Cruz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN ANTONIO CRUZ, :

Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-665

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

ULL! KLEMM, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court in this prisoner civil rights case is

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons set forth

below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, John Antonio Cruz, filed this case on April 8, 2025, and the

court received and docketed his complaint on April 15, 2025. (Doc. 1).

According to the complaint, Cruz is a member of the Jewish faith who follows

a Kosher diet. (/d. 98-9). He was committed to the custody of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in 2016 and is currently

housed in SCl-Benner Township. (/d.)

Cruz was scheduled to observe Passover in April 2023 on the DOC’s

roster of inmates observing the holiday. (/d. 911). On April 2, 2023, Cruz met

with SCl-Benner Township’s chaplain, Chaplain Hansard, who purportedly

instructed him that no food for the ceremonial meal would be made available

for purchase and that only food from the regular institutional menu would be

available. (/d. 911). The complaint alleges that the food available on the

institutional menu is not Kosher and therefore would violate the tenets of

Cruz’s faith. (/d.) Cruz sent a request to Hansard requesting that Kosher food

be provided for the observance of Passover. (/d.)

On April 13, 2023, Cruz and other members of the Jewish faith met

with defendant Ulli Klemm, the DOC’s religious services aaiministrator, to

discuss recent policy changes regarding meals for religious observances.

(Id. 9/4, 12). Klemm stated that he was aware that the Jewish religion

required adherents to eat certain foods during certain holidays, but allegecily

stated that he would not arrange for these foods to be mace available. (/d.

4/13). Klemm purportedly stated that denying Jewish inméte:s’ request for

food on certain holidays was necessary because other religious groups

would likely request specific meals for specific religious holidays if their

request was granted. (/d.) Kiemm also allegedly told Cruz thiat his lawyers

were “better” than Cruz’s lawyers and that Cruz should sue him if he disliked

the policy. (/d.) The complaint alleges that the DOC’s polcie2s concerning

religious meals have been changed multiple times since this conversation,

but that none of the changes have provided the meals necessary for Jewish

inmates to practice their religious holidays. (/d. ]14).

The complaint alleges violations of the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) and the First Amendment. (/d. 116).

Cruz names as defendants Klemm and Laurel Harry, the DOC’s secretary.

(Id. at 1-2). He sues both defendants in both their individual and official

capacities. (/d.) Cruz seeks an injunction requiring the DOC to provide

Jewish inmates religious meals on six specific holidays: Shabbath, Pesach,

Shabu’oth, Yom Te’Urah, the evening after Yom Kippur, and Sukkoth. (/d.

4/17). He also seeks punitive damages and declaratory relief. (/d. 918-19).

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint along with a

supporting brief on August 19, 2025. (Docs. 15-16). Defendants assert six

arguments for dismissal: (1) that all official capacity claims against them

should be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity; (2) that all official

capacity claims for money damages should be dismissed on the basis of

qualified immunity; (3) that all individual capacity claims should be dismissed

for failure to allege personal involvement; (4) that all individual capacity

claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted; (5) that all claims for monetary damages should be dismissed

because Cruz has not alleged any physical injury; and (6) that all individual

capacity claims for damages under RLUIPA should be dismissed because

RLUIPA does not permit such claims. (Doc. 16). Cruz filed an opposition brief

on November 30, 2025, which the court received and docketed on December

10, 2025. (Doc. 19). Defendants have not filed a reply brief. The motion to

dismiss is accordingly ripe for judicial review.

ll. © LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true,

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to tre plaintiff, and

determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the

plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210 (3d Cir. 2009 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 FF.3d 224, 231

(3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and dettailed factual

allegations are not required, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 55) U.S. 544, 555

(2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” /d. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer dosssibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and conclusions” are not

enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is not bound to accept as

true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” /d.

In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court thus conducts “a two-part

analysis.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, the court separates the factual

elements from the legal elements and disregards the legal conclusions. /d.

at 210-11. Second, the court determines “whether the facts alleged in the

complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for

relief.” /d. at 211 (quotations omitted).

Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants.

Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

B. Constitutional Claims

Cruz’s constitutional claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 authorizes redress for violations of constitutional rights and

provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory .. .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress....

42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, to establish a successful claim under Section 1983,

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by

a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). Section 1983 does

not create a substantive right, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights conferred by the United States Constitution and the federal

statutes that it describes. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (19779).

Ill. Discussion

A. Official Capacity Claims

Defendants first seek dismissal of all claims brougtt agiainst them in

their official capacity on the basis of sovereign immunity. (Dor. 16 at 4-5).

Cruz argues that defendants are not entitled to sovereign imrnunity to the

extent he seeks injunctive relief ordering defendants to cease ongoing

violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 19 at 6-8). He atnitronally argues

that his suit is allowed because the government has waiwed sovereign

immunity under RLUIPA. (/d.)

To the extent Cruz seeks damages for his constitutional claims from

defendants in their official capacities, these claims are barred by sovereign

immunity. DOC employees sued in their official capacities are entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from claims for

damages brought pursuant to Section 1983. Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs.,

968 F.3d 299, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2020).

Defendants are also entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent Cruz

seeks damages for violation of RLUIPA. States retain their sovereign

immunity from claims for damages under RLUIPA. Sossaman v. Texas, 563

U.S. 277, 293 (2011). The official capacity and RLUIPA damages claims will

accordingly be dismissed.

Cruz’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, however, are not

barred by sovereign immunity. “[T]he Ex Parte Young doctrine allows suits

... for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official

capacities.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 234 (2023) (citing Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 159-61 (1908)).

B. Official Capacity Damages Claims

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from

Cruz’s official capacity damages claims. This argument is meritless. “[T]he

doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials acting only in their individual

capacities” and does not apply to official capacity claims.’ W.B. Matula, 67

F.3d 484, 499 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472-73

(1985)), abrogated in nonrelevant part by A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schs.,

486 F.3d 791, 795-99 (3d Cir. 2007).?

C. Individual Capacity Claims — Personal Involvement

Defendants next seek dismissal of Cruz’s individual capacity claims for

failure to allege personal involvement. (Doc. 16 at 6-8). A defendant cannot

be liable for a violation of a plaintiff's civil rights unless the defendant was

personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d

280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). The defendant’s personal involvement cannot be

based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845

F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, for a supervisor to be liable for the

actions of a subordinate, there must be allegations of personal direction or

actual knowledge and acquiescence. /d.

1 As noted above, defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity from

the official capacity damages claims.

2 Although defendants’ argument might be charitably read as asserting

qualified immunity with respect to Cruz’s individual capacity claims if the

invocation of the official capacity claims is viewed as a typographical error,

the court will not grant defendants this liberal construction in light of Cruz’s

status as a pro se litigant. An argument that defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity from official capacity claims simply does not give a pro se

litigant sufficient notice that qualified immunity with respect to individual

capacity claims may also be at issue.

Personal involvement may also be pleaded through allegations that a

supervisory defendant “established and maintained a policy, practice or

custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Santiago v.

Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A.M. ex rel.

J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.

2004)). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a policy

or practice and allege that: “(1) the existing policy or practice created an

unreasonable risk of . . . injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the

unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk;

and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or practice.” Beers-Capitol v.

Wheizel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d

1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)).

In this case, Cruz alleges that defendants have promulgated and

enforced various religious meals policies that have disallowed the religious

meals necessary for him to practice his Jewish faith. (Doc. 1). The court finds

this sufficient to allege personal involvement. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129

n.5; Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 134. Although the allegations against

defendant Harry in this respect are sparse, Cruz alleges that as the secretary

of the DOC, Harry “is charged with the final word in the policy making

process” and “approved the policy concerning the religious food items

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necessary for the ceremonial and ritual observance of the Plaintiff's Hebrew

religion.” (Doc. 1 at 2). Liberally construed, this is sufficient to allege Harry’s

personal involvement in the alleged civil rights violations.

D. Individual Capacity Claims — Merits

Defendants also seek dismissal of Cruz’s individual capacity claims for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 16 at 8-10).

Cruz's claims are grounded in the First Amendment and RLUIPA. The

First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S.

CONST. amend. I. It offers protection for a wide variety of expressive

activities, which are lessened, but not extinguished, in the prison context,

where legitimate penological interests must be considered in assessing the

constitutionality of official conduct. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

Although prisoners must be afforded “reasonable opportunities” to exercise

the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, Cruz v. Beto,

405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (per curiam), imprisonment necessarily results

in restrictions on some constitutional rights, including the First Amendment

right to the free exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-

49 (1987). Only beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature

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are entitled to constitutional protection. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,

215-19 (1972); Dehart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).

Once it is established that the individual has a belief that is “both

sincerely held and religious in nature,” the Turner test must be applied to

determine whether the curtailment at issue is reasonably related to

penological interests. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. Specifically, Turner instructs

courts to weigh the following four factors in determining the reasonableness

of a challenged prison regulation: (1) whether there is “a valid, rational

connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental

interest put forward to justify it”; (2) whether there are alternative means of

exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) the impact that

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and

other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4)

whether there are “ready alternatives” available “that fully accommodate the

prisoner's right at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Turner, 482

U.S. at 89-91; O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-52.

The most important prong of the Turner analysis requires a rational

connection between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest that

justifies it. Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 2003). “According to

Turner, a regulation will be sustained unless, ‘the logical connection between

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the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy

arbitrary or irrational.” /d. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).

RLUIPA provides additional protection for the religious rights of

incarcerated individuals beyond that provided by the First Amendment. Holt

v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). Under RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall

impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in

or confined to an institution, ... even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of

the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1(a). “A plaintiff bears the initial

burden of proving that a prison policy ‘implicates his religious exercise.”

Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 425 (2022) (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 360).

If the plaintiff makes such a showing, “the burden flips and the government

must ‘demonstrate that imposition of the burden on that person’ is the least

restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” /d.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1(a)).

In this case, the court finds Cruz’s allegations that defendants have

promulgated religious meals policies that directly bar him from obtaining the

meals necessary to practice his religion sufficient to allege violations of both

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the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Whether the policies ultimately comply

with the First Amendment and RLUIPA are fact questions that cannot be

resolved without a developed record. The court will accordingly deny the

motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims.

E. Damages

Finally, defendants argue that Cruz may not recover damages under

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) because he has not alleged a

physical injury. (Doc. 16 at 10-11). Although defendants are correct that the

PLRA bars compensatory damages in a prisoner civil rights case unless the

plaintiff has suffered a physical injury, see 42 U.S.C. §1997e(e), Cruz seeks

only punitive damages in this case and does not reques: c:‘ompensatory

damages. (Doc. 1 at 5). Punitive damages are not barred by the PLRA’s

physical injury rule. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (Sd ‘Cir. 2000).°

F. Leave to Amend

Before dismissing a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, a district court must perrnit a curative

amendment unless the amendment would be inequitable or {futile. Phillips,

3 Defendants also seek to bar Cruz from recovering damiages for his

RLUIPA claims. (Doc. 16 at 11). The court need not address t his argument

because, as noted above, defendants are entitled to sovereigr’ immunity

from Cruz's RLUIPA damages claims.

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515 F.3d at 245. The court will deny leave to amend as futile because the

dismissed claims fail as a matter of law. The case will accordingly proceed

to discovery on plaintiffs original complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant in part and deny in part

defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismiss plaintiff's complaint to the extent it

seeks damages from defendants in their official capacities or for violation of

RLUIPA, require defendants to answer plaintiff's complaint with respect to all

other claims, and impose a case management schedule to govern this case.

An appropriate order shall issue.

oe Mannion

United es District Judge

Deon foe

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