Thibodeaux

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CODY THIBODEAUX CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. NO. 24-00388-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 19).

The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 22). Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 24). For the

following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 19) is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, an incarcerated person at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”),

alleges that he was subject to excessive force by LSP officials, forming the basis for

this case. (Doc. 10).

On July 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed suit in the 20th Judicial District Court,

West Feliciana Parish, State of Louisiana. (Doc. 1-5 at 8). On May 16, 2024,

Defendants removed the case to this Court, alleging federal question jurisdiction.

(Doc. 1 at { 5). Defendants allege that they were served with Plaintiffs Petition on

April 18, 2024. dd. at { 8).

Once in this Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 10). Plaintiffs

Complaint asserts the following claims: (1) violation of civil rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1988; (2) negligence; (3) respondeat superior; and (4) costs and attorneys’

fees. Ud.). Named Defendants are the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections (““LDPSC”) and Sargeant Jonathan Emery.!

Now, Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that Emery is entitled

to qualified immunity regarding Plaintiffs Section 1988 claim. (Doc. 19). Defendants

further assert that Plaintiffs state law claims fail as a matter of law. (Id.). For the

following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 19) is DENIED.

II. FACTS

On October 20, 2020, Sargeant Jonathan Emery placed Plaintiff, an

incarcerated person at LSP, in wrist restraints that were fastened to a lap belt and

leg irons. (Doc. 19-2 at § 2; Doc. 22-17 at § 2). Emery then removed Plaintiff from

yard pen #5. (Doc. 19-2 at 1, 3; Doc. 22-17 at 1, 3). Thereafter, Emory and

Plaintiff engaged in a physical altercation.

The parties dispute key facts surrounding the altercation, relying on the same

video evidence. The video, submitted to the Court through a conventional filing, is

thirty minutes and six seconds long, and shows footage from four camera angles

recording activity in different areas at LSP.2 (Doc. 20; Doc. 30). Two of the four camera

angles show video footage relevant to Plaintiffs claims. The video does not contain

audio.

! The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Randy Lavespere.

(Doc. 7).

2 Due to CM/ECF limitations, the video is not publicly available on the Court’s docket.

Along with their Motion, Defendants provided Emery’s description of the

altercation, dated October 22, 2020, which states:

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT (ATTACH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IF N

EEDED

On the above date and approximate time while | Sergeant Jonathan Emery, w.

; ' , Was escorting Offi

oeedeaonn me ee me observed that hie ‘eels restraints were hanging loosely from his walet. | pave □□□□□□□□

Stop so that | could fit his restraints on properly. Offender Thibod

given and continued pulling away from my escort stating directly to me, "Fuck that. You ain't gotta do all that!" gave

ve er Thibodeaux several more direct verbal orders to Stop to which he still flatly refused all orders given and continued

away from my escort. At which time, | took Offender Thibodeaux to the ground. | continued to hold Offender

° veal on the ground to prevent injury to myself, At which time, Offender Dennis Minor #518772 entered the rear exit

Shon ve eereaton Yard and began repeatedly punching me in my face and nose with closed fists. At which time, Major

ane Worsham and Lieutenant Oscar Coney arrived and took control of the situation. | was relieved of my duties and sent

to the Treatment Center to be seen by Medical Personnel for injuries to my face and nose. | was advised by Major Shane

Worsham that | could go to the West Feliciana Parish Sheriff's Office and press charges against Offender Minor for assault

on a Correctional Officer. Assistant Warden Chad Darbonne, Lieutenant Colonel Willard Gauthier, Assistant Warden Jeremy

Mickey, and Assistant Warden Tim Delaney were all notified of this incident. This is for your information and further handling.

Goaathes Ere [O~29. > Ln A

REPORTING OFFICER = (, DATE COMPLETED TIME COMPLETED

Along with his Opposition Brief, Plaintiff provided a Declaration dated

August 27, 2025, attesting to what he believes the video shows. (Doc. 22-1). Plaintiffs

description of the altercation is as follows:

15:07:27-08:19 [Plaintiff] walking in door—Guard hand around

[Plaintiff]. Guard slams [Plaintiff] to the floor and punch him. Female

guard enters and stands over the guard who holding [Plaintiff] to the

floor. Emory has one hand around [Plaintiffs] throat and he is punching

[Plaintiff].

15:08:19 Another inmate, who had jumped the intervenes by attacking

Emory trying to pull him off of [Plaintiff].

15:08:31 Three guards enter the building as the inmate who jumped the

fence enters and jumps on the guard who is holding [Plaintiff] down. The

guard separate the inmate and takes [Plaintiff] into another room.

15:08:32-44 Major Shane Worsham slams [Plaintiff] to the floor and put

his knee in [Plaintiffs] neck to hold him there. Officer Magee makes

contact with [Plaintiff]

15:08:52 Magee is holding [Plaintiff] while Minor is being detained.

15:09:33 [Plaintiff] with Magee but Emory is coming back from kitchen

area approaching|[.|

15:09:38 [Plaintiff] turns around talking to Emory who is approaching.

Magee tries to hold Emory back as Emory enters and tries to get at

[Plaintiff]. Guard is in between the two trying to hold him back while

they exchange words.

15:09:47 Emory backs off as Magee holds [Plaintiff] against a cell to

shelter him from a further attack[.]

(Doc. 22-1 at 1-2).

The Court’s review of the video does not provide clear answers as to whose

version of events is accurate. Approximately five minutes and twenty-six seconds into

the video, Plaintiff appears walking through a door, entering a building at LSP from

the outside. The video footage shows that the altercation occurred almost

immediately after Plaintiff entered the building. The video shows Emery tackling

Plaintiff to the ground. It is unclear from the video what led to the incident, and

again, the video lacks audio.

The parties agree to the following facts, such that the Court considers these

facts undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. Plaintiff confirmed that Emery

restrained him prior to removing him from the yard pen. (Doc. 19-2 at § 28;

Doc. 22-17 at § 28). Emery placed Plaintiff into side restraints that secured Plaintiffs

wrists to his sides. (Doc. 19-2 at § 29; Doc. 22-17 at | 29). Emery secured Plaintiffs

ankles with leg irons. (Doc. 19-2 at { 30; Doc. 22-17 at { 30). The leg irons were not

connected to Plaintiffs waist belt. (Doc. 19-2 at { 31; Doc. 22-17 at { 31). Plaintiffs

leg irons were separated by approximately two feet of chain. (Doc. 19-2 at J 32;

Doc. 22-17 at § 32). The leg restraints allowed Plaintiff to walk. (Doc. 19-2 at □ 33;

Doc. 22-17 at § 33).

Plaintiff and Emery greeted each other while Plaintiff was being restrained in

the pen. (Doc. 19-2 at J 34; Doc. 22-17 at { 34). There were no discussions between

Plaintiff and Emery on the way from the yard pen to the building door. (Doc. 19-2 at

{| 35; Doc. 22-17 at 4 35). The incident occurred near the door to the yard. (Doc. 19-2

at | 46; Doc. 22-17 at { 46).

Plaintiff testified that he complied with Emery’s orders to stop walking.

(Doc. 19-2 at ¥ 37; Doc. 22-17 at | 37). A padlock was located on the back of Plaintiff's

waist belt. (Doc. 19-2 at 39; Doc. 22-17 at | 39). Emery did not tell Plaintiff what

he was trying to do with the lock. (Doc. 19-2 at □ 40; Doc. 22-17 at { 40).

Major Shane Worsham, Lieutenant Oscar Coney, and Sargeant Tyreek Magee

responded to the altercation. (Doc. 19-2 at § 15; Doc. 22-17 at § 15). During their

response, Worsham forced Plaintiff to the ground and placed his knee in Plaintiffs

neck. (Doc. 19-2 at § 50; Doc. 22-17 at | 50). Magee helped Plaintiff to his feet.

(Doc. 19-2 at § 51; Doc. 22-17 at ¥ 51).

Lieutenant Freda Gee escorted Plaintiff to the treatment center following the

incident. (Doc. 19-2 at §[ 54; Doc. 22-17 at § 54). Plaintiff arrived at the treatment

center ambulatory. (Doc. 19-2 at □ 24; Doc. 22-17 at { 24). Plaintiff underwent medical

evaluation at the treatment center. (Doc. 19-2 at § 23; Doc. 22-17 at J 23). Medical

providers observed redness to Plaintiffs right arm, wrist, fingers, and ankles.

(Doc. 19-2 at § 26; Doc. 22-17 at { 26).

Emery never came into physical contact with Plaintiff again. (Doc. 19-2 at { 53;

Doc. 22-17 at 53).

Ill. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Funches v. Progressive Tractor

& Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (“This occurs when a party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).

For issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, they “must

come forward with evidence which would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if the

evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Intl Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,

939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the

motion by either countering with evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material

fact, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade

the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Jd. at

1265.

Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must

offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim or point out the absence of

evidence supporting essential elements of the claim. See Lujan ov.

Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the movant shows

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Darden v.

City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants ask the Court to issue summary judgment in its favor on all of

Plaintiffs claims. First, Defendants argue that Emery is entitled to qualified

immunity regarding Plaintiffs excessive force claim brought under Section 1983.

(Doc. 19). Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs state law claims fail as a matter

of law. ([d.). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

A. Qualified Immunity.

Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity to Plaintiffs

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim brought under Section 1983. The doctrine

of qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 228, 231 (2009); Ezell v. Seal,

No. CV 28-1514-SDD-EWD, 2025 WL 3124046, at *4 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2025).

“In determining whether an official enjoys immunity, [courts] ask (1) whether

the plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of a clearly established federal

constitutional or statutory right and (2) whether the official’s actions violated that

right to the extent that an objectively reasonable person would have known.”

Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Hope v. Pelzer,

586 U.S. 730 (2002)). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be

addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” See

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

This inquiry is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a

broad, general proposition. Berry v. Sanders, No. CV 17-318-BAJ-EWD,

2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2020), report and recommendation

adopted, No. CV 17-00318-BAJ-EWD, 2020 WL 1033654 (M.D. La. Mar. 3, 2020). This

Court has emphasized: “Corrections officers are faced with myriad situations where

they must exercise discretion, including situations where they must choose whether

to exercise force against a prisoner. When force is used, a corrections officer must also

exercise discretion to determine the appropriate amount of force.” Jd. (internal

citations omitted).

Force is considered excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment of the

United States Constitution if it is applied maliciously and sadistically for the purpose

of causing harm rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.

Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37

(2010); Hudson v. McMillian, 508 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). “An inmate who is gratuitously

beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely

because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Berry,

2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (citing Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38). The Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, however, necessarily excludes

from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that such

force is not “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2

(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10).

Factors to be considered in determining whether an alleged use of force is

excessive include the extent of injury sustained, if any; the need for the application

of force; the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force utilized;

the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper

the severity of a forceful response. Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2 (citing Hudson, 503

U.S. at 7). The law governing excessive force is clearly established; thus, whether

Emery is entitled to qualified immunity turns on the reasonableness of his conduct.

See Berry, 2020 WL 1034627, at *2.

Here, Defendants argue that Emery’s actions were reasonable because he was

simply attempting to restore discipline. (Doc. 19-1 at 12). Defendants argue that

Plaintiff disobeyed Emery’s commands, escaped Emery’s grasp, then turned and

confronted Emery in a threatening manner. (/d. at 14). Defendants further assert

that “Plaintiffs defiance and threatening movements established the need for force.”

(Id.).

Plaintiff tells a different story. According to Plaintiff, Emery attacked him

unprovoked and “without warning” by “grabbing him[,] lifting him],] slamming him

to the ground and then jumping on him holding him by the throat and punching him

in the face multiple times.” (Doc. 22 at 11). Further, Plaintiff asserts that he “was in

full restraints unable to defend himself.” (/d.).

After reviewing the record before the Court, including the video evidence, the

Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the

issue of qualified immunity. Based on the video evidence and the parties’ conflicting

testimony regarding the altercation, and because the Court is unable to ascertain the

full context of the altercation from the video, the Court cannot determine whether

Emery is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.3 It will be for the finder

of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses to determine the reasonableness of

Emery’s actions at the time of the physical altercation at issue. See Cole v. Carson,

935 F.8d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019) (affirming the district

court’s denial of summary judgment on an excessive force claim, finding that

“genuine disputes of fact regarding . . . entitlement to qualified immunity remain.”);

see also Kelly v. Stassi, 587 F. Supp. 3d 409, 426 (M.D. La. 2022) (Dick, C.J.) (As in

Cole, the existence of competing factual narratives in this case means that “the full

reach of qualified immunity gives way to a trial, the first point at which its application

is determinable.”); Rios v. Perez, 777 F. Supp. 3d 727, 749 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (“Based

on the video evidence and the parties’ conflicting testimony about the events that

preceded the recordings, the Court cannot determine qualified immunity as a matter

of law.”); Bruce v. Ellis, No. 3:12-CV-1683-L, 2013 WL 1091241, at *10

(N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2018) (“As [plaintiff] has raised a genuine dispute of material fact

regarding the objective reasonableness of Ellis’s conduct, summary judgment is not

3 The Court notes that there is a separate Motion pending before the Court in which Plaintiff

requests an adverse presumption for the spoliation of video evidence showing other camera

angles of the altercation between Emery and Plaintiff, which Plaintiff asserts would show

the full story.

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appropriate.”); Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The contents

of the video are too uncertain to discount [plaintiffs] version of the events.”).

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19)

regarding qualified immunity is DENIED.

B. State Law Claims.

For similar reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding

Plaintiffs state law claims—negligence and vicarious liability—will also be denied.

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs negligence claim because “the video

evidence and Plaintiffs corroborating testimony establish that [| Emery acted

reasonably under the totality of circumstances[.]” (Doc. 19-1 at 19). Because the Court

has already found that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the

reasonableness of Emery’s actions, Defendants’ Motion will be DENIED in this

respect.4

As for Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim, Defendants argue that because

Plaintiffs negligence claim against Emery fails as a matter of law, no liability can be

legally imputed to LDPSC through a theory of vicarious liability. Ud. at 20). Because

the Court has denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding

Plaintiffs negligence claim, Defendants’ Motion regarding vicarious liability will also

be denied.

* Defendants dedicate two sentences of their Motion to requesting summary judgment on

Plaintiffs negligence claim alleging that Emery failed to obtain medical treatment for

Plaintiff following the altercation. (Doc. 19-1 at 19). Plaintiff similarly glosses over this issue

in his Opposition Brief. (Doc. 22). The Court is simply without sufficient information to rule

on this issue as a matter of law.

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Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19)

regarding Plaintiffs state law claims is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment

(Doc. 19) is DENIED.

215

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this day of -eLanuary, 2026

JUDGE BRIAN A. J. SON

UNITED STATES D ICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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