Helton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

SARA HELTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-CV-2036

)

ILLINOIS SECRETARY OF STATE, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

Plaintiff, Sara Helton, filed an Amended Complaint (#11) asserting claims

pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.)

against Defendant, the Illinois Secretary of State. Presently before the court are a Motion

for Summary Judgment (#20) filed by Defendant and a partial Motion for Summary

Judgment (#21) filed by Plaintiff. Both parties have filed Responses (Plaintiff (#25),

Defendant (#24)) and Replies (Defendant (#27), Plaintiff (#28)). For the reasons set forth

below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#20) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

partial Motion for Summary Judgment (#21) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The following background facts are taken from the statements of undisputed

material facts included in the parties’ respective Motions, the additional facts in their

Responses, and the exhibits attached to the parties’ various filings.

Plaintiff’s Position and Duties

During the relevant time period, Plaintiff worked at Defendant’s Driver Services

Office in Monticello, Illinois, holding the title of Drivers Facility Manager I. She was the

only Drivers Facility Manager at the Monticello office.

The Position Description for the Drivers Facility Manager I position states,

among other things, that the person in that position “provides, arranges for and/or

supervises the training of employees as directed or needed.”

Kevin Duesterhaus has been the Director of Driver Services for Defendant since

March 2003. In 2020 and 2021, he oversaw the region that included Defendant’s

Monticello office. Regarding a Drivers Facility Manager I’s training responsibilities,

Duesterhaus testified that “training is part of what is in their job description; overseeing

it, doing it and evaluating it.” Such training could consist of “[e]verything from opening

to closing[.]”

Duesterhaus explained that Defendant also employs “trainers” in various regions

of the state. These trainers would go from facility to facility training employees. Stephan

Roth, Director of Personnel for Defendant, testified that Defendant “restricted travel of

individuals” to different facilities as a precaution during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Plaintiff testified that the rotation of “trainers” between facilities was suspended during

the pandemic.

Plaintiff testified at her deposition that, at least prior to the pandemic, she

conducted training on a daily basis, “standing next to them and guiding, and coaching,

and directing them, and training them[.]” She added: “[A]s a manager, we had

employees that we trained, that I trained until they went to the main training in

Springfield. And then they came back and then I continued to train them if they had

questions.” Plaintiff considered training to be an essential function of her job. She could

not train other employees while maintaining a six-foot distance between them at all

times.

Roth has been Defendant’s Director of Personnel since May 2006. In that role, he

oversees hiring processes, leaves of absence, training, discipline, and job audits. Roth

also sat on the Reasonable Accommodation Committee, a group of individuals who

review all accommodation requests made by employees of Defendant. Roth agreed that

“part of [Plaintiff’s] essential job duties included the training of other employees at that

facility[.]” He testified that no one at the Monticello office, other than the Driver

Facilities Manager, “had the training of employees as part of their essential job

functions[.]”

Plaintiff agreed that no one assigned to the Monticello office had the job

description to provide, arrange for and/or supervise the training of employees other

than herself. But she believed that the provision allowing her to “arrange” training

meant that she could require other employees that worked underneath her to train

other employees, even if the training of employees was not included within that other

person’s job description. She testified that this belief was supported by “the union book,

[which] stated that senior employees are allowed to train other employees if requested.”

Plaintiff herself was not in the union, because she was a manager. She could not

remember the name of the union, of which she had been a member prior to becoming a

manager, but knew that it included drivers facility employees. When asked if she had

the authority to force a union member to take on duties not within their job

description—along with the additional pay contemplated by the union contract—

Plaintiff replied: “Absolutely not.”

Plaintiff’s job description also stated that a Drivers Facility Manager I

“[a]dminister[s] road examinations to applicants for all classes of drivers licenses;

administers and grades written drivers examinations; [and] performs cashier functions

for drivers license fees[.]” In order to administer these road examinations, Plaintiff was

required to be within six feet of the examinee as they were inside of the vehicle

together. Further, a 2011 ADA Job Requirements Questionnaire states that the Drivers

Facility Manager I position entails continuous “[i]nteracting with the public, other

workers, etc.” The questionnaire states that the position also requires frequently

working inside.

Training Crystal McDade

In March of 2020, Plaintiff raised concerns with her superiors, April Aptke and

Laura Gray, regarding the job performance of one of the employees that worked under

her, Crystal McDade. McDade had transferred to the Monticello office from the

Decatur, Illinois, facility, though Plaintiff could not recall when. Plaintiff reported that

McDade was not meeting Defendant’s performance standards. Of McDade’s job

performance, Plaintiff testified at her deposition: “She was inept[,] to be frank.”

Plaintiff was instructed to provide McDade with remedial training and to

provide her superiors a synopsis of her training efforts. Aptke and Gray gave Plaintiff a

“document” to guide her training of McDade, but Plaintiff did not describe the

document in detail. Plaintiff understood remedial training to simply mean ongoing

training, given that McDade had already had her “official training” in Springfield upon

starting in Decatur.

Plaintiff could not provide the training to McDade without coming within six

feet of her. Plaintiff did not provide the type of remedial training requested in the

spring/summer of 2020 because she was scared of COVID-19. Instead, she provided

training and instruction to McDade by answering her questions or correcting her

mistakes as they arose. In doing so, Plaintiff attempted to stay six feet or more away

from McDade. Nevertheless, on occasions that it was absolutely necessary, she did

come within six feet of McDade in the spring and summer of 2020.

At some subsequent point, Aptke and Gray talked to Plaintiff again about the

training they were requiring her to conduct with McDade. It was after this conversation

that Plaintiff requested that her doctor inform Defendant of her medical condition.1

1 At Plaintiff’s deposition, counsel suggested that the conversation with Aptke

and Gray occurred on August 28, 2020. While Plaintiff could not recall the exact date of

the conversation, she did not take exception to the date suggested by counsel. The court

notes that the August 28 date would align with the September 1 letter from Plaintiff’s

doctor discussed below.

Plaintiff testified at her deposition that the most senior person working under

her at the Monticello office was Linda Downing. Plaintiff believed Downing’s job title

was Customer Service Representative. Downing’s job description did not include

providing, arranging for, or supervising the training of other employees. Nevertheless,

Plaintiff testified that, at some point during the pandemic, she “arranged for the most

senior person who did not have any medical issues and was willing to help train

[McDade]. It says in the union contract that a senior employee may do so. So I had

carried out my responsibilities.”

Plaintiff’s Condition and Her Request for Accommodation

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation,

the only medical condition relevant to her instant cause of action. Her atrial fibrillation

did not prohibit her from training other employees before the onset of the pandemic.

On September 1, 2020, Plaintiff’s cardiologist, Dr. Abraham Kocheril, wrote

a letter to Defendant asking it to excuse Plaintiff from “close contact or training other

employees to avoid the Covid 19 infection,” citing her cardiac history. At the time that

Dr. Kocheril wrote this letter, he was concerned that Plaintiff was at greater risk of

suffering complications related to COVID-19 than an average working-age healthy

person, particularly in light of how highly transmissible COVID-19 was, especially for

people that were indoors and in close contact with one another. He believed that

Plaintiff should be restricted from performing any job functions that required her to be

within six feet of others while at work. While Defendant’s COVID-19 protocols allowed

employees to be within six feet of others if they wore a mask, Dr. Kocheril, citing the

relative unavailability of N95 masks at the time, wanted to make sure that Plaintiff

maintained a six-foot distance at all times.

On September 3, 2020, Defendant emailed Plaintiff in response to Dr. Kocheril’s

letter. The email stated: “Based on the duties of your position as the Drivers Facility

Manager I at the Monticello Drivers Facility, you will need to submit a Request for

Reasonable Accommodation and provide more information, i.e., what is considered

close contact, can you perform drive exams, can you continue other duties of this

position in relation to day-to-day customer service?” Plaintiff was encouraged to

complete the attached form with her physician.

Plaintiff submitted a Request of Reasonable Accommodation form on September

11, 2020. Her description of the accommodation being requested read, in full: “Due to

Covid 19 and 6 [foot] social distancing, I am requesting to not train as if ‘new employee’

until SOS restrictions are removed.”2

In a portion of the Request form filled out by Dr. Kocheril (or his nurse), it is

written: “Patient is able to perform all essential function except H-53” due to COVID-19

safety precautions. “H-53” is a reference to section H.53 of the ADA Job Requirements

Questionnaire, discussed above. Section H.53 contemplates “[e]xposure to infection

(germs, bacteria, viruses, etc.) (This question refers to a risk greater than the risk to the

2 The confusing language employed here—“as if ‘new employee’”—is never

directly addressed by the parties. However, some light is shed on the matter in a later

letter written by Plaintiff, in which she writes, presumably referencing McDade, “I have

been directed to start over again and train as if she were a new hire[.]”

average person.).” Dr. Kocheril recalled at his deposition that he had reviewed the ADA

Job Requirements Questionnaire in filling out Plaintiff’s Request form. He agreed that

the portion of the Request form referencing section H-53 should be read as stating:

“Patient is able to perform all essential functions except exposure to infection, such as

germs, bacteria, viruses, et cetera that is a risk greater than the risk to the average

person due to COVID-19 safety precautions.” Dr. Kocheril believed that “[i]f [Plaintiff]

had to be within that 6 feet for any significant length of time, that would be a concern. It

would be better avoided.”

On September 16, 2020, Roth sent Plaintiff a letter indicating that the Department

of Driver Services determined that it was unable to accommodate Plaintiff’s request,

and that the Reasonable Accommodation Committee agreed with decision. Citing Dr.

Kocheril’s concerns, Roth wrote that “we . . . cannot guarantee a [sic] environment void

of germs, bacteria or viruses.” The letter continued:

Due to this decision, it will be necessary for you to immediately leave your work

location. Since your physician has indicated that these restrictions are considered

to be temporary in nature, you have the option to apply for a leave of absence

(forms enclosed) or you may choose to submit a resignation to our office.

Beginning immediately, you will be required to utilize your accrued benefit time

for these absences.

In closing, the letter provided a fax number, in the event that Dr. Kocheril wished to

submit additional medical documentation.

On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff submitted two forms—titled “Leave of Absence

Request/Extension/Medical” and “Medical Leave Certification”—requesting leave

under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The latter form was filled out by

Dr. Kocheril. On that form, one question asked: “Will the patient be incapacitated for a

continuous period of time due to this medical condition?” Dr. Kocheril checked the box

corresponding to “No.” The box immediately below states: “During the continuous

absence — check one:” and Dr. Kocheril checked the line corresponding to the

following proposition: “Employee is temporarily disabled and unable to perform one or

more of the essential functions of his/her position.” Elsewhere in the medical form, Dr.

Kocheril noted that Plaintiff’s atrial fibrillation could result in “flair ups [sic] 1-2 times

per month lasting 1-2 days per episode.” The Medical Leave Certification only concerns

Plaintiff’s atrial fibrillation—it contains no reference to COVID-19 or Plaintiff’s risk of

infection.

On October 5, 2020, Roth sent another letter to Plaintiff. Roth stated that his office

had received Plaintiff’s request for sporadic FMLA leave, but observed that the “request

did not mention the concerns presented in the September 16, 2020[,] correspondence

from our office.” Roth added: “The additional documents received in response to our

letter, do not retract nor change any of the restrictions previously submitted by your

physician, therefore the action required of you by this office will remain the same.”

On October 14, 2020, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendant expressing confusion as

to why she had been given ADA paperwork, vehemently insisting that she was not

disabled, and explaining that Dr. Kocheril would not request a leave of absence for that

very reason. Plaintiff also sought clarification as to why she could not simply arrange

for some other employee, one without health issues, to train McDade.

On October 19, 2020, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff reiterating that in the

absence of new medical documentation from a physician, the determination that she

could not return to work and would need to apply for a leave of absence was

unchanged.

Continued Correspondence and Plaintiff’s Return to Work

On November 20, 2020, Defendant sent a letter to an attorney retained by

Plaintiff, responding to his written request that her position be reinstated. Defendant

explained that regardless of her request to have someone else train employees in her

stead, Plaintiff’s job status was in question due to the physician’s order that she may not

have close contact with any employees nor be exposed to infection, explaining that her

job required her to interact with both customers and co-workers that at times

necessitated close contact, and that Defendant could not guarantee a work environment

entirely free from germs, bacteria, or other viruses. Defendant again informed Plaintiff

that she could submit additional documentation from her physician.

On January 21, 2021, through her counsel, Plaintiff submitted a letter dated the

same day from Dr. Kocheril, in which Dr. Kocheril advised that Plaintiff was “released

for return to work, performing her standard job duties. She is able to be around others

(co-workers or members of the public) for short periods of time, but prolonged close

exposure should be avoided. Once she has received the COVID-19 vaccine, these

restrictions will be lifted.”

On January 25, 2021, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff requesting additional

clarification regarding some of the terms used by Dr. Kocheril, specifically as to the

terms “short periods of time,” “prolonged exposure,” and whether the Plaintiff had

made an appointment to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.

On February 10, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel advised Defendant that Plaintiff had

received her first of two COVID-19 vaccination shots.

On February 11, 2021, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter advising that, based upon

the then-existing Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) guidelines, a patient was not

fully inoculated from the virus with the first shot, and as a result, she could not return

to work at that time. The letter requested that her physician provide further information

if he felt differently.

On March 10, 2021, Plaintiff’s attorney provided documentation showing

Plaintiff had received her second vaccination on that date.

On March 12, 2021, Defendant sent an email to Plaintiff’s attorney requesting

clarification as to whether Dr. Kocheril was allowing her to return to work immediately

after receiving the second vaccination or two weeks following the second dose, as

recommended by the CDC. Plaintiff’s counsel responded the same day, confirming that

the doctor agreed that two weeks following the second dose was the appropriate date to

return.

On March 16, 2021, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter advising her that based upon

the medical documentation provided, she was permitted to return to work on March 24,

2021. Plaintiff did return to work on that date.

Plaintiff’s Declaration

A Declaration (#25-2) signed by Plaintiff on June 5, 2025, is attached to her

Response. Therein, she states: “There is training required for new employees and that

can be formal or informal. The training can be performed by me or by someone else.

[Defendant] provides for new employee training in Springfield. They also have trainers

who come to the individual facilities to provide for training.” Plaintiff continues: “At

the Monticello location we had two employees, Linda and Lori, who had trained, were

capable of training, and were willing to train employees. They were both Public Service

Representatives. Lori had been assisting in training Crystal McDade and others prior to

Covid.”

Plaintiff further explains in her Declaration that McDade was not a new

employee when she started at the Monticello office; she had received full, formal

training at her prior position in Decatur. Thus, what McDade needed was informal

training. Plaintiff states that at the time she was “asked to leave,” McDade had not been

provided this informal training, and that “[d]uring the period of time that I was forced

out of the office, no one else was brought in to train [her].”

The Collective Bargaining Agreement

Plaintiff has also attached to her Response the Collective Bargaining Agreement

(“CBA”) (#25-1) between Defendant and the Service Employees International Union

Local No. 73 that was in effect at the time in question. Section 38.4.4 of the CBA states

that “Employees who are placed in positions identified by management as Trainer

positions shall receive additional compensation over their regular rate of pay of

seventy-five dollars ($75) per month.” The CBA is silent as to what “Trainer positions”

consist of, who may be put in such positions, or by whom employees may be placed in

such positions.

The CBA explicitly lists—at pages 1 through 3—the positions within the

“Clerical Bargaining Unit” to whom the agreement applies. “Customer Service

Representative” is not listed among those positions. “Public Service Representative” is

listed.

ANALYSIS

Although not apparent on the face of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff explains

in her Response that she has actually brought three discrete claims under the ADA: (1)

she was denied the reasonable accommodation of not having to train employees; (2)

Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her disability when it forced her

into a leave of absence in September 2020; and (3) Defendant discriminated against her

again when it would not allow her to return to work after Dr. Kocheril cleared her in his

letter dated January 21, 2021.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to liability on at least the first two of

these claims—the notion that Defendant engaged in a separate discrete act of

discrimination after January 21, 2021, is not addressed in her Motion. Defendant moves

for summary judgment on whatever ADA claims Plaintiff has raised on the grounds

that, inter alia, Plaintiff was not able to perform the essential functions of her job, and

was thus not entitled to ADA protections.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, a district court is tasked with deciding, based on

the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.

Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment

is appropriate only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a

verdict in the nonmovant’s favor. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).

In making this determination, the court must construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014). In other

words, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

However, the court’s favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing

inferences that are only supported by speculation or conjecture. Fischer v. Avanade, Inc.,

519 F.3d 393, 401 (7th Cir. 2008). In addition, this court “need not accept as true [the

non-moving party’s] characterization of the facts or [their] legal conclusion.” Nuzzi v.

Nguyen, 2009 WL 1409703, at *8 (C.D. Ill. May 20, 2009) (emphasis in original).

The party opposing summary judgment may not rely on the allegations

contained in the pleadings. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920. “[I]nstead, the nonmovant must

present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal.” Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387

F.3d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment “is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in

a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of

fact to accept its version of events.” Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d

1104, 1111 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th

Cir. 2003)). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must make a

sufficient showing of evidence for each essential element of its case on which it bears

the burden at trial.” Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2007).

“When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, each motion must be

assessed independently[.]” In re Aon Corp. Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 2011 WL

248448, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2011) (citing M. Snower & Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 367,

369 (7th Cir. 1944)). Cross-motions for summary judgment are evaluated under the

ordinary standards for summary judgment. See Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 797 (7th

Cir. 2017).

The ADA

Title I of the ADA provides that no qualifying employer may “discriminate

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application

procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination against a qualified individual on the

basis of disability is defined to include a failure to make “reasonable accommodations

to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Thus,

in order to prove a violation of Title I’s antidiscrimination provisions, a plaintiff must

prove that: (1) she is disabled; (2) she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential

functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the

employer took an adverse job action against her because of her disability or failed to

make a reasonable accommodation. Stevens v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 736

(7th Cir. 2000).

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence from which a

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that she was able to perform the essential

functions of her job—a required element for each of her ADA claims.3

“[T]he essential functions are the ‘fundamental job duties’ of a position, rather

than the position’s ‘marginal functions[.]’ ” Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 807 F.3d

849, 853-54 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)). To determine what constitutes

an essential function of a position, “consideration shall be given to the employer’s

judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a

written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this

3 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot prove that she was disabled and that

it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its employment actions. The court need

not reach these arguments.

description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(8). The Seventh Circuit has identified the followed factors as relevant in

determining whether a particular duty is an essential function: “[1] the employee’s job

description, [2] the employer’s opinion, [3] the amount of time spent performing the

function, [4] the consequences for not requiring the individual to perform the duty, and

[5] past and current work experiences.” Gratzl v. Office of the Chief Judges of the 12th, 18th,

19th, & 22nd Judicial Circuits, 601 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2010).

It is undisputed in this matter that Plaintiff could not train other employees. As

reflected in the opinion of her cardiologist, Plaintiff’s atrial fibrillation put her at greater

risk of complications from COVID-19. For that reason, and because of the then-existing

disparity in access to N95 masks, Dr. Kocheril opined that Plaintiff should be restricted

from performing any job functions that required her to be within six feet of others

while at work. And Plaintiff did not request, nor has she suggested here, an

accommodation that would have allowed her to perform that duty. Rather, Plaintiff’s

requested “accommodation” was that she simply be excused from training others

altogether. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2017) (“If

the proposed accommodation does not make it possible for the employee to perform his

job, then the employee is not a ‘qualified individual’ as that term is defined in the

ADA.”).

The pertinent question then, is whether training was an “essential function” of

her position.

Most of the relevant factors identified by the Seventh Circuit support the

conclusion that training employees was an essential function of Plaintiff’s position.

First, Roth made clear that Defendant’s opinion is that training is an essential function

of the Drivers Facility Manager. Indeed, for what its worth, Plaintiff herself believed

that training was an essential function of her job.

As for the amount of time spent performing the function, Plaintiff testified that

she engaged in training on a “daily basis,” which included “standing next to them and

guiding, and coaching, and directing them, and training them[.]” As Duesterhaus

testified, the training consisted of“[e]verything from opening to closing[.]”

Unquestionably, tasks performed on a daily basis are more likely to be regarded as

essential. See Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 988458, at *19 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2006),

aff’d, 497 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2007) (observing that the requirement of lifting 50 pounds

on a daily basis “demonstrates that lifting is an essential job function”); cf. Dobosz v.

Quaker Chem. Corp., 2016 WL 4376528, at *13 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2016) (“[J]ust because

Dobosz was not required to do some of the physical tasks daily does not mean that the

physical tasks were not essential functions.”).

“Past and current job experiences” is more helpfully defined in the Code of

Federal Regulations as “[t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job” and “[t]he

current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(vi-vii).

Little evidence has been presented on these fronts, but the testimony of Duesterhaus

describing the training responsibilities makes clear that they were not unique to

Plaintiff, but applied to all Drivers Facility Manager I’s generally.

As for Plaintiff’s job description, Defendant points out that training of other

employees is expressly contemplated in the job description for a Drivers Facility

Manager I. Plaintiff raises a dispute, insisting that the job description “does not indicate

that she is personally required to provide training for employees. What it states is

she is to ‘arrange for and/or supervise the training of employees.’”

In making this argument, of course, Plaintiff has conveniently omitted a key

word; the job description states that a Drivers Facility Manager I “provides, arranges for

and/or supervises the training of employees as directed or needed.” (Emphasis added).

Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the job description clearly contemplates that she

might be directed or needed to personally provide training—just as she was in this

instance by Aptke and Gray. That Plaintiff might also, or separately, be directed or

needed to instead arrange for training, or supervise training, does not change that fact.

Again, Plaintiff testified that she herself provided training to her employees on a

regular basis.

Further, aside from Plaintiff’s own job description, the court finds it relevant that

no training obligations appeared in the job descriptions of anyone else who worked in

the Monticello office. The importance of training in any workplace is self-evident, and

the fact that training obligations did not appear in the job description of any other

Monticello office employee tends to suggest it was an essential function of Plaintiff’s

position.

Among the relevant factors guiding an essential function analysis, the only one

for which Plaintiff actually argues she has any favorable evidence is the consequences

for not requiring the individual to perform the duty. She points out that after she was

forced to take a leave of absence, she was not replaced with anyone that trained

McDade in her stead. Thus, she wonders: “If [Plaintiff’s] performance of that duty was

so essential to her job, how could they go for nearly six months without having

someone perform it in her absence? The fact that no one was brought in to perform that

job and temporarily replace [Plaintiff] is further evidence that this was not an essential

function that required [Plaintiff’s] performance.”4

Defendant first observes that it is entirely unclear how Plaintiff would have any

personal knowledge of what happened at the Monticello office while she was gone. This

point is well-taken. “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion

must be made on personal knowledge [and] set out facts that would be admissible in

evidence[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). “A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence

is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of

the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. While “[e]vidence to prove personal knowledge may

consist of the witness’s own testimony,” no such evidence has been provided here. In

4 Plaintiff’s argument on this point derives entirely from the following excerpt

from her Declaration: “During the period of time that I was forced out of the office, no

one else was brought into train Crystal McDade.” Defendant asks the court to disregard

Plaintiff’s Declaration entirely under the sham affidavit rule. Out of an abundance of

caution, the court is inclined to consider the Declaration. In any event, the specific

excerpt in question—regarding the lack of replacement training—does not contradict

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, nor is it such a significant or critical fact that its

omission from Plaintiff’s deposition is indicative of bad faith.

short, Plaintiff does not appear to have any competent evidence concerning what

happened at the Monticello office while she was away.

Even if Plaintiff’s statement is assumed to be admissible, Defendant also

identifies the paradoxical nature of Plaintiff’s argument. That McDade—who was

apparently greatly in need of training—was not trained in the six months that Plaintiff

was away tends to underscore how essential Plaintiff was to performing that task. In

other words, Plaintiff has established that “the consequence[] for not requiring the

individual to perform the duty,” Gratzl, 601 F.3d 674 at 679, was simply that the duty

did not get performed—which does not advance her case. Moreover, to the extent that

Plaintiff is implicitly arguing that training in general was an unessential duty, her

Declaration does not speak to the actual consequences of the six months in which

McDade did not receive training. That is, there has been no indication of what

McDade’s performance was like in that period, or the effect of that performance on the

operations of the Monticello office.

Finally, Defendant argues: “In addition to employee training, the record is clear

that Plaintiff could not perform other essential job functions, either.” Plaintiff’s position

required continuous interactions with the public in an office, and she was required to

administer driver examinations, which involved being inside of a motor vehicle with a

participant well within six feet of one another. Dr. Kocheril’s opinion was that Plaintiff

should be restricted from performing any job functions that required her to be within

six feet of others while at work—an opinion that would seem to prohibit her from

myriad other duties in addition to training.

Defendant’s point is not a post hoc justification for its conduct. On the contrary,

in its initial response to Plaintiff’s request to be excused from training, Defendant

alluded to the fact that Dr. Kocheril’s concerns about social distancing would seem to

apply with equal force to many of Plaintiff’s other job duties, writing: “[C]an you

perform drive exams, can you continue other duties of this position in relation to day-

to-day customer service?” Plaintiff did not answer those questions then, and she does

not now respond to Defendant’s argument. Nor does she otherwise point to any

evidence to suggest that (a) these were not essential functions of her job, or (b) she was

somehow able to do them.5

Plaintiff makes much of the fact that “[t]here were at least two other individuals

who could have provided this training. Furthermore, the collective bargaining

agreement specifically permitted this to occur. It would have cost [Defendant] about $75

per month.”

As an initial matter, the court finds that the CBA does not constitute reliable

evidence from which any reasonable inferences can be drawn. That document, to which

Plaintiff was not a party, references “Employees who are placed in positions identified

by management as Trainer positions[,]” but never defines “Trainer positions,” or

otherwise explains how employees may come to find themselves in such positions. The

5 There is simply no answer in the record as to why Plaintiff requested an

accommodation from training because her atrial fibrillation made it too risky to get

within six feet of other people, even with a mask, but did not need an accommodation

from any of her other duties that also would have surely required her to break social

distancing.

only “Trainer positions” referenced anywhere else in the record were Defendant’s

roving Trainers who worked at multiple facilities, but Plaintiff testified that that

program was suspended during the pandemic. While Plaintiff suggests that assigning

one of the Monticello office’s Public Service Representatives to do training would be as

simple as paying them an extra $75 per month, there is not enough information in the

CBA to draw that conclusion.

That being said, Plaintiff did testify that she had previously arranged for Linda

Downing to assist in training McDade, and added in her Declaration that a “Lori” had

assisted in training as well. Thus, even setting aside the CBA, the court accepts that

others in the Monticello office were capable of conducting training.

That fact, however, does not measurably impact the essential function analysis.

“An employer need not reallocate the essential functions of a job, which a qualified

individual must perform.” Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2001)

(cleaned up). “The fact that restructuring is feasible, in itself, is not persuasive evidence

one way or the other that a function is essential to a job.” Id. at 930 (“Basith’s suggestion

would result in a restructuring of both his job and the jobs of other employees. This is

not required by the ADA.”); see also Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2015)

(“[A]n employer’s ability to assign duties to another employer does not make them

nonessential[.]”); Smith v. Cook Cnty., 2019 WL 1515007, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2019)

(“[T]he possibility that overtime and out-of-shift work obligations could be reassigned

among [other employees] does not make those obligations nonessential.”).

In sum, there is no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude

that the training of employees in her office was not an essential function of Plaintiff’s

position. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was medically unable to do that portion of her

job—and presumably other parts of her job—because they required her to be within six

feet of others, and her atrial fibrillation put her at an increased risk of infection during

the COVID-19 pandemic. ADA protections extend only to “qualified individuals,”

defined in part as people who “can perform the essential functions of” their job. 42

U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8).

Because Plaintiff therefore does not meet the definition of “qualified individual,”

her ADA claims necessarily fail, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#20)

must be GRANTED. See, e.g., Guzman v. Brown Cnty., 2016 WL 7839143, at *7 (E.D. Wis.

Sept. 1, 2016), aff’d, 884 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Having failed to establish that she is a

qualified individual for the purposes of the ADA, Guzman’s ADA claim necessarily

fails and Defendant’s request for summary judgment on Guzman’s ADA claim will be

granted.”). It follows, a fortiori, that Plaintiff’s partial Motion for Summary Judgment

(#21) must be DENIED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

(1) Defendant Illinois Secretary of State’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#[20])

is GRANTED.

(2) Plaintiff Sara Helton’s partial Motion for Summary Judgment (#[21]) is

DENIED.

(3) Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on the claims

contained in the Amended Complaint (#[11]).

(4) This case is terminated.

ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2026.

s/Colin Stirling Bruce

COLIN S. BRUCE

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE