The opinion
Filed 1/20/26; Original opn. filed 12/2/25; certified for pub. 12/26/25; vacated 1/2/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
R.R., II, B339866
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. 24STRO03652,
v. 19STFL04998)
C.R.,
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Dennis F. Hernandez, Commissioner. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Ben Gharagozli for Plaintiff and Appellant.
C.R., in pro. per., for Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
R.R. appeals from the denial of his request for entry of a domestic
violence restraining order (DVRO) against his ex-wife, C.R. He contends the
trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard for abuse and therefore
abused its discretion. We agree. We therefore reverse the court’s order and
remand with directions to the trial court to enter the DVRO.
BACKGROUND
I. Prior Proceedings
R.R. and C.R. were married in 2014. They have one child, son W.R.,
born in 2015. R.R. filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in April 2019,
seeking full custody of W.R. He also requested a temporary emergency order
granting him full custody of W.R., based on C.R.’s recent psychiatric
hospitalization “following her attempt to overdose on her Prozac medication.”
The court denied the emergency request.
The family was referred to the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) in 2019 based on allegations by C.R.
that W.R. had been sexually abused by his paternal grandfather
(grandfather). DCFS ultimately determined those allegations were
inconclusive. In November 2019, DCFS filed a petition in juvenile court
alleging that W.R. was at risk of harm due to C.R.’s mental and emotional
problems, including a diagnosis of psychosis, paranoid and erratic behavior,
and suicidal ideation. DCFS cited C.R.’s April 2019 suicide attempt and
subsequent hospitalization. C.R. told DCFS that she was not trying to kill
herself, rather, she had accidentally overdosed on Prozac. She admitted
having depression and anxiety but denied other mental health issues.
In November 2019, R.R. reported an incident where C.R. was acting
paranoid, claiming that people were chasing her and driving erratically late
at night with W.R. in the car. She refused to cooperate with R.R. or with
police, leading to her detention and a second hospitalization. In December
2019, C.R. began to see a psychiatrist and started taking medication for her
mental condition.
In January 2020, the juvenile court ordered joint legal custody of W.R.
and sole physical custody to R.R., with monitored visitation to C.R. The
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juvenile court also terminated jurisdiction over the matter. In August 2020,
the family court entered a judgment of dissolution. The parties agreed to a
stipulated judgment, including joint legal custody of W.R. and primary
physical custody to R.R., with monitored visitation by C.R., with increased
visitation as approved by C.R.’s psychiatrist. In April 2022, the parties
entered into a stipulated order allowing C.R. unmonitored visitation.
II. DVRO Petition
In May 2024, R.R. filed a request for DVRO against C.R. He alleged
ongoing abuse by C.R. since December 2023 that was “progressively getting
worse.” He also requested a return to professionally monitored visitation for
C.R. due to reoccurring issues with her “severe and untreated mental health
issues.”
R.R. also filed a declaration outlining his allegations of abuse. He
stated that C.R.’s conduct included sitting in her car outside of his home at
all hours of the night and ringing his doorbell incessantly, refusing to leave,
even after he threatened to call the police. He stated that C.R.’s conduct had
worsened over the past six months and she was “now stalking us almost
daily,” putting him in fear for his and W.R.’s safety. He further stated that
C.R. sent him threatening communications after he refused to communicate
with her. According to R.R., he had agreed to unmonitored visitation for C.R.
in mid-2021 after her mental health had stabilized. This arrangement
continued successfully until late 2023, when C.R. “fell back into some sort of
delusional mental state and began stalking and following me incessantly as
well as harassing me via text and calls.”
R.R. detailed multiple specific instances of C.R.’s alleged abuse. In
December 2023, C.R. followed R.R. and W.R. home and entered the residence
without permission, refusing to leave for two hours. She also made
accusations toward R.R.’s parents and grabbed R.R.’s father by the shirt.
W.R. was present and yelled for C.R. to stop. Ultimately, R.R. left with
W.R. and stayed at a hotel.
On March 29, 2024, C.R. followed R.R. home and rang his doorbell
repeatedly. She refused to leave despite his requests that she do so. In early
April, C.R. picked W.R. up from school without notice to R.R. According to
W.R., she was recording him, taking pictures of his body, and asking
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questions about injuries and scratches. She asked W.R. if R.R. was taking
care of him and disparaged R.R. to the child.
On April 29, 2024, R.R. and W.R. were at home sick. C.R. began
texting him incessantly and threatened to call in a welfare check on W.R.
She parked in R.R.’s driveway and refused to leave until W.R. came out and
spoke to her. When R.R. blocked her text messages, she began texting his
parents.
In early May 2024, R.R. detailed several instances in which C.R.
followed R.R. and W.R. to various outings to which she was not invited,
outside of her agreed visitation time with W.R. In one instance she tried to
gain access to the home of a friend where they were spending the afternoon,
and then began video recording, asking W.R. questions, and making
accusations about R.R. being with other women. Another time, she called
R.R. repeatedly from several phone numbers, then appeared at a dinner she
had agreed not to attend. After R.R. left, she texted him “It is not my fault
you follow the devil instead of God.”
On May 11, 2024, C.R. got into R.R.’s car with R.R. and W.R. without
permission and refused to leave. R.R. stated that W.R. was scared of his
mother. C.R. then followed them in her car, pulling up next to R.R.’s car and
threatening to send someone to “inspect” W.R. and ensure there were no
scratches on him.
On May 17, 2024, R.R. alleged that C.R. followed him and W.R. in her
car despite his texts requesting that she stop. She also threatened to
message his boss. That evening, C.R. rang his doorbell incessantly, ignoring
his requests that she stop and leave. She then sat in her car outside his
house for hours and continued to call and text him.
At 5:30 the following morning, R.R. left home to drive W.R. to a soccer
tournament. C.R. followed him from his neighborhood onto the freeway.
Once on the freeway, she “sped up” to pull alongside his vehicle, signaling
him to call her. R.R. exited the freeway to try to lose her, but when he got
back on, he saw C.R. had pulled onto the freeway shoulder. She “continued to
chase after me,” and texted that she would pay his parents a visit. R.R.
attached copies of some of these texts to his declaration as well as evidence of
repeated phone calls, and photos and videos purporting to show C.R. at his
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door and following his car.
The court granted a temporary restraining order against C.R. on May
23, 2024, protecting R.R. and W.R. until the scheduled hearing the following
month. The court retained R.R.’s sole custody over W.R. and ordered
monitored visitation for C.R.
III. C.R.’s Response
C.R. filed a response in propria persona, objecting to the request. She
denied each of the incidents R.R. alleged. She contended that she was fearful
for W.R.’s safety due to past incidents of sexual abuse by grandfather and
physical abuse by father, and explained that she often attempted to “stay
nearby” to W.R. so that she could check on him to ensure he was safe. She
stated that her mental health had been “deeply affected” by past abuse
toward W.R. and R.R.’s domestic violence toward her and she had “sought
help from therapists.”
IV. DVRO Hearing and Ruling
Both parties appeared in propria persona and testified at the hearing
on June 13, 2024.
A. R.R.’s Testimony
R.R. discussed the December 2023 incident when C.R. followed them
into the house and refused to leave despite his repeated requests. He
testified he was fearful because she was “acting in a very erratic and
dangerous manner.” C.R. began recording grandfather with her phone, he
grabbed the phone, and they scuffled as she tried to get it back. R.R. stated
that C.R. grabbed grandfather’s shirt and was “out of control,” and he had to
“step in and break it up.”
R.R. also testified that the evening before she followed him on the
freeway, she rang his doorbell incessantly. Later that evening, the
community watch program reported someone matching C.R.’s description and
car parked near his house for several hours. Early the following morning, as
he drove W.R. to a soccer tournament, C.R. followed him from his
neighborhood and onto the freeway. On the freeway, C.R. pulled next to him,
signaled for him to call her, and tried to “force me to pull over.” He explained
that he was afraid because “when she follows me it gets very erratic,” and
that W.R. was also afraid. In response to questioning by the court, he
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confirmed that she was driving erratically, stating that she “raced up behind
me. And she got very close to my bumper. When I didn’t stop, she pulled up
around side of me signaling me to stop.” He explained that he had evidence
of multiple instances of C.R. ringing his doorbell, refusing to leave, and then
calling and texting “frantically.”
R.R. also highlighted other incidents in May where C.R. followed him
home and rang the doorbell incessantly. She also threatened to contact his
boss, as shown in his text messages from that date. R.R. stated that C.R.
had in fact contacted his work in the past and said, “not so nice things.” He
also noted the incident when she got into his car without permission and
refused to leave. R.R. testified that W.R. was scared and the child asked her
to get out of the car. He outlined other instances where C.R. recorded
W.R. playing with friends outside, followed R.R. and W.R. to social events to
which she was not invited, and threatened to send someone to the house to
inspect W.R. or to harass R.R.’s parents.
The court stated that R.R.’s “allegation is principally the stalking
allegation,” rather than threats to do harm. R.R. told the court that he was
requesting monitored visits until C.R.’s behavior was more stable and her
paranoia was controlled. R.R. explained that he wanted C.R. and W.R. to
have a relationship, but the child had not asked to see C.R. because he
“doesn’t feel safe.” W.R. told R.R., “I don’t want mommy following us. I don’t
want her asking me questions.” R.R. noted that W.R. was affected by C.R.’s
conduct and had begun to have anxiety.
B. C.R.’s Testimony
C.R. provided documents and testified as to her current mental health
status, which she contended was “stable.”1 Regarding R.R.’s allegations, she
1 It appears that the documents C.R. submitted to the trial court,
including letters from mental health providers, are the same documents she
has included in her respondent’s appendix on appeal. As such, we grant
C.R.’s unopposed request to submit an undated Respondent’s Appendix
containing these records. However, C.R. has also included new evidence in
her respondent’s brief, such as photographs of W.R. and statements regarding
events occurring after the hearing at issue. There is nothing in the record to
establish that this evidence was before the family court at the time it made
the ruling at issue, and therefore we cannot consider it. (Reserve Insurance
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acknowledged that she “went to his house many times. Yes. And he didn’t
open the door many times. Yes.” She also admitted that she would knock
and then refuse to leave when he asked. She contended that R.R. stopped
communicating with her and she could not schedule her visits with W.R.
She acknowledged that on the day she followed them on the freeway, it
was not her scheduled visitation time. She testified that she was following
R.R. to confirm that he was taking W.R. to his soccer tournament. She then
continued to follow him so that she could attend the tournament.
The court also questioned C.R. about her mental condition, noting that
her evidence suggested she was receiving treatment for an adjustment
disorder. The court asked whether C.R.’s condition manifested in “obsessive
behavior,” such as the behavior R.R. alleged, and whether “you think those
are as a result of any current medical condition that you’re suffering from?”
C.R. responded that she did not. She then agreed with the court’s summary
of her position that “whatever condition that you’ve been suffering in the
past, they’re [sic] being addressed by therapy. And that at the present
time . . . you’re not exhibiting any symptoms related to your adjustment
disorder.” In response, R.R. again noted C.R.’s past hospitalizations and
evidence of paranoid tendencies and stated that he was scared because
C.R.’s behavior had “taken a very drastic turn over the last several months.”
C. Court’s Findings and Order
The court noted the “serious consequences” of issuing a DVRO. It
stated that R.R. had “certainly presented evidence related to the stalking.
But I guess the question really is, is this kind of circumstance arising from a
medical condition that can be addressed in way [sic] other than this court
issuing a restraining order.”
Finding “abuse” as defined in Family Code, section 6320,2 “[C.R.] has
acknowledged that she has a medical condition that is identified as
adjustment disorder. And that it is being treated via therapy. The condition
Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813 [“It is an elementary rule of
appellate procedure that, when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s
judgment [or order], an appellate court will consider only matters which were
part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.”].)
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
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is under control. And is [sic] not currently suffering from any such
circumstances.” The court concluded that R.R.’s allegations “primarily relate
to conduct where the respondent is seeking to have additional time with their
child. . . .”
The court found that the evidence C.R. was following R.R. was
“inconclusive. As far as this court’s concerned, at least there’s not
preponderance of the evidence, that the stalking via following on the freeway
was an intentional attempt to threaten or otherwise intimidate [R.R.]. The
testimony was to the effect they were going to a tournament and in different
vehicles.” Addressing C.R., the court stated, “it’s clear that you have some
issues you need to deal with. And you need to stay in therapy. You need to
address those issues.”
The court stated it was denying the DVRO for the moment, but
cautioned that “if anything like this happens in the future, that [R.R.] is
welcome to come back to this court and ask for a restraining order because
what he has identified is clearly obsessive behavior. [¶] Behavior that may
well be a result of [C.R.’s] medical condition and may well manifest itself in
different ways.” The court additionally cautioned C.R., “it’s clear that you
need some medical attention,” and advised her to address her issues “before
they manifest themselves in ways that do, in fact, constitute abuse.” The
court told C.R. that “it sounds like much of the conduct here seems to arise
from your condition. And it’s up to you as a responsible adult to get control of
that. [R.R.] has every reason to be concerned for . . . your son’s welfare
because he sees what’s going on. And it affects him too in significant ways.”
R.R. also requested that the court order monitored visits for W.R.’s
safety. The court agreed that “the conduct is sufficiently alarming” and
ordered professional monitoring for W.R.’s visits with C.R.
R.R. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
A. DVRO
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (§ 6200 et. seq.) permits
the trial court to issue a protective order “to restrain any person for the
purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period
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of separation of the persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or
acts of abuse.” (§ 6300.) “Abuse” under the DVPA includes bodily injury
(§ 6203, subd. (a)(1)); reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury
(§ 6203, subd. (a)(3)); and “behavior that has been or could be enjoined
pursuant to Section 6320” (§ 6203 subd. (a)(4)).
Section 6320 in turn permits an order enjoining, in relevant part, a
party from “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, . . .
harassing, telephoning . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or
otherwise, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (a).)
The DVPA further defines “disturbing the peace of the other party” as
“conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental
or emotional calm of the other party. This conduct may be committed directly
or indirectly, . . . and by any method or through any means including, but not
limited to, telephone, online accounts, text messages, internet-connected
devices, or other electronic technologies.” (Id., subd. (c).) This includes
“coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect
unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.
Examples of coercive control include, but are not limited to, unreasonably
engaging in any of the following. . . . [¶] Controlling, regulating, or
monitoring the other party’s movements, communications, daily behavior,
finances, economic resources, or access to services.” (Ibid.)
The DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence. (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220,
226; see also Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 90, fn. 14.) The
trial court must consider “the totality of the circumstances” in determining
whether to grant or deny a DVRO. (§ 6301, subd. (d).)
B. Standard of Review
We review the grant or denial of a request for a DVRO for abuse of
discretion. (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820
(Rodriguez); In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495
(Nadkarni).) However, “the exercise of discretion is not unfettered in such
cases.” (Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 (Nakamura).)
An exercise of discretion must be guided by applicable legal principles,
“which are derived from the statute under which discretion is conferred.
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[Citations.] If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous
understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope
of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the
law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of
improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed
discretion and is subject to reversal.” (Rodriguez, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
p. 820, quoting Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.)
Whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an issue in
exercising its discretion is a question of law, requiring de novo review.
(Rodriguez, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 821, citing Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420–421.) “‘To the extent that we are called upon to
review the trial court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence
standard of review.’” (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 220, 226, quoting In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773,
780.) We “view the whole record in a light most favorable to the judgment,
resolving all evidentiary conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the decision of the trial court.” (Melissa G. v. Raymond M. (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 360, 373–374.)
II. Analysis
R.R. argues the trial court did not properly consider all of his evidence
of abuse when denying his request for a DVRO. Instead, he contends the
court narrowly focused on whether C.R.’s “obsessive” conduct was
intentionally threatening or intimidating, or whether it was caused by her
mental disorder. The record of the hearing supports his contention that the
court did not correctly apply the standard of abuse under the DVPA.
The DVPA includes a wide category of abusive conduct which we
broadly construe in order to accomplish the purpose of the statute. (See
Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498 [finding DVPA has a “protective
purpose” that is “broad both in its stated intent and its breadth of persons
protected”]; Nakamura, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 334.) The statute
expressly encompasses not just physical abuse, but also stalking, harassing,
telephone contact, and conduct that “disturb[s] the peace of the other party,”
which includes acts of coercive control, such as “monitoring the other party’s
movements.” (§ 6320, subds. (a), (c).)
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At the hearing, the court found R.R. had presented evidence of C.R.’s
“clearly obsessive behavior,” as well as “evidence that may well constitute
stalking” as demonstrated by her “incessant following, knocking on doors,
coming to the house, and refusing to leave after numerous requests.”
However, the court concluded that R.R. had not met his burden of proof to
establish abuse, remarking that he had not shown by a preponderance of the
evidence “that the stalking via following on the freeway was an intentional
attempt to threaten or otherwise intimidate” him.
The court’s limited interpretation of the conduct included in the DVPA
was error. For example, in Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pages 1488–
1489, the appellant sought a DVRO to restrain her ex-husband from using
information he obtained after accessing her email account. The ex-husband
had already attached emails to family court filings and the appellant feared
that he would continue to use the emails “to control, harass, and abuse” her.
(Id. at p. 1492.) The trial court denied the application, finding that while the
ex-husband’s “conduct may very well be illegal, . . . I don’t think that it rises
to the level of conduct that is amenable to the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act.” (Id. at p. 1493.) The appellate court reversed. The court found that the
“plain meaning of the phrase ‘disturbing the peace’ in section 6320 may
include, as abuse within the meaning of the DVPA, a former husband’s
alleged conduct in destroying the mental or emotional calm of his former wife
by accessing, reading and publicly disclosing her confidential emails.” (Id. at
p. 1498; see also Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 398–
399 (Perez) [respondent’s post-breakup phone calls and texts, despite
petitioner’s requests that they stop, were a disturbance of petitioner's peace
and therefore abuse under DVPA]; Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1140, 1146 [unannounced and uninvited visits and repeated
contacts by phone, e-mail, and text, despite requests of no contact,
“disturb[ed] the peace” and constituted abuse].)
Indeed, as this court previously explained, “[t]he law does not permit
courts to make a distinction between physical and non-physical abuse when
issuing DVROs. . . . [S]talking and other controlling behaviors are more than
just useful predictors of future physical harm. They cause significant
psychological damage on their own.” (G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
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413, 425 (G.G.).) In G.G., the issue before the court was whether to renew a
DVRO. The court (the same judicial officer who presided in this case) denied
the petition, finding that the petitioner had presented “evidence of stalking”
but not “intentional causing of fear” by the respondent. (Id. at p. 424.) This
court reversed, finding that the trial court’s decision “was predicated on the
absence of intentional violations of the initial order. Use of such a narrow
focus prevented the court from exercising its discretion.” (Id. at p. 427, citing
Perez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 398.)
The trial court employed a similarly narrow focus here and therefore
failed to appropriately exercise its discretion when considering the totality of
the circumstances. The court’s comments indicate that it largely found R.R.
credible, but it nevertheless ignored his evidence of C.R.’s escalating
behavior, including relentless calling, texting, and ringing his doorbell,
waiting in his neighborhood for hours, following and/or chasing him in her
car while driving erratically, entering his home and car without permission
and refusing to leave, and threatening to harass his work and parents if he
did not comply with her demands. R.R. testified repeatedly that this conduct
scared him and W.R. He also provided support for his testimony with copies
of text messages, phone logs showing missed calls, photos and videos.
Additionally, although she testified as to a more innocuous motive, C.R. did
not dispute much of her behavior alleged by R.R., including that she
repeatedly called and texted him, came to his home and rang the doorbell,
refused to leave when asked, and followed him in her car.
Although the court recognized that C.R.’s conduct affected R.R. and
W.R. in “significant ways,” it nevertheless found the conduct did not rise to
the level of abuse. The court’s findings that R.R. had established C.R.’s
obsessive behavior and stalking, which significantly affected R.R. and his
child and were “sufficiently alarming” to require professional monitoring for
her visitation, are contrary to its finding that there was insufficient evidence
of abuse under the DVPA. Instead, the court focused on C.R.’s intent, as
reflected in its questioning and comments regarding whether C.R.’s conduct
was caused by her mental condition and its admonition that she continue to
seek treatment. As it had in G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 427, the court
erroneously relied on its finding that C.R. did not have a malicious intent and
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ignored the substantial evidence of her conduct that qualifies as abuse under
the DVPA. Notably, R.R. presented evidence of C.R.’s abusive conduct for the
six months prior to the DVRO hearing, including less than a month before
the hearing.
R.R. was not required under the DVPA to show that C.R. intended to
threaten or intimidate him. (G.G., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 427.) Nor
was he required to establish a probability of future abuse, as section 6300
permits the court to issue a DVRO upon “reasonable proof of a past act or
acts of abuse.” (Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 783; see also
Nakamura, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 334 [“A trial court is vested with
discretion to issue a protective order under the DVPA simply on the basis of
an affidavit showing past abuse.”].)
By misapplying the applicable law when deciding whether to issue a
DVRO, the trial court abused its discretion. (Rodriguez, supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at p. 820.) Moreover, the court failed to properly consider the
totality of circumstances. Indeed, apart from its consideration of C.R.’s
mental state, the court did not identify any countervailing evidence that
would weigh against the DVRO. As such, based on largely uncontradicted
evidence of past abuse, which the court found to be “alarming,” the evidence
presented at the hearing permitted only one reasonable conclusion—R.R.
met his burden of proof for entry of the DVRO. We therefore reverse the
order.
DISPOSITION
The order denying R.R.’s application for a DVRO is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to grant R.R.’s
application and enter the DVRO requested. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J.
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