], italics
omitted.) Thus, much like content-based regulations within a
proscribable category of speech, a core concern with statutes
targeting knowing falsehoods is whether they risk driving out
certain forms of ideas from the marketplace, which includes
“true” (or at least well-intentioned) speech. (Id. at pp. 733, 736,
conc. opn. of Breyer, J. [prohibitions on falsity “can inhibit the
speaker from making true statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind
of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart”; “a speaker
might . . . be worried about being prosecuted for a careless false
36
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
statement, even if he does not have the intent required to render
him liable”], italics omitted.)10
Most recently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Free
Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, confirmed what was
implied in R. A. V. and Davenport: Statutes that regulate only
unprotected categories of speech can be subject to heightened
scrutiny if they have “ ‘an incidental effect on protected
speech.’ ” (Free Speech Coalition, at p. 478, quoting Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale (2000) 530 U.S. 640, 659.) Thus, the mere
fact that we have construed section 148.(6)(a) as applying to an
unprotected category of speech — knowingly false, defamatory
claims of police misconduct — does not foreclose the possibility
that the statute’s impacts on protected speech (truthful or well-
intentioned claims of police misconduct) might warrant
heightened review.
While there remains some uncertainty regarding the
specific contours of the high court holdings discussed above, the
fundamental principle we derive from those cases is that when
assessing a content-based regulation within a proscribable class
of speech, courts must evaluate whether the “risk” (Davenport,
supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188) that the prohibition will “ ‘drive
certain ideas or viewpoints’ ” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387)
10
In Alvarez, 567 U.S 709, the court expressed concerns
about multiple effects of the Stolen Valor Act, which broadly
criminalized knowingly false claims of having received certain
types of military medals. Those concerns included prohibiting
lies in contexts where they were unlikely to cause harm (e.g.,
private conversations in the bedroom) and chilling nonmalicious
forms of speech, including true speech. (See id., plur. opn. of
Kennedy J., at pp. 722–723; conc. opn. of Breyer, J., at pp. 733–
734, 736.)
37
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
from the public sphere is so “inconsequential” (Davenport, at
p. 188) that further constitutional scrutiny is unwarranted.
(See R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387.) Stated differently,
courts should ask whether the regulation disfavors certain
viewpoints (as in R. A. V.) or is structured in a manner that
burdens protected forms of speech, whether directly (as in
Alvarez) or incidentally (as in Free Speech Coalition). Alvarez
suggests that when a statute targets a form of knowing
falsehood (as section 148.6(a) does), the court’s evaluation
should take into account whether the prohibition is drafted in
such a manner that it creates a consequential risk of chilling
citizens from engaging in protected forms of speech, including
truthful speech. Consideration should also be given to the
various categories of content discrimination described in
R. A. V. that generally “do[] not threaten censorship of ideas.”
(R. A. V. at p. 393; see id. at p. 388.)
Finally — and critically — while R. A. V. includes
language suggesting as much, cases like Davenport, Alvarez,
and Free Speech Coalition make clear that in conducting this
inquiry, the ultimate question is not whether there is reason to
believe that the government actually intended to drive out
certain viewpoints or forms of protected speech, but rather
whether the means that government has selected — even if well-
intentioned — create a substantial risk of doing so. (See
R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 387, 388 [some forms of content-
based regulations within proscribable classes of speech do not
“pose [the] . . . threat” of “ ‘effectively driv[ing] certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace’ ”], italics added; Davenport,
supra, 551 U.S. at pp. 188, 189 [describing relevant inquiry as
38
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
whether regulation “pose[s] a threat to the marketplace of ideas”
or “impermissibly distort[s] the marketplace of ideas”].)
b. Section 148.6(a) raises substantial risks to the
marketplace of ideas
Applying the R. A. V. framework, as supplemented by the
high court’s analysis in Davenport, Alvarez, and Free Speech
Coalition, we conclude that section 148.6(a)’s criminal provision
(subdivision (a)(1)) and its accompanying admonition
requirement (subdivision (a)(2)) exhibit numerous
characteristics that, considered together, “incidental[ly]
burden” (Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 483) or
otherwise present a reasonable risk of driving certain forms of
protected speech — namely, truthful (or at least not knowingly
false) complaints of police misconduct — from the public sphere
so as to warrant additional scrutiny.
First, section 148.6(a) does not merely regulate speech,
but imposes criminal liability on speech. As our high court has
repeatedly explained, “[T]he severity of criminal sanctions may
well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate
even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. [Citation.]
As a practical matter, this increased deterrent effect . . . poses
greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated by . . .
civil regulation.” (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
521 U.S. 844, 872 (Reno); see City of Houston v. Hill (1987)
482 U.S. 451, 459 [“Criminal statutes [involving speech] must
be scrutinized with particular care”]; U.S. v. Caronia (2d Cir.
2012) 703 F.3d 149, 163 [“Criminal regulatory schemes [on
speech] . . . warrant even more careful scrutiny”]; Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union (2004) 542 U.S. 656, 660
[“Content-based prohibitions, enforced by severe criminal
39
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
penalties, have the constant potential to be a repressive force in
the lives and thoughts of a free people”].)
Second, section 148.6(a) singles out for criminal treatment
speech that is critical of a particular class of government
official — law enforcement — whose “duties . . . tend naturally
to have a relatively large or dramatic impact on members of the
public.” (Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1611
(Kahn).) Courts have long emphasized that “the freedom to
criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing is a
fundamental First Amendment value.” (Arnett v. Myers (6th
Cir. 2002) 281 F.3d 552, 560; see Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966)
383 U.S. 75, 85 [“Criticism of government is at the very center
of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion.
Criticism of those responsible for government operations must
be free, lest criticism of government itself be penalized”].) Thus,
section 148.6(a) is rare not only in that it imposes a form of
penalty that has been recognized to have a particularly
deterrent effect on speech — criminal liability — but also
implicates a topic — criticism of law enforcement — that “ ‘lies
at the very core of . . . the First Amendment.’ ” (Green, supra,
52 F.4th at p. 739.)
Adding to those concerns, section 148.6(a)(1)’s criminal
provision is asymmetrical in its application, criminalizing
knowingly false complaints filed against law enforcement
personnel — and expressly requiring complainants be told of
that possibility — while leaving unregulated (and requiring no
admonition against) knowingly false claims that a witness
might make against the complainant during any ensuing
40
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
investigation.11 LAPPL argues that this asymmetry is
understandable given that a knowingly false allegation of
misconduct triggers a mandatory investigation but a knowingly
false statement supportive of law enforcement has no such
effect. That does not change the fact, however, that
complainants face a situation in which they can be prosecuted if
authorities believe they are lying about their allegations of
misconduct — and are forcefully reminded of that possibility
through the admonition requirement (discussed more below) —
but witnesses speaking in favor of the accused officers would
face no such consequence under this law were they to lie about
the events in question. The concern with the statute then is not
its “ ‘underinclusiveness’ ” per se (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at
p. 387) — i.e., extending speech-related protections to one
11
Multiple federal courts have held that section 148.6(a)’s
disparate treatment of false claims made against police versus
false claims made in support of police in the context of an official
investigation qualifies as a form of “viewpoint” discrimination,
a subset of content-based restrictions that can “rarely, if ever,
. . . withstand [constitutional] . . . scrutiny.” (Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Commissioner of
Virginia Dept. of Motor Vehicles (4th Cir. 2002) 288 F.3d 610,
616, fn. 4; see Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d at p. 1227 [§ 148.6(a)
“regulates an unprotected category of speech, but singles out
certain speech . . . based on the speaker’s viewpoint”]; Hamilton
II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1094 [§ 148.6(a) “discriminates
based on viewpoint”].)
Because we conclude that section 148.6(a) is an invalid
content-based regulation, we need not address whether it might
also qualify as an invalid viewpoint-based regulation. (See
generally Iancu v. Brunetti (2019) 588 U.S. 388, 418, conc. & dis.
opn. of Sotomayor, J. [“the line between viewpoint-based and
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination can be ‘slippery’ ”].)
41
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
category of public official that other persons do not enjoy — but
rather that it does not treat defamatory expressions made in the
context of the same official police misconduct proceeding the
same way.12
More troubling still, section 148.6(a)(1)’s criminal
provision is accompanied by an admonition requirement that
contains various speech deterring elements. Section 148.6(a)(2)
prohibits law enforcement from accepting an official claim of
misconduct unless the complainant reads and signs an
admonition, which must be written in bold printed capital
letters, warning that “IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE
A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. IF YOU
MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER
KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE
12
The dissent argues that these asymmetry concerns are
unfounded because a witness testifying in support of a peace
officer would still be subject to criminal liability under section
132. (See dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 9–10.) That provision
directs that, in any trial or official proceeding, it is a crime to
submit a knowingly forged or fraudulently altered “instrument
in writing.” (§ 132.) The asymmetry remains, however, because
section 132 would not appear to reach oral statements a witness
for the peace officer might make during an official investigation.
The dissent also relies on section 118, which is California’s
prohibition on perjury. But section 118 pertains only to people
who have taken an oath and the dissent has provided no basis
to conclude that witness statements made in the context of
section 832.5 police investigations are generally required to be
made under oath. Nothing in section 132 or section 118 alters
the basic fact that section 148.6(a) criminalizes knowingly false
allegations of misconduct that are filed against a peace officer
while leaving unregulated knowingly false allegations that are
made in support of an accused peace officer.
42
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
PROSECUTED.” (Ibid.) Potential complainants are thus
effectively told: To lodge a complaint against a police officer, you
must first sign an acknowledgment that we can charge you with
a crime if we think you are being knowingly untruthful about
the allegations of misconduct levied against the employees of
our agency. Those concerns are compounded by the fact that, at
least in some situations, it appears that the admonition will be
provided by another law enforcement agent in the setting of a
police station. And these concerns are further exacerbated by
the fact that the very entity the citizen is making the complaint
to will often be the same entity that decides whether the
complainant has committed a crime pursuant to this statute for
purposes of effectuating their arrest. (See Cuadra, supra, 2010
WL 55875 [supervising captain of precinct found the defendant’s
allegations of misconduct untruthful and prepared report
referring the defendant for prosecution under section 148.6(a)].)
As Justice Werdegar astutely observed in Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, subdivision (a)(2) “is unique in its
mandate that the possibility of criminal sanctions for knowingly
false complaints be prominently held up before prospective
complainants at a critical juncture. In many police misconduct
situations, it inevitably will come down to the word of the citizen
against the word of the police officer or officers, in which case
law enforcement authorities will conduct an investigation to
determine who is telling the truth. If authorities for any reason
disbelieve the citizen, the citizen (whether guilty or innocent)
may then . . . face both criminal prosecution and the burden and
expense of retaining a defense attorney. Prospective
complainants cannot help but be aware of these realities when
deciding whether to go forward with their complaints by signing
43
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
the statute’s required admonition. Realistically, some
complainants are likely to choose not to go forward — even when
they have legitimate complaints.” (Id. at pp. 513–514, conc. opn.
of Werdegar, J., italics omitted; accord Hamilton II, supra,
325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1094 [“There is a high likelihood that
Section 148.6’s warning will cause individuals to refrain from
filing a complaint against law enforcement officers”].) Similarly
problematic, the admonition requirement may well deter
reporting by persons who merely suspect, but cannot be certain,
that they were a victim of more subtle forms of police misconduct
such as racial profiling or an unlawful stop. (See Alvarez, supra,
at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J. [mens rea element does not
eliminate the risk that “a speaker might . . . be worried about
being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even if he does
not have the intent required to render him liable”], italics
omitted.)
In sum, subdivision (a)(2) requires that: (1) complainants
walk into a police station and locate the appropriate person to
complain to, who will likely be a uniformed police officer; (2)
complainants make known that they want to levy a serious
complaint of misconduct against one of the colleagues of the
person they are complaining to; (3) complainants will then be
told that before the police will even accept a complaint, they
must sign an advisory acknowledging that they can be
criminally charged if law enforcement believes that anything
they say is knowingly false; and (4) the entity that will make a
determination of falsity for purposes of effectuating an arrest is,
in the first instance, likely to be the very entity that the person
is complaining about. It is reasonable to assume that when
presented with such a situation, some citizens — whether
44
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
fearful of retaliation for truthful reports of misconduct or merely
uncertain whether the alleged misconduct can be proven —
might well throw up their hands and ask, “Why bother?”
Raising further concerns, the language of subdivisions
(a)(1) and (a)(2) introduces uncertainty and confusion as to the
specific scope of statements that might fall within the criminal
provision. Subdivision (a)(1) criminalizes any knowingly false
“allegation of misconduct” but includes no definition of what
might constitute “misconduct.” (See, e.g., Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania (1966) 382 U.S. 399, 404 [statute allowing jury to
assess costs based on a finding that party engaged in
“misconduct” deemed impermissibly vague]; Perrine v.
Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 656, 663 [statute deemed vague
for failing to “define what constitutes ‘acts of sexual
misconduct’ ”]; Soglin v. Kauffman (7th Cir. 1969) 418 F.2d 163,
168 [the “use of ‘misconduct’ ” as a standard in imposing student
discipline “contains no clues which could assist . . . in
determining whether conduct not transgressing statutes is
susceptible to punishment”].) Nor does subdivision (a)(1)
expressly require that the false statement be material to the
allegations at issue or that the statement actually caused any
harm to the accused. (See Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Reynolds (8th Cir. 2021) 8 F.4th 781, 787 (Animal Legal Defense
Fund) [applying Alvarez in invalidating a statute prohibiting
falsehoods on an employment application and noting that “the
absence of a materiality requirement” distinguished the statute
from “permissible prohibitions on fraud, perjury, and lying to
government officials”].)
Subdivision (a)(2)’s admonition provision uses entirely
different — and arguably erroneous — language to explain the
45
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
scope of subdivision (a)(1)’s criminal provision. It states, in
relevant part: “You have the right to make a complaint against
a police officer for any improper police conduct. . . . [¶] It is
against the law to make a complaint that you know to be false.
If you make a complaint against an officer knowing that it is
false, you can be prosecuted on a misdemeanor charge.”
(§ 148.6(a)(2), italics added and boldface and all caps omitted.)
The term “improper police conduct” could be reasonably
construed as encompassing a broader category of behavior than
“misconduct.” (Compare Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 826,
col. 1 [defining “improper” as “incorrect; unsuitable or
irregular”] with id. at p. 1089, col. 1 [defining “misconduct” as “a
dereliction of duty”].) And whereas subdivision (a)(1) makes
clear that it is a knowingly false “allegation of misconduct” that
triggers the criminal sanction, the admonition in subdivision
(a)(2) simply states it is a misdemeanor to file any “complaint”
that one knows to be false. Given that complainants must also
be asked to sign the admonition attesting they “have read and
understood the above statement” (even though they might not
have), a legitimate complainant might reasonably but
erroneously conclude they are being asked to guarantee the
accuracy of all facts contained in the complaint under threat of
possible prosecution, and not simply those material to the
allegations of misconduct. (See Racial Identity & Profiling
Advisory Board (RIPA) Annual Report 2025, at pp. 170–171
<https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-
2025.pdf> [as of Nov. 10, 2025]13 (RIPA Annual Report 2025)
13
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year,
docket number and case name at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/
opinions/cited-supreme-court-opinions>
46
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
[advisory’s wording may cause citizens to believe that “the
inclusion of a single, inaccurate allegation that is not material
to the claim of misconduct is enough for prosecution”].) Given
the breadth and “different linguistic form[s]” (Reno, supra,
521 U.S. at p. 871) of the language that subdivisions (a)(1) and
(a)(2) employ in defining the scope of potential criminal liability,
the statute raises concerns that persons of common intelligence
will be left to “guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.” (Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926)
269 U.S. 385, 391; Reno, at p. 871 [statute’s use of “different
linguistic form[s]” to describe scope of potential criminal liability
“will provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two
standards relate to each other and just what they mean”], fn.
omitted.)
We acknowledge that section 148.6(a) does have certain
narrowing requirements. First, as noted, section 148.6(a)(1)
applies only to knowingly false allegations of misconduct. But
as our high court made clear in Alvarez, the presence of a mens
rea requirement does not invariably shield content-based
statutes regulating falsity from constitutional scrutiny. In this
case, we are unpersuaded that the statute’s limitation to
knowing falsehoods eliminates the substantial chilling risks
presented by the combined effects of the various characteristics
discussed above.
Second, unlike the Stolen Valor Act at issue in Alvarez,
section 148.6(a) does not criminalize knowingly false claims of
police misconduct “made to any person, at any time, in any
context.” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 720, plur. opn. of
Kennedy, J.) Instead, section 148.6(a) applies only to persons
who “file[]” a knowingly false allegation of police misconduct.
47
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
We have previously construed this language to limit the
statute’s application to official complaints of misconduct that
trigger the investigation requirements set forth in section
832.5. (See Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 511 [“section
148.6 applies only to formally filed accusations that the agency
must investigate”].) Presumably then, the statute would not
apply to knowing falsehoods delivered through other channels,
such as picketing, social media or the press. The fact remains,
however, that the “context” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 720,
plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) section 148.6(a) does target (official
citizens’ complaints) is a particularly important and utilitarian
form of government criticism in California: complaints that the
government is required to investigate and respond to. The fact
that section 148.6(a) leaves other avenues of criticism
unregulated does little to negate our concerns regarding the
statute’s potential speech-deterring effects on the most
accessible and effective mode of reporting police misconduct
that is available to the citizens of California.
In sum, we do not question whether section 148.6(a) was
intended to address a legitimate problem facing law
enforcement (the filing of knowingly false police complaints), or
that a different law crafted more narrowly and specifically
might pass constitutional muster. Nonetheless, we conclude
that the combined effect of the statutory scheme creates more
than an “inconsequential” risk of driving out certain ideas or
viewpoints that are at the very core of the First Amendment,
namely speech that reveals, and seeks redress for, official
abuses of power. Much like the situation in Free Speech
Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, because section 148.6(a) targets
an unprotected category of speech (knowingly false defamatory
48
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
allegations of misconduct) in a manner that incidentally
burdens protected speech (well-intentioned reports of police
misconduct) further constitutional scrutiny is warranted.14
c. Stanistreet’s application of R. A. V.
LAPPL’s defense of section 148.6(a) focuses on the
reasoning of Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th 497, which was
issued without the benefit of decisions such as Davenport,
14
Although Free Speech Coalition makes clear that
regulations on unprotected speech are subject to heightened
scrutiny if they incidentally burden protected speech, the
opinion does not examine what qualifies as an “incidental
burden” or how courts should evaluate whether a regulation on
unprotected speech burdens protected speech. In our view,
however, the burden section 148.6(a) places on truthful (or at
least not knowingly false) reports of police misconduct is at least
as great (and arguably greater) than the “modest burden” (Free
Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 496) that the statute at
issue in Free Speech Coalition places on adults’ ability to access
sexually explicit material. That statute required adult websites
to verify users’ age through various means such as a simple
“credit-card transaction[]” (ibid.) or obtaining proof of age
through “a third-party verification service” (id. at p. 497).
According to the court, similar verification methods were
already in use by “tens of thousands” of adult websites and
numerous other age-restricted online services. (Ibid.)
As enumerated above, the statute here includes a broadly
worded criminal provision that is accompanied by an unusual
admonition requirement. These statutory elements, as
described by the Hamilton II court, create a “potent
disincentive” for citizens to file even well-intentioned complaints
of police misconduct. (Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at
p. 1094; see ante, at pp. 39–49.) We do not believe that section
148.6(a)’s potential chilling impacts can be reasonably
characterized as less obtrusive than submitting proof of age to a
third-party verification service.
49
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Alvarez and Free Speech Coalition (and before multiple federal
courts found section 148.6(a) violative of free speech principles).
As noted, Stanistreet did not directly address whether the
features of section 148.6(a) risk driving certain ideas or
viewpoints from the public sphere by burdening protected
speech. Instead, Stanistreet’s analysis focused on whether
section 148.6(a) fell within any of the three categories of content-
based regulations that R. A. V. had — in the words of
Stanistreet — “identified [as] . . . not threaten[ing] to drive ideas
or viewpoints from the marketplace.” (Stanistreet, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 508.) Stanistreet ultimately concluded that
section 148.6(a) fell within each of three R. A. V.-delineated
categories and was therefore constitutionally “permissible.”
(Stanistreet, at p. 508.) Our analysis gave little consideration as
to whether or how the principles of R. A. V. might apply to
content-based regulations within proscribable classes of speech
that have an incidental burden on protected forms of speech,
including true (or well-intentioned) speech.15 Instead, we
15
To the extent Stanisreet addressed the potential effects
that section 148.6(a) might have on protected speech, it did so
only through the framework of the overbreadth doctrine, a
variant of First Amendment jurisprudence law whereby “a law
may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” (United States v. Stevens
(2010) 559 U.S. 460, 473 (Stevens).) Stanistreet reasoned that
because section 148.6(a) only applies to knowingly false and
officially filed claims of misconduct — a variant of speech it
deemed to be categorically unprotected — the statute could not
be said to be overbroad. (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 511.)
50
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
effectively concluded that if a content-based regulation falls
within any one of the R. A. V. categories, it is valid under the
First Amendment.
However, with the benefit of subsequent case law, we
believe that when assessing a content-based regulation within a
proscribable category of speech, consideration should be given
not only to whether the regulation falls within one of the
categories described in R. A. V., but also whether the regulation
may incidentally burden protected speech. (See Free Speech
Coalition, 606 U.S. at pp. 482–483.) In other words, the R. A. V.
categories are best understood as examples of content
discrimination that generally pose a lesser risk of either
suppressing disfavored viewpoints or consequentially burdening
protected speech. (See ante, at pp. 34–39.) As explained above,
in this case we are concerned about section 148.6(a)’s potential
effects on protected speech.
Applying the first R. A. V. category, for example, LAPPL
argues that the reason defamation is proscribable — to protect
As explained above, however, the problem with section
148.6(a) is not that the statute violates the overbreadth doctrine
by criminalizing some forms of protected speech. Indeed, we
agree with Stanistreet that, on its face, the statute only
criminalizes unprotected speech (knowing, defamatory
falsehoods). (See ante, at pp. 32–34.) Rather, the problem is
that under the framework R. A. V. provides for evaluating
content discrimination within a proscribable class of speech, we
cannot say that the risk of official suppression of ideas through
section 148.6(a), including the risk of deterring citizens from
filing truthful complaints of police misconduct is so
“inconsequential” as to uphold the statute with no further
scrutiny. (Davenport, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 188; see also Free
Speech Coalition, supra, 606. U.S. at pp. 482–483, 495.)
51
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
against “injury to reputation” (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974)
418 U.S. 323, 348 ) — applies with special force in this context
because section 832.5 requires that all claims of misconduct filed
against law enforcement must be investigated, thereby exposing
accused officers to heightened risks of reputational and
professional harm. But even if we accept the premise that
section 832.5’s investigation requirements transform knowingly
false complaints against police officers into a particularly
injurious form of defamation, that does not mean that the
mechanism the Legislature chose to address those problems is
categorically immune from further scrutiny regardless of its
effect on protected speech. Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. 709, for
example, illustrates that while the government is frequently
justified in regulating false statements that are associated with
legitimate harms (in the case of Alvarez, compromising the
integrity of the Congressional Medal of Honor), courts will
nonetheless apply heightened scrutiny when the government’s
chosen means of deterring such falsity unduly burdens protected
speech. Similarly, as the high court explained in Free Speech
Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, heightened scrutiny is
warranted when the government chooses to regulate an
unprotected form of speech in a manner that incidentally
burdens protected forms of speech. The overarching principle
we draw from these authorities is that even if the reason
defamation is proscribable applies with special force in the
context of false complaints against police officers, that does not
license the Legislature to remedy those harms through a
52
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
mechanism that unnecessarily deters citizens from filing
truthful (or at least well-intentioned) complaints.16
Thus, even assuming section 832.5’s investigation
requirements can be said to create a particularly injurious form
of defamation that would justify some forms of content-based
regulations involving false complaints against police, that does
not alter our conclusion that the means the Legislature chose
here raise constitutional concerns due to their potential to
excessively deter truthful (or at least well-intentioned) criticism
of the government. (See Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 723, plur.
opn. of Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 736, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.; Free
Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461.)
Similarly, we do not read R. A. V.’s second category of
regulations — speech-based restrictions “aimed only at the
‘secondary effects’ of the speech” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at
p. 394) — as creating a bright-line rule that immunizes from
heightened scrutiny any content discrimination within a
proscribable class of speech that targets the secondary effects of
speech. Indeed, Renton, supra, 475 U.S. 41, which R. A. V.
16
Surely the First Amendment must impose some
boundaries on the government’s authority to regulate what it
perceives as a particularly harmful subset of proscribable
speech. Assume, for example, that the Legislature passed a law
requiring the formal investigation of any claim of misconduct
filed against a state representative. Would that justify a law
imposing a mandatory 20-year prison sentence for any
knowingly false complaint of misconduct filed against a state
representative? Would it justify a law that required
complainants, in order to file such a complaint, to travel
personally to Sacramento and take a sworn oath to tell the truth
while standing in front of no less than fifty witnesses on the
Capitol steps?
53
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
repeatedly cites (see R. A. V., at pp. 389, 394), and other First
Amendment cases addressing the secondary effects doctrine
make clear that even regulations aimed at the secondary effects
of speech cannot be designed in a manner that unduly interferes
with speech itself. (See Alameda Books (2002) 535 U.S. 425,
434, plur. opn. of O’Connor, J. [ordinance targeting secondary
effects will be upheld only if government demonstrates that
“reasonable alternative avenues of communication remain[]
available”].) And again Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. 709, and Free
Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, now make clear that even
well-intentioned regulations that target falsity or that target
unprotected categories of speech can trigger heightened scrutiny
when they are structured in a manner that risks unduly
burdening protected forms of speech. We see no reason why a
different rule should apply to well-intentioned content-based
regulations that are meant to target only the secondary effects
of speech. For the reasons discussed above, to the extent section
148.6(a) can be properly characterized as being aimed only at
the secondary effects of false complaints of police misconduct,
the means that the Legislature chose to remedy those secondary
effects still pose a sufficient threat of deterring a core form of
protected speech so as to warrant additional scrutiny.
Finally, R. A. V.’s third category — which Stanistreet
coined as a “catchall” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509) —
applies to content-based regulations that do not present any
“realistic possibility” of “suppressi[ng]” any disfavored
viewpoints (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390) or burdening any
protected forms of speech (see Free Speech Coalition, supra,
606 U.S. at pp. 482–483, 495; see also Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S.
at pp. 709, 723, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 736, conc. opn.
54
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
of Breyer, J.). With the benefit of subsequent case law, we
construe this “general exception” (id. at p. 393) as merely
recognizing that there might be some forms of content
regulation within proscribable classes of speech where the
potential for favoring certain viewpoints or burdening protected
forms of speech are so obviously remote as to warrant no further
scrutiny. As an example, the high court posited that it could
“not think of any First Amendment interest that would stand in
the way of a State’s prohibiting only those obscene motion
pictures with blue-eyed actresses.” (R. A. V., at p. 390.)
Stanistreet concluded that R. A. V.’s “catchall” applied
because section 148.6(a) does “not suppress[] all complaints of
police misconduct, only knowingly false ones.” (Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509.) Thus, the Stanistreet majority
appears to have reasoned that knowingly false complaints of
official misconduct do not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.
While that conclusion may have been sound based on the
precedent that Stanistreet had available to it, subsequent case
law indicates that when evaluating a statute that discriminates
on the basis of content within a proscribable category of speech,
courts should additionally consider whether the statute
incidentally burdens protected speech. (See Free Speech
Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at pp. 482–483; cf. Alvarez, supra,
567 U.S. at pp. 709, 723, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.; id. at p. 736,
conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) Thus, contrary to Stanistreet’s
suggestion, the fact that section 148.6(a) only regulates
knowingly false claims of police misconduct does not foreclose
the possibility that it does so in a manner that consequentially
burdens protected speech, thus warranting heightened scrutiny.
55
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
For the reasons explained in detail above, while true that
section 148.6(a) targets “only knowingly false” claims of
misconduct (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 509), the
elements of the statute nonetheless present a consequential risk
of deterring protected speech (truthful or not knowingly false
complaints against police). (See ante, at pp. 39–49; Stanistreet,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 513–514, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.;
Hamilton II, supra, 325 F.Supp.2d at p. 1094.) While we
express no view whether any of these elements might unduly
burden speech when considered in isolation, we think it clear
that, considered together, they “threaten censorship of ideas”
(R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) by dissuading individuals
from making truthful (or at least well-intentioned) complaints.
As a result, R. A. V.’s “general exception” (R. A. V., supra,
505 U.S. at p. 393) is inapplicable.17
17
It also bears noting that section 148.6(a)’s restriction on
knowingly false claims against police officers is far afield from
the example that the high court provided to illustrate a form of
regulation that would fall within the catchall — i.e., a statute
that “prohibit[s] only those obscene motion pictures with blue-
eyed actresses.” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390.) That
example hypothesizes a category of regulation (no persons with
blue eyes) that cannot conceivably suppress any viewpoints or
ideas associated with the type of speech to which the regulation
applies (obscene motion pictures). Unlike a law that targets
police complaints, eye color cannot possibly be associated with a
specific viewpoint. Section 148.6(a), in contrast, has numerous
features that raise a substantial risk of deterring not only
knowingly false complaints against police, but truthful (or well-
intentioned) ones as well.
56
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
d. The dissent
The dissent concludes that section 148.6(a) should not be
subject to any form of heightened constitutional scrutiny. We
disagree.
i. Alvarez did not establish a new category of
proscribable speech
The dissent argues that heightened scrutiny is
unwarranted because section 148.6(a) constitutes a regulation
on falsity that is intended to “ ‘protect the integrity of
[g]overnment processes.’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3,
quoting Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 709, plur. opn. of
Kennedy, J.) In the dissent’s view, this qualifies as a
“ ‘ “ ‘historic and traditional categor[y] [of expression]’ ” ’ where
‘content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted.’ ”
(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3.) We are not aware of any
authority that has categorized falsities that threaten the
“ ‘integrity of government processes’ ” (ibid.) as one of “the few
‘ “historic and traditional categories [of proscribable speech]
long familiar to the bar.” ’ ” (Alvarez, at p. 709, plur. opn. of
Kennedy, J., quoting Stevens, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 468.) The
sole authority the dissent cites in support of that conclusion is
the plurality opinion in Alvarez. (See dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at
p. 3.)
The dissent’s reliance on Alvarez is notable not only
because plurality opinions do not constitute binding precedent
(as they do “not represent the views of a majority of the Court”
(CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America (1987) 481 U.S. 69,
81), but also because we find nothing in the Alvarez plurality
indicating that it intended to proclaim a new category of
proscribable speech. While it is true that the plurality signaled
57
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
approval of statutes that “prohibit falsely representing that one
is speaking on behalf of the Government” and described those
statutes as “protect[ing] the integrity of Government processes”
(Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 721, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.),
we do not view those comments as endorsing an expansion of the
“ ‘well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech’ ” that
have historically been deemed proscribable. (Stevens, supra,
559 U.S. at pp. 468–469.) As the Alvarez plurality
acknowledged later in its opinion, the Supreme Court has
consistently rejected any “ ‘freewheeling authority to declare
new categories of speech outside the scope of the First
Amendment,’ ” and will do so only when “presented with
‘persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part
of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.’ ”
(Alvarez, at p. 722, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) Against that
backdrop, we are doubtful that the plurality’s reference to the
purpose of statutes that prohibit falsely representing oneself as
a government actor was meant to endorse a new proscribable
category of speech. Indeed, in the intervening decade since it
was decided, we are not aware of any decision that has read
Alvarez so broadly.18
18
We do not dispute that the Alvarez plurality signaled the
constitutional validity of many existing restrictions on falsity
that can be said to protect government processes, including
sections 1001 and 912 of the United States Code. (See Alvarez,
supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 720–721, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.; accord
dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 5–6.) We disagree, however, with
the dissent’s further assertion that the plurality reached that
conclusion by creating a new category of proscribable speech,
i.e., false statements that can be said to threaten “ ‘the integrity
58
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
In our view, the only category of proscribable speech that
section 148.6(a) implicates is defamation. More specifically, as
we have construed it (and as Stanistreet construed it), section
148.6(a) regulates a subset of defamatory speech consisting of
allegations of professional misconduct targeted at law
enforcement agents. As discussed above, R. A. V. makes clear
that heightened scrutiny may apply to content-based
regulations within a proscribable class of speech. (See R. A. V.,
supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387 [“the First Amendment imposes . . . a
‘content discrimination’ limitation upon a State’s prohibition of
proscribable speech”].) And while Stanistreet and the parties’
briefing in this case focus squarely on R. A. V., the dissent
makes no mention of the allowance for the potential application
of heightened scrutiny that R. A. V. established in this context.
Nor does the dissent discuss the high court’s recent decision in
Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, which confirms that
heightened scrutiny applies to statutes that regulate
of [g]overnment processes.’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3.)
We are not aware of any authority that has endorsed that novel
proposition.
While it may be that many prohibitions on falsity that
protect the integrity of government processes are valid because
they are sufficiently circumscribed to achieve that purpose (see
Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 721, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.
[describing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 912 as “targeted
prohibitions”], italics added), we find nothing in the Alvarez
plurality that suggests such laws are categorically immune from
constitutional scrutiny because they regulate a class of speech
that qualifies as one of “the few ‘ “historic and traditional
categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar.” ’ ” (Alvarez,
at p. 717, plur. opn. of Kennedy, J., quoting Stevens, supra,
559 U.S. at p. 468.)
59
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
proscribable speech in a manner that incidentally burdens
protected speech.
Instead, the dissent grounds its defense of the statute in
the proclamation of a new category of proscribable speech that
no party in this long-running litigation has ever proposed and
that no court has ever endorsed.
ii. The chilling effect of section 148.6(a)
The dissent’s second line of reasoning is that it sees no risk
(or at least no consequential risk) that the features of section
148.6(a) — particularly its admonition requirement — would
deter anyone from making a “good-faith complaint[].” (Dis. opn.
of Liu, J., post, at p. 11.)
In support, the dissent argues that while focusing on the
admonition’s threat of criminal liability, our analysis ignores
additional language in the admonition explaining that while the
agency may ultimately find there is not enough evidence to take
action on the complaint, the complainant still has the right to
“ ‘make the complaint and have it investigated.’ ” (Dis. opn. of
Liu, J., post, at p. 11, quoting § 148.6(a)(2).) According to the
dissent, this additional language “distinguishes between a good-
faith complaint that lacks ‘enough evidence’ and ‘a complaint
that you know to be false.’ ” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 11.)
The dissent further reasons that because a well-intentioned
complainant would “know” they are acting in good faith, and not
making “a complaint [they] know[] to be false” (ibid.), there is
no reasonable risk they would be deterred.
In our view, however, telling complainants that they have
a right to make a good-faith allegation of misconduct even if it
is ultimately deemed to be supported by insufficient evidence
60
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
does little to mitigate the deterrent effect of then immediately
telling them, but if we think you are lying, you can be charged
with a crime. The problem with the dissent’s argument is that
it assumes that simply because the complainant believes that
what they are saying is true — and because they have been told
that acting in good faith is not a crime — then they should have
no reason to be deterred from complaining. But as Justice
Werdegar explained, allegations involving police misconduct
will frequently “come down to the word of the citizen against the
word of the police officer” (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 513, conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.), and the admonition makes
prospective complainants acutely aware that they could face
“criminal prosecution and the burden and expense of retaining
a defense attorney” if authorities think they are being
knowingly untruthful. (Id. at p. 514.) Under such
circumstances, “some complainants are likely to choose not to go
forward.” (Ibid.)
The dissent disagrees with that line of reasoning. The fact
that it may be a complainant’s word against a police officer’s
does not alter the dissent’s view. Nor does the fact that before
citizens are even allowed to make a complaint, they are told they
may face criminal prosecution if their statements are deemed
knowingly untruthful. The fact that the entity that will make a
determination of falsity for purposes of effectuating an arrest
may, in the first instance, be the very entity that the person is
complaining about? The dissent is unpersuaded. The fact that
there is no materiality requirement in the admonition? This,
too, does not alter the dissent’s view because the average person
will understand that materiality is inherent in its terms. (See
dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 15–16.) The language of the
61
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
criminal provision does not even match the language of the
admonition? Mere “ ‘worldplay,’ ” says the dissent. (Id. at p. 15.)
Some might construe the scope of the statute to be vague and ill-
defined? That should only “increase the latitude for citizens to
make complaints in good faith” (id. at pp. 14–15) argues the
dissent, turning First Amendment jurisprudence on its head.
(See Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 109
[“where a vague statute ‘abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise
of [those] freedoms.’ Uncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens to ‘ “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked’ ”], fns.
omitted; see also RIPA Annual Report 2025, supra, at p. 170
[section 148.6(a) “could have a chilling effect on members of the
public . . . especially since there are no statutory limitations on
what types of ‘false’ allegations that could result in
prosecution”].) We take a different view: The question we must
ask is whether the average person might be deterred from
making even a truthful report of wrongdoing (or at least not a
knowingly false one) when they are admonished with the threat
of criminal prosecution — and required to sign a document
attesting to that admonishment — before they are allowed to
complain. We believe the answer to that question is clearly yes.
The dissent contends, however, that a report showing that
thousands of misconduct claims were filed in 2018 and
ultimately determined to be “ ‘unfounded’ ” belies any claim that
citizens are deterred from pursuing complaints. (Dis. opn. of
Liu, J., post, at p. 12.) The dissent appears to reason that
because many citizens were willing to come forward with
complaints in 2018 that could not ultimately be substantiated,
62
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
it is unlikely that section 148.6(a)’s admonition requirement
deters civilian complaints in any meaningful way. But the fact
that thousands of complaints were filed and deemed unfounded
(in a state with a population of 40 million) tells us little about
how many people may have been deterred from filing complaints
in the first instance.19
The dissent next argues that our concerns regarding the
deterring effects of section 148.6(a) are overstated because the
dissent has identified some jurisdictions that allow the signed
admonition to be submitted online. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at
p. 13 & appen.) As a preliminary matter, California is
comprised of over 500 law enforcement agencies. (See RIPA
Annual Report 2025, supra, at p. 18.) Thus, while true that
some jurisdictions have voluntarily chosen to allow
complainants to file their allegations online (perhaps
recognizing how intimidating it may be to file in person), there
has been no showing that all jurisdictions do so and the RIPA
Board’s findings imply otherwise.20 (See RIPA Annual Report
19
The dissent appears to limit its argument to statistics
from 2018 because most of the largest law enforcement agencies
in California — indeed 10 of the 15 largest — do not currently
include the admonition language in their complaint forms and
many have not been doing so since at least 2020. (See RIPA
Annual Report 2025, supra, at pp. 171–172 & fn. 650.) Given
that a vast majority of our largest law enforcement agencies are
not employing the admonition, any more recent complaint
statistics are particularly unhelpful.
20
The RIPA Board was established under The Racial and
Identity Profiling Act of 2015 (Stats. 2015, ch. 466, § 4) “for the
purpose of eliminating racial and identity profiling, and
improving diversity and racial and identity sensitivity in law
63
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
2020, at p. 70 <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/
ripa-board-report-2020.pdf> [as of Nov. 10, 2025] (RIPA Annual
Report 2020) [indicating that some jurisdictions may have low
numbers of reported complaints because “individuals . . . are
required to . . . bring in complaints in person”].) While laudable
that some law enforcement agencies have elected to implement
the statute in a less speech-deterring manner, that is cold
comfort to residents who live in jurisdictions where that may not
be the case.
More crucially, even if the initial complaint is submitted
online, that would not seem to end the complainant’s
participation in the matter. The language of the admonition and
text of section 832.5 both make clear that the law enforcement
agency has an obligation to conduct a follow-up investigation.
As the dissent expressly acknowledges, some law enforcement
agencies “require an in-person interview for a filed complaint to
go forward.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 13.) And even in
those jurisdictions that do not mandate an in-person interview,
the complainant would presumably (at least in most cases) be
required to speak with an investigating law enforcement agent
in some capacity. And the admonition makes complainants well
enforcement.” (§ 13519.4, subd. (j)(1).) The board is made up of
representatives of law enforcement, appointees from the
legislative and executive branches, attorneys, and community
members, spiritual leaders and academics who specialize in
policing and racial profiling. (See id. at subd. (j)(2).) The RIPA
Board is required to conduct “evidence-based research” (id. at
subd. (j)(3)(D)) on various police practices and issue an annual
report making policy recommendations for eliminating racial
and identity profiling (id. at subd. (j)(3)(E)).
64
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
aware they can be charged with a crime if the investigator
thinks they are being knowingly untruthful.
The dissent similarly argues that any risk of deterrence is
mitigated by the fact that law enforcement “agencies commonly
have structures designed to protect the integrity of
investigations.” (Dis. opn. of Liu J., post, at p. 14.) Again,
however, while some agencies may have such “structures” (ibid.)
in place (the dissent identifies only four such agencies), the
RIPA Board findings suggest that others likely do not. (See
RIPA Annual Report 2020, supra, at pp. 67–70 [law enforcement
agencies throughout California lack “a uniform system to
accept, document, investigate, and report complaints”].) Nor are
we persuaded that the average person would have any reason to
know about those “structures” (e.g., that some counties may
refer the complaint to an independent Internal Affairs Bureau
Office or Inspector General) when deciding whether to move
forward with a complaint. The admonition certainly does not
inform them of any such safeguards.
The dissent also expresses confusion as to how deterring
well-intentioned complaints of police misconduct could possibly
be said to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the public
sphere given that “complaints alleging misconduct by a peace
officer are generally confidential.” (Dis. opn. of Liu J., post, at
p. 18.) We think it clear, however, that when a regulation
substantially burdens a citizen’s ability to engage in protected
speech that relates to the conduct of government officials —
even speech that the larger public may not be privy too —
heightened scrutiny is required. The fact that allegations
within a complaint are generally confidential does nothing to
alter the speech deterring effects of the statute.
65
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
On a more fundamental level, we simply disagree with the
dissent’s suggestion that there is no reason to believe that
section 148.6(a)’s features — in particular its admonition
requirement — create a risk of deterring well-intentioned
reports of police misconduct. That is particularly true among
residents of communities that have historically experienced
“disproportionately . . . heightened levels of police scrutiny and
racial profiling.” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1054,
conc. opn. of Evans, J.) As the dissent itself acknowledges,
“[M]any people, especially members of minority, immigrant, or
low-income communities” may be reluctant to pursue claims of
police misconduct because “they may lack confidence their
complaints will be taken seriously” or they “may distrust law
enforcement.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 4; cf. Flores, at
pp. 1053–1055, conc. opn. of Evans, J.) The dissent nonetheless
finds no risk — or at least no meaningful risk — that individuals
who already harbor such concerns would be deterred by being
told (in many cases in a police station by a police officer) that
their complaint will not be accepted unless they agree to read
and sign an admonition (written in all capital letters and in
boldface print) warning that they may be charged with a crime
if the law enforcement agency about whom they are complaining
believes they are lying. The dissent is confident that this is “not
a message of deterrence” (dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 11) and
that our concerns amount to nothing more than “speculative
assertions” (id. at p. 4). But the entire point of the admonition
is to deter. While the statute explicitly seeks to deter only
knowingly false allegations of misconduct, we think it entirely
reasonable (and indeed probable) that threatening people with
66
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
prosecution under an ill-defined standard of falsity would also
give pause to those with well-intentioned complaints.
We are not alone in that conclusion. The district court in
Hamilton II, 325 F.Supp.2d 1087, for example, found that there
is a “high likelihood” that subdivision (a)(2)’s admonition
provisions “will cause individuals to refrain from filing a
complaint against law enforcement officers.” (Id. at p. 1094.)
The court further found that, “Overall, [s]ection 148.6 creates a
potent disincentive for citizens to file a complaint.” (Ibid.)
Multiple members of this court have expressed similar views.
(See Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 513–514, conc. opn. of
Werdegar, J.; Moreno, J., joining [§ 148.6(a)’s criminal provision,
coupled with its “unique” admonition requirement, will
“[r]ealistically, [cause] some complainants . . . to choose not to go
forward — even when they have legitimate complaints”].)
The Attorney General’s RIPA Board (see § 13519.4, subd.
(j); see ante, at p. 64, fn. 20), which includes several
representatives of law enforcement (see id. at subds. (j)(2)(A),
(C)–(F)), has also concluded that section 148.6(a)’s statutory
scheme risks deterring reasonable citizens from coming forward
with truthful complaints about police misconduct. In its most
recent annual report, the RIPA Board recommended (as it has
in every report since its inception) that “the Legislature delete
or amend” section 148.6(a)(2)’s admonition requirement,
explaining that the “the advisory language . . . could have a
chilling effect on members of the public seeking to file a
complaint, especially since there are no statutory limitations on
what types of ‘false’ allegations that could result in
prosecution. . . . [R]equiring a complainant to reveal their
identity [by signing the advisory] even if they wish to remain
67
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
anonymous, could [also] deter members of the public from
submitting valid complaints.”21 (RIPA Annual Report 2025,
supra, at pp. 170–171; see also RIPA Annual Report 2020,
supra, at p. 74 [“requiring complaints to be signed, in writing,
and under penalty of criminal prosecution may create an
unnecessary chilling effect . . . particularly those that allege
racial or identity profiling”].) Those recommendations are
consistent with guidance from the U.S. Department of Justice
(U.S. DOJ). (See Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S.
DOJ, Standards and Guidelines for Internal Affairs, p. 17
<https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/RIC/Publications/
cops-p164-pub.pdf> [as of Nov. 10, 2025] [“[u]nless required by
law, no threats or warning of prosecution or potential
prosecution for filing a false complaint should be made orally or
in writing to a complainant or potential complainant”].)
21
Several decisions highlight the potential concerns with
section 148.6(a). In Hamilton I, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d 1239, for
example, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action alleging that
he was repeatedly subjected to police misconduct but elected not
to move forward with a citizen complaint after the watch
commander questioned his story and read him the admonition
required by section 148.6(a)(2). And in Cuadra, supra, 2010 WL
55875, the defendant lodged a citizen’s complaint alleging that
he had been unlawfully stopped and beaten by several officers.
The officers denied the allegations, asserting that the defendant
was intoxicated and had sustained his injuries by “repeatedly
bash[ing] his head against the plastic divider.” (Id. at *1.) The
officers’ supervisor conducted an investigation and ultimately
believed the officers’ story. The defendant was thereafter
charged under section 148.6(a), but the charges were later
dismissed, and the defendant pursued a civil rights action
against the city.
68
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Although the RIPA Board includes numerous experts in
law enforcement, the dissent discounts its findings regarding
the potential deterrent effects of section 148.6(a)(2) (and
apparently the guidance of the U.S. DOJ) because those findings
were unaccompanied by empirical evidence such as “community
surveys.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17.) The dissent
contends that we should not (and indeed cannot) conclude that
section 148.(6) burdens speech in the absence of “evidence” (dis.
opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17) — presumably statistical evidence
or the like — confirming that the admonition risks deterring
well-intentioned complaints of police misconduct. That
approach, however, finds no support in the law. In the recently
decided Free Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, for
example — again a case the dissent does not reference — the
high court did not require any statistical proof or other
“evidence” that an age-verification requirement might deter
adults from accessing sexually explicit websites as a
precondition of finding that the regulation warranted
heightened scrutiny. That decision is consistent with other
cases in which our high court has considered the potential
deterring effects of speech regulations without looking to the
type of empirical evidence the dissent appears to call for here.
(See, e.g., Multimedia Holdings Corp. v. Circuit Court of
Florida, St. Johns County (2005) 544 U.S. 1301, 1304 [“A threat
of prosecution . . . raises special First Amendment concerns, for
it may chill protected speech . . . by putting that party at an
added risk of liability”]; Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C. (1996) 518 U.S.
727, 754 [written notice requirement would “restrict viewing by
subscribers who fear for their reputations should the operator
69
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
. . . inadvertently[] disclose the list of those who wish to watch
[explicit content]”].)
We join the many voices who have previously concluded
that as currently structured, section 148.6(a) presents a
meaningful risk of deterring a core form of protected speech —
well-intentioned reports of police misconduct — thus
warranting heightened scrutiny.
iii. Additional arguments
The dissent additionally argues that section 148.6(a) is no
different than statutes that “make it a crime to commit perjury”
or to “lie to a government official concerning an official matter.”
(Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 3.) Such statutes, however,
merely target — in a neutral manner — the act of lying about
any material issue during a particular form of proceeding. They
do not single out for special treatment lies that target a
particular category of government employment. The more apt
comparison would be a law barring perjury that relates to the
misconduct of a government official. And these laws certainly
do not require that, as a condition of filing a formal complaint
against a government employee, the complainant must sign an
admonition warning that they can be charged with a crime if
their allegations are deemed to be knowingly false.
The dissent also notes that section 148.6(a)(1)’s criminal
provision only applies when a person files a knowingly false
allegation of misconduct that triggers the citizen complaint
procedure and thus leaves unregulated claims of misconduct
conveyed in any number of other mediums, such as a “blog post,
viral email, or TikTok.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 6.) But
as we have explained above, the fact that section 148.6(a) does
70
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
not regulate all forms of statements concerning police
misconduct does little to negate our concerns regarding the
burdens the statute places on the most accessible and effective
mode of reporting police misconduct that is available to the
citizens of California. (See ante, at p. 48.) While the statute
may not chill what a person chooses to say about police
misconduct in a Tik Tok video, the fact that it risks chilling what
a person might report to the government (who has a duty to
investigate such reports) nonetheless raises constitutional
concerns.
3. Section 148.6 is not narrowly tailored to achieve its
purposes
Because section 148.6(a) constitutes a content-based
regulation within a proscribable category of speech that
presents a consequential risk of suppressing a core form of
protected speech, further constitutional scrutiny is warranted.
The level of scrutiny that applies to a regulation like section
148.6(a), which discriminates on the basis of content within a
proscribable category of falsehood (defamation), is somewhat
uncertain. While R. A. V. applied strict scrutiny to the content-
based regulation before it, that regulation was expressly deemed
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint — “a ‘more blatant’ and
‘egregious [subclass] of content discrimination.’ ” (Reed, supra,
576 U.S. at p. 168.) In this case, the primary concern with
section 148.6(a) is not that it disfavors any particular viewpoint
(as the statute in R. A. V. did), but rather its incidental burden
on protected forms of speech.
Moreover, section 148.6(a) does not directly regulate any
protectable form of speech. Rather, as we have construed it, the
statute only criminalizes malicious defamatory falsehoods. (See
71
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
ante, at pp. 33–34.) Thus, unlike many forms of content-based
regulations, the constitutional concern here is not that the state
is attempting to regulate a protected form of speech or that the
statute is written in such a manner that it sweeps protected
speech within its actual prohibitions. Rather, the concern is
that the means the state has selected to regulate a proscribable
form of speech risks deterring citizens from engaging in a
protected form of speech. The high court’s recent opinion in Free
Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. 461, suggests that under such
circumstances, intermediate scrutiny is generally the
appropriate standard of review. (Id. at pp. 482–483, 495.)
For purposes of this case, it is ultimately immaterial
whether intermediate or strict scrutiny applies because we
conclude that section 148.6(a) cannot survive even the less
exacting standard of intermediate scrutiny. (See Packingham,
supra, 582 U.S. at p. 105 [“Even making the assumption that
the statute is . . . subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision
cannot stand”]; McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) 572 U.S. 185, 199,
plur. opn. of Roberts, C. J. [because the statute “fail[s] even
under the [less demanding] test,” the court “need not parse the
differences between the two standards in this case”].) “In order
to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’ [Citation.]
In other words, the law must not ‘burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate
interests.’ ” (Packingham, at pp. 105–106; accord Free Speech
Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 471.) “[T]hese standards ensure
. . . that the [government’s] interests are proportional to the
resulting burdens placed on speech.” (Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
(2011) 564 U.S. 552, 572; accord Free Speech Coalition, at p. 471;
72
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 730, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) [in
the context of falsity, intermediate scrutiny requires the court
“to determine whether the statute works speech-related harm
that is out of proportion to its justifications”].)
Applying those standards here, we find that the
government has a significant interest in deterring knowingly
false complaints of misconduct levied against police officers. As
detailed in the legislative history, section 148.6(a) was passed in
response to a substantial increase in false claims of misconduct
that were causing professional and reputational harm to law
enforcement officers (and resulting in the unnecessary
expenditure of public funds) due to section 832.5’s investigation
requirements. The state has a legitimate interest in curbing
abusive false complaints of police conduct, the negative effects
of which take on added significance because of the statutory
investigation requirements.
We are not persuaded, however, that section 148.6(a) has
been crafted in a manner that “ ‘does not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to further those interests.’ ” (Free
Speech Coalition, supra, 606 U.S. at p. 471.) While the objective
of curbing abusive false claims of police misconduct is sound, the
means the Legislature chose to accomplish those objectives —
an ill-defined criminal provision that is accompanied by an
unusual admonition requirement — unnecessarily risk chilling
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government’s interests. Indeed, there would seem to be any
number of other, less speech-deterring ways of addressing the
73
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
reputational and professional harms that may be caused by
section 832.5’s investigation process.22
The Legislature might, for example, provide peace officers
heightened procedural protections that insulate them against
the potentially damaging professional effects of false
complaints. (See Gov. Code, §§ 3300–3313 [the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act]; § 832.5, subd. (c) [any
complaints that are found to be frivolous, unfounded, or
exonerated are not maintained in the officer’s personnel file].)
Alternatively, it might “more finely tailor[]” (Alvarez, supra,
567 U.S. at p. 738, conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) the scope of
subdivision (a)(1)’s criminal provision by, among other
possibilities, “insist[ing] upon a showing that the false
statement caused specific harm” (Alvarez, at p. 738, conc. opn.
of Breyer, J.) or including a materiality requirement (see
Animal Legal Defense Fund, supra, 8 F.4th at p. 787). The
statute’s criminal provision and its attendant admonition
requirement might more precisely (and consistently) define
what form of allegations might trigger criminal liability. The
statute might treat knowingly false statements made in the
context of a police misconduct investigation more even-
handedly, which would seem to accord with the state’s claims
that section 148.6(a) is intended (at least in part) to protect the
integrity of the complaint investigation process. And perhaps
most crucially, the Legislature might amend the admonition
22
The parties have not identified any other state statute
that criminalizes knowingly false allegations of police
misconduct while conditioning acceptance of any such complaint
on signing the type of admonition at issue here.
74
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
requirement in a manner that is less speech deterring.23 While
we express no view as to whether any of these alternative
approaches would be sufficient to survive constitutional
scrutiny, we think it clear that the current structure of section
148.6(a) unnecessarily risks chilling substantially more speech
than necessary to deter knowingly false allegations of
misconduct against police officers.
Again, we acknowledge that the state has a legitimate
interest in curbing the deleterious effects of false complaints
against law enforcement. (Accord dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at
p. 6.) And like the dissent, we reaffirm Stanistreet’s conclusion
that the Legislature has the authority “to protect the integrity
of complaint procedures by . . . deterring abuse.” (Dis. opn. of
Liu, J., post, at p. 6; see Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 510.)
Unlike the dissent (and Stanistreet), however, we conclude that
as presently drafted section 148.6(a) “works disproportionate
constitutional harm” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 739, conc.
opn. of Breyer, J.) by attempting to achieve those objectives in a
manner that unduly chills a core form of protected speech —
truthful or well-intentioned complaints of government
misconduct. It consequently fails intermediate scrutiny and
thus violates the First Amendment.
23
The RIPA Board’s most recent annual report shows that
since at least 2020, many of the largest law enforcement
agencies in California have omitted the advisory language set
forth in section 148.6(a)(2) from their citizen complaint forms.
(See RIPA Annual Report 2025, supra, at pp. 171–172.) LAPPL
has made no showing that these omissions have had any
material effect on the number of abusive police complaints filed
against agencies that have chosen not to include the admonition.
75
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
III. DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the matter
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
GROBAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
EVANS, J.
JENKINS, J.*
*
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
76
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
S275272
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu
At least since the beating of Rodney King by officers of the
Los Angeles Police Department in 1991, police misconduct has
been a high-profile issue in California and throughout the
nation. The concern has remained salient in light of many
fraught and sometimes deadly police interactions with minority
communities over the years. (See People v Flores (2024)
15 Cal.5th 1032, 1049; id. at pp. 1053–1054 (conc. opn. of Evans,
J.); People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 451–452 (conc.
opn. of Liu, J.); B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th
1, 30–31 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)
As one recourse, our Legislature requires every law
enforcement agency to “establish a procedure to investigate
complaints by members of the public against the personnel of
these departments . . . , and . . . [to] make a written description
of the procedure available to the public.” (Pen. Code, § 832.5,
subd. (a)(1); all undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.) Such procedures enable everyday citizens to report
misconduct and hold officials accountable.
As important as these procedures are, they are also
susceptible to abuse. Section 148.6 makes it a misdemeanor to
“file[] any allegation of misconduct against any peace officer . . .
knowing the allegation to be false.” (§ 148.6, subd. (a)(1).) In
addition, the statute requires any complainant to read and sign
1
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Liu, J., dissenting
an advisory that says in capital letters and boldface: “YOU
HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST A
POLICE OFFICER FOR ANY IMPROPER POLICE
CONDUCT. CALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES THIS AGENCY
TO HAVE A PROCEDURE TO INVESTIGATE CIVILIANS’
COMPLAINTS. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO A WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION OF THIS PROCEDURE. THIS AGENCY MAY
FIND AFTER INVESTIGATION THAT THERE IS NOT
ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT ACTION ON YOUR
COMPLAINT; EVEN IF THAT IS THE CASE, YOU HAVE
THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE COMPLAINT AND HAVE IT
INVESTIGATED IF YOU BELIEVE AN OFFICER BEHAVED
IMPROPERLY. CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AND ANY
REPORTS OR FINDINGS RELATING TO COMPLAINTS
MUST BE RETAINED BY THIS AGENCY FOR AT LEAST
FIVE YEARS. [¶] IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A
COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. IF YOU
MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOWING
THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUTED ON A
MISDEMEANOR CHARGE.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
In enacting section 148.6, the Legislature observed that a
“glaringly negative side-effect which has resulted [from the
availability of complaint procedures] has been the willingness
on the part of many of our less ethical citizens to maliciously file
false allegations of misconduct against officers in an effort to
punish them for simply doing their jobs. [¶] Unfortunately for
the officers, these complaints usually become a permanent part
of their personnel jackets . . . . Additionally, most of the officers
find they have very little recourse against the complainants.”
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1732
2
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Liu, J., dissenting
(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) April 18, 1995, at p. 1.) The statute
“addresses the issue of knowingly making false allegations of
misconduct against any peace officer. These false accusations
can adversely affect the officer’s position within the
Department, and this legislation will discourage such false
reports. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . For example, a Deputy Sheriff on a list
for promotion to Sergeant receives a false report of misconduct,
after which his promotion is deferred until the matter is
resolved. After which, the complaint being found ungrounded,
the Deputy has no recourse for any financial loss due to the
delay.” (Id. at p. 2.) Further, by deterring knowingly false
complaints, the statute enables law enforcement agencies to
focus on good-faith complaints, thereby saving time and
resources. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)
The question is whether section 148.6 is an
unconstitutional restriction on freedom of speech. The answer
is simple: Section 148.6 is no more unconstitutional than laws
that make it a crime to commit perjury, file a false police report,
submit a false document to a public agency, or lie to a
government official concerning an official matter. Such laws
“protect the integrity of [g]overnment processes, quite apart
from merely restricting false speech.” (United States. v. Alvarez
(2012) 567 U.S. 709, 721 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) (Alvarez).)
They belong to one of the “ ‘ “historic and traditional categories
[of expression]” ’ ” where “content-based restrictions on speech
have been permitted.” (Id. at p. 717.) Today’s opinion
invalidates section 148.6 on the ground that it “deter[s] citizens
from filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaints
of police misconduct.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) But that
3
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Liu, J., dissenting
rationale rests on speculative assertions and does not withstand
scrutiny.
To be sure, many people, especially members of minority,
immigrant, or low-income communities, may be reluctant to file
complaints. They may feel it is not their place to question
authority; they may lack confidence their complaints will be
taken seriously; they may distrust law enforcement; they may
not know the process or have time to figure it out. These issues
have long histories and many complexities quite apart from
section 148.6, and for police agencies, there is perhaps no task
more important than gaining the trust of the communities they
serve. But trust is a two-way street, and our men and women
in uniform have a hard enough job without having to deal with
knowingly false allegations of misconduct. Because section
148.6 targets unprotected speech and has not been shown to
pose a substantial risk of suppressing protected speech, I cannot
agree that it violates the First Amendment.
I.
As the high court has made clear, there is no “general
exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”
(Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 718 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.);
see id. at pp. 733–734 (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.).) But our
statutes and common law have long recognized categories of
“knowing or reckless falsehood[s]” that may be proscribed
without running afoul of the First Amendment. (Alvarez, at
p. 719 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) These include defamation,
fraud, perjury, and false statements made to a government
official. (Id. at pp. 719–721; see id. at pp. 734–735 (conc. opn. of
Breyer, J.).) The common denominator of such laws is not
merely that they proscribe false speech, but that they protect
4
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE
v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Liu, J., dissenting
against “legally cognizable harm associated with a false
statement.” (Id. at p. 719 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see id. at
p. 734 (conc. opn. of Breyer, J.) [such laws narrow the range of
proscribed falsehoods “by specifying that the lies be made in
contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely
to occur” or “by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are
particularly likely to produce harm”].)
One subset consists of longstanding laws that protect the
integrity of government processes. Perjury lacks First
Amendment protection “not simply because perjured statements
are false,” but because “[p]erjury undermines the function and
province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments
that are the basis of the legal system.” (Alvarez, supra, 567 U.S.
at pp. 720–721 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.); see United States v.
Dunnigan (1993) 507 U.S. 87, 97 [“the constitutionality of
perjury statutes is unquestioned”].) The federal law prohib
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.