US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 1 Filed: 01/22/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2024-1520

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Washington in No. 2:23-cv-00592-JHC,

Judge John H. Chun.

______________________

Decided: January 22, 2026

______________________

DAVID P. BERTEN, Global IP Law Group, Chicago, IL,

argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by ALISON

AUBREY RICHARDS.

JOHN R. BOULE, III, Jones Day, Los Angeles, CA, ar-

gued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by T.

KAITLIN CROWDER, Cleveland, OH; MICHAEL C.

HENDERSHOT, Palo Alto, CA; ISRAEL SASHA MAYERGOYZ,

Chicago, IL; JENNIFER L. SWIZE, Washington, DC; RITA J.

YOON, San Francisco, CA.

______________________

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 2 Filed: 01/22/2026

2 US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, HUGHES and STOLL, Circuit

Judges.

MOORE, Chief Judge.

US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC appeals an order of the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Washington granting Google LLC’s (Google) motion to dis-

miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant owns U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637, which re-

lates to web conferencing systems that include “time-shift-

ing capabilities” enabling participants “to observe [a]

session in real-time, delayed while the session is still in

progress, or after the session has completed.” ’637 patent

at abstract, 3:61–64; see also id. at 2:33–43. Participants

can also observe the session at different playback rates

while maintaining substantially consistent perceived audio

quality. Id. at 3:64–67. According to Appellant, and undis-

puted by Google on appeal, the claims allow data streams

(e.g., video, chat data, documents, web pages, and white-

boarding sessions) to be viewed asynchronously, for exam-

ple, to go back and review one aspect of a multimedia

presentation while another aspect is proceeding live. Ap-

pellant Br. 29–30; see also Google Br. 3–4.

Independent claims 2 and 7 of the ’637 patent are rep-

resentative. Claim 2 reads:

2. A web conferencing system comprising:

(a) a first client application allowing at least one

presenting participant to share computer screen

video,

(b) said first client application also being arranged

to allow said presenting participant to share at

least one data stream selected from the group

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 3 Filed: 01/22/2026

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 3

consisting of chat data, documents, web pages and

white-boarding session,

(c) storage means for recording said computer

screen video and said data stream, and

(d) a second client application allowing at least one

observing participant to sense said computer

screen video and said data stream live,

(e) said second client application also being ar-

ranged to allow said observing participant to selec-

tively sense a previously presented and recorded

part of said computer screen video and said data

stream while said presenting participant is sharing

a current part of said computer screen video and

said data stream,

(f) said second client application also being ar-

ranged to allow said observing participant to selec-

tively sense a previously presented and recorded

part of said computer screen video and said data

stream after said presenting participant has fin-

ished sharing a said computer screen video and,

said data stream

whereby said web conferencing system is able to

simultaneously record said computer screen video

and said data stream and allow said observing par-

ticipant to sense current and previously presented

parts of said computer screen video and said data

stream.

’637 patent at 12:32–61.

Claim 7 reads:

7. A web conferencing system comprising:

(a) a first client application that allows at least one

presenting participant to share data streams

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 4 Filed: 01/22/2026

4 US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

comprised of audio data and computer screen video

data

(b) a second client application that allows at least

one observing participant to sense said data

streams

(c) a server application operatively connected to

said first client application and to said second cli-

ent application, said server application arranged

to:

i. receive said data streams from said first

client application and record it in a storage

device

ii. retrieve said data streams from said

storage device and send it to said second

client application

(d) a time-scale modification component opera-

tively connected to said second client application

which is able to maintain substantially consistent

perceived audio quality at a plurality of playback

rates

whereby said data streams from said first client ap-

plication can be simultaneously recorded by and re-

trieved from said storage device, and said second

client application allows said observing participant

to sense said data streams in real-time, and said

second client application also allows said observing

participant to selectively sense a previously pre-

sented and recorded part of said data streams at a

plurality of playback rates at the same time that

said presenting participant is sharing a current

part of said data streams and after said presenting

participant has stopped sharing, and said observ-

ing participant will perceive substantially con-

sistent audio quality.

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 5 Filed: 01/22/2026

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 5

Id. at 13:20–14:19.

Appellant sued Google for infringing claims 2–5 and

7–9 of the ’637 patent. J.A. 87–88. Google moved to dis-

miss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-

dure 12(b)(6), arguing the asserted claims are patent-

ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 1 J.A. 121–36. The district

court granted Google’s motion to dismiss and denied Appel-

lant leave to amend its complaint based on futility.

J.A. 1–25. US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC appeals. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal un-

der the law of the regional circuit, here the Ninth Circuit.

Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1353

(Fed. Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit reviews Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissals de novo, accepting all factual allegations in the

complaint as true and construing the pleadings in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Knievel

v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005)).

I. Patent Eligibility

Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of

law that may contain underlying factual issues. Interval

Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir.

2018). We review the district court’s ultimate conclusion

on patent eligibility de novo. Id. We assess patent eligibil-

ity using a two-part test. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,

573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014). First, “[w]e must . . . deter-

mine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-

1 Google also argued Appellant failed to plausibly al-

lege that Google “benefits” from or “uses” the entire

claimed system. J.A. 136. The district court did not reach

this alternative argument, J.A. 2 n.1, and we do not reach

it on appeal.

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 6 Filed: 01/22/2026

6 US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

ineligible concept,” such as an abstract idea (i.e., Alice Step

One). Id. at 218. If so, we must then “consider the ele-

ments of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered

combination’ to determine whether the additional elements

‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible ap-

plication” (i.e., Alice Step Two). Id. at 217 (quoting Mayo

Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.

66, 78–79 (2012)). The Supreme Court has described Alice

Step Two as “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an

element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to en-

sure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly

more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.’” Id.

at 217–18 (citation modified) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.

at 72–73).

Applying the Alice test, the district court determined

the asserted claims are patent-ineligible because they are

directed to an abstract idea and do not include an inventive

concept that makes the claims patent-eligible. J.A. 1–24.

We agree the asserted claims are not eligible.

A. Alice Step One

Regarding Alice Step One, Appellant argues the dis-

trict court erred in determining the asserted claims are di-

rected to the abstract idea of “playing back recorded

content.” Appellant Br. 21 (citing J.A. 18). According to

Appellant, this is an over-generalization of the claims,

which are directed to a “specific asserted improvement that

allows a presentation to be reviewed asynchronously . . . at

the same time.” Id. at 23–26. Even if we were to narrow

the district court’s characterization of the claims, however,

we would still conclude the claims are directed to the pa-

tent-ineligible abstract idea of allowing asynchronous re-

view of presentations, rather than any specific

technological improvement, because they do not “describe

how the alleged goal of [asynchronous review] is achieved.”

Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC, 60 F.4th 1349,

1357 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (emphasis added).

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 7 Filed: 01/22/2026

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 7

“In cases involving software innovations, [the step-one]

inquiry often turns on whether the claims focus on specific

asserted improvements in computer capabilities or instead

on a process or system that qualifies [as] an abstract

idea . . . .” Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc.,

50 F.4th 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (alterations in origi-

nal). “While the § 101 inquiry must focus on the language

of the asserted claims themselves,” ChargePoint, Inc. v.

SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (ci-

tation modified), the claim itself need not explicitly recite

the improvement. Rather, our precedent supports a vari-

ety of analytical approaches including, for example,

(1) looking to the written description to understand the

problem facing the inventor and what the patent describes

as the invention, id. at 767–68; (2) considering whether

any technological improvement is “embodied in the claims,”

Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1258

(Fed. Cir. 2017); and (3) analyzing whether the claims and

written description “describe how [the] improvement was

accomplished.” Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp.,

134 F.4th 1205, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (collecting cases),

cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2025 WL 3507020 (Dec. 8, 2025).

We start our analysis with the claim language. Here,

independent claim 2 recites that the first and second client

applications are “arranged to allow” certain results and

that the web conferencing system is “able to” achieve sim-

ultaneous recording and observing of current and previ-

ously presented parts of a computer screen video and data

stream. ’637 patent at 12:32–61 (claim 2). Similarly, inde-

pendent claim 7 recites that “a first client applica-

tion . . . allows at least one presenting participant to share

data streams comprised of audio data and computer screen

video data” and “a second client application . . . allows at

least one observing participant to sense said data streams”

in real time and asynchronously. Id. at 13:20–14:19

(claim 7) (emphases added). Neither these claims nor their

dependent claims, however, disclose how the claimed

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 8 Filed: 01/22/2026

8 US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

results are achieved or embody any specific technological

improvement discernible to a skilled artisan from the pa-

tent or the prosecution history. Accordingly, we agree with

the district court that the asserted claims of the ’637 patent

are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. See Be-

teiro, LLC v. DraftKings Inc., 104 F.4th 1350, 1356

(Fed. Cir. 2024) (“[C]laims . . . drafted using largely (if not

entirely) result-focused functional language, containing no

specificity about how the purported invention achieves

those results . . . are almost always found to be ineligible

for patenting under Section 101.”).

Appellant argues the asserted claims are not result-ori-

ented because they recite two client applications enabling

the manipulation (e.g., the sharing, recording, reviewing,

and sensing) of multiple data streams, and thus “expressly

explain how the systems need to be set up to accomplish

the improvement” of asynchronous presentation review.

Appellant Br. 29–30; see Oral Arg. at 5:07–7:32. We do not

agree. The claims are result-oriented because they do not

explain how the client applications achieve the recited ma-

nipulation of the data streams to enable asynchronous re-

view. ’637 patent at 12:32–61 (claim 2), 13:20–14:19

(claim 7). Moreover, the written description does not dis-

close any improvement to the underlying components to en-

able asynchronous review. See id. at 10:26–29 (disclosing

known client applications); id. at 5:37–38 (acknowledging

data streams were “commonly used in the audio visual

field”); id. at 8:33–39 (stating “the workings of [the stream

decompression and display] components resemble those of

similar components in existing web conferencing . . . appli-

cations”). The written description does not suggest the use

of two client applications and multiple data streams was a

technical solution to any problem facing the inventor. See

id. at 2:66–3:6, 3:61–64 (describing problem and inven-

tion). Instead, the written description suggests the inven-

tion is nothing more than the abstract idea of applying

known time-shifting functions to web-conferencing

Case: 24-1520 Document: 55 Page: 9 Filed: 01/22/2026

US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 9

systems to solve “great inefficiencies” resulting from par-

ticipants waiting for others to join a presentation or from

participants missing part of a presentation. Id. at 3:2–6.

For these reasons, this case is not like Contour IP Hold-

ing LLC v. GoPro, Inc., where the patent disclosed (and the

claims reflected) “improving POV camera technology

through specific means of generating high- and low-quality

video streams in parallel and transferring a low-quality

video stream to a remote device.” 113 F.4th 1373, 1380

(Fed. Cir. 2024). Instead, this case is like Hawk Technol-

ogy Systems, where the claims at issue also involved the

manipulation of multiple data streams but “fail[ed] to re-

cite a specific solution to make the alleged improvement—

conserving bandwidth while preserving quality—‘con-

crete’” and were “recited at such a level of result-oriented

generality that those claims amount[ed] to a mere imple-

mentation of an abstract idea.” 60 F.4th at 1358 (quoting

Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d

1143, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).

Appellant additionally argues that, even if the asserted

claims are result-oriented, Google similarly uses “func-

tional claiming” in its own video conferencing patents and

thus necessarily believes this approach to claim drafting

does not result in subject matter ineligible claims. Appel-

lant Br. 30–34. The subject matter eligibility of Google’s

patent claims is not before us and has no bearing on our

analysis of the ’637 patent. Moreover, we reject the notion

that the mere existence of factually distinguishable Google-

owned patents somehow amounts to a sweeping concession

by Google that all patents involving functional claiming ap-

proaches are necessarily patent-eligible.

Because we conclude the asserted claims of the ’637 pa-

tent are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we

proceed to Step Two of the Alice test.

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10 US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

B. Alice Step Two

Appellant argues the district court erred in its applica-

tion of Alice Step Two by overlooking two inventive con-

cepts recited in the asserted claims that allegedly make

them patent-eligible: (1) a two client application system

allowing for the manipulation of multiple data streams and

(2) a “time-scale modification component.” Appellant

Br. 37–40. We do not agree either “transforms the nature

of the claims into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,

573 U.S. at 217 (citation modified).

First, Appellant largely repeats its Alice Step One ar-

guments in pointing out the claims recite two client appli-

cations enabling the manipulation of distinct data streams.

Appellant Br. 38. As explained above, the claims use re-

sult-oriented language with no specific implementation il-

lustrating how to achieve the claimed results. “Merely

describing the functions of the abstract idea itself, without

particularity, . . . is simply not enough under step two.”

Int’l Bus. Machs., 50 F.4th at 1382 (citation modified).

Moreover, as the specification makes clear, the claimed cli-

ent applications are conventional, well-known components,

operating according to their ordinary functions to manipu-

late conventional data streams. See ’637 patent at 5:10–

20, 5:23–39, 8:33–39, 10:20–29. This cannot amount to an

inventive concept, which must “reflect[] something more

than the application of an abstract idea using ‘well-under-

stood, routine, and conventional activities previously

known to the industry.’” Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,

927 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Aatrix Soft-

ware, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121,

1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also Accenture Glob. Servs.,

GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (no inventive concept in system claims that

“only contain generalized software components arranged to

implement an abstract concept on a computer”). Nor can

conclusory allegations to the contrary “alter what [the]

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US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 11

patent itself states.” Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc.,

65 F.4th 698, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2023).

Second, Appellant points to claims 4 and 7 of the

’637 patent as allegedly supplying an inventive concept be-

cause they require an audio “time-scale modification com-

ponent” able to maintain substantially consistent

perceived audio quality (or aspects of audio quality) at a

plurality of playback rates. Appellant Br. 39; ’637 patent

at 13:1–10 (claim 4), 13:20–14:19 (claim 7). Again, there is

no disclosed inventive concept used to accomplish the

claimed result, and the specification confirms the time-

scale modification component was a conventional compo-

nent implemented using off-the-shelf algorithms from re-

lated audio contexts including the “playback of recorded

content.” ’637 patent at 3:19–32, 9:4–13. Under these cir-

cumstances, the time-scale modification component can-

not, as a matter of law, constitute an inventive concept,

which “must be more than well-understood, routine, con-

ventional activity.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v.

DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (ci-

tation modified).

We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that

claims 2–5 and 7–9 of the ’637 patent are patent-ineligible

and affirm the dismissal.

II. Premature Dismissal

Appellant next argues that, as a procedural matter, the

district court erred by deciding patent-eligibility at the mo-

tion to dismiss stage and should have granted Appellant

leave to amend its complaint. Appellant Br. 40–44. We do

not agree.

“A patent may be determined ineligible at the Rule

12(b)(6) stage ‘when there are no factual allegations that,

taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as

a matter of law.’” Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods.,

Inc., 983 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Aatrix,

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12 US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

882 F.3d at 1125). And while “[t]he Ninth Circuit reviews

a district court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint for

abuse of discretion,” “[t]he question of futility of amend-

ment . . . is reviewed de novo.” Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blip-

par Ltd., 110 F.4th 1280, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation

omitted).

The Appellant has made no factual allegations that

would preclude dismissal in this case. The abstract idea

involves allowing asynchronous review of web conferencing

presentations, and an inventive concept “must be signifi-

cantly more than the abstract idea itself.” BASCOM Glob.

Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). No amendment to the complaint can

alter what the ’637 patent itself states regarding the con-

ventionality of the client applications, data streams, and

time-scale modification components discussed in the eligi-

bility analysis detailed above. See supra Discussion § I;

Sanderling, 65 F.4th at 706. Accordingly, we see no error

in the district court’s conclusion that granting leave to

amend here would be futile. J.A. 25.

Appellant additionally argues the district court should

have (1) treated Google’s motion to dismiss as a motion for

summary judgment because Google improperly relied on

facts outside the complaint to attempt to establish what

was known, routine, or conventional, and (2) conducted

claim construction before dismissal. Both arguments are

unavailing. The district court was not obligated to treat

Google’s motion as a summary judgment motion because

the court was clear it did not rely on any extra-pleading

materials. See J.A. 22 n.7; Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d

1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-

miss supported by extraneous materials cannot be re-

garded as one for summary judgment until the district

court acts to convert the motion by indicating . . . that it

will not exclude those materials from its consideration.”

(emphases added)). Nor was claim construction necessary

because Appellant never proposed any constructions or

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US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC 13

explained how a proposed construction would change the

patent-eligibility analysis. Mobile Acuity, 110 F.4th at

1293 (“To defeat a motion to dismiss based on the pur-

ported need for claim construction, a patentee must pro-

pose a specific claim construction . . . and explain why any

dispute . . . must be resolved before the scope of the claims

can be understood for § 101 purposes.” (citation modified)).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments

and find them unpersuasive. Because claims 2–5 and 7–9

of the ’637 patent are patent-ineligible and dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate, we affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs to Google.